


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The Oxford Church Bible Commentary

THE BOOK OF WISDOM

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

EDITED BY

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NEW YORK

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1913

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P R E F A C E

‘WHEN will the learned man appear,’ asks Harnack, speaking of the Apocrypha, ‘who will at length throw light upon these writings?’ The answer, so far as concerns the Book of Wisdom, is ‘Never.’ No learned man will ever be able to explain the mind of an author who did not know it himself. Such attempts have been made in respect of modern writers, and the result has been unsatisfactory. With regard to the ‘Wisdom of Solomon,’ the time of theories is past. They must still be chronicled, but they are never final. All that remains is to secure a rational exegesis, for which much has yet to be done.

For such exegesis Grimm’s admirable Commentary must always be the foundation. For the summary of the views of previous critics, for the collection of parallel and illuminative passages, and for rational explanation of difficulties, the work stands by itself. Yet it has its faults. Far too little attention is paid to the last chapters of the book, which are indeed generally neglected as of little philosophical interest. Theologically, as a matter of fact, and as representing a distinctly Egypto-Hebraic point of view of God’s Providence, they are infinitely more interesting than the first part, and that they were full of difficulty even for ancient readers is shown by the

number of variations of interpretation in the versions, far more numerous than in the earlier chapters. Yet these are almost entirely neglected by Grimm, who does not even notice the strange aberrations (or paraphrases) of the Peshitto-Syriac. Moreover, the number of his false citations is amazing. In many cases this is probably due to the printer's error, but not always¹; the present editor has collected upwards of seventy such mistakes—a warning that the book must be treated with the greatest caution in this respect.

The present editor had purposed, and did to a certain extent execute, a careful study of the older commentators enumerated in Mr. Deane's Bibliography of 'Wisdom.' He quickly found that, with the exception of the merely homiletic writers, there were few indeed whose conclusions had not been briefly and acutely summarised by Grimm. Exception must be made in the case of Holkot, whose merits are hereafter discussed, and whose works Grimm seems to have as a rule neglected. Nor is he quite fair to the brilliantly original work of Bretschneider, among later critics. But with the writings called forth by the famous German 'Apokryphenfrage' (which often contained a good deal more than mere polemic) he was thoroughly acquainted, and gives us the results.

Grimm's work, in the form of a judicious adaptation (at times a translation), was presented to English readers by Dr. Farrar in the *Speaker's Commentary*. He added to it much illustration from modern and especially English sources, and, best of all, he supplemented his author's

¹ E.g. on 14⁷, after enumerating passages, quite correctly, where ξύλον means the cross of Christ, Grimm subjoins Acts 16²⁴, where it means 'the stocks.'

jejune notes on the last ten chapters so effectively that he is cited by modern German critics (under the name of 'Wace'!) as an independent authority. Unhappily Dr. Farrar did not verify Grimm's references,¹ and he quoted books which he had never seen. Yet at the time of its appearance (1888), and for long after, his work was far the best available for English students. In many respects it is so still.

A few years before the appearance of the *Speaker's Commentary*, in 1881, Mr. Deane had published his elaborate edition of the Old Latin, the Greek Text, and the Authorised Version. To this work, with its full citations from the Fathers and its commonsense way of dealing with difficulties, the editor must acknowledge his great indebtedness. Mr. Deane's estimate of Philo's philosophy, in his Introduction, is severe; but no one who has had to read through the hazy and often contradictory lucubrations of the old Alexandrian will deny that it is to some extent deserved. On the other hand, he speaks too slightly of Bissell's American edition of the Apocrypha, which certainly contains some remarkable interpretations,² but of which the greatest fault is certainly not that it 'seems to be chiefly a compilation from

¹ A single instance may suffice. Grimm on Wisdom 14⁶ quoted the famous 'Illi robur et aes triplex' as from the *second* ode of Horace, Book I. (the equally famous 'Jam satis terris'). Farrar copies the error! As to the second charge: he cites Noack (Introd., 413 n.) as saying that 'Apollos wrote (Wisdom) with the help of St. Paul.' Now Noack's point is to prove the antagonism between Apollos and St. Paul. For other instances see the notes.

Siegfried in *Hast. D. B.*, iv. 931^a, cites the works of Farrar and Deane as 'recent English translations.' Both adopt the Authorised Version as their text.

² E.g. 15¹⁸.

German sources.' Dr. Bissell's 'Introductions' are often excellent.

Quite recently there has appeared a small edition of the Book of Wisdom, with Introduction and Notes by Mr. J. A. F. Gregg. Nominally part of the Cambridge Series 'for Schools and Colleges,' this little book really embodies, especially in the Introduction, some of the most valuable results of modern criticism. The notes are excellent in respect of exegesis, but from the necessary limitations imposed on such a work do not deal with many questions which are here discussed.

The edition of 'Wisdom' by the late Father Cornely (Paris, 1910), revised by Zorell, appeared just in time to be utilised by the present editor. It contains undoubtedly the best commentary which has yet been published. The writer is distinguished both for his lucidity of thought and the candour of his statements. He is by no means wedded, like so many of his predecessors, to the Latin version (cf. his notes on 17⁴, 18¹), and he does not hesitate to adopt the opinions of 'Acatholici' when they appear the better, citing the English version at times with approval. His knowledge of the early commentators is superior even to that of Grimm.

He has, however, his limitations. Apart from the onerous task, imposed on all members of his church, of defending the canonicity of the book, and to that end explaining away the blunders of Pseudo-Solomon, he exhibits certain idiosyncrasies. He holds to the idea that the picture of the persecuted Righteous Man in chap. 2 refers distinctly to the suffering Christ, and he refuses to acknowledge that the 'Wisdom' of the first nine chapters is tacitly forgotten in the last ten. He even

insists, in spite of the strongest internal evidence, that the person addressed in chaps. 11-12 is not God but Wisdom, though he acknowledges that such Wisdom is there and thereafter treated merely as an attribute of God. On the other hand, he brushes aside without hesitation the time-honoured efforts to extract from the book authority for modern Roman doctrines. See his note on 'refrigerium' in 4⁷. Lastly, we may note that he has little or no acquaintance with the Rabbinic legends and ideas by which so many passages of 'Wisdom' can be elucidated.

Within the last thirty years the recognition of the arbitrary nature of the Jewish canon of Scripture, and the awakened interest in the documents which form the 'bridge' between Old and New Testament doctrine, have produced a number of works of which the result at least should be presented to the student of 'Wisdom.' Some writers, as Bois, Bertholet, André, Grafe, Siegfried (in his all too brief Commentary appended to his translation in Kautzsch's *Apokryphen*), and Zenner, deal directly with the text of the book; while among collateral works those of Edmund Pfeiderer, Schwally, Charles, Bousset, Margoliouth, Weber, Lincke, Deissmann, Drummond, and others furnish invaluable side-lights. To these should be added numerous articles in Hastings' *Dictionary*, in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*, and in the new edition of Herzog's *Real-Encyklopædie*. The contribution of Mr. F. C. Porter to our knowledge of 'Wisdom's' psychology is dealt with here in a separate Additional Note.

Nor should it be forgotten that within the period mentioned many monumental works of criticism, for the knowledge of which English scholars were once condemned to wait for a translation often inadequate and sometimes

misleading, have, owing to the increasing knowledge of German in this country, been rendered accessible to multitudes of Biblical students. Gfrörer, Grätz, Langen, Bruch, Budde, Duhm, can now be read in their mother-tongue, and the advantage to English theological knowledge has been incalculable, from the side both of constructive and destructive criticism.

From the Revised Version little or no assistance has been derived. It is perhaps the least successful of the translations of the Apocrypha undertaken by the revisers. It is diffuse without being explanatory; and it includes some of the worst faults which made the New Testament revision fail, *e.g.* the attempt to represent the same Greek word by the same English word in whatever sense it occurs. In the case of the author of Wisdom, who, with a vocabulary at once limited and peculiar, had to make the same Greek word serve as the equivalent for many ideas, this is especially unhappy. The best renderings will generally be found, not in the text, but in the margin of the Revised Version.¹

On two points the editor has ventured to differ from his predecessors: on one, from most; on the other, from practically all. He cannot accept the assumption that the Book of Wisdom is a homogeneous whole, written by the same pen, at the same time, and with the same purpose. Secondly, a careful study of the text has convinced him that the author did not really know Greek. For both these views he trusts that he has submitted sufficient grounds. The establishment of the

¹ For an instance of something like absolute mistranslation see 15³, where the meaning of *ἐρχεται εις* seems to be completely misunderstood.

second would at all events clear away a mass of difficulties from the interpretation of 'Wisdom.'¹

The text adopted for translation is Swete's, but with occasional corrections from Fritzsche, chiefly on the ground of the closer correspondence of the latter with the ancient versions. These the editor has examined and utilised to the best of his ability, and in particular he has used throughout the Hexaplar version of the Syriac, which has been greatly neglected, as reputed to be a mere slavish version of the Septuagint text. But which text? The whole importance of the version depends upon that.

Quotations, where it seemed that they really tended to elucidation, have been given in full, even at the risk of considerably increasing the volume of the book. It is unfair to expect the ordinary student to spend time over the consultation of every authority quoted; it is still more disappointing for him to look out a reference with pains and trouble, and to find that the merest verbal

¹ Dr. J. H. Moulton, in his admirable 'Prolegomena,' writes as follows of the New Testament authors: 'There is not the slightest presumption against the use of Greek in writings purporting to emanate from the circle of the first believers. They would write as men who had used the language from boyhood, not as foreigners painfully expressing themselves in an imperfectly known idiom. . . . It does not appear that any of them used Greek as we may sometimes find cultivated foreigners using English, obviously translating out of their own language as they go along.' This is no doubt absolutely true with regard to the New Testament authors: they wrote the *κοινή*; but Pseudo-Solomon does not write the *κοινή*. He writes classical Greek exactly as Dr. Moulton's cultivated foreigner would write English—with a scanty vocabulary and a tendency to old-fashioned forms of expression. It is much to be desired that some critic of Dr. Moulton's capacity and knowledge would turn his attention to the Greek of 'Wisdom.'

correspondence is contained in the passage cited. The references to Philo, it may be remarked, are given, in accordance with modern usage, to the sections of the various books and not, as in the old cumbrous system, to the volumes and pages of Mangey's edition.

A. T. S. GOODRICK.

WINTERBOURNE RECTORY,

October 1912.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Most of the abbreviations used in this work explain themselves the following, which occur only occasionally, may be noticed :—

J. Q. R. = *Jewish Quarterly Review.*

J. R. A. S. = *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.*

Bousset, *Rel. des Jud.* = *Religion des Judentums im Neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, Berlin, 1903.

Schürer, *H. J. P.* = *History of the Jewish People*, English translation, vol. iii, Edinburgh, 1886.

Bois, *Essai* = *Essai sur les origines de la Philosophie Judéo-alexandrine*, Toulouse, 1890.

The following are common to the volumes of this series :—

H = the Hebrew text.

G, **G^A**, **G^N**, etc. = the various Greek MSS. of the Old and New Testaments.

L = the Old Latin Version.

S^P = the Syriac Peshitto.

S^H = the Syriac Hexaplar.

S^{PAL} = (in this volume) the fragments of the Syriac Palestinian Version.

T = Targum, **T^{JOH}**, Targum of Jonathan, **T^{IEK}**, the Jerusalem Targum

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INTRODUCTION

§ 1. Wisdom and the Hebrew Canon.

THE study of the non-canonical books of the Old Testament should be at the present day of peculiar interest. The progress of Biblical criticism, with the introduction of sounder methods of interpretation, has inclined us to reconsider the subject of inspiration, and the question may well be raised whether there are not books outside the Canon which are more deserving of inclusion than some of those which have gained admission.^a

Of such outside works the book of Wisdom stands out foremost with its noble statement of the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, its indignant denunciation of idolatry at a time when such denunciation may have been dangerous, and its firm stand against the Epicureanism which was sapping the very foundations of Jewish morality and belief. So exalted indeed are the sentiments of the writer that he has been, as we shall see, claimed as one of the foremost teachers of the early Christian Church. On what ground his book was never admitted to the Canon we do not know. Possibly he was after all too late; possibly his unfortunate parade of Greek learning disgusted the Jewish doctors.

^a Ryle, *Canon of O. T.*, 171. Cheyne, *Job and Solomon*, 280, states that 'when after the destruction of Jerusalem Jewish learning reorganised itself at Jamnia (4½ leagues south of Jaffa), the view that the Song and Koheleth "defile the hands," *i.e.* are holy Scriptures, was brought forward in a synod held about A.D. 90, and finally sanctioned in a second synod held A.D. 118. The arguments urged on both sides were such as belong to an uncritical age. No attempt was made to penetrate into the spirit and object of Koheleth, but test-passages were singled out. The heretically sounding words in 11^{9a} were at first held by some to be decisive against the claim of canonicity; but, we are told, when the "wise men" took the close of the verse into consideration ("but know that for all this God will bring thee into the judgment") they exclaimed, "Solomon has spoken appropriately." Dr. Cheyne adds (281) that 'there was even as late as A.D. 90 a chance for any struggling book (*e.g. Sirach*) to find its

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It is, moreover, high time that the value of the so-called Apocryphal books (we shall use the term 'apocryphic' as not implying the idea of falsification or forgery which attaches to the other word) should be recognised, not merely on the ground of their intrinsic merit, but also because they represent a transition stage between the doctrines of the Old and New Testaments. The more the nature of the gap between these has been recognised, and the more clearly the distinct points of view which the Old and the New Dispensations afford have been set forth, the more men's attention has been directed to the Apocrypha. Under this name we include not only the books recognised as deutero-canonical by Jerome and the Fathers, but also the rich stores of kindred literature which modern research has unearthed or recalled to notice. Among the former 'Wisdom' easily holds the first place. Valued by the early Christians for the beauty of its dictation and of its ideas, it now occupies a higher place as introducing us to the mind of a man who stood at the very turning-point of belief; a Jew so advanced in his opinions that inconsiderate critics have even called him Christian.

Of this intermediate literature we recognise three distinct classes or currents, answering to the local conditions of the dispersed Jews. We have first the purely Palestinian school, represented by Siracides, 1 Maccabees, Judith, and the book of Jubilees. They keep to the old ways; their one concern is with the observance of the Law and the respect due to the Temple. They exhibit no ideas with regard to a future state, and they cling to the old doctrine of retribution meted out by God to the righteous and to the wicked in this life. In the

way into the Canon.' But Budde (*Althebr. Lit.*, p. 2) goes further. As late as 125 A.D., he says, there was a dispute as to the admission of the Song and Ecclesiastes. It is true that we find no mention of the rejected candidature of any book; but the Rabbis seem to have proceeded on two principles—(1) that books which claimed an authorship older than Moses (e.g. Enoch) were not genuine; (2) that Apocalyptic works must be excluded. For this latter there was a reason; Christian writers had already begun to employ such books for their own ends. See also Bertholet in the same volume, p. 338, on the use of the Jewish Apocalypses by Christian writers, and F. C. Porter in *Hast. D. B.*, i. 114a. So Corn. à Lapide says that the Jews rejected Wisdom because the death of Christ was there predicted. For the views of the Western Fathers on the Canon, see the full and clear account in Salmon's *Introduction to the Speaker's Apocrypha*, vol. i. pp. xxv-xxviii, and Bissell, *Introd.* 51 *sgq.*, cf. Aug. *de Doctr. Chr.*, ii. 8, who practically maintains the absolute right of the Church to say what is canonical and what is not; and he is speaking of O.T. as well as N.T.

book of Judith in particular we have the old idea of Yahwe as the national God, protecting his own at the expense of other nations, and even countenancing the base assassination of Holofernes as he had countenanced that of Sisera. To the second class belong those works which, though chiefly of Palestinian origin, are deeply affected by views imbibed during the captivity from the followers of Zoroaster. These are 2 Maccabees, Baruch, the additions to Daniel, and, most of all, on the score of local origin as well as of content, Tobit. In these books we find the Resurrection of the Just plainly set forth, coupled with elements which had but little influence in the ancient Jewish theology. We have a doctrine of angels approaching to that of mediaeval times, accompanied by a similar development of belief as to demonic interference; we have hints of miraculous interference in the most trifling affairs of domestic life; and we have the efficacy of prayer for the dead plainly stated. We have, in short, signs of intermediate opinion; a distinct variation from Old Testament doctrine; a distinct approximation to that of the New.

But most important of all is the Jewish-Alexandrian class, which represents not merely the growth of Jewish opinion, unfertile in itself and yet capable of development when assisted from without, but also the assimilation of Hellenic elements. To this class we may assign without hesitation 1 Esdras, the Prayer of Manasses, and Wisdom.

On the merits and value of our book the most diverse opinions have been held and expressed. The storm of controversy which began with the decision of the Bible Society to exclude the Apocrypha from their editions in 1827 involved 'Wisdom' in the general denunciation of books as widely different from it as 'Bel and the Dragon'.^a We can here only refer to the great dispute over the retention of the Apocrypha which raged in Germany in the early fifties of the last century. Conservative Lutherans like Stier and Hengstenberg, as well as liberal theologians like Bleek, were rightly in favour of the toleration of the books on precisely the grounds laid down in our own Articles. But the great value of the discussion was that it suggested a deeper study of the Apocrypha than had hitherto been known. The work of its opponents, like Keerl, is most important. With regard to English scholars of the time, one can only suppose that their knowledge of 'Wisdom' in particular was most superficial. Brucker's *History of Philosophy* was their text-book, and when Brucker insisted on dis-

^a For specimens of the unmeasured language used with regard to the Apocrypha in general, cf. Fairweather in *Hast. D. B.*, v. 273.

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covering Platonism, Stoicism, the *anima mundi*, and what not, in every chapter of 'Wisdom,' they blindly followed him. Burton's *Bampton Lectures* are a good example of such criticism, and Payne-Smith's words (*Bamp. Lect.*, p. 368) are worth quoting: 'It is in the book of Wisdom that we find the open expression of those philosophical opinions which finally ruined the Alexandrian school. . . . Nothing can be more unsound than its philosophy, and it did introduce into the Church principles contrary to the teaching of the New Testament.' He cites three points: (1) the eternity of matter, (2) the pre-existence of souls, (3) the inherent badness of matter and of the body. But the extremest views naturally were those of the Evangelical school in the Church. We may cite one specimen from Gurney's *Dictionary of the Bible* (1828): 'Sundry phrases of it seem taken out of the prophets and even the New Testament. Some will have Philo the Jew to be the author of it, but he seems rather to have been a fraudulent Christian. He talks as if souls were lodged in bodies according to their former merits; makes the murder of Abel the cause of the flood; represents the Egyptians as plagued by their own idols, though it is certain they never worshipped frogs or locusts; and calls the divine Logos or second person of the Trinity a *vapour* and *stream*.' On the other hand, appreciation at the present day goes too far, as when André (*Les Apocryphes de l'Ancien Test.*, Florence, 1903, p. 312) says that 'Wisdom' contains the first attempt at a systematic Jewish philosophy. Theocratic Monotheism has no place for philosophy; and Pseudo-Solomon is nothing if not unsystematic.

Nevertheless, the book has been repeatedly used in the Christian Church as of evidential value. It was employed in the Trinitarian controversies, in which the attributes of Wisdom were connected sometimes with the person of the Son, sometimes with that of the Holy Ghost. Methodius used Chap. 4 in pleading for the monastic and conventional life. Chap. 2 was quoted against the Jews to support the view of a suffering and not a triumphant Messiah. Chap. 3 is an encouragement for martyrdom. St. Augustine used the words as to the inherited guilt of the Canaanites in his argument against the Pelagian heresy; and the 'idolatry' chapters were naturally quoted in the Iconoclastic disputes (*Church Quart. Rev.*, Apr. 1879). Lastly, the pseudo-Dionysius in the treatise *De divinis nominibus* uses the passage in 8² ἐραστῆς ἐγενόμην τοῦ κάλλος αὐτῆς as a justification of the erotic or passionate form of devotion, of which enough is said in the notes on the text. The book was continually used by the Christian

Fathers for centuries, during which, according to Freudenthal,^a it remained unrecognised by the Jews.

§ 2 Date of Composition.

The question of date is in the case of the book of Wisdom of great importance, and that for two reasons: the first concerning its position in the development of Jewish Eschatology; the other affecting the question of the purpose which the author had in view in composing it. We may here summarise briefly what will be more fully treated of hereafter. (1) If the date of the writing be pushed as far back as the earliest period assigned to it by any reasonable critics—say 200 B.C.—then it represents a most remarkable step forward in the doctrine of the Resurrection and of a future life. If, on the other hand, we accept the opinion, now more and more advocated, that the book was composed in the reign of Caligula (37-41 A.D.),^b then it contains little more than the formulation of a belief already current among a large section of the Jewish people;^c a belief in the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life Everlasting. (2) Again, if we accept the earlier date, the persecutions indicated must almost certainly be those alleged to have taken place under the Egyptian Ptolemies. No authoritative writer considers that the oppression of the Jews by the kings of Syria can be referred to. But if Egyptian persecution be in question, then the purpose of the book is little more than an exhortation to hold fast by God and his Providence, and to resist the temptations of idolatry. If, however, we adopt the latter date, there is much ground for accepting the theory that 'Wisdom' has, to begin with, a distinct and definite aim: that it is directed against those renegade Jews who, embracing heathenism, had risen high in imperial favour and held great offices

^a *J. Q. R.*, iii. (1891) 722 *sqq.*

^b Bousset, *Theolog. Rundschau*, 1902, p. 185.

^c The whole question of the differences of the opposing sects of Pharisees and Sadducees, and in particular of their antagonistic views on the subject of the Resurrection, is involved in obscurity. Cf. Grätz, *Geschichte der Juden*, iii. 647 *sqq.*, who thinks that the Sadducees admitted a life after death in some form, but not future rewards and punishments. There can be little doubt that Josephus is a bad authority on the subject; he is too much concerned with the laudation of the Essenes. Yet not only Christian authority (Mk. 12¹², Acts 23⁸) ascribes to the Sadducees denial of the Resurrection, but at least one Talmudic tract (*Sanhedrin*, 16⁴, quoted by Grätz) testifies to the same effect.

under the Roman government. They are regarded as oppressors^a (chap. 1), as epicureans (chap. 2), and as idolaters: and certainly, if this view be accepted, the purport of the book becomes clear and its violent rhetoric more justified.

We turn our attention, therefore, in the first place, to this question of date. And we may at once accept the common decision that the book was written later than the 'Septuagint' and earlier than those New Testament books in which it is quoted or referred to. The writer's acquaintance with the Greek Old Testament is plain enough, 6⁷ οὐ γὰρ ὑποστελεῖται πρόσωπον ὁ πάντων δεσπότης is from Deut. 1¹⁷, οὐ μὴ ὑποστείλῃ πρόσωπον ἀνθρώπου. So also 11⁴ ἐδόθη αὐτοῖς ἐκ πέτρας ἀκροτόμου ὕδωρ from Deut. 8¹⁵, τοῦ ἔξαγαγόντος σοι ἐκ πέτρας ἀκροτόμου πηγὴν ὕδατος; and though the allusion in 12⁸ to the 'hornets' of Ex. 23²⁸, etc., shows no verbal identity, πῦρ φλεγόμενον ἐν τῇ χαλάζῃ 16²² is Ex. 9²⁴ with the single change of φλεγόμενον for φλογίζον. But the question is set at rest by two passages. In 15¹⁰ Wisdom has σποδὸς ἡ καρδία αὐτοῦ directly from Isa. 44²⁰, where the present Hebrew text reads 'he feedeth on ashes'; and again in 3¹² ἐνεδρεύσωμεν τὸν δίκαιον ὅτι δύσχρηστος ἡμῖν ἔστι is from Isa. 3¹⁰ δήσωμεν τὸν δίκαιον ὅτι δύσχρηστος ἡμῖν ἔστι which is the Greek translation of the Hebrew, 'say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him.'

These are decisive proofs that the writer knows the Septuagint;

^a In the passage of Philo generally quoted as condemnatory of the apostates (*De Confus. Ling.*, § 2), it is noteworthy that their fault is stated rather as intellectual than moral. They deride the law. οἱ μὲν δυσχεραίνοντες τῇ πατρὶ πολιτείᾳ (which seems to fix the charge on renegade Jews) ψόγον καὶ κατηγορῶν ἀεὶ τῶν νόμων μελετῶντες, τούτοις καὶ τοῖς παραπλησίοις, ὡς ἀν ἐπιβάθραις τῆς ἀθετητος αὐτῶν, οἱ δυσσεβεῖς, χρῶνται, φάσκοντες, ἔτι νῦν σεμνηγορεῖτε περὶ τῶν διατεταγμένων ὡς τοὺς ἀληθεῖας κανόνας αὐτῆς περιεχόντων, κτλ. Philo did not see that it was his own explaining away of the historical facts which encouraged such apostasy. In *De Migr. Abr.*, § 16 (the whole section), he protests against the idea that the law can be neglected on account of its spiritual signification. For an example of such ideas (the spiritual observance of the law) cf. Aristea, 234. The highest glory is 'to honour God, not with gifts and sacrifices, but by purity of soul and pious belief.' We see here plainly the decay of belief in the purely ceremonial ordinances.

For an instance of the fidelity of the apostates to their Egyptian lords, cf. the case of Dositheus (3 Macc. 1³), who saved the life of Ptolemy Philopator. Edersheim (*Hist. of the Jewish Nation*, 71) makes out a good case for Tiberius Alexander in his suppression of the tumults at Alexandria. The Jews had actually attempted to set fire to the amphitheatre and destroy the multitudes therein assembled.

but they do not justify Farrar (420b) in saying that he 'could not have known Hebrew.' St. Paul is represented in the Acts (13³⁴⁻³¹) as quoting not only the Septuagint but its peculiar translations. Yet no one argues that he did not know the original.

We have, therefore, the 'date of the Septuagint'^a as fixing the earliest time at which our book could have been written. But this date is almost no date at all. The idea of the simultaneous or even contemporary translation of the books of the Old Testament has long ago been given up, and it is recognised that the narrowest time-limit which can be assigned to the compilation of the Greek Old Testament is that of 283-205 B.C. (the reigns of Ptolemy Philadelphus, Euergetes, and Philopator). No book of which the author can be proved to have known the Septuagint can be dated earlier than 210 B.C.

On the other hand, a date, not much more definite, is fixed as the latest at which the book can have been composed, by the quotation of it by New Testament writers. The question of such quotation becomes, therefore, of considerable importance.

Before entering upon it, we may dismiss in a few words the matter of the relation or want of relation between 'Wisdom' and Philo. Philo's lifetime may be roughly put between 20 B.C. and 45 A.D., and if there were the slightest reference in him to Wisdom or in Wisdom to him, we should have some vague indication of date. But no such allusions can be traced, and we are left to the *à priori* conjectures of scholars. Schürer (*Jewish People*, Eng. tr., II. iii. 234) argues that, as the Pseudo-Solomon's standpoint is a preliminary step to Philo's, he must precede Philo. Farrar, on the contrary (421b), thinks that he must be later; for, 'if he had preceded Philo, some traces of the powerful style and individuality and phraseology of the Pseudo-Solomon must surely have been observable in the voluminous pages of the Jewish Theosophist.' The argument is not without force; but the conflicting views

^a It is noteworthy, though it militates against the theory of the late origin of 'Wisdom,' that the books especially quoted by Pseudo-Solomon were precisely those which are supposed to have been first translated.

For a clear and succinct account of the probable origin of the Septuagint, see besides Swete, *Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek*, Salmon's Introduction to the Apocrypha (*Speaker's Com.*), § 22. For its date cf. Schürer, *Jewish People in the Time of Christ* (Eng. tr.), Div. II. vol. iii. 161, 201. The earliest writer who quotes it seems to be a certain Demetrius, about 210 B.C., but even then it is possible that some books remained untranslated. Grätz (*Gesch. der Juden*, iii. 623) puts Demetrius much later, and indeed refers the whole Septuagint to a date not earlier than 150 B.C. Cf. Swete, *Introduction*, p. 17.

are almost reconciled if we suppose, as we shall find reason to do, that the two writers are nearly contemporary. In that case Farrar's further position, that we have here 'an author who was familiar with the speculations of Philo, but who regarded them from a completely independent point of view,' may be fully justified.

In dealing with quotations by New Testament writers it is hardly necessary to premise that great care is necessary in eliminating all apparent correspondences which may proceed from a source common to both authors; of this striking instances will be found in the additional note on St. Paul's supposed references to Wisdom; and, indeed, we can hardly ever be sure that such a common source does not exist in any given case. Nevertheless the resemblances of language and of ideas are here too striking to be neglected.

1. The coincidence—to call it nothing more—of the language of the Epistle to the Hebrews with that of Wisdom is remarkable, and indeed gave rise to somewhat extravagant theories, hereafter to be mentioned. A few instances will suffice. In Heb. 1³ the unusual phrase ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ corresponds to Wisd. 7²⁸ ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς ἀιδίου, where it is applied to *σοφία*. Again, the words *τόπος μετανοίας* in Wisd. 12¹⁰ are repeated in Heb. 12¹⁷. Here, indeed, the verbal resemblances cease, except for *παιδεία* in the sense of disciplinary suffering, used repeatedly in Heb. 12⁶⁻¹¹ and also in Wisd. 3⁵ (*παιδευθέντες*); *ἔκβασις* for the result and end of life in Heb. 13⁷ and Wisd. 2¹⁷, and *θεράπων* used of Moses as the 'servant' of the Lord in Heb. 3⁶ and Wisd. 17²¹, the word not occurring elsewhere in the New Testament. But besides these there seem to be genuine resemblances of thought in Heb. 4^{12,13}, Wisd. 7²⁴ (cf. also 1⁶), where the word ^a of God in the first case and his wisdom in the latter is spoken of as 'quick to discern the thoughts and intents of the heart'; and again the description of 'the true tabernacle which the Lord pitched, not man' in Heb. 8² is compared with that in Wisd. 9⁸, 'the holy tabernacle which thou hast prepared from the beginning.' Other supposed correspondences quoted by Plumptre (*Expositor*, Series I. i. 333-9) are too vague to be of value.

^a Any attempt to argue (as Drummond, *Philo Judæus*, i. 137, seems inclined to do) that the Septuagint held a 'Logos theory' from their occasional translation of יְהוָה דָבָר by λόγος is hopeless. They constantly render the same phrase by ρῆμα θεοῦ (cf. Exod. 10²⁰, 1 Sam. 3¹, etc.), and as Freudenthal (*J. Q. R.*, iii. 723) remarks, they were wretched translators with no knowledge of Greek philosophy. Drummond is compelled to say (139) that the 'word of the Lord to some extent stands in opposition to the later idea of the Logos.' As a matter of fact, has it any connection with it at all?

We turn as of course to the sententious and practical Epistle of St. James for references to the 'sapiential' literature current in his time, and we are not disappointed. But naturally he makes most use of the wise maxims of the son of Sirach, from whom he seems at times to quote directly : *e.g.* 1¹³, 'Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God,' compared with Eccl. 15¹¹, 'Say not thou, It is through the Lord that I fell away,' etc. There are no such close correspondences with the book of Wisdom ; but Dr. Mayor, in his edition of the Epistle (pp. lxxv-vi), has collected some ten instances which certainly seem to show that the writer knew the work of the Pseudo-Solomon and was imbued with his views. The oppression of the just man, the value of suffering as a means of education, the strong condemnation of slander and backbiting, are ideas common^a to both ; but the verbal resemblances are few indeed, except perhaps *καταλαλεῖν* and *καταλαλία* in Jas. 4¹¹ and Wisd. 1¹¹, while in one instance (Jas. 4 compared with Wisd. 2⁴) the New Testament writer seems to adopt the very view which Pseudo-Solomon condemns : the likeness between chap. 4¹⁴ and Wisd. 2⁴ is very close indeed. But St. James uses the very phraseology of Wisdom's epicureans to rebuke the far-reaching schemes of avaricious men. He refers to Wisdom, and that in terms which might well have been used by the Pseudo-Solomon (3¹⁷) ; and there is even a hint of a personification, but none of a separate entity.

But the most remarkable verbal correspondence with Wisdom to be found in the New Testament, apart from those passages of St. Paul where the similarity is explained by derivation from a common source, is undoubtedly to be found in 1 Pet. 1^{6.7}, compared with Wisd. 3^{5.6}. A parallel arrangement will make this clear.

1 Peter.

Wisdom.

ἐν φάγαλλιάσθε δλίγον ἄρτι εἰ
δέον λυπηθέντες ἐν ποικίλοις
πειρασμοῖς, ἵνα τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν
τῆς πίστεως πολυτιμότερον χρυσίον
τοῦ ἀπολλυμένου διὰ πυρὸς δὲ
δοκιμαζομένου εὑρέθη εἰς ἔπαινον
κτλ.

καὶ δλίγα παιδευθέντες μέγαλα
εὑργετηθῆσονται ὅτι ὁ θεὸς ἐπείρασεν
αὐτοὺς καὶ εὑρεν αὐτοὺς ἀξίως ἔαντον
ώς χρυσὸν ἐν χωνευτηρίῳ ἐδοκίμασεν
αὐτοὺς καὶ ως δλοκάρπωμα θυσίας
προσεδέξατο αὐτούς.

^a Here, however, the resemblance in phraseology to Wisdom is as nothing compared to the exact similarity between Jas. 3 and Eccl. 28. The two should be read side by side to appreciate the likeness.

Compared with this, the verbal similarity of 1 Pet. 2¹² ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπισκοπῆς and Wisd. 3⁷ ἐν καίρῳ ἐπισκοπῆς αὐτῶν is unimportant, and indeed both phrases are probably reminiscences of Jer. 6¹⁵ ἐν καίρῳ ἐπισκοπῆς αὐτῶν ἀπολοῦνται.

Of the relation of the prologue of the Fourth Gospel to the book of Wisdom various views will be taken, according as the indebtedness of the Evangelist to the Alexandrine doctrine of the Logos is affirmed or denied, but one strong verbal similarity may be noted. In Joh. 1¹ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν may be compared with the phrase used of Σοφία in Wisd. 8³, συμβίωσιν θεοῦ ἔχουσα, and again Joh. 1³ πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο with Wisd. 9¹ ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα ἐν λόγῳ σου; but other supposed correspondences are either references to the same subject, as Joh. 3¹⁴ and Wisd. 16⁵ (the brazen serpent), or mere coincidences of phrase, like Joh. 3¹² and Wisd. 9¹⁶. Mere identity of words like σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα in Joh. 4⁴⁸ and in Wisd. 8⁸, 10¹⁶ proves little more than the use of the words 'signs and wonders,' by, say, two Elizabethan writers would do; and the same may be said of χάρις καὶ ἔλεος in 1 Tim. 1² and in Wisd. 3⁹, 4¹⁵.

The quotations of Wisdom in an Apostolic Father, Clement of Rome, can have little weight in determining our estimate of the date of 'Pseudo-Solomon,' but they are of interest for other reasons, and may be dealt with here. The first and most generally quoted is from Clement's First Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. 17, τίς ἐρεῖ αὐτῷ τί ἐποίησας; ή τίς ἀντιστήσεται τῷ κράτει τῆς Ἰσχύος αὐτοῦ; This may certainly come direct from Wisd. 12¹², τίς γὰρ ἐρεῖ τί ἐποίησας; ή τίς ἀντιστήσεται τῷ κρίματί σου; but it may also be a reminiscence of Job 11¹² and Rom. 9²⁰, or possibly of Daniel 4³², οὐκ ἔστιν ὁς ἀντιποιήσεται τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐρεῖ αὐτῷ Τί ἐποίησας. Still, the connection with Wisdom is exceedingly likely, and still more in the passage of Clement 1 Cor. 3, ζῆλον ἀδικον . . . δὶς οὖν καὶ θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον compared with Wisd. 2²⁴, φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον. Yet even here there is a considerable likeness to Rom. 4¹² διὸ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἡ ἀμαρτία εἰς τὸν κόσμον εἰσῆλθεν καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀμαρτίας ὁ θάνατος.

Of all these references, the most important and yet the least satisfactory are to be found in the Epistle of St. James: if actual quotation from the book of Wisdom by the writer of that Epistle could be proved, there would be at least some reason for not dating the Pseudo-Solomon later than the first decade after the death of Christ. But to that decade other and internal evidences point. Those evidences are now to be examined.

It is very generally assumed that the book was written in a time of great persecution of the Jews, though indeed there are few expressions in it which are not as easily explicable of private revenge as of public wrong. It may, however, be conceded that it does refer to persecution, but Grätz (iii. 630) and Kuenen (*Relig. of Israel*, Eng. tr., iii. 188) think it was written after actual attacks had ceased, the latter commenting on the cool and measured language which is used.

What persecution, then, can be alluded to? Jewish writers have never hesitated to lay on the colour thickly when they have depicted the woes of their nation; but one story, that of a savage attack on the Jews by Ptolemy Philopator (222-205 B.C.) after the battle of Raphia, is now consigned to the region of myth. Kuenen even considers the whole story as a guarded parable of the Caligulan persecution presently to be mentioned,^a and he is probably right in saying (iii. 188) that 'in no case was it the author's intention (he is referring to 3 Macc.) to write history.' That book is either, as he conceives it to be, a political allegory, or it is a religious fiction like the fourth book, which is a philosophic glorification of reason—a sermon indeed—with a background of fabulous martyrdoms. But it is on this third book that the story of Philopator's persecution rests. A brief account of that story is here necessary.

After this victory over Antiochus of Syria at Raphia in 217, Ptolemy is said, in the pride and insolence of success, to have attempted to enter the Holy of Holies; whereupon, in answer to the prayer of the high priest Simon, he fell crippled and speechless to the ground. The story is obviously a replica of that of Heliodorus in 2 Macc. 3²⁷. Thereupon Ptolemy, instead of revenging himself on the perfectly innocent Israelites of Egypt. After vainly attempting to force them into idolatry by threats of enslaving them, he has them seized all through Egypt and brought in fetters to Alexandria, where they are shut up in the circus and an attempt made to take down their names, which fails after forty days' hard work, paper and pens having given out. Elephants made drunk

^a Ewald seems to have been the first to advance this theory, which is elaborated by Grätz (iii. 359 and 631), where he suggests that the object of the book was (1) to denounce apostates (ii. 23, vii. 8, 10), of whom three hundred who had gone over to heathendom to *preserve their civil rights* were afterwards delivered over by Ptolemy to the faithful and slain; (2) to console the victims of Flaccus for the loss of such rights by an example of their restoration in ancient times. Ewald also finds in the fabled attempt of Philopator to enter the temple a reference to the demand of Caligula for his statue to be set up there.

with wine are now let loose upon them, but these turn on the king's own friends and trample many of them to death. A number of minor miracles we omit, and turn to what is probably the one historical point^a in the whole book, the establishment of an annual day of thanksgiving in memory of this or of some real persecution.

We may at once dismiss the theory that the author of 'Wisdom' wrote in the time of, or referred to, a persecution which almost certainly never took place, or, if it did, was but a small^b and local matter.

But the elephant story is repeated, with the detail of the elephants being made drunk, by Josephus (c. *Ap.*, ii. 5). Only he refers it to the time of Ptolemy Physcon (146-116 B.C.), and certainly gives reasons why that king should have persecuted the Jews: the conduct namely of the Jewish chief Onias, the founder of the famous Jewish temple at Leontopolis, in defending the king's sister (and afterwards his wife) Cleopatra. Physcon had first, under Roman auspices, obtained the kingdom of Cyrene from his brother Philometor, and on his death seized the whole kingdom, marrying his sister Cleopatra, and, it was said, murdering her son, the rightful heir, on the very day of the nuptials. He had reason enough to show hostility to the loyal Onias. But the character of this king is involved in mystery. Later writers—Diodorus, Justin, and Strabo—make him a monster of cruelty and tyranny. The actual records hardly correspond to this estimate. They testify to a well-ordered and prosperous realm, and, to say the least, in no way corroborate any story of persecution of the Jews at large. It is hardly to be wondered at that the 'Physcon legend' is consigned by some critics to the same nebulous region as that of Philopator, and accounted also as an allegorical reference to Caligula and his times. In any case, the references to persecution in the book of Wisdom are far too mild to imply any acquaintance with drunken elephants.^c

^a For the not very successful attempt of Deissmann to explain the 'decree' of Ptolemy which is given in 3 Macc. 3²⁸, cf. his *Bible Studies* (Eng. tr.), 342.

^b Mahaffy (*Egypt*, iv. 145) takes a peculiar view of 3 Macc. He thinks it 'is so far no invention, that this king (Philopator) set himself to limit the influence of the Jews in Egypt.' They took their revenge by propagating stories against his character, and the author of 3 Macc. merely brought these traditions together. On the exact date of the book cf. Bertholet in Budde's *Althebräische Litteratur*, p. 403.

^c It is quite possible that Mahaffy (*Egypt*, iv. 183, 201) may have gone too far in extolling the capabilities of Physcon and minimising his vices:

If, therefore, the book of Wisdom (its Egyptian origin being presumed) refers to any persecution at all,^a it must be to the one of which we have real historical details—that under Caligula. For of any public oppression of Egyptian Jews between the time of Ptolemy Physcon and that of the half-demented son of Germanicus there is no trace; on the contrary, they seem to have enjoyed the favour of the Roman conquerors. But the circumstances of the Caligulan persecution certainly correspond remarkably to the indications conveyed by Pseudo-Solomon. These circumstances must be briefly narrated.

In the later years of Tiberius, young Agrippa, grandson of Herod the Great and Mariamne (the 'Herod' of Acts 12), who had been educated at Rome, was a *persona grata* at the emperor's court. After a series of not very creditable adventures in Palestine, unnecessary to discuss here, he had incurred the jealous tyrant's displeasure, chiefly on account of his devotion to the young Caligula. On the accession of the latter, whose companion and favourite he had been, Agrippa received from him the title of king. This distinction of a Jewish prince seems to have excited the anger of the Greeks of Alexandria, already provoked by the commercial success of their Israelite fellow-citizens, and a series of virulent pamphlets against the abhorred nation appeared (Grätz, *Gesch. d. Juden*, iii. 346-352), to which, it would seem, we owe the origin of the fables of the worship of the ass and of the expulsion of the Jews from Egypt as 'lepers' in the time of the Pharaohs. One of the last of the authors of such writings was Josephus' antagonist, the worthless Apion. The Jews were for a long time strong enough, under their half-independent 'Arabarch,' Alexander Lysimachos, brother of the celebrated Philo, and a friend of Agrippa, to defy their enemies. But Flaccus the Roman governor was suspect at court as a former friend of Tiberius, and, in constant fear of denunciation, dared not oppose the fury of the Alexandrian mob, who, on the occasion of but, apart from the silence of the inscriptions and papyri, there are serious objections even to the possibility of a general persecution of Jews in this reign. Cf. with regard to the migration to Egypt of the younger Sirach (Eccl. prologue), Grätz, iii. 54 n. Stories of intended massacres of Jews 'in the circus' are found in Josephus, *Ant. XVII.* vi. 5 and *xviii.* iii. 1, but to suppose that the Physcon legend is copied thence is an unwarranted supposition.

^a Reuss (*Introd.*, 513) remarks on these general references to oppression: 'Nous demandons à quelle époque des plaintes de ce genre auraient été tout à fait hors de propos, si l'on tient compte de la différence des localités où elles pouvaient se produire et des dispositions individuelles des personnes qui pouvaient les formuler.'

an unlucky visit of Agrippa to Alexandria in the summer of A.D. 38, treated that prince with open insult, and presently, breaking into the Jews' places of prayer, set up therein images of Caligula.^a Flaccus, then, was base enough to withdraw from the persecuted people its ancient rights of citizenship. The Jews were driven into one quarter of the city, called 'Delta,'^b and their abandoned homes sacked, though few, if any, lives seem to have been taken. Flaccus was suddenly recalled to Rome in September A.D. 38. He had of course exceeded his powers in the cancelling of the citizen-rights of the Jews, and while under his successor order was being re-established in Alexandria, an embassy was organised, including Philo the Philosopher and his brother the Arabarch Alexander, to proceed to Rome and to plead for the restoration of the lost rights. The fortunes of this deputation are of no great importance to this narrative, but the account of Caligula's behaviour, as given by Philo, produces a strong impression as to the incipient mania of the emperor.

This mania showed itself fully when on his return from his imaginary 'conquests' in Germany he demanded from his subjects recognition as a god (Aug.-Sept., A.D. 40). This gave the Alexandrian populace a fresh opportunity for seeking to enforce idolatry on the Jews, and the Roman governor demanded of these obedience to the Imperial orders.^c The great bulk of them proved loyal to their religion, but it is to this period that we must assign the apostasy not only of many of the baser multitude,^d but of one at least of their chiefs who was afterwards

^a The authority for most of this account is Philo's book *in Flaccum*, with regard to which, and its historic value, cf. Grätz, iii. 681. He decides against the authenticity of the *Legatio ad Gaium*.

^b The 'Delta' was simply one of the five quarters into which Alexandria was divided, named after the first letters of the Greek alphabet. See the map at the end of Mahaffy's *Egypt*, vol. iv. It has no connection with the 'Delta' of the Nile.

^c The version of the governor's message as given by Philo (*de Somniis*, ii. § 18) condemns itself. It is conceived on Hebraic lines, and is more like the harangue of an ancient prophet of Israel than the plain command of a sober Roman administrator. Was it possibly the work of a renegade Jew serving as scribe to the governor?

^d Philo, *de Poenitentia*, § 2, gives us his opinion of apostates in language not entirely unlike that of Wisdom. 'One sees those who apostatise from the laws profigate, shameless, unjust, ignoble, leanwitted, rancorous, companions of lying and perjury, selling their freedom for meat and drink and sweetmeats, and fair seeming; given to the enjoyments of the belly and that which comes after.'

to achieve a baleful reputation. Tiberius Julius Alexander, son of the faithful Arabarch, and nephew of Philo, now went over to the side which promised high office and distinction; wealth was probably his already. It is only necessary to read his uncle's lucubrations to discover an incentive to, if not a justification for, his acts. The persistent allegorising away of Old Testament history by learned men would naturally produce among cultivated Jews the impression that the law itself was after all symbolic only. If the history was only one long allegory, then all the ordinances of religion, Sabbaths, sacrifices, even circumcision itself, might be explained away; and when persecution came there was none of the obstinate old Jewish zeal for the law to resist it. To revive such zeal the so-called Third Book of Maccabees was probably written.

Caligula's insane attempt at self-deification failed. When it came to a question of intruding his image and his worship into the temple at Jerusalem, his own governor, Petronius, remonstrated with him, and before his reply insisting on the mad scheme could be received he was murdered. Under his successor, Claudius, who owed his elevation in part to the diplomacy of Agrippa, the Jews of Egypt and of Palestine alike enjoyed a period of rest and even favour, which lasted till the death of Agrippa in A.D. 44.

It is necessary to give these details in order to place before the reader the precise surroundings amid which the book of Wisdom was probably written. A sore persecution had just been endured; a persecution not to the death indeed, but involving grave damage and distress. This persecution, founded in part on gross calumny, had as one of its main features the attempted enforcement of idolatry, and of idolatry in its most insane and revolting form—the worship of a living man. This living man was a prince ruling at a distance, but his commands were enforced by apostate Jews dwelling close at hand, who had surrendered their ancient belief without sincerely adopting any other, and represented no religion except that of Epicureanism, for which they sought to find their text-book in the so-called Solomon's 'Preacher.' This persecution had been carried on through the agency of the dregs of the populace of Alexandria, wherein were represented the superstition of ancient Egypt at its worst, combined with hereditary Greek hatred of the Jews and wild misrepresentation of their religion and ordinances. Finally, a time of temporary repose must be pictured, in which it was possible to substitute severe rebuke for furious complaint. All these conditions the

period from A.D. 41 to 44 presents, and an examination of the book of Wisdom confirms the belief that it was then written.

To take the first point: that of a sore persecution but not to the death. We may refer with confidence to the description of the oppression of the just man in 2¹⁰⁻²⁰. There is no question of furious elephants here; simply of attacks involving loss, misery, and possibly bodily outrage. Of the calumnies which had instigated the persecution, that which had obtained the widest circulation, apart from the fables as to asses' heads and leprosy, was that of the hatred of the Jews for all mankind except their own nation, a belief which was common certainly among the Romans.^a It is probably alluded to in Wisd. 2¹⁵, and is controverted in 12¹⁹, 'the just man must be a lover of mankind.'

The allusion to the deification of living men is plain enough in 14¹⁶⁻¹⁷. 'By the commandments of princes the graven images received worship, and when men could not honour them in presence because they dwelt afar off, imagining the likeness from afar they made a visible image of the king whom they honoured, that by their zeal they might flatter the absent as if present.' This passage is referred by those who argue for an early origin of the book to the deification of the Ptolemies. But such deification seems certain in very few cases: possibly only in that of Ptolemy I. (Mahaffy, *Egypt*, iv. 102), and the persons deified are here not in Egypt but at a distance. The judges who decide the destinies of Israel are those who dwell at the 'ends of the earth'; who 'make their boast in multitudes of nations' (6²), an expression which seems plainly to denote a wide sway, like that of the Roman emperors. So, too, Solomon's supposed assertion (7¹⁻⁶) of his very human origin seems intended to rebuke the claims to superior nature of even an Imperial Cæsar. Again, the allusion to apostate Jews of the school of Koheleth is plain indeed in 2¹⁻⁹ (see notes there), and that Jews and not aliens are meant is indicated clearly in 2¹², 'upbraideth us with sins against the law, and layeth to

^a Cicero, *pro Flacco*, § 69 (Judaeorum religio) 'a splendore hujus imperii, gravitate nominis vestri, majorum institutis abhorrebat.' Juvenal, writing in later days, when the desperate defence of Jerusalem had exasperated Rome, writes of the Jewish religion (xiv. 103, 104) that it taught

non monstrare vias eadem nisi sacra colenti
quaesitum ad fontem solos deducere verpos.

And cf. Mayor's notes on the passage.

our charge sins against our discipline.' Grätz, indeed, finds in these verses allusion to the baser passions of the mob of Alexandria, but surely the whole passage refers to the debaucheries of wealthy and cultured profligates. But the most striking reference to contemporary matters is that in 19⁵ as to the rights of citizenship: 'these first welcomed with feastings and then afflicted with dreadful toils *them that had already shared with them in the same rights.*' Apparently, it is true, this refers to the behaviour of the ancient Egyptians, but it seems undoubtedly to be a guarded allusion to the action of Flaccus already mentioned. The immediate danger of the vengeance of that governor had passed, but some respect even to the fallen statue of Zeus is always advisable.

No other epoch, surely, can furnish correspondences so exact and so undeniable; and we may be satisfied to accept the conclusion of Farrar (pp. 421-2), arrived at more than twenty years ago, that the book of Wisdom was written in the decade after the death of Christ. All subsequent investigations have only served to confirm this theory.

§ 3. Object of the Book.

The question of the purpose which the author had in view is again in great measure dependent on the date which we assign to his book. That its main object is polemic cannot be doubted; the first six chapters and the ten last are plainly so, though, as Eichhorn long ago perceived, they are directed against two different forms of unbelief—Epicureanism and downright debased idolatry. The three intervening chapters certainly proceed on somewhat different lines, though the account of Solomon's birth at least may well have a politico-religious significance. The general object of their introduction we shall examine later on.

1. If the book be assigned to a Ptolemaic age, early or late, the persons addressed in the exordium (1¹) must be heathen princes of some kind, and by them the writer could hardly expect his book to be read or regarded. A way out of this difficulty is to suppose (as Reuss, *Introd.*, p. 504, suggests) that this address to other rulers was a mere piece of colouring intended to impart probability to the fiction of Solomon's authorship. It would be proper for a king to address kings; therefore let us begin with a flourish of trumpets—an exhortation to righteousness addressed by one sovereign prince to his peers. Only it

is to be noted that, in contradistinction to the opening words of Ecclesiastes, our book at first makes no distinct claim to Solomonic origin.^a That comes later on.

But this difficulty disappears and others are explained if we accept the date now generally regarded as the true one. In that case the 'rulers' referred to are certainly 'judges of the earth,' and men of power enough to persecute; but they are apostate Jews, who have attained to that power by accepting a formal paganism, though at heart they are Epicureans^b of a type not unknown among the Israelites of earlier days. Such, at all events, is the judgment of the Pseudo-Solomon, though a reference to the career of the most famous of the apostates, Tiberius Alexander, nephew of Philo, will display him as no vindictive renegade, but as a just if stern Roman governor. His sanguinary suppression of a Jewish tumult in Alexandria (Josephus, *B. J.*, II. xviii. 7, 8) belongs to a period later than any to which 'Wisdom' can be assigned. He had considerable influence, as holding Egypt, in the elevation of Vespasian to the throne (*Tac.*, *Hist.*, II. 74, 79).

One peculiarity at least of the Pseudo-Solomonic presentation of Jewish history is explained if we adopt this hypothesis, viz., the extraordinary apologetic attitude adopted by the writer in the later chapters towards the sins of Israel—those very sins which are so repeatedly denounced in the Pentateuch and the Prophets; in the first case, their rebellions against God; in the second, their own idolatries. It is probable that these very reproaches against the character of the Israelites, and the fact that they had *not* been loyal, had had their share in alienating cultured Jews from the religion of their fathers; and it would be with a view to bring them back that the writer glosses over such sins in the most unwarrantable way.

2. It is possible, however, to explain this smoothing away of the

^a If we adopt this theory, it would not be amiss to describe the book as a polemical pamphlet, directed against Jewish apostates (1-6), and followed by 'pièces justificatives' (10-19), with three chapters added afterwards, possibly to secure a circulation for the book, or possibly to set forth new views of the author. Gfrörer, *Philo*, II. 206, saw that it must be the actual rulers of the country who were addressed.

^b Bruch, *Weisheitslehre der Hebräer*, 338, is fettered by his view of the early date of 'Wisdom.' He thinks the persons rebuked are merely neglectful Jews, who disregarded the ordinances. He is somewhat baffled, however, by the confusion of such persons with actual heathen in the denunciatory passages 1⁶ *sqq.*, and chaps. 2-6.

difficulties of ancient Jewish history on other grounds. It has been held, notably by Siegfried in his early work on Philo (1875),^a and more recently by Bertholet^b and others, that the book was written with the view of attracting proselytes to Judaism from among the cultured Greeks. Two grounds for this theory are apparently relied upon: first, that the book is permeated by Platonic and Stoic philosophy; and secondly, that Pseudo-Solomon seeks to explain away those signs and wonders of the Old Testament which might excite Gentile incredulity, in the manner of Philo.

Now, with respect to permeation by Platonic and Stoic ideas, the expressions which distinctly indicate even an acquaintance with those ideas may, with one doubtful exception (the creation of the world out of 'formless matter,' in chap. 11), be regarded as existing only in chaps. 7-9. The remainder of the book consists of one long denunciation of that paganism which was at least the official creed even of the Greek philosophers. The first six chapters may be regarded as directed against their disbelief in immortality, and the last ten against their idolatry. The dying Socrates had ordered a cock to be sacrificed to Asklepios.

^a *Philo*, p. 23: 'To reconcile the opposition of Jew and Greek, Pseudo-Solomon played a lucky card in the choice of "Wisdom," which, on account of its variety of aspects and meanings, could vary its colour, at times as Graeco-philosophical, at others as Jewish-theological. It was easy to bring into the conception of *σοφία* all that Greek philosophy offered of truth, while Proverbs 8 afforded the possibility of making Wisdom the central idea of Jewish religion.'

^b In Budde's *Althebräische Litteratur*, 413: 'To address heathen, and to convert heathen, and, as it seems, primarily not the lower circles of heathen, is the real purpose of our book, which has been questioned, but wrongly.'

Siegfried's argument that 'Sophia' was put forward as a kind of neutral ground on which Jews and Gentiles could unite seems to depend on the identification of that 'Sophia' with the Logos, which may well have been a timid concession of Philo to Polytheism. But is the Logos identical with Sophia in Philo? The passages quoted by Siegfried himself (*Philo*, p. 222) are, like everything else in Philo, most indefinite. Wisdom is at one time 'Mother of the Logos' (!), *De Profugis*, § 20, πατρὸς μὲν θεοῦ ὁς καὶ συμπάντων ἐστι πατήρ, μητρὸς δὲ σοφίας δι' ἣς τὰ ὅλα ἥλθεν εἰς γένεσιν. But, again, in *Quod deter. potiori insid.*, § 31, we have a confused account of the rock which Moses smote, first as Sophia and then as the Logos. Philosophical argument on such data is absurd. The one thing of which we can be certain is that the *Σοφία* of the book of Wisdom was a purely Jewish Sophia: she has, for example, no concern with the offspring of mixed marriages (*Wisd.* ch. 4).

But, above all, we find in the last ten chapters an arrogant particularism,^a the enunciation of which, if credited, might recall the apostate to the fold, but could only disgust and repel the cultured pagan. No idea of God can be more narrow than that propounded in 11¹⁰ ff. and 12¹ ff. It almost takes us back to the conception of Yahwe as a tribal god. He is father of the Jews alone, but to the heathen a stern god. And so far, as Bertholet points out (p. 413), we do get an idea of a world-destiny of Israel which conflicts with particularism: God is at least God of all the earth. But when we examine particulars we find this God no impartial ruler. The sufferings which came upon the Jews are but^b a fatherly correction (11¹⁰ *τούτους μὲν γὰρ ὡς πατὴρ νονθετῶν ἐδοκίμασας*). With the heathen sufferings mean outpourings of Divine wrath (*ἔγνωσαν πῶς ἐν ὀργῇ κρινόμενοι ἀστεβεῖς ἐβασανίζοντο*, 11⁹) and a sign of judgment (*ὡς ἀπότομος βασιλεὺς καταδικάζων*). Sinning Jews are by punishment freed from evil, but the sinning Canaanites God *hates* (12³, *τοὺς παλαιοὺς οἰκήτορας τῆς ἀγίας σου γῆς μισήσας . . . ἐβουλήθης ἀπολέσαι*), and roots them out for their sins.

To this repellent picture is added a detail which reflects an ancient Jewish doctrine: that of exact and corresponding compensation for sin which finds its first expression in the words 'whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed,' and which persisted, through the Christian apocalyptic literature (cf. *Rer. Petri*, §§ 12, 13, etc.), to the time of Dante. The general principle is set forth in 11¹⁶, 'by what things a man sinneth, by these he is punished'; but we note that there is here an advance on Old Testament ideas: it is not merely the quantitative penalty—heavy punishment for heavy sins—that is here suggested, but an actual qualitative retribution, which the author proceeds to describe in detail.

^a Cf. 4 Esdr. 6⁵⁵, 7¹¹, 9¹³; Apoc. Bar. (Syr.), 14¹⁹, 15⁷, where we are told that the world was created for Israel's behoof.

^b Cf. 2 Macc. 6¹⁴⁻¹⁶. 'In the case of other nations the Sovereign Lord doth with long-suffering forbear, until that he punish them when they have attained to the full measure of their sins; but not so judged He as touching us . . . He never withdraweth His mercy from us; but though He chasteneth with calamity, yet doth He never forsake His own people.' This also appears to be the teaching of the *Psalms of Solomon*. Good and evil suffer alike; but for the wicked misfortune is the cause of their final destruction, while the righteous recognises the chastening hand of God and is full of hope of final salvation: Bertholet, p. 366. Cf. especially Psalm 3⁴, *οὐδὲ δλιγωρήσει δίκαιος παιδευόμενος ὑπὸ κυρίου*. The whole of the Psalm is concerned with *παιδεία*. Cf. also Ps. 10², *χρηστὸς ὁ κύριος τοῖς ὑπομένουσι παιδείαν*.

(a) The Egyptians worship beasts: therefore they are punished through the very beasts which they worshipped. From a comparison of 16¹ διὰ τοῦτο δι' ὄμοιών ἐκολάσθησαν ἀξίως^a καὶ διὰ πλήθους κνωδάλων ἐβασανίσθησαν, and 16⁹ οὐς μὲν γὰρ ἀκρίδων καὶ μυιῶν ἀπέκτεινε δῆγμα . . . ὅτι ἄξιοι ἦσάν ὑπὸ τοιούτων κολασθῆναι it appears that the writer believed that the Egyptians worshipped gnats and stinging insects.

(b) More fantastic still is the idea conveyed in chaps. 16-19. The Egyptians had cast the children of the Israelites into the water; therefore they were punished by lack of water. Nay, further, as they had murdered infants by water, so when they fain would drink they 'were troubled with clotted blood instead of a river's ever-flowing fountain.' This kind of thing might serve to terrify the ignorant into the Jewish fold: to the educated Greek it was surely unlikely to appeal.

The improbability of such reasoning attracting, or being intended to attract, the heathen world, is accentuated by the fact that those who did set themselves to this task adopted a method diametrically^b opposite; they either explained away every point of Jewish history which might give umbrage to a philosophic Greek, or they boldly affirmed that Hellenic religion was borrowed from that of the Jews. Of this latter method Aristobulus, or rather Pseudo-Aristobulus (for we have here another author claiming the name of a dead and gone authority) furnishes us with the best example. He professed to write in or soon after the days of Ptolemy Philometor (died 146 B.C.), and to have been that king's friend and instructor. Ptolemy may have had a friend called Aristobulus, but it was certainly not this man who elaborated Philo's idea of the derivation of Greek religion from that of 'Moses' by a succession of barefaced impositions and forgeries, of which Eusebius (*Praep. Ev.*, xiii. 12) gives us a pretty full account.

^a The interpolation of the Revisers here almost amounts to a commentary: 'for this cause were *these men* worthily punished through *creatures* like *those which they worship*.'

- In spite of his particularism, the author seems to argue that the Gentiles *ought* to recognise the one true God. Indeed, they are punished for their unbelief.—Bousset, *Rel. des Jud.*, 176.

^b How far the Jew was prepared to go to conciliate Greek sympathies is shown in the letter of Aristeas (§ 284), where one of the Septuagint translators, in his answer, when asked by Ptolemy 'what is the proper amusement for a king in hours of leisure?' replies 'the theatre.' Philo is said to have been present at the performance of a play of Euripides.—Bertholet, 390.

He altered or invented verses of 'Orpheus,' Linus, Hesiod, and Homer to serve his purpose, and, in particular, to ascribe to them a full recognition of the Jewish Sabbath. Such an imposture would of course have been impossible at the educated Greek court of the Lagidae, and Grätz (iii. 632) is no doubt right in assigning to the writer a date contemporary with or even later than the book of Wisdom. The reader may judge what likeness exists between the two. Wholesale forgeries for the same purpose are found in the hexameters circulated under the name of Phocylides, a real Greek poet of the sixth century B.C. It was by such means as these, and not by threats and reproaches, that the Hellenistic Jews sought to win over their pagan compatriots to their faith.

But again, the allegorising tendencies of Pseudo-Solomon^a are compared with those of Philo. As Farrar (412 b, n. 3) well points out, the two have little or nothing in common: 'In Philo the symbol is everything; the fact little or nothing.' Philo explains away the letter of Scripture: 'Wisdom,' without for a moment doubting its literal truth, finds in that literal truth symbolic meanings also. The serpent of Eden is the devil (2²⁴), but it is scarcely fair to say with Siegfried (*Philo*, p. 24), that it is 'no beast': it is both. It was not that the brazen serpent healed the Israelites (16⁵⁻⁷), it was God's help; nevertheless the serpent was a real one. Philo says it was an allegory of sober-mindedness. In 10¹⁷ the pillar of cloud is a manifestation of Wisdom; but there is no hint that it was not a real cloud. Jacob was shown the 'kingdom of God' by Wisdom, but the story of the ladder (which is not actually mentioned) is not explained away. The pillar of salt (10⁷) is the monument of an unbelieving soul: in which there is no allegory at all. In 17²¹ the darkness which covered the Egyptians was 'an image of the darkness that should afterwards receive them'; but no thicker or more substantial darkness can well be conceived than that of Pseudo-Solomon's famous description. In one passage only (18²⁴) the symbolism of the high priest's robe approaches not only to the ideas but the language of Philo. The matter is discussed in the notes.

^a Bois, *Essai Critique sur les Origines de la Philosophie Judéo-Alexandrine*, Toulouse, 1890, p. 220, points out that Pseudo-Solomon does not use his allegories, such as they are, as a proof, which Philo does. He proves nothing; he produces results as if they had been arrived at elsewhere. There is no apparent reason for his 'Wisdom' as a hypostasis.

In all this there may be mysticism ; but assuredly there is no attempt to evacuate Holy Scripture of its historic^a truth with the object of alluring the Gentiles. As to the subject of Philo's and Pseudo-Solomon's 'wisdom,' it will be better dealt with later on.

There is, however, one aspect of the book of Wisdom which, in their eager pursuit of the supposed Greek philosophic views contained therein, and their anxiety to connect Pseudo-Solomon's doctrine with that of Philo, critics have of late somewhat neglected. There is, namely, a plainly traceable attempt to controvert the teaching of the writing (or the congeries of writings) known under the name of Koheleth^b or Ecclesiastes. This intention was noticed more than a century ago by Nachtigal (1799), and has been constantly noted, though not much insisted upon, perhaps, by a succession of scholars. So sober a critic as Plumptre (*Eccl.*, p. 70) remarks that 'if I mistake not, a main purpose of his book was to correct either the teaching of Koheleth or a current misinterpretation of it.' The last words contain the reason why the obvious antagonism of the two writers has been so often neglected or glossed over. For centuries men have tried to persuade themselves that the original book of Ecclesiastes (chiefly on

^a Bissell, *Apocr.*, p. 228, goes too far when he says that in his philosophic views 'the author stands not only outside the teaching of the Bible, among the philosophers of his time, but, consciously or unconsciously, takes an attitude in a certain degree antagonistic to the Bible.' He is more accurate when he points out that 'the Divine holiness is indeed but little emphasised' (12¹⁶, 'Thy strength is the source of righteousness'); but still it is implied in the recognition of other absolute attributes (12³, hatred of crime, 15¹ righteousness; 14⁹, again hatred of wickedness; 16²⁴, beneficence); the idea is in fact included in the *σοφία* that is ascribed to God, which is not something merely intellectual, but has also a moral significance. Cf. 7²², where *σοφία*=*εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος θεοῦ*. So also Bois, *Essai*, 226 n. 1, doubts if God is ever here spoken of as omnipresent. He is omniscient, but only through the omnipresence of the Spirit, which Bois identifies with Logos. One might say that all is directed and governed by God through the agency of *σοφία*. 'God is the cause of wisdom ; he is then the cause of what wisdom does, but not the immediate cause.' The manifestation of God in his creation only reveals him imperfectly : and Solomon in chap. 9 asks for wisdom to enable him to understand God.

^b It should be noted that Hitzig in the *Kurzgefr. Handbuch* on Ecclesiastes, p. 125, actually endeavoured to maintain that Wisdom was earlier in date of composition than Koheleth. Cf. Wright, *Koheleth*, p. 70, and Cleyne, *Job and Solomon*, p. 279, n. 1, who remarks that this is 'plainly impossible in the light of the history of dogma' : not a very certain proof of anything. Cf., however, Dr. Cheyne's later work, *Jewish Religious Life after the Exile*, p. 192, where he still maintains, as far as possible, the unity of Ecclesiastes.

INTRODUCTION

the ground, perhaps, of its inclusion in the Canon of Scripture) contained something better than the dreary philosophy of a man who had no hope in the next world—did not, indeed, believe in the other world—and very little in this: whose theory of life was literally summed up in the words ‘let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.’ The attempts of Dr. Cheyne (in his *Job and Solomon*), wrestling hard with his critical instincts, to claim something like coherence for the book, and something like a conscience for its author, represent the last struggle between scholarship and the desire to justify a book which in its present form does contain a number of passages not only edifying but almost sublime. Unfortunately, it is pretty certain that ‘Koheleth’ never wrote those passages.

That the book of Ecclesiastes has been extensively manipulated with the view of making it orthodox, hardly any theological scholar of the present day will question. It is not necessary to adopt Siegfried’s exact anatomy of the work, verse by verse, on rather fanciful lines. But the obviously contradictory passages in it, which have given rise to such theories as those of the ‘Two Voices’ (Bradley, *Ecclesiastes*), the ‘note-book’ containing occasional jottings down of inconsistent thoughts (Cheyne), and the dislocation of the leaves of an original manuscript (Bickell), show plainly that we have not the book in the form in which it first appeared.

In what form it lay before the author of ‘Wisdom’ we cannot say. Here, again, the undecided question of his own date renders our conjectures uncertain. Gregg, who assigns to ‘Wisdom’ a date somewhere about 100 B.C., questions if Ecclesiastes could even have penetrated to Egypt by that time; but this objection the generally accepted date for the later book will obviate. If ‘Wisdom’ lived soon after Koheleth, he may have possessed a copy without the mitigating interpolations. But even if he had the work before us in its present state, he would find matter enough for indignation. It is only an ultra-conservative clinging to the reputation of the Preacher that can attribute the hostility of the second Pseudo-Solomon to a ‘current misinterpretation’ (Plumptre). That ‘the resemblances between Wisdom and the Greek version of Ecclesiastes are very few and doubtful’ (Gregg) is only verbally true. And we have still the question whether the book stood alone, or did not rather represent a whole body of writings of the same class which might serve as text-books for the Epicurean Jew.

Even supposing, then, that the author of *Wisdom* had the book of

Koheleth before him in the form in which we possess it to-day, three points in its teaching must disgust and irritate him as a right thinking Jew. The first two are fully brought out by Dr Cheyne: these are the surrender of the claim of Israel to be God's chosen people; secondly, the denial both of the immortality of the soul and, if the learned professor is right, also the resurrection of the dead,^a and indeed of any after world at all.^b From the third charge, that of the teaching of downright Hedonism, the apologists of Koheleth have always endeavoured to defend him: their defence is based chiefly on disputed passages.^c

To take the points in order: the name of God is used 29 times in Koheleth, but always in the form 'Elohim,' the Creator: never once does he employ the name of 'Yahwe,' which only the Jew was privileged to invoke as that of his protecting God. There is no mention from beginning to end of the book of God's special mercies to Israel, or of the character of Israel as the chosen people, or of the natural antagonism to heathenism which is not wanting even in Esther—indeed, forms the keynote of that book. 'Koheleth' might almost have been written by a pagan.^d

^a On this point see Cheyne's reference to Grätz (*Ibid.*, p. 301), which must be read in the light of recent investigations into Jewish eschatology. 'The doctrine (of Immortality) was not of native Jewish origin, but imported from Alexandria, and was the source of the ascetic gloom opposed by Koheleth. Koheleth's denial of the Immortality of the Soul does not, according to Grätz, involve the denial of the Resurrection of the Body, the Resurrection being regarded in early Judaism as a new creative act.' Dr. Cheyne very naturally questions this statement.

^b Bousset (*Religion des Judenthums*, p. 287), though he does not acknowledge that the author of Wisdom believed in any resurrection of the dead, yet recognises the defence in Wisd. 2²¹ of the broader doctrine of immortality as against Koheleth.

^c Not always, however; Tyler, *Ecclesiastes*, p. 80. 'Koheleth, when he summons to enjoyment, never incites to lying in wait for the righteous or oppressing the widow, but Wisdom might well think that this followed from his denial of immortality.' And so Wright argues that Koheleth never actually urges to a dissolute life but to the enjoyment of natural pleasures.

^d That other books of similar type were current among half-believing Jews is testified to by (Eth.) Enoch, civ. 10: 'I know this secret, that many sinners will change and distort the words of truth, hold evil discourses and lie, devise great deceptions and write books on their discourses.' Beer *ad loc.* remarks that 'Sadducean' books are meant, for the existence of which he cites the Talmud (*Sanhedrin*, 100).

It is hardly necessary to quote passages from the Alexandrine Pseudo-Solomon to illustrate his diametrically opposite view. 'He, an Israelite, proud of the history of his fathers, could not understand a man writing almost as if he had ceased to be an Israelite, one to whom the names of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob were unknown, and therefore he enters on a survey of that history to show that it had all along been a process manifesting the law at once of a Divine exhibition and of a Divine education' (Plumptre, *Eccl.*, p. 73). Every passage which expresses the narrow particularism of 'Wisdom' may be regarded in this sense, as when in 10¹⁶ 'Wisdom delivered an holy people and a blameless seed from a nation of oppressors'; when in 11¹⁻¹⁵ we have God's different dealings at once with his chosen and their enemies the Egyptians; and when in 12²² we are told that 'while thou dost chasten us thou scourgest our enemies ten thousand times more.' So, too, 15², 'Even if we sin we are thine, knowing thy dominion,' a sentiment illustrated by the whole of chapter 18. But perhaps the most striking insistence on the power of the God of Israel is to be found in 6⁴⁻⁷, where the 'judges of the ends of the earth'—possibly the Emperor himself—are reminded that their dominion was given from the Lord and their sovereignty from the Most High, 'who shall search out your works and shall make inquisition of your counsels, because *being officers of his kingdom* ye did not judge aright.'

But when Dr Plumptre goes on to say of the writer of Wisdom that 'he could as little understand how a son of Abraham, *writing in Egypt* with all the monuments of its old idolatries and later developments of the same tendency to anthropomorphic and theriomorphic worship around him, could have let slip the opportunity of declaring that God is a spirit,' he goes too far, and assumes as facts the mere suppositions of his 'ideal life' of Koheleth, who is generally understood to have been a Palestinian Jew,^a of whatever age. Further suggestions of this author, however, deserve notice. That the absolute want of any devotional sentiment in Koheleth should have stirred the writer of Wisdom to 'put into the mouth of his ideal Solomon a prayer of singular power and beauty' is likely enough; and still more convincing seems the idea that, finding in Ecclesiastes no idea of God but 'that of power, hardly of law, predestinating times and seasons (Eccles. 3¹⁻¹⁰) and the chances and changes of

^a Cheyne, *Job and Solomon*, pp. 258-259. Plumptre, again, goes too far when he speaks of the author of Wisdom as a 'mystical ascetic who had been trained in the school of Philo'—an absolutely unfounded description.

men's lives (9¹¹), working out a partial retribution for man's misdeeds *within the limits of earthly experience*^a (11⁹, 12¹⁴), but leaving many wrongs and anomalies unredressed' (5⁸, 8¹¹) the new Solomon insisted on the idea of the Fatherhood of God, which had been the mainstay of Israel in their darkest hour (Isa. 63¹⁶, 64⁸) as he does in 11¹⁰, 'These thou didst admonish and try as a father,' and in 14³, 'Thy providence, O Father, guideth it (the ship) along.'

With regard to the eschatology of Koheleth, perhaps it would hardly be an exaggeration to say that he has no eschatology at all. It is impossible to gather from his writings that he believes in any other world than this; the single passage in which Sheol is mentioned is one of those ascribed by Siegfried to his 'Epicurean Sadducee.' Probably the writer's true sentiments are to be found in 3²⁰, 'all are of the dust and all turn to dust again'; 9⁵⁻⁶, 'the dead know not anything, neither have they any more a reward, for the memory of them is forgotten. As well their love as their hatred and envy is now perished; neither have they any more a portion for ever in anything that is done under the sun.' The only reason why death is worse than life is given in the same passage, 'the living know that they shall die, but the dead know not anything.' But the most remarkable text of all is 7¹⁴, if it is rightly interpreted by Dr. Cheyne:^b 'On a good day be of good cheer, and on an evil day consider (this): God hath made this (good) equally with that (evil), on the ground that man is to experience nothing at all hereafter.' The translator remarks on this: 'as a last consolation for cool and rational thinkers, be sure that there is nought to fear after death; there are no torments of Gehenna. This is in fact the reason why God ordains evil: there being no second life, one must learn whatever he can from calamity in this life.' But it was this very assumption that God ordained evil in the world that inspired the writer of Wisdom in his strong asseveration that God never did so; (2²⁴) 'by the envy of the devil death entered into the world,' etc.

^a This limitation is introduced by those who still refuse to regard 11⁹ as an interpolation; but Dr. Cheyne, acknowledging the interpolation, frankly admits (what must be plain to the candid reader) that judgment *after death* is most likely referred to (*Ibid.*, p. 224). If it refers even to retribution here on earth, it is at variance with the rest of the writer's ideas (cf. Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 67).

^b *Ibid.*, p. 216.

We can hardly be wrong in following Dr. Cheyne so far as to doubt whether the writer of Koheleth had any belief at all in the immortality of the soul or even the resurrection of the dead. The author of Wisdom apparently had no doubts; his setting forth of his belief in the resurrection (chap. 3) follows so closely upon his denunciation of the Epicureanism of Ecclesiastes that we must almost perforce regard the whole as an attack on the same book. The question of the precise meaning and force of the famous passage, 'the souls of the righteous' (3¹⁷), must be deferred for further consideration in an additional note, but in any case it is a strong asseveration of that belief in some form of life after death which the writer of Koheleth never shows. As a side issue, we may here mention the question of retribution even here on earth. Dr. Charles (*Eschatology*, p. 67) says plainly, 'he declares in fact that there is no retribution at all. Thus he maintains that evil may prolong a man's days and righteousness curtail them (7¹⁵), that the destiny of the wise man and the fool is identical (2¹⁴), and likewise that of the righteous and the wicked (9²): "All things come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good and to the evil; to the clean and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth and to him that sacrificeth not. The good man fares like the sinner, and he that sweareth as he that feareth an oath"; finally, that the wicked attain to the honour of burial, whilst this is often denied to the righteous (8¹⁰).' To this the book of Wisdom has a single incisive answer, but one which indicates well the heresy against which it is directed (2²²). 'They knew not the mysteries of God, neither hoped they for wages of holiness, nor did they judge that there is a prize for blameless souls.' But the criticism becomes even more direct in *Wisd.* 1¹², where 'seek not death in the error of your life' is a plain rebuke to *Eccles.* 6⁵, where Koheleth says of the 'untimely birth' that 'it hath not seen the sun nor known it; this hath rest rather than the other,' viz. the most prosperous man that lives. It was only the ungodly who counted Death their friend (*Wisd.* 1¹⁶), for God made not death (*Wisd.* 1¹³) and never intended it. And whatever view we take of the precise meaning of *Wisd.* 3¹⁷, it is certain that it contains a direct contradiction of the doctrine of Koheleth. 'There is no remembrance of former things,' said the latter (1¹¹), 'neither shall there be any remembrance of things that are to come with those that shall come after,' and 'Wisdom' almost repeats the words as the utterance of the wicked (2⁴), 'Our name shall be forgotten in time, and no man shall

remember our works': and then comes the magnificent answer to this, and to the similar complaint that 'the wise man dieth as the fool,' and that there is one event to the righteous and the wicked Eccles. 7¹⁵, 9²) in the words (Wisd. 3²⁻⁴), 'In the sight of the unwise they seemed to die, and their departure is taken for misery . . . but they are in peace . . . their hope is full of immortality.' Such detailed contradiction seems almost like the work of a contemporary, or nearly contemporary, critic.^a There is indeed hardly a statement as to the behaviour and language of the wicked in Wisdom which is not based upon some text or hint in the book of Koheleth, except, indeed, the references to persecution of the just man, which, as we have seen, are to be referred to local and contemporary events.

We come thirdly to the arraignment of Koheleth 'as a Hedonist; a mere Epicurean.' It may be mentioned in passing that also the modern Hebrew connects 'Epicurus' with the notion of apostasy; and the Rabbis even asserted (Cheyne, 262 n. 2) that 'the Serpent was Epicurus'; and however the doctrines of the Ionian philosopher may be explained away and softened down nowadays, it is certain that his followers, incapable of entering into the subtle doctrines of live and let live which the sage taught, interpreted them as encouraging Hedonism pure and simple, lustful and sensual. Against the charge of inculcating such ideas most of the commentators on Ecclesiastes are eager to defend him. Cheyne (p. 253) regards him merely as an advocate of 'festive but refined society,' and with some justice attacks (p. 263) the efforts of Plumptre and Tyler to connect his teaching with the formal system of Epicurus as expounded by Lucretius. He thinks (p. 211) that the writer 'is no vulgar sensualist; his merriment is spoiled by the thought of the misery of others.' It may have been; but he did not recommend other people to allow it to spoil theirs. The extreme statement of the defenders of Koheleth may perhaps be found in Cornill, as quoted by the writer of the article on 'Ecclesiastes' in Hastings *D. B.* i., 'Old Testament piety has never achieved a greater triumph than in the book of Koheleth.'

^a Dr. Wright gives the following list of parallel or antagonistic passages. Wisd. 2¹. Eccl. 2²², 5^{16.17} | Wisd. 2^{2.3.5}. Eccl. 8⁸, and 3^{2.18.21} | Wisd. 2² (the word *αὐτοσχεδίως*) and Eccl. 3¹⁹, 9¹¹ | Wisd. 2⁴ and Eccl. 1¹¹, 2¹⁶, 9⁵ | Wisd. 2⁵ (v.⁹) and Eccl. 6¹², 8¹³ | Wisd. 2⁶⁻¹⁰ and Eccl. 9⁷⁻⁹ | Wisd. 3²⁻³, and Eccl. 9² | Wisd. 8¹⁶, and Eccl. 1¹⁸ | Wisd. 8¹⁰ and Eccl. 9¹¹ | Wisd. 8¹³ and Eccl. 2¹⁶. Dr. Wright maintains the theory of a deliberate polemic of Wisdom against Koheleth. He assumes (p. 67) that the Freethinkers of Alexandria actually appealed to that book as the genuine work of Solomon.

We are accustomed to such exaggerations. The main point for us is the way in which the book struck the author^a of Wisdom, and we cannot blame him if he overlooked the Old Testament piety and went straight to such words as Eccl. 9⁷⁻⁹: 'Eat thy bread with joy and drink thy wine with a merry heart; for God hath already accepted thy works. Let thy garments be always white, and let not thy head lack ointment. Live joyfully with thy wife whom thou lovest all the days of thy vanity . . . for that is thy portion in life.' Is he misrepresenting Koheleth when he puts into the mouth of the *wicked* such words as (2⁷) 'Let us enjoy the good things that now are . . . let us fill ourselves with costly wine and perfumes, and let no flower of spring pass us by'? In some verses he seems to take the very words of the 'Preacher' to refute: it is he and his crew who say 'the misery of man is great upon him,' and Wisdom repeats the sentiment with reprobation in (2¹) 'Short and sorrowful is our life.' 'We shall be hereafter as though we had never been' (Wisd. 2²) is an echo of Eccles. 9⁶, 'the dead know not anything . . . for the memory of them is forgotten.' Death and life are both determined by a random chance: 'by mere chance we were born' (Wisd. 2²), 'time and chance happeneth to them all' (Eccles. 9²). 'The body shall be turned into ashes and the spirit shall be dispersed as thin air' (Wisd. 2³) represents a certain interpretation of Eccles. 12⁷, which may well have been current in the days of the writer of 'Wisdom.' To the recurring complaint that 'all things are vanity and the pursuit of wind,' he answers with the stern rebuke that 'murmuring is unprofitable' (Wisd. 1¹¹) and indeed worse; for 'no man that uttereth unrighteous things shall be unseen; neither shall convicting Justice pass him by' (Wisd. 1⁸). Where Koheleth speaks of seeking wisdom in wine and revelry and the delights of the sons of men (Eccles. 2¹⁻⁸), the Alexandrian answers that 'Wisdom will not dwell in a body that is subject unto sin' (Wisd. 1⁴).

Besides these general arraignments of the three most offensive points in Koheleth—its unJudaic character, its despairing theory, or want of theory, of an after life, and its Hedonism—a number of minor antagonisms appear between the two writers. The different view taken of the function of kings and rulers and of their iniquities (Eccles. 5⁸,

^a Plumptre, *Introd.*, p. 74, 'I look on the estimate which the author of the Wisdom of Solomon formed of Ecclesiastes as a wrong one, that he was wanting in the insight that sees the real drift which is the resultant of cross currents and conflicting lines of thought.'

10^{4,20}, compared with Wisd. has 6¹⁻¹⁰) already been noticed. But Wisdom's view of domestic life is also different from that of Koheleth: the latter's opinion of women is, like that of all sensualists, a low one: Eccles. 7²⁶, 'one (good) man among a thousand I have found; but a woman among all those have I not found'; 'he is met,' says Plumptre, 'with the half personal answer that that was but natural, that it was true of all who despised wisdom and nurture that their wives were lightminded and their children wicked' (Wisd. 3¹²). Again Koheleth certainly takes a sensual view of wedlock. His exhortations to 'live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest' (9⁹), though expressed in unimpeachable language, can have but one meaning. It is just possible that 11^{1,2}, 'cast thy bread upon the waters,' etc., and 12¹, 'Remember thy fountain' (?) have the same significance; but it is unnecessary to press the point. The doctrine of 'Wisdom' implies no asceticism: it simply affirms that 'blessed is the barren who is undefiled' (3¹³), which very possibly refers not even to breaches of chastity, but to unlawful marriages with Gentiles or apostate Jews. Taking it in this latter sense, there is no reason to argue that Koheleth (Plumptre, p. 73) 'welcomed on almost equal terms children born in and out of wedlock': he may have done so: the author of Wisdom does not accuse him of it, but certainly the latter shows no trace of the doctrine of the 'more rigid Essenes.'

Lastly, it is assumed by Dr. Charles, whom we quote as one of the latest writers on the question, that the purpose of the Pseudo-Solomon is to prove that 'for the soul in such straits' (i.e. weighed down by the corruptible body) 'there is one sovereign remedy, and that is Divine wisdom.' Wisdom is the 'redeemer of the soul and its preserver, and the only spring of its immortality' (*Eschatology*, p. 256).

The last statement arises from a confusion between actual immortality and the purely figurative 'deathlessness' (of reputation?) alluded to in 8¹⁷ and 6^{18,19}. But unless these two passages be further forced so as to prove wisdom to be the 'redeemer of the soul and its preserver,' one may well ask where, in the whole book, such statements are to be found.

Dr. Charles is induced to read this strong assertion of the present succouring power of wisdom into the book, because he acknowledges only the vaguest form of immortality as compensating the righteous hereafter for their sufferings here on earth. (See additional note on the Interpretation of Wisd. 3¹⁻⁷.) But there certainly are traceable

in the first few chapters signs of a view of Wisdom not unlike that which modern Christian preachers sometimes put forward under the name of Nature: something vague and yet active, intervening between God and man, on which the blame of man's misfortunes and errors may be conveniently cast at times; not a real entity or person, but of sufficient substance to be described as 'God's handmaid,' or, on the other hand, as in Tennyson's famous 'Nature red in tooth and claw.' No one supposes that Professor Drummond or the late poet laureate believed in a personified Nature, and probably the author of Wisdom, even when, as in chaps. 7, 8, 9, he comes nearest to 'hypostatising' Wisdom, goes no further in actual belief than they did. But even the vague conception of *σοφία* as God's helper and companion appears only in the first nine chapters, and principally, of course, in the three attributed to Solomon. In the last ten the idea is silently dropped, or rather another conception of Wisdom substituted. We are told in chap. 6²⁴ that we are now to have a sketch of Wisdom's career, and we anticipate a kind of Philosophy of History, but we never get it. The next three chapters are filled with Solomonic praises of her, and the remaining ten are occupied with that form of *human* wisdom which consists in the resolute rejection of idolatry.

It should be noted that Dr. Farrar (*Introd.*, 418b) takes a view similar to that of Dr. Charles, but in a modified form: he recognises that what is secured by wisdom is merely 'immortal memory'^a (8¹⁰⁻¹⁶), but he repeats the other eulogies of her from chaps. 7-9, and adds one point. 'Childlessness and a short life might be regarded as misfortunes; but when they befall the possessor of wisdom they were blessings far more consummate than the many children of long-lived sinners' (4¹⁻⁸). Unfortunately for the argument, it is not the 'possessor of wisdom' but of 'virtue'^b (*μετὰ ἀρετῆς* 4¹) who is alluded to.

^a With this figurative view of 'immortality' compare that of Eccl. (37²⁶). 'His name (that of the wise man) shall live for ever' (41^{12,13}), 'a good name continueth for ever': cf. Burney, *Israel's Hope of Immortality*, pp. 65-68. The son of Sirach certainly did not believe in 'immortality' in our sense of the word, or indeed in any real world beyond the grave. Bois, *Essai Critique*, p. 386 (who speaks contemptuously of this pseudo-immortality as an 'immortalité mnémonique'), wonders that after writing chap. iii. the author should limit himself to the mention of any such figurative eternity, and thinks it still more remarkable that he should use *ἀθανασία* in such a sense.

^b It seems possible, moreover, that the 'virtue' referred to is merely rejection of paganism, and that the 'multitudinous offspring of the impious' are simply the result of mixed marriages. Siegfried and Reuss, *ad loc.*

But on the whole Farrar's statement is reasonable with regard to the first part of the book. After speaking of the persecution, he says, 'the author of the book of Wisdom has to face the question how such a state of things is compatible with the faithfulness of the chosen people. His solution of the old problem is involved in the eulogies of wisdom. It is practically a Stoic view of life and providence.' But, like Dr. Charles, he also asserts (409a) that the writer of Wisdom 'says nothing about resurrection,' and that 'it may be considered doubtful whether the views of the writer went beyond a belief in the continuance of *some sort of retribution* beyond the grave.'

To sum up: that 'Wisdom's' first chapters are written with a distinct purpose—that of exhortation to the Epicurean Jews, and a passionate appeal to them to return to the belief of their fathers, and abandon their worldly philosophy, can hardly be doubted. For the three middle chapters we have assigned below a distinct purpose also—possibly a different origin. The last ten have been not without reason described by modern Jewish critics as a Passover sermon. To look for any distinct purpose or end as pervading the whole book is futile: nor will any scholar who has read the book well, and recognised the discursive nature of the writer's mind as therein mirrored, waste his time in attempting to discover such.

§ 4. Title.

The question of the title of the book of Wisdom is one of unusual interest. We cannot dismiss it as Farrar does with the cursory remark (*Introd.*, p. 412a) that Solomon had become a sort of collective name for all sapiential Hebrew literature, just as all Psalms were collected under the name of David and Greek fables were usually assigned to *Æsop*. Similarly, Siegfried (*Introd.* in Kautzsch, *Apokr.*, i. 476) merely remarks that Solomon was the 'patron of all didactic literature,' referring very appositely to the character of him given in Ecclus. 47¹⁴⁻¹⁷, 'the countries marvelled at thee for thy songs, and proverbs, and parables, and interpretations,' and so on. But the assumption of the pseudonym by the writer of Wisdom is capable of two different explanations, each of which has its bearing on the character and purpose of the book.

The history of the title may be briefly given. The uncial MSS. all head the book in one Greek form or another, the 'Wisdom of Solomon.' The Vulgate, or rather the Old Italian, has simply 'Liber Sapientiae,'

The Peshitto version is of uncertain date, but its superscription is noteworthy, 'the book of the great Wisdom of Solomon, son of David. Of which there is a doubt; whether another wise man of the Hebrews wrote it in a prophetic spirit, putting it in the name of Solomon, and it was received.' The Arabic translator expresses no doubts. Of the Greek Fathers, Epiphanius^a and Pseudo-Athanasius^b call it *πανάρετος Σοφία*; Clement of Alexandria^c and Origen,^d ἡ θεία Σοφία. Of the Latins, Augustine called it 'Liber *Christianae Sapientiae*' (which is curious), and in the *De Civ. Dei.*, xvii. 20, classed it, together with Ecclesiasticus, as customarily called Solomon's on account of some similarity of diction, but added 'non autem esse ipsius non dubitant doctiores.' Jerome in his Preface^f to the books of Solomon describes it as 'Pseudepigraphus,' and elsewhere refers to it as 'the wisdom that is ascribed to Solomon, if any one thinks proper to receive the book.' It was probably this contemptuous view of it that induced him to let the old Italian version pass without any important alterations from his pen. Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.*, v. 21) says that Irenaeus quoted from Hebrews and the so-called (*τῆς λεγομένης*) Wisdom of Solomon. But the most extraordinary title is found in the Muratorian Canon, where, after the mention of the Epistle of St. Jude and the third and fourth of St. John, we find 'et Sapientia Salomonis ab amicis Salomonis in honorem ipsius scripta.' Tregelles thought (*Canon Murat.*, 53) that the writer had mistaken ὑπὸ Φίλων (an early ascription of the book to Philo) in his Greek original for ὑπὸ φίλων (having probably never heard of Philo); but the words are capable of explanation. They may mean that Solomon's admirers wrote the book to vindicate his doctrines from the false view of them given by Koheleth; or they may signify that the book was written literally 'in his honour,' like the *Laelius* and *Cato Major* of Cicero. The presbyter who forged the *Acts of Paul and Thekla* is said to have declared that he did so for the love of the apostle

^a *De Ponder. et Mens.*, § 4.

^b *Synops. Script.*, ii. 173 D, ed. Bened.

^c *Strom.*, iv. 16 (i. 609, l. 27, ed. Potter).

^d In *Ep. ad Rom.*, vii. 14; but elsewhere (*c. Celsum*, v. 29) he speaks of it as ἡ ἐπιγεγραμμένη τοῦ Σαλωμῶντος σοφία.

^e *Ep.* 130; *De Doctr. Christ.*, ii. 8, cf also *Retractt.*, ii. 4.

^f Vol. i. col. 937-8, ed. Bened., Paris, 1693; Wright, *Koheleth*, p. 57. 'It is worthy of note that some of the Fathers, such as Origen, Eusebius, and Augustine, who doubted or denied the Solomonic origin of the book, maintained its divine inspiration.' But in the quotation from 14¹² in Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.*, i. 9 (p. 33 ed. Heinichen), it is simply called *θεῖον λόγιον* and not *θεῖος λόγος* as in Origen.

(Tertull., *de Baptismo*, 17). It is suggested that in the repetition of the word 'Salomonis' a reference to his 'Psalms' may be concealed.

But of pseudonymous^a literature there are several widely distinct varieties. In some cases books have been written merely 'in honorem ejus,' like the writings of Cicero just quoted, where no one is expected or supposed to accept the name at the head of the treatise as genuine. Somewhat different from this case is that of Plato's *Apologia of Socrates* and the rival tractate of Xenophon. Here we certainly have an effort to represent what the eponymous hero of the work said or should have said: the line between 'in honorem ejus' and forgery becomes, as in the case of the speeches in Thucydides, less distinct. Possibly it is to this class that the book of *Wisdom* belongs, and its position in such case cannot be better described than in the words of Dean Plumptre (*Introd. to Eccles.*, pp. 70, 71) who regards 'Wisdom' as primarily intended to confute 'Koheleth.' 'Let us remember,' he says, 'in what light it [Koheleth] must have presented itself to him. It had not, if our conclusion as to its authorship be right, the claim which comes from the reverence due to the authority of a remote antiquity or an unquestioned acceptance. He must have known that it had not been received as canonical without a serious opposition, that the strictest school of the Pharisees had been against its reception, that it had seemed to them tainted with the heresy of Epicureanism and Sadduceism. If it was interpreted then as it has often been interpreted since, it may have seemed to him to sanction a lawless sensuality, to fall in with the thoughts of those who said, "let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," and to throw doubt, if not denial, on the soul's immortality. Was this, he seems to have asked himself, the true ideal of wisdom? Was it not his duty to bring before men another Solomon than that whose experience seemed to end in materialism and pessimism, in the scepticism of an endless doubt? And so he too adopts without any hesitation the form of personated authorship.' This account of things can hardly be bettered. The writer of *Wisdom* accepts Koheleth as a manifesto (possibly published not very long before) of the Epicurean

^a Early commentators were not without their doubts as to the morality of the ascription to Solomon. John of Salisbury, *Ep. cxlii.*, Migne, 199, col. 129, indicates this: 'Librum sapientiae composuit Philo diciturque Pseudipigraphus, non quia male scripserit, sed quia male inscrispsit. Inscriptus enim est Sapientia Salomonis cum a Salomone non sit editus.'

school of thought, and he says, 'I pit the real Solomon against your false Solomon; I am persuaded that your ideas are not such as the wise monarch would have approved. I give to the world my book under the name of Solomon the Genuine as against Solomon the garbled and fictitious.'^a

This would be a perfectly satisfactory settlement of the question of pseudonymity if it were not for the three Solomonic chapters 7-9. It has been already remarked that that acute critic Bickell stigmatised the distinctly Solomonic passages in Koheleth as introduced for the purpose of obtaining for the book admission into the Canon. Can we be quite sure that a similar object did not dictate the composition of these chapters, though in all probability they are by the author of the rest? (cf. the section on the *Unity of the Book*).

This view is taken by authorities of weight. Kuenen^b (*Rel. of Israel*, Eng. trans., iii. 176) remarks that almost all the Jewish apologetics are pseudepigraphic, *i.e.* written in the names of older authors, and so arranged as to induce the unsuspecting reader to believe in the authorship. The augmentors of Esther and Daniel did this, inasmuch as their additions joined on to the original and appeared to be part of it. We may go somewhat further, and point out that in the case of 'Daniel' it was the successful capture of the name of the Old Testament saint referred to in Ezek. 14¹⁴⁻²⁰ and 28³ that probably secured the admission of a questionable book into the Canon, while the honesty of the son of Sirach forfeited for him all hope of such a privilege.

Such appropriation of literary reputations was so continual that it seems to have become recognised as a trick of the trade. Speaking of the Alexandrine age, Dr. Plumptre (*Introd. to Eccles.*, p. 53) says, 'The students of philosophy habitually conveyed their views in the

^a Dr. Wright (*Koheleth*, p. 60) quotes a book on 'the Authorship of Ecclesiastes,' by the Rev. David Johnston, in which it is stated that the allegation that the book of Wisdom personates Solomon is scarcely borne out by the contents of the book—apparently on the ground that Solomon is not mentioned by name. But surely the allusion to the building of the temple in 9⁸ is sufficient to establish this point. Cf. notes on 7¹.

^b So too Dähne, *Geschichtl. Darst. der jüd.-alex. Philosophie*, ii. 223, who remarks that 'all these interpolations are cunningly done.' [He is speaking of Eupolemus, Pseudo-Phocylides, etc.] 'They are effected in the case of writers who lived in the days of Jewish splendour and therefore would be likely to speak of the nation with respect.' They did not always escape exposure, cf. Dähne's notes *ad loc.*

shape of treatises by Aristotle or lectures or dialogues by Plato. There was scarcely a medical writer of eminence at Alexandria who had not published his views as to the treatment of disease under the name of Hippocrates.' This is all very well, but the design of these persons was to all intents and purposes fraudulent, and it is not well to class them with the authors of the two 'Apologies' of Socrates, as Dr. Plumptre does. They have done an infinity of mischief by preventing us from discerning which are the genuine and which the supposititious works of the great masters. But of their absolute want of conscience on this point Bertholet, in Budde's *Althebräische Litteratur*, p. 339, quotes some striking instances. An Arabic author, Gâhîz, is said by Al Masûdi to have complained that the only way to secure popularity for his books was to ascribe them to some great foreign authority ; the story of the *Acts of Paul and Thekla* has been quoted above ; and in the second preface to 2 Macc. (2¹⁴) we have an example of the way in which scattered notices were to be collected and combined into one pseudopigraphic work.

The question is then, Is the author of 'Wisdom' to be reckoned among the forgers? The answer depends on the view which we take of the three middle chapters, 7-9. If those are part of the original scheme of the book, then the author's intention is innocent. If they are later additions, they are additions deliberately made to secure, if not canonicity, at least popularity for the work.

§ 5. Authorship of Wisdom.

The conjectures as to the authorship of such a book may well seem to be the vainest of pursuits. The assumption of a false name, for whatever purpose, obviously precludes the writer from giving us the slightest hint as to his own real personality, and so far he has perfectly succeeded in concealing his identity. Such theories as are here stated are merely for the benefit and information of the student, who may, if he cares to do so, find the result, or want of result, attained to, in the authorities quoted. The best summary is undoubtedly that of Farrar (*Introd.*, pp. 411 *sqq.*).

1. The hypothesis of Solomonic authorship, questioned, as we have seen, so far back as the date of the Syriac Peshitto, may be at once dismissed. Neither on internal nor on external evidence (for the Fathers who quote the book as by Solomon are obviously speaking as loosely as we do when we speak of 'Remember thy creator' as the

words of the great king) can we presume such authorship. It is slaying the slain when Reuss (*Introd.*, p. 505) points out the discrepancies; in particular, that the reference to all the nations that had oppressed the Jews, with their many and modern forms of idolatrous worship, points to a time far later than the victorious days of Solomon.^a

2. The passing suggestion of St. Augustine (*De Doctr. Christ.*, ii. 8) that the book was written by the son of Sirach was withdrawn by the author of it (*Retractations*, ii. 4), and is every way untenable. The two writers not only differ in style and in purpose,^b but also, as we shall presently see, are diametrically opposed on the question of the resurrection.

3. More serious is the suggestion that Aristobulus, or rather Pseudo-Aristobulus, wrote the book. Now, if 'Aristobulus' had really been what he represents himself to be, the historic personage spoken of as 'instructor of King Ptolemy' in 2 Macc. 1¹⁰, no doubt Dr. Farrar's arguments would hold good. He says quite truly that Ptolemy's teacher could never have written Wisd. 6¹⁻⁵ (the address to the 'judges of the ends of this earth'), and that the condition of the Jews under Ptolemy Philometor was not consistent with talk of persecution. But the Aristobulus of Eusebius is no 'teacher of Ptolemy' at all; he is a Jewish apologist writing some forty years after the

^a Equally unnecessary is the argument that Solomon with his 700 wives and 300 concubines is not the proper person to chant the praises of purity and self-restraint, as in 3³ *sqq.* It should be noted, however (Wright, *Koheleth* p. 64), that in later times at least the Jewish authorities refused to recognise the conduct of Solomon as sinful. The Talmud explained away the crimes both of David and Solomon, and asserted that the former was never guilty of adultery.

Quite recently Margoliouth (*Expositor*, 1900, i. 141, 186) has revived the idea of Solomonic authorship. He argues (1) that where there is correspondence between Siracides and Wisdom (as in the passages about the children of the wicked), Ecclesiasticus copied Pseudo-Solomon; (2) that Isaiah (28¹⁵, 40¹⁵, and 35⁶) was thinking of Wisdom and not Wisdom of Isaiah; (3) and finally declares openly for the Solomonic authorship of Wisdom, the references to Greek philosophy being introduced by the translator.

^b Cf. Nestlé in Hastings's *D. B.*, iv. 550. Speaking of Ben-Sira as an expounder of 'Wisdom,' with a magniloquent description of which he opens his book, he says quite truly, 'he does not dwell long in these lofty regions, but turns himself to the wisdom of daily life'; but even of daily life Pseudo-Solomon has a higher conception than Siracides. Cf. Schürer, ii. 3, 230, and for a brilliant and humorous estimate of the value of Ben-Sira for didactic purposes, Salmon, 'Introd. to Apocrypha' in *Speaker's Commentary*, i. p. xxxix.

Christian era (cf. Grätz, *Gesch. der Juden*, iii. 632), and the main argument against his authorship of the book of Wisdom, apart from the want of all evidence to that effect, is that while he seeks to conciliate the Pagans by wholesale forgeries, the author of Wisdom confines himself to denunciation of their idolatrous follies.

4. The view that Philo^a was the author of the book had been held by writers before Jerome 'nonnulli scriptorum veterum' (*Praef. in Libros Salmonis*, vol. i. col. 937-8 ed. Bened.). It is not stated that he held it himself, but Nicolaus of Lyra is said to have done so, as also Luther and our own Bishop Cosin. It might suffice to quote the incisive words of Reuss (*Introd.*, p. 505), 'this merely proves that the study of Philo's philosophy was yet in a very rudimentary stage'; but an examination of the claims of 'Wisdom' to Philonian authorship may absolve us from the wearisome task of investigating the possible connection of the two writers. That they were contemporaries (or nearly so), knowing nothing of one another, or at least ignoring one another,^b is the theory which commends itself on the ground of common sense. It reconciles the opposing views of Farrar, who (p. 421b) thinks that if Pseudo-Solomon had preceded Philo he must have influenced him, and that of other writers who argue that the system (?)

^a To the objections to Philo's authorship one or two are added by Bissell (*Apocr.*, p. 226). (1) If ἐπισκοπή (37.18) be taken in the sense of the day of Judgment, we have here another idea quite foreign to the Philonian philosophy. (2) Considering the absolute personification of σοφία (?λόγος) in Philo, how would it have been possible for him to have kept this thought out of sight, if he had been the author of 'Wisdom,' in passages like 9.1.2 (where λόγος and σοφία occur one after another), 16.12, and 18.15 (where λόγος is spoken of as all-powerful, without mention of σοφία)? It is further objected by the writer in the *Church Quarterly* (April 1879, p. 83) that if Philo had written a book on the divine wisdom he would undoubtedly have made Moses the great philosopher and not Solomon. The same article quotes the *Shalsheleth Hakkabah* as follows: 'Nearly one hundred years before the destruction of the temple there was another Jew well skilled in Jewish matters and a wonderful philosopher, Philo of Alexandria. He was the author of various books in Greek, as also of the book called Wisdom, which the Gentiles include in their Bibles, supposing it to be Solomon's.' Basil, according to the same authority, is supposed to attribute 'Wisdom' to Philo, because he refers the tradition as to the manna adapting itself to all tastes to that author. But the legend was common. Cf. notes on 16.20.

^b Westcott, in Smith's *D. B.*, thinks that if Philo's writings were examined with this definite object, some allusion to 'Wisdom' must surely be found. It may be said now that Philo's writings have been thoroughly examined, and that no trace of such allusion has been found.

of 'Wisdom' is less advanced than that of Philo, and must therefore precede it in point of time.

(a) We cannot afford altogether to neglect the question of style and power of employing language. Even the most casual reader of Philo's lucubrations will recognise that he could never have written the lurid descriptions of 'Wisdom,' chapters 16-19. But there are also positive discrepancies, *e.g.* as to the use of tradition. Philo narrows down the Hebrew scriptures to their simplest form in order that he may allegorise them away. Pseudo-Solomon accepts tradition with joy whenever it answers his purpose, as in 16²⁰, where we have the legend of the transformation of the manna to suit divers ages and tastes (quoted as from the *Midrash Rabba*, ii. 37a, Warsaw edition, by Margoliouth in *J. R. A. S.*, 1890, p. 290). The 'allegorisings' of Philo and Pseudo-Solomon are on a different basis and have a different object. Farrar's remarks, which have been illustrated above, are well worthy of quotation. 'Philo,' he says, 'allegorises rather than exaggerates; Pseudo-Solomon exaggerates rather than allegorises. It seems strange that any commentator who is at all familiar with Philo's habitual method of dealing with Scripture should suppose that he could possibly have written a book of which the method is so un-Philonian as that of the book of Wisdom' (*Introd.*, p. 412b).

(b) The philosophy of the two writers is entirely different. It may be questioned whether the writer of Wisdom has any system of thought at all beyond the conviction that God governs and guides His chosen people. To this he adds—'eclectically,' which means confusedly—certain elements of Stoic and Platonic philosophy or rather language, and there his 'system' ends. But Philo has a real structure of his own, vague as it is. Its main points are the trichotomy of the soul, the doctrine of ideas, a faint reflex of that of Plato, and the theory of the Logos.

Of the first of these, it may be said at once, there is no trace^a at all in Wisdom. 'Mind' and 'soul' are used without misgiving as interchangeable terms in 9¹⁵. To attempt to find in 13¹ ἐκ τῶν ὄρωμένων ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ἵσχυσαν εἰδέναι τὸν ὄντα an allusion to the 'central idea' of Plato (cf. Siegfried in Kautzsch, *Apokr.*, i. 477) is simple perversity. The conception and the expression are Hebraic, as

^a Bois (*Essai*, p. 274) remarks that if there is any analysis of being at all, Wisdom gives it not three parts but about six. He enumerates (a) body, (b) the γεώδες σκῆνος, (c) ψυχή, (d) νοῦς, 9¹⁶, (e) πνεῦμα, 15¹¹, and possibly also (f) συνείδησις, 17¹⁰.

in Exod. 3¹⁴, 'Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὄν . . . ὁ ὄν ἀπέσταλκέ με πρὸς ὑμᾶς. And there seems to be no other trace of the doctrine of ideas.^a

'Logos' seems to occur in a purely abstract sense thrice, and thrice only, in the book of Wisdom. The question is whether the 'Wisdom' of Pseudo-Solomon can be identified with the Logos of Philo; if it can, we have not only a rapprochement between the two writers, but also some sort of proof that the 'Wisdom' of Pseudo-Solomon may have played its part in influencing early Christian doctrines. The concrete evidence on this point is slender (cf. additional note A). But when we come to examine the passages in which Pseudo-Solomon speaks of the Logos, they do not seem to favour the idea that the Philonian Logos at all events had any part in the system of the author of Wisdom. The first is chapter 9^{1,2} (one of the 'Solomonic' chapters be it observed), where the king prays 'Lord of mercy, who hast made all things with thy word and ordained man through thy wisdom that he should have dominion,' and so forth: this is said to prove the identity of the Logos with Wisdom. It may be so, but what at once strikes us is the fact that the Logos deals with the creation of the world, the Sophia with the wellbeing of man. But the author is probably writing loosely; in Psalm 33⁶ 'By the word of the Lord were the heavens made and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth,' no one surely will pretend to find a philosophic doctrine of the Logos. The prayer of which the words form part is based on Old Testament diction, and the words have their ordinary sense. In 16¹² ὁ σὸς, Κύριε, λόγος ὁ πάντα λώμενος, referring to the brazen serpent, it is obvious that what we should call the 'will' of God is referred to; there can be no technicality in the expression. And this view is supported by the fact that in the very next line σύ (God himself) is substituted for λόγος. In the last instance (18¹⁵), 'Thy word leaped down from heaven,' it seems to have the same meaning. Gfrörer (*Philo*, ii. 232) is no doubt right in refusing to identify it here with *σοφία*. The idea of *σοφία*, the *φιλάνθρωπον πνεῦμα*, as a destroying spirit, is too in-

^a Gfrörer, *Philo*, ii. 226, professes to find such trace in 7^{25,26}, though he is puzzled by *ἀπαύγασμα*, which, as meaning 'reflection in a mirror,' can denote only something shadowy and unsubstantial. In like manner he argues that the 'holy tabernacle which thou preparedst beforehand from the beginning' refers to the doctrine.

Deane *ad loc.* also refers to Burton's *Bampton Lectures*. But Burton relies almost entirely on the views of Brucker, *Hist. Phil.*, ii. 694 *sqq.*, and discovers Platonism everywhere.

congruous. In the face of this it seems difficult to argue, as does Bois, that because the same epithets are applied to *σοφία* and to the Logos they are therefore identical in the mind of the author of Wisdom. The plain fact is that the writer knows nothing of the exact and philosophical conception of a Logos. He uses the term casually for the 'will of God,' and every passage^a which assigns the same characteristics to Sophia and Logos really proves that Sophia is no person in the estimation of the writer, but merely a manifestation of the will of God.

Now, so far as we can interpret the erratic and at times contradictory ideas of Philo, he does seem to identify *σοφία* (of which he has but little to say) and the Logos. He makes a certain distinction between 'divine' and 'human' wisdom (*Quis Rerum Div. Her.*, § 25), but the *σοφία* of Proverbs 8, of Ecclesiasticus, and of Baruch (3^{20,37}) is not important for his system. His one point is the Logos, and of the Logos Pseudo-Solomon knows nothing from a philosophical point of view. He uses *ρῆμα* in 16²⁶ as merely equivalent to *λόγος*.

(c) The theology of the two writers differs entirely. Philo does not recognise, or at least does not mention, a spirit of evil, which is plainly spoken of by Pseudo-Solomon in 2²⁴. The 'serpent' in Eden is in Philo's view merely an allegorical term for pleasure. Furthermore, whereas Pseudo-Solomon, in spite of his statement in

^a The passages actually quoted by Bois (p. 236) are as follows : (1) *σοφία* creates all things—9¹², 7²², 8⁵, 9⁹; so does Logos 9² (but see above). (2) Logos by inflicting the plagues delivered Israel from Egypt, 18¹⁵. It was also Wisdom that delivered them, 10¹⁵⁻¹⁶. (3) Both are called *παντοδύναμος*, 18¹⁵, 7²³. (4) They dwell in the same place, 18¹⁵, 9⁴, by 'the throne.' (5) Logos touches heaven and walks on earth, 18¹⁶, and Wisdom 'reacheth from one end to another,' 8¹. The reader can judge how far identity of idea is proved by these texts.

Bois' identification of the *πνεῦμα ἄγιον* with *σοφία* (p. 234) may be accepted; it proves nothing with regard to the connection of 'Wisdom' and Philo. Größer, *Philo*, ii. 216, 217, had already acknowledged it. Bousset, *Rel. des Judenthums*, p. 342, argues that Wisdom, the 'holy spirit of discipline' and the spirit of God are in the writer's idea one and the same. But the 'holy spirit of discipline' is generally taken as 'a holy spirit of discipline' (1⁵, cf. notes *ad loc.*).

Acting on his idea that *λόγος* and *σοφία* are the same, Bois (p. 249) remarks that whereas the Stoics believed that all created things possessed the Logos, but men in a different degree to animals, Pseudo-Solomon makes his distinction between the bad and the good man. The good possess wisdom exactly as God does. *Συμβίωσις* is used of both relations (8³ and 8⁹). But the wicked must possess it in a certain sense also; for Wisdom penetrates all (7²⁴, 8¹).

9¹⁵ that 'a corruptible body weigheth down the soul,' acknowledges in 8²⁰ that there may be 'a body undefiled,' Philo, on the other hand, pushes the Platonic idea of the natural evil character of the body to its extreme. It is even called an 'utterly polluted prison' (*παρρίαρον δεσμωτήριον*, *De Migr. Abr.* 2). Of course with such views Philo could hardly hold that a resurrection of the body was possible. Indeed, there appears to be no mention of a resurrection in his writings at all; and herein he differs *toto cælo* from the author of *Wisdom*, chap. 3.

(d) Among other minor points of disagreement one stands out sharply. Pseudo-Solomon in a somewhat famous passage 3¹⁴ ('Happy is the eunuch which hath wrought no lawless deed with his hands,' etc.), commends a class of persons whose position was utterly abhorrent to Jewish feeling (cf. notes *ad loc.*). Philo (*de Vict. Offer.*, §§ 13, 16) speaks with approval and in somewhat revolting terms of their exclusion from the assemblies of God's people.

Lastly, there is a distinct difference in the two writers' treatment of idolatry^a and its causes. Philo (*de Monarchia*, i. 1, 3,^b) deduces certain forms of idolatry, and quite correctly, from the adoration of sun, moon, and stars. Pseudo-Solomon, with another kind of superstition in his mind, and possibly forced upon his notice by the proceedings of Caligula, ascribes such worship to the depiction of dead relatives (12¹⁶ *sqq.*). But he also recognises in 13² the other form. Little can be proved from such a point.

5. J. M. Faber's suggestion that Zerubbabel may have been the author of the book, fantastic as it seems, was founded (according to Blunt, *Annotated Bible*) on the apocryphal speech of that vague hero on Truth in 1 Esdr. 4¹³⁻⁴⁰.

6. But we come now to what is surely one of the strangest theories ever advocated by a sober-minded English scholar. Dr. Plumptre in the *Expositor*, Ser. I. vol. i. 329, 409, revived and defended an idea of Noack, a somewhat imaginative German writer of the last century, to the effect that 'Wisdom' was written by Apollos. He had not seen

^a Cf. Bousset, *Rel. des Judenthums*, p. 174, who remarks that Wisdom distinguishes three kinds of idolaters in order of merit—(1) the worshippers of the heavenly bodies, (2) the worshippers of images of men, (3) worshippers of beasts and reptiles. This, he thinks, is 'a finer appreciation of ethnic religion than Paul arrived at.'

^b Cf. also *De Vita Contemp.*, § 1; *De Decalog.*, §§ 12-16; *De Parent. Col.*, § 9.

Noack's book.^a His efforts at identification depend on a mixture of ingenious conjecture and of what a French writer calls *parallélomanie* —a mania which has possessed many commentators on the Apocrypha.^b He finds so many correspondences between Hebrews, Wisdom, and Clement of Rome that we are almost left in doubt as to whether all three authors are not the same. But he fails to meet the fatal objection that there is absolutely no resemblance between the general style of the books of Hebrews and Wisdom. That his theory has no external evidence to support it goes without saying.

Farrar's statement, however (414a), that Hebrews 'shows no trace of the familiarity with Greek learning and philosophy which is so remarkable a feature of the book of Wisdom' is of no great value. As we shall presently see, it may be questioned if the Pseudo-Solomon knew much philosophy at all, or even much Greek.

Giving up, therefore, as an insoluble problem, the question of the writer's personality, can we form any idea of the class or school to which he belonged? We may probably assume that he was an Egyptian Jew. Professor Margoliouth, it is true (*l.c.*, p. 295), argues against this idea. 'He knows,' he says, 'nothing of Egypt beyond what he might have got from the Bible,' and he proceeds to reason to the same effect from the omission of all mention of the peculiarities of the land of the Pharaohs; in particular, 'Wisdom,' he says, 'does not refer to the scarcity of water, but speaks of the 'ever-flowing river,' which is an incorrect description. He was answered by Freudenthal in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, 1891, and in the main effectually, though it is questionable if $\xi\acute{e}v\acute{o}i \acute{u}er\acute{o}l$ in 16¹⁶ can have the meaning of scarce or infrequent rains. Still less cogent is Margoliouth's argument that because the writer of Wisdom refers with affection to Jerusalem and never once to the rival temple of Onias at Leontopolis (*Jos., Ant.*, viii. iii. 3), he therefore did not dwell in Egypt.

^a Nor had Farrar, who (413b, n. 2) says that Noack (*Ursprung des Christenthums*, i. 222) 'supposes that Apollos wrote it with the help of the Apostle Paul.' Noack, on the contrary (ii. 244 *sqq.*), emphasises and exaggerates the difference between the two teachers, even discovering in St. Paul's quotation from Isaiah in I Cor. 1¹⁹ $\acute{a}po\acute{u}l\acute{o} \tau\acute{h}\acute{v} \sigma\acute{o}f\acute{h}\acute{a}\acute{v} \tau\acute{h}\acute{v} \sigma\acute{o}f\acute{h}\acute{w}\acute{v}$ at once a pun on Apollos' name and a denunciation of his teaching of the Hellenic $\sigma\acute{o}f\acute{h}\acute{a}$ or Logos. All the passages in which St. Paul argues against the 'wisdom of men' he takes to be directed against Apollos as the author of this book of Wisdom.

^b As an example we may quote Hilgenfeld's attempt to discover correspondences between 'Wisdom' and the 'Psalms of Solomon' (König, *Einl. in das A. T.*, 506 n.).

For though priests and Levites served in that sanctuary, it never could efface the old love for the temple at Jerusalem even among the Alexandrine Jews. 'In their eyes Jerusalem was still their holy city; they sent their temple tribute thither (Jos., *Ant.*, XIV. vii. 2), and went a pilgrimage thither' (Kuenen, *Rel. of Isr.*, Eng. trans., iii. 183).^a

The point of the Egyptian origin of the book is of some importance as affecting a theory which was held by Gfrörer (*Philo*, ii. 265) and others, to the effect that the author was an Essene,^b or a member of the branch of that society which existed in Egypt under the name of Therapeutæ. Unfortunately, as soon as mention is made of this sect we have to encounter furious prejudice. A certain school of critics are determined to exaggerate the numbers and importance of the Essenes in order to give colour to the hypothesis that Christianity itself was but a development of this Jewish form of belief which took the form of the extremest asceticism. Why Josephus thought^c fit to exalt the little sect is not very apparent (*Ant.*, XVIII. i. 5), but he estimates their numbers at four thousand only, and as they did not allow marriage, and depended on proselytising to maintain their numbers, it is not probable that they ever increased much. Gfrörer (*l.c.*) maintains with warmth that Wisdom is a Therapeutic book, but he builds chiefly on the supposed commendation of sterility in 3¹³, *μακαρία στείρα ἡ ἀμιάντος*, where 'unpolluted' may simply mean not contaminated by marriage with idolaters. The assumed direction to pray towards the sun in 16²⁸ is of no importance. Cf. notes *ad loc.*

But were there Therapeutæ in Egypt at all? The account of their existence there is based solely upon a tract '*De Vita contemplativa*,' attributed to Philo, which Grätz (*Gesch.*, iii. 658, 680) and Kuenen (*Rel. of Isr.*, Eng. trans., iii. 204) condemn as a forgery, the former roundly

^a Another argument which might be urged against the Egyptian origin of the book, viz., the apparent ignorance of the author as to Egyptian worship, as shown by his mention of vermin and reptiles as their deities, has not been much pressed. Even residents in Egypt (like Juvenal possibly) fall into the strangest errors with respect to the native customs.

^b This theory is held by Ed. Pfeiderer and defended by him at some length in *Die Philosophie des Heraklit von Ephesos*, Berlin, 1886, p. 306, n. 1.

^c It is now held by many critics (1) that Josephus wrote the account of the Essenes with a fixed intention 'to show what Jewish heresy was like,' and altered his facts to suit his purpose (Lucius, *der Essenismus*, 1881), and (2) Ohle (*Jahrb. für Prot. Theol.*, XIV.-XV.) doubts if Josephus ever wrote the passage at all, or thinks that if he did he was copying and exaggerating Philo.

declaring that it is a Christian work intended to exalt monasticism. It is defended by Conybeare in *Philo about the Contemplative Life*^a (Oxford, 1895), but a book so questioned can hardly, when it stands alone, be referred to as a safe authority.

Nor need the hypothesis that the book was written by a Christian detain us long.^b 'There is no trace in the book,' says Farrar rightly (414a), 'of any knowledge of Christ nor of His atonement nor of His resurrection,' and it is quite true that of nine texts adduced to support such a view (414b, n. 1), not a single one shows distinct marks of Christian origin. They are 3⁵, 4^{2,10}, 5¹⁷, 7²⁶, 9^{8,15} *sqq.*, 11^{10,24}, and it is not worth while to quote them at length. There remain, however, two passages of more importance—2^{17,18}, and 14⁷. In the first ('let us see if his word be true . . . for if the righteous man is God's son He will uphold him and He will deliver him out of the hand of his adversaries') we have certainly a very strong resemblance to S. Matt. 27^{42,43}, but that does not prove anything. As to the other text (4⁷), 'Blessed is the wood whereby righteousness cometh,' it certainly seems meaningless where it stands. It is capable of explanation, as we shall see, without referring it to the cross of

^a Conybeare seems to succeed in proving an early date for the book, but he fails to remove the impression (1) that an ideal rather than a real mode of life is described, (2) that the asceticism described is such as Philo had no sympathy with. In any case, it must be conceded (Edersheim, *Hist. of Jewish People*, App. viii.) that no one before Eusebius distinctly mentions the Therapeuta, and he thinks they were Christians. Drummond (*Philo*, i. 25) points out that Philo had no sympathy with asceticism, and quotes *Quod det. pot. ins.*, § 7, 'Bodily mortification is not temperance, nor ritual holiness.' Zeller in his third edition (III. ii. 207) gave up the defence of the 'contemplative life' as Philonian.

^b It was, however, strongly maintained by distinguished scholars down to the middle of the last century. Kirschbaum (cited by Grimm, p. 25) held that all the Apocrypha except 1 Macc., 1 Esdr., and Eccl., as well as all Philo's writings, were of Christian origin. Noack's theory is mentioned above. The original argument of C. H. Weisse is quoted in full by Bruch (*Weisheitslehre der Hebräer*, 324 n.). It is grounded on (1) the name 'Father' used of God, (2) the passage 9⁸, which seems entirely irrelevant, (3) the similarity of the language with that of the prayer of Ben-Sira in Eccl. 51, especially v. 10, 'I called upon the Lord, the Father of my Lord,' which he thinks undoubtedly Christian. His conclusion is 'it is said that St. Paul had this book before his eyes ! see if the reverse be not the truth.' He also held that Wisdom contained a 'clear and noble statement of the doctrine of immortality and retribution.'

Christ; but if any passage could encourage the theory that the book has been dealt with by a Christian interpolator, it would be this. Of other passages, 3¹³ is absolutely Judaic in sense, as we have seen; 4¹ is to be explained similarly; while in 2²⁴ the identification of the serpent with the devil is as much Talmudic as Christian. Cf. notes *ad loc.*

The most recent and also the most fantastic theory as to the authorship of the work is that propounded by Lincke (*Samaria und seine Propheten*, 1903), who claims at least the first part of the book as the work of a Samaritan and anti-Jewish patriot. The erring rulers addressed in the earlier chapters are the 'Hierocrats' at Jerusalem. The school of Samaria was founded under Persian auspices, and in the allusions to the devil we have a trace of the Persian dualism. The persecutors of the righteous man are the orthodox Jews.

All this requires proofs, and those which are adduced are as follows: (1) The author is no Jew, or he would have mentioned the law of Moses and have named the Jewish saints by name. (2) A Jew, whether in Egypt or Palestine, would, in describing the life of Abraham, have followed Jewish tradition and not the Samaritan historian Eupolemus.^a (Cf. note on 10⁵.) (3) The sparing of the Canaanites (12¹⁰) would

^a Whether Eupolemus was a Samaritan at all may very fairly be doubted. The only reason for thinking him to have been such seems to be that, while he is generally regarded as a Jew, Josephus, *c. Ap.*, i. 23, says that he, with Demetrius Phalereus and the elder Philo, was incapable of exact understanding of Jewish documents. But even if he was a Samaritan (1) the passage about Abraham (Euseb., *P. E.*, ix. 17) is probably not by him at all (Schürer, *H. J. P.*, ii. iii. § 32, pars. 2 and 6); (2) it does not describe Abraham as present at the building of Babel, but seems to imply that he lived ten (or thirteen) generations after. Dähne, ii. 222, founds his belief that Eupolemus was a Samaritan on the passage in Eusebius, *P. E.*, ix. xvii. 3: Ἀργαριζίν ὁ ἐστιν μεθερμηνευόμενον δρός ψίλστρου. Cf. Heinichen *ad loc.* It seems probable that Lincke derived his theory from Dähne.

As to the bitter hostility between Jews and Samaritans in the land of their common exile there can be no possible doubt. In the 'Martyrdom of Isaiah' (second century A.D.) it is a Samaritan who accuses the prophet (3⁶), under the inspiration of 'Belial,' who seems to have been regarded as the spirit of evil peculiar to the hated newcomers. Cf. *Orac. Sibyll.* iii. 63, 'from the Sebasteses (*i.e.* Samaritans) will Belial hereafter come' and do great mischief. He will be a kind of Antichrist (Grätz, iii. 628). The miserable dispute between the opposing factions in the days of Ptolemy Philometor, which ended in the martyrdom of two Samaritan representatives, is recounted by Jos. *Ant.*, XIII. iii. 4.

have no interest for Alexandria; but an appeal to such long-suffering of God might soften the heart of the cruel despots of Jerusalem. (4) Wisdom sets up against the orthodox 'righteousness according to the law,' a new righteousness founded on obedience to the decrees of 'Wisdom.'

It is not pretended that the book was written in Samaria, but it is pointed out (p. 143) that both Alexander the Great and Ptolemy I. transported multitudes of Samaritans to Egypt; these took with them their books—Phocylides, the Rechabite Psalms, the 'Oath of the Essenes': such literature was remodelled by Jews on Jewish lines, and possibly our book of Wisdom underwent similar manipulation. Such is Lincke's theory.

§ 6. The Conception of 'Wisdom' in the Book.

In approaching this subject the student must be warned that he will find in Pseudo-Solomon no exact philosophical reasoner, but rather a loose rhetorical thinker,^a who uses the first word that comes to hand, and that will round off a period. It is probably unfair to say that he wavers in his ideas of immortality (Siegfried in *Hast. D. B.*, iv. 930^a) between 'that of a continued personal existence and that of a survival in the memory of posterity,' for the *δθανασία* of 8¹³ is a figurative term, and there is no sign of his confusing it with the real immortality of the soul. But in other respects he reveals himself for what he is; a deeply religious Jew who has learned a little about Greek philosophy, and is not unwilling to let the world know that he has learned that little. If we leave out of account the three middle chapters, 7-9 (probably superimposed), we have the real man in his simplicity. Outside those chapters we have two expressions, and two only, which can be taken as showing acquaintance with Greek theories. They are *πρόνοια* in 14³ and 17², and *ἀμορφος* *ἄλη* in 11¹⁷.

On the other hand, when Mr. Deane (*Prolegom.*, p. 1a) says that 'herein is presented a view of the Hebrew religion definite and consistent,' he is surely going too far. Dr. Farrar's words (p. 415b) are more to the purpose: 'It cannot be called a Hebrew philosophy. The

^a An example of confusion of ideas is to be found in 19⁴—*ἡ ἀξία ἀναγκή*, a plain contradiction in terms. *ἀξία* implies freewill, *ἀναγκή* predestination. Cf. Drummond, *Philo*, i. 192 *sqq.* Dähne (ii. 154) is perhaps right when he says that there is in the whole book no clear philosophical word on the actual relation of God and Wisdom.

Jews had no philosophy; . . . a nation which was absorbed in the contemplation of a uniquely revealed religion had little or no need for a speculative philosophy.' He quotes Dr. A. B. Davidson as pointing out that the Hebrew Wisdom 'aims at the *recognition*, not the *discovery*, of God. It professes to *verify*, not to *infer*.' This explains the remark of Bois (*Essai critique*, p. 220) that 'he proves nothing; he produces results as if they had been arrived at elsewhere.'

We come now to 'that familiarity with Greek learning and philosophy which is so remarkable a feature of the book of Wisdom.' It may safely be said that there is not a line in the book which reveals any further knowledge of Greek philosophy than might be acquired by any frequenter^a of the schools and market-places of Alexandria. 'Il touche à tout, il ne développe rien,' says Reuss (p. 507), and he might have added that he probably did not know enough to develop anything. Yet the same writer speaks of him as 'sketching in a few pages a perfect encyclopædia of philosophic science, including almost all that we should consider such in modern times, from psychology and metaphysics down to the principles which should regulate domestic and social life.' But where is the encyclopædia? do the simple words 'circuits of years and positions of stars' (7¹⁹) evince a knowledge of the whole science of astronomy? Does the line (7²⁰) 'the natures of wild beasts,' contain an exposition of zoology and physiology? As to 'psychology and metaphysics,' we are left to discover them in the four words (two in the Greek) 'the thoughts of man'; while the next line, 'the diversities of plants and the virtues of roots,' gives us a fair idea of the exalted nature of our author's philosophy. Such 'sciences' as are indicated need not have been outside the ken of any ordinary Jewish student.

Siegfried falls into the common snare. In Kautzsch, *Apokr.*, i. 476, he says of the author of 'Wisdom,' 'He is acquainted with philosophy, especially Stoic and Epicurean; he knows their problems and their technical expressions. He shows knowledge of Greek culture in art and science, astronomy and natural history, and gives us historical

^a This is also more or less Grimm's estimate (*Einl.*, p. 22): 'Pseudo-Solomon's knowledge of Greek philosophy appears not as gained by any deep study, but as a casual acquaintance very loosely connected with the content of Old Testament religion.' Cf. Porter in *Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of W. R. Harper*, p. 209.

reflections.' Of the last point only there can be no doubt. But as to art in particular, the less said the better. A more Philistine point of view than that revealed in 15⁴⁻⁵ can hardly be conceived. 'Neither were we led astray by any evil device of men's art, nor yet by painters' fruitless labour, a form stained with varied colours, the sight whereof leadeth fools into lust; their desire is for the breathless form of a dead image.' The Mohammedan goes no further than this.

We may return to Reuss in his common-sense mood and his summing up of what we are to expect from 'Wisdom.' 'Il ne faut pas chercher dans les livres philosophiques de ce temps-là une méthode rationnelle et dialectique telle que nous l'exigeons de nos jours des compositions du même genre.' Much, of course, may be read into such a book where the outline is so vague.^a Recent writers have, however, raised so many interesting points with regard to Pseudo-Solomon's acquaintance with Greek philosophy, that the matter must receive fuller consideration below. After premising this much, we shall not be surprised to find that on his main and central subject (as it at first appears) of *σοφία*, our author is vague and self-contradictory. That his 'wisdom' in any way corresponds to the *λόγος* of Philo we may consider at once (cf. previous section) as not proven. But more than this: he forgets all about the Divine Wisdom, the demi-goddess *σοφία*, as he goes on, and such 'wisdom' as appears in the latter half of his book takes the form of that very human *φρόνησις* which rejects idolatry as at once contrary to all reason, and also as bringing physical and concrete plagues and torments upon its adherents.

What, then, is this 'Wisdom'? In its earliest form ('*hokma*'), as

^a One may quote as examples of such 'reading in' the attempt of Plumptre (*Eccles.*, p. 47) to find the doctrine of atoms in Koheleth, and Cheyne's quotation (*Job and Solomon*, 229 n.) of Dr. John Smith, 'who, in his *Portrait of Old Age* (1666), sought to show that Solomon was thoroughly acquainted with recent anatomical discoveries.'

Ewald (*Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, iii. 2, 549 n. 1) touches the real point. 'The influence of the Alexandrian philosophy on our author,' he says, 'has been much exaggerated.' And remarking on the fact that the four 'Platonic virtues,' of which so much has been made, occur only 'casually' in 87, he quotes 4 Macc. 1¹⁸, 5²², and 15¹⁰. Any one who will read these passages will be convinced that the person who wrote them was indeed saturated with Platonic philosophy, and will be equally assured that the author of the book of Wisdom treated them in his *obiter dicta* as of no particular importance. The insistence on these four virtues in the Fourth Book of Maccabees (in the case of Jews who refused to eat pork) is very marked.

exemplified in the parables of the Old Testament, it seems to have been a kind of common-sense philosophy of life, yet with a strong religious tendency, which had its professors, somewhat like the Sophists of Greece, who were looked upon askance by the prophets. But after the exile, when the springs of prophecy were dried up, it assumed a new shape. The writer of Proverbs 8 invented a semi-divinity,^a an offspring of God, the account of whose origin reminds us of the Greek myth of the birth of Pallas Athene from the brain of Zeus, and this idea is strengthened if we accept Siegfried's exposition (Hast., *D. B.*, iv. 925a) that God 'after the toils of creation found a diversion as it were in this his firstborn before the world, as the child played before his eyes'^b (Prov. 8³⁰). But Wisdom did not co-operate in the creating of the heavens and the earth. Nor does she in the Pseudo-Solomon (8⁴, 'she chooseth out for Him His works' cannot be interpreted to mean this). She has, according to Prov. 8^{31b}, to do with men alone; in these she finds her delight, to them alone she turns with her call to hear instruction.

Of course all this may simply mean a rhetorical account of that wisdom which is one of God's attributes, but it often came perilously near to the dualism which was so abhorrent to the Jewish mind. This exaggeration reaches its extreme point in the book of Baruch, where, after a long and ambiguous laudation of Wisdom (3²⁸⁻³⁶), we find the amazing statement (5³⁷), 'afterward did she appear upon

^a With this may be compared the curious personification of 'Wickedness' as a woman in Zech. 5⁵⁻¹¹. But Drummond (*Philo*, i. 142), doubts if even in Proverbs anything more than a 'purely poetical' personification is meant. There is, he says, no personification in Job.

^b Cheyne, however (*Jewish Religious Life*, p. 149), maintains that 'pre-existent Wisdom was the artificer of the world, one in purpose and in act with the creative Deity.' In order to support this, however, he has to correct Prov. 8³¹, which he renders 'sporting in the elaboration of his earth.' Bruch, *Weisheitslehre*, p. 346, had long ago emphasised the point that though wisdom is never spoken of by Pseudo-Solomon as instrumental in creating the earth (whereas the 'spirit of God' is), he yet afterwards seems, from several passages, to treat the two as identical. He thinks that the author had given so much power to Wisdom that he had left no room for the Holy Spirit, and so had to merge them in one another.

In the same work Bruch notices a feature of this 'Wisdom' which is strangely at variance with her high claims (p. 138). The very earthly quality called subtilty (craft, in fact) is an essential part of her (Prov. 8⁵⁻¹²), and she is also regarded as the best road to wealth (Prov. 3¹⁴⁻¹⁶, 8¹⁸). Cf. Reuss on Wisd. 10¹⁷: 'La sagesse consistait ici à duper les autres.'

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earth and was conversant^a with men.' This idea, entirely foreign to all Israelitish belief, it was sought to explain away by restricting the portion of humanity among which Wisdom moved to the Jewish nation only. And this is really the view of the author of Wisdom. After describing *σοφία* in such general terms as might satisfy any loose thinker, Greek or Jewish, of his times, in the first nine chapters, he illustrates her activity in the last ten solely by the history and successes of the Jewish people.

The less philosophical and less discerning the writers are who talk of Wisdom, the more unguarded we find them in their phraseology.^b They meant no harm; they simply did not weigh their words. Hence we find the Son of Sirach using the strongest language: 'All wisdom,' according to his first verse, 'is from the Lord, and is with him for ever'; it is unfathomable in its nature, and God alone comprehends it (1⁶); it was, however, created (1⁹), and God poured it out upon all his works. Then we come to Wisdom personified (24³⁻¹²). She glorifies herself; 'I came forth from the mouth of the Most High, and covered the earth as a mist' (Gen. 2⁶). 'I dwelt in high places, and my throne is on the pillar of the cloud' (cf. Wisd. 10¹⁷). Then follows the remarkable statement, 'in every people and nation I got a possession' (24⁶), followed by the contradictory command of the Creator (v. 8), 'let thy tabernacle be in Jacob and thine inheritance in Israel.' It is fairly obvious that this is loose and irresponsible talk. There is no attempt to define the exact limits and function of Wisdom; the self-glorification dies away into a comparison with cedars, cypresses, palm trees, rose plants, olives, planes, cinnamon, aspalathus, myrrh,—a mere poetic extravagance, devoid of philosophic meaning.^c

^a The A.V. made 'God' the nominative in this sentence, which was accordingly attacked as a Christian interpretation (but see Churton *ad loc.*). The Revisers are probably right in making 'Wisdom' the subject, though the versions are against them.

^b Seneca, *Ep.*, xviii. 3 (106), 'Si adfectus (animi) corpora sunt, . . . ergo et malitia et species ejus omnes, maligitas, invidia, superbia.' And in xix. 8 (117) he gives as the views of his school: 'Sapientiam bonum esse dicunt; sequitur ut necesse sit illam corporalem quoque dicere.'

^c Bois, p. 243 (who does not estimate 'Wisdom's' philosophic acumen very highly), thinks he is halting between three opinions—(1) that wisdom is a mere attribute of God, (2) that it is God himself manifesting himself, (3) that it is a separate Divine personality. An objection to this personality is that Wisdom is divided among a number of individuals—all the righteous, in fact. Bois, not very pertinently, compares the quasi-division of the three persons of the Trinity.

It remains to examine whether the Pseudo-Solomon is more exact and systematic in his account of 'Sophia.' According to Dr. Farrar, 'Wisdom is throughout the book repeatedly personified, but never in reality hypostatised.' A review of the crucial passages (which, it may be remarked, come almost entirely from the three middle or Solomonic chapters 7-9) to a certain extent confirms this dictum; but we must always expect to come upon careless overstatements, which are magnified by modern critics into deliberate philosophic definitions. The passages are as follows: 7²⁶, 'she is a breath of the power of God, and a clear effluence of the Almighty.' There would be nothing much in this or in the following verse, 'an effulgence from everlasting light,' were it not that the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews has used the same term *ἀπαύγασμα* for the Son of God himself (Heb. 1³). But other texts certainly seem to prove that the author of Wisdom had a vague idea of *σοφία* as apart from God. In 7²¹⁻²², Solomon says, 'All things that are either secret or manifest I learned, for she that is the artificer of all things taught me, even Wisdom.' In 8³ we are told 'She glorifieth her noble birth, in that it is given her to live with God, and the Sovereign Lord of all loved her' (cf. Prov. 8³⁰), and in 9⁴ that she 'sitteth by thee on thy throne.' Whether 8⁴, 'she is initiated into the knowledge of God, and she chooseth out for him^a his works,' implies actual co-operation, may be doubted. The passage 9³, *τὴν σοφίαν*

He is happier when he points out that the want of clearness as to the nature of 'personality' was a constant source of confusion to the men of the time.

Bruch, *Weisheitslehre*, p. 536, puts the matter in a different form. Pseudo-Solomon, he thinks, was incapable of conceiving Wisdom as a mere metaphysical existence. His practical Jewish mind compelled him to make her something almost concrete. The explanation is capable of being applied to many of the expressions of the Siracide.

^a The R.V. of Prov. 8³⁰ has, 'then I was by him as a master-workman,' but the rendering is disputed.—Hast., *D. B.*, iv. 925a.

Bousset, *op. cit.*, p. 339, while holding that the hypostatisation of *σοφία* is pretty complete in Wisdom, referring especially to 9⁴ (her that sitteth by thee on thy throne), thinks that Pseudo-Solomon holds a middle position between 'Aristobulus,' who in Euseb., *P. E.*, xiii. xii. 10, implies that the Light that was created on the Sabbath was an 'allegory' of Wisdom, and Philo, whose personification of her is *at times* complete. Any discovery of Philo's exact ideas as to the relation of *λόγος* and *σοφία* seems to be hopeless. 'At times *λόγος* is the source of *σοφία*; sometimes *σοφία* of *λόγος*.' See above p. 19 n. b.

Bruch, p. 349, points out that the epithets applied by Pseudo-Solomon to Wisdom, *πολυμερής*, *εὐκίνητος*, *σαφῆς*, *δέσις*, and the like, are quite inconsistent with 'Divine hypostasis,' and seem to refer more to a substantial existence— one might almost say (though he does not) that of an 'angel.'

σου κατεσκεύασας ἀνθρωπον, certainly means no more than that God 'in His wisdom' created man; agency is not implied.

Personifications are plentiful enough. In 1⁶, She will not hold a blasphemer guiltless; in 8⁸, She is a teacher of all the past, the present, and the future; but the force of the passage as suggesting a demi-goddess is greatly weakened by what follows (v. 9), 'I determined, therefore, to take her unto me to live with me,' which could hardly be said of a person co-existent with God. Whether the text 7²⁴, 'She pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness,' really refers to the idea of the world-soul may be questioned, and with good reason; for in 1⁷ it is the *πνεῦμα κυρίου* that 'has filled the world.' Obviously the terms appropriated by philosophers are used by this writer as his own, to be employed when they will express the view of his subject which is uppermost in his mind.

It is to this loose view that we must ascribe the different applications of the word 'wisdom' which we find in this book. Philo, in one of his interminable allegories, had distinguished between wisdom, human and divine (*Quis Rer. Div. Her.*, § 25), but in the title of our book it seems to have yet a third signification; the sagacity, as expressed in words, of Solomon. Now, as already noted, we find in the first six chapters of Pseudo-Solomon's work a laudation of Divine Wisdom, personified at times, but certainly not hypostatised; in the next three we have something very like hypostasis: in the last ten 'practical godliness'—the merest *φρόνησις*. We may question if Mr. Deane is right (p. 25b) when he says that 'Wisdom embraces what a Greek would call virtue'; but we can certainly follow him when he adds that 'it comprised also the notion of a deep knowledge, an appropriation of the history of God's dealings with His people, and a thorough trust in the Divine aid.' But that is not the *σοφία* of Proverbs, of Baruch, of Ben-Sira.^a

^a The question of the relation of Pseudo-Solomon's *σοφία* and Philo's *λόγος* is not a very profitable one. It is best dismissed, as by König, in a few words (*Einl. in das A. T.*, p. 409). He cites the words of Menzel, *De Graecis in libris Kohleleth et Σοφίᾳ vestigiis*, p. 66. 'Pseudo-Solomon's *σοφία* is a substantial, Philo's *λόγος* a personal, manifestation of God,' says König. This is not quite true, for (1) the object of the writer of Wisdom is *not* to depict an independent being existing beside God, and (2) he does show signs of transferring the *personality* of God to Wisdom as a medium (7²⁷, 8¹, etc.). But besides this, 'Philo ascribes to the *Logos* at once personality and impersonality,' which sums up the whole matter.

Grimm's note on the supposed personification of Wisdom in 6¹²⁻¹⁶ is worth noticing as that of a critic who has no preconceived theory to maintain. 'Wis-

It would seem almost as if in the last few chapters the writer attempted a 'retractatio' (in St. Augustine's sense) of what he had stated in the earlier ones. Taking those first few chapters alone, it might certainly seem as if, as Kübel (quoted in Bissell, *Apocr.*, p. 229) says, he 'finds the highest good not in single virtues, not in outward works of the law; moreover, also, not in a primary sense in the inner cleansing of the heart, but in nothing else than in *σοφία*, which man makes his own by reason of his constitution (his *ψυχή*, his *νοῦς*) in his thought; yes, even in his knowledge. The perception or knowledge of God (of God and wisdom objectively considered) is the highest good.'^a

It is obvious that this purely intellectual standard affords no basis

dom is here not dogmatically hypostatised, but personified in a rhetorical and poetic sense. This is proved with perfect certainty by the similar descriptions in Proverbs and Sirach, where she is depicted as a maiden who invites men to her on heights, at crossways, and at the gates of cities, or sends her handmaidens for them (Prov. 1²⁰ *sqq.*; 8¹ *sqq.* 3²; 9¹ *sqq.*), as a mother welcoming men, as a virgin bride receiving them (Sir. 15²; also as a speaker in the assembly of the heavenly beings, 24¹ *sqq.*), and where, consequently, the personification is still more daring than in our text. For that in those other cases only a personification is to be assumed, is generally acknowledged by unprejudiced philological criticism (whereas old-fashioned orthodoxy found in these depictions, as we know, the divine Logos as the second person of the Trinity), and is the necessary consequence of Prov. 9¹³ *sqq.*, where Folly also, poetically personified, invites passers-by at the door of her house and on the high places. Reduced to plain prose, these descriptions imply nothing more than that. The struggle to attain wisdom is a thing competent to every man, inasmuch as she is no stranger to his intellectual life; that she exercises a peculiar charm on all who are capable of receiving her, and that to all who earnestly strive after her manifold means and ways for that attaining are offered.'

^a If *σοφία* is conceived as implying and bringing in its train all virtues, then it is difficult to see how the Israelites, who are certainly understood to be the possessors of this quality, could have sinned at all—at least in their corporate capacity—which is exactly what, according to the Scriptures, they did. The most extravagant epithets are heaped upon them by the writer of Wisdom. They are (10¹⁵) a holy people and a blameless seed. 11¹, Wisdom prospered their works. 12¹⁹, They are God's sons (exclusively, it would seem). 15², 'Even if we sin, we are thine.' 15¹⁴, Their enemies are fools. 18¹, Thy holy ones. We may compare with this the severe language of the O.T., *e.g.* Deut. 9⁵. The Canaanites are driven out for their own wickedness, not for the goodness of the Israelites; 9²⁷, they are stubborn, wicked, and sinful. Later passages, as Ezek. 20⁸ *sqq.*, 23³ *sqq.*, Neh. 9¹⁶ *sqq.*, refer to a degenerate Israel, but those quoted are supposed to belong to the very period of which Wisdom writes.

for the preaching of the Jewish religion and worship, resting so much as it did on ceremonial observances, and exhortations to *σοφία* would be of little effect when addressed to Jewish apostates in inducing them to return to the beliefs and especially the ritual of their fathers. The author therefore hastens to correct this impression. He allows *σοφία* to glide into the conception of *φρόνησις* (dropping, indeed, the first term altogether in its original sense), and then shows how this same *φρόνησις* (little more than human prudence) induces men to avoid idolatry, for which they are rewarded, as were the Israelites in their early history, by a succession of Divine deliverances, while idolaters are fitly punished for their want of *φρόνησις*. Here at length we have an argument which, perhaps more than the invective against their Epicurean tendencies in chapter 2, might appeal to the renegades. It is true that for a time the forces of heathenism had the upper hand; but so for a time did the idolatrous Egyptians prevail against the Israelites, and if the apostates will but reflect, they will see how likely it is that a similar succession of deliverances may again restore the power to the chosen people of God.

§ 7. The Eschatology of Wisdom.

Our judgment on this, as on so many other points, must be conditioned by the view we take of the date at which the author wrote. It would appear that much of the hesitation of modern critics in accepting the fact that Wisdom really sets forth a comprehensive view of the resurrection proceeds from the traditional theory which assigns to the book a date long before the Christian era. In any case, in order to comprehend the writer's standpoint, we must briefly consider the revolutions through which Jewish opinion on the subject had passed.^a

The earliest conception of God (Yahwe) is undoubtedly that of a tribal deity, unconcerned with other nations except in so far as he protects^b his own people against them. Under the system of religion

^a Apart from Dr. Charles's exhaustive *Eschatology* (1899), and his article on the subject in Hastings's *D.B.*, an excellent summary will be found in Burney, *Israel's Hope of Immortality* (Oxford, 1909); cf. also the remarks of Mr. Porter quoted at the end of additional note A.

^b A most striking illustration of this view is to be found in 1 Sam. 26⁹, where David complains that if he is driven out from the 'inheritance of the Lord' he must 'serve other gods.'

which was evolved under these auspices, the responsibility for wrong-doing rested on the nation. Yahwe, it is true, differed from the gods of other nations in demanding moral purity (Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 11), but his covenant was with the nation, not with the individual, and so individual responsibility disappears into the background. National apostasy might injure^a the covenant, but no single person's crimes could do so; and with individual responsibility disappears individual hope: when there is no punishment except temporal punishment, there is no reward but temporal reward.

Yet from the very earliest times we find traces of belief in 'another world' (we can give it no other name). It is Sheol—which may mean the 'Great Land'; it is under the earth; it is a place of horror and ghostliness. The spirits of the good and of the wicked alike^b meet there. They are conscious of the pangs of bodily corruption (Job 14²²), but whether they have any knowledge of what goes on on earth is doubtful.^c It was certainly considered as outside the jurisdiction of Yahwe. So Hezekiah, for example, recognises that (Isa. 38^{18, 19}) 'They that go down into the pit cannot look for thy faithfulness. The living, the living, he shall praise thee.' The outlook upon the unknown future was dreary and distasteful in the extreme. Yahwe's dominion extends only to the earth, and, indeed, to that portion of the earth inhabited by his chosen people.

The mere fact of the recognition of 'another world' carries us far.

^a But even this would not entirely abrogate it. Ps. 89³², 'I will visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes. But my mercy will I not utterly take from him, nor suffer my faithfulness to fail. My covenant will I not break, nor alter the thing that is gone out of my lips.'

^b Job 30²³, 'The house appointed for all living.'

^c There is a difference of opinion on the subject. Dr. Charles holds that two distinct views of Sheol prevailed at different times: that at first, in the days of ancestor-worship, the dead could be propitiated (as in Greek religion) by offerings, could act as protectors of their descendants (Isaiah 63¹⁶), and could even be summoned from the grave to give counsel. But when the dominion of God was extended to the whole world, it became unreasonable to suppose such a region of activity outside his jurisdiction. For this exemption of those in the grave from God's dominion he cites Psalm 88⁵, 'They are cut off from thy hand.' But the new belief was that in Sheol they knew nothing of what passed on earth. This Dr. Charles, however, deduces rather from a logical argument based on the psychology of Gen. 2, 3, than from Scripture texts. That Sheol is called Abaddon, or Destruction, in Job 26, Prov. 15¹¹, 27²⁰, does not prove much. More to the purpose is Job 14²¹, 'His sons come to honour, and he knoweth it not; and they are brought low, but he perceiveth it not of them.'

At all events death is not the absolute end. And there are other indications of a belief in possible immortality. The question of the Tree of Life, which makes so transient an appearance in the story of Eden, has never been properly explained, and probably never will be. To eat of it certainly entailed immortality.^a Again, we have the plain cases of Enoch and Elijah. Only there seems here to have been no argument from the particular to the general. Their apotheosis may, indeed, be compared to that of the Roman emperors: they are simply individuals translated from earth.

A reasoned belief in immortality began only when Yahwe was announced as Lord of the whole earth. The Jehovah in Genesis certainly makes Yahwe-Elohim Creator of the entire world, but when Amos (9) declared that he was the *judge* of the whole earth, he was enunciating something like a new doctrine, and to this he added the further novelty that God would also punish individual unrighteousness among his ownpeople (3²). In view of this, the return to particularism in later writers, as in Wisdom, where no real punishment of the perfectly faultless Israelites is allowed—only their ‘education’—is the more remarkable.

But with the idea of individual punishment came that of individual responsibility. For a time this responsibility was, so to speak, halved by the perfectly true and natural but perfectly untheological theory that the sinful father suffered in the ruin and misery of his children; but this was brushed aside by the prophets: *e.g.* Jer. 31³⁰, ‘Every one shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eateth the sour grapes, *his* teeth shall be set on edge’; followed by Ezekiel 18⁴, ‘the soul that sinneth, it shall die.’

But there is nothing in all this to suggest the idea of *future* punishment; the whole doctrine of retribution is so far confined to this life. The obvious failure of the theory in many cases suggested that if God were just, some further truth must lie behind. Jeremiah (12¹⁻³) had had his doubts; ‘wherefore doth the wicked prosper? wherefore are all they at ease that deal treacherously?’ The Psalmists, who feel the difficulty acutely, suggest at times that they are not all ‘at ease’ (*e.g.* Ps. 27¹³, 55²³, and the whole of Ps. 37 and 49).

Yet it is questioned if there are any certain indications of belief in retribution in a future life in the Psalms. The famous passages in 16¹⁰, ‘Thou wilt not leave my soul in Sheol, neither wilt thou suffer

^a Gen. 3²², and cf. ‘Life of Adam and Eve,’ § 28, in Kautzsch’s *Pseudepigraphen*, p. 523.

thine holy one to see corruption,' and 17¹⁶, 'As for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness : I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness,' are explained as referring to physical conditions and physical dangers. There is one passage which may be taken to suggest retribution in the resurrection (Ps. 49¹⁴): 'They are appointed as a flock for Sheol ; Death shall be their shepherd ; and the upright shall have dominion over them in the morning': yet on the whole we may confess that the Psalms were written prior to any real doctrinal affirmation of the doctrine of immortality.

With regard to the book of Job, the opinions of critics are notoriously at variance. It is now fairly well recognised that the speech of Elihu (32-37) is a not very purposeful interpolation. It has, however, a distinct meaning ; it explains suffering as discipline, and the account of the restoration of Job to prosperity, after being educated by adversity, seems to chime in with this. But the real solution, such as it is, of the problem appears in chapter 38, where God answers : His wisdom and power are infinite, and none may question them.

A detailed examination of the eschatology of the book would be out of place here : a good deal of it seems simply to reflect the old hopeless idea of Sheol (7^{9,10}, 14⁷⁻¹², etc.), but there is a hint of better things in 14¹⁴. 'All the days of my warfare would I wait, till my relief should come.' With respect to the interpretation of the famous passage 19²⁵, 'I know that my Redeemer liveth,' it may be left to the discussion of expert Hebraists. At present so many explanations are suggested, that no certainty is possible.

Ecclesiastes may be passed over. The writer has no faith in anything beyond^a the grave. Ecclesiasticus deserves more attention. We have in it probably a statement of the Sadducean point of view ; a stolid philosophy of this life without regard to another. The most distinct reference indeed to that other life (41⁴) assures us that it does not really concern us ; for 'there is no inquisition of life in Sheol'^b—

^a Schwally (*Das Leben nach dem Tode*, 1892) sums up his position : (p. 106) 'Das Leben ist trostlos und der Hades noch trostloser.'

^b The rendering is disputed, perhaps with reason, on the ground of the newly found Hebrew text, by Ryssel in Kautzsch, *Apokryphen*, p. 435. He translates : 'A man cannot dispute over the length of life in the underworld,' which certainly chimes in with the context.

With regard to the one passage which has been regarded as saving the reputation of the Son of Sirach (7¹⁷), 'the punishment of the ungodly man is fire and the worm,' it is now rendered from the original Hebrew, 'the expectation of man is the worm'—another hopeless sentiment.

no rewards nor punishments hereafter. However we may interpret this particular passage, there can be no doubt of the writer's generally hopeless outlook. He has gone back to the old theory of retribution on this earth and here alone (2^{10.11}) 'Who did ever put his trust in the Lord and was ashamed?' 12³, 'There shall no good come to him that continueth to do evil, nor to him that giveth no alms.' But he imports an element of his own. Not only is the seed of the ungodly to perish (40¹⁶, 41⁶) and the 'teeth of the children to be set on edge' after all, but a man's immortality is to consist in his repute after death. The famous passage which ends with the words, 'their bodies were buried in peace, and their name liveth to all generations' (44¹⁴), is simply the enunciation of this doctrine, to which 'Wisdom' in 8^{13.17} and 6^{18.19} is wrongly supposed to approximate. Still more is this 'immortality' achieved by leaving behind children of good repute.

All this explains away the passages in which the writer does seem to imply a belief in the recompense of a future life; such as 1¹³, 'Whoso feareth the Lord, it shall go well with him at the last, and in the day of his death he shall be blessed.' The blessedness of a man's end consists not in any future hope but in the fact that his possession of a good repute is then secure; a curious twist of the Solonian maxim, 'Call no man happy till he is dead.' This, then, is Ben-Sira's sole conception of immortality: an untarnished reputation (of the Oriental kind) and descendants to maintain that reputation.

The change, sudden almost as it seems, from these uncertain and tentative theories, mingled with absolute denial of immortality, to an affirmation of the resurrection of the body as in 2 Maccabees,^a is due to the rise of apocalyptic as against prophetic literature. By the second century B.C. it may be said that prophecy was dead (1 Macc. 9²⁷,' tribulation in Israel, such as was not since the time that no prophet appeared unto them'). In its place there arose a new kind of belief which is foreshadowed in the later prophets like Joel. Prophecy had still maintained that the earth is the Lord's, and that even in this world his goodness and truth will yet be justified. Apocalyptic, on the other hand, almost despairs of the present, and pictures as bright a future as it can. The position is not unlike that of mankind in times

^a What Bertholet, p. 347, calls 'crass belief in the resurrection,' appears in 2 Macc. 14⁴⁶. Razis 'drew forth his bowels, and taking them in both his hands, he shook them at the crowds; and calling upon him who is Lord of the life and the spirit to restore him these again, thus he died'—a suicide by the way.

of great earthly and bodily misery turning for comfort to the other world even in its gloomiest and most repulsive form—the genesis of sorcery and witchcraft.

Of this apocalyptic we have probably the first certain trace in Isaiah 24-27, a separate work assigned by Dr. Cheyne to about 334 B.C.^a Here we have the resurrection of the body (of the good) set forth in unmistakable terms (26¹⁹), 'Thy dead men (Israel!) shall arise, and the inhabitants of the dust shall awake and shout for joy.' But we mark that this is only a resurrection of the elect, for in v.¹⁴ the doom of their enemies is pronounced, 'they are dead, they shall not live; they are shades, they shall not arise; therefore hast thou visited and destroyed them, and made all their memory to perish.' This view persisted; it may be regarded as the current one down to the first century B.C., when we find it enunciated in the Psalms of Solomon (14^{6.7}). 'Therefore their lot shall be Hades and darkness and destruction, and in the day of mercy for the just they shall not be found, but the holy of the Lord shall have for their lot life in joy.'^b

We find aberrations on the subject. The author of Ps. 88 seems to reject the belief in a resurrection altogether, and Koheleth (7¹⁴), as we have seen, almost certainly does, while the view of 'Daniel' is remark-

^a As usual, the most revolutionary critics assign as late a date as possible to the chapters. Charles, *Eschat.*, p. 126 n. 1, 'Smend and Kuenen assign chaps. 24-27 to the fourth century; Driver to an early post-exilic date; Duhm (*Das Buch Jesaia*, p. xii) to the close of the second century B.C.,' a difference of some four hundred years!

^b It is impossible to acquit Harnack, usually so fair, of some bias in dealing with the question of the origin of belief in the resurrection of the body 'diese irrationale Hoffnung' as he calls it (*Dogmengeschichte*, i. 451, n. 3). He seems to put the rise of such belief too late (cf. quotation from 2 Macc. above). No doubt he is right in saying that the resurrection of the flesh is connected with belief in a Messianic kingdom on earth, but it is not fair to assume that a writer who shows small sign of any hope of such kingdom must necessarily disbelieve in such resurrection. The passages quoted from the Apostolic Fathers (Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 26³, 2 Cor. 9¹; Herm., *Sim.* v. vii. 2; Barn. 5⁶ *sqq.*) do not especially connect the two ideas, though Barn. 21 seems to do so. Harnack further claims that in the case of St. Paul and Ignatius their belief in the resurrection of the flesh became weaker as their hope of an immediate appearance of the Messiah on earth faded away (i. 141, n.). That the dogma was first formulated in a creed of the Roman Church about the middle of the second century (i. 131) is noteworthy, but proves little. For a most extreme statement cf. Stade, *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, ii. 436. The 'resurrection doctrine of Pseudo-Solomon is a denial of the resurrection of the body.' But for a view of the matter differing from that of Harnack, cf. Schwally, quoted below.

able indeed. Dr. Charles (*Eschat.*, p. 180) summarises it: the writer is thinking only of the coming world-kingdom of the Jews, and so considers only the future of those who have helped or have hindered that kingdom in an extraordinary degree. Hence Sheol is the intermediate abode of the very good and the very bad ; but the eternal place of the rest of Israel and of the Gentiles. Here, at all events, we have the resurrection of some of the wicked.^a

Now this book of Daniel was probably the work of a member of that strict sect of Jews called Chasidim, the forerunners of the Pharisees, and the authors of all that was best and noblest in the creed of the latter. These are the persecuted saints of Heb. 11³⁶⁻³⁹, 'of whom the world was not worthy.' They at least preserved, in the face of the Hellenising Sadducees, the belief in the resurrection. 'Through their agency the spiritual aspirations of the Old Testament few became in the course of a century the unshakable convictions of Palestinian Judaism.'^b Of this Judaism, Palestinian or not, we seem to have the perfect expression in the book of Wisdom.

We may sum up the eschatology of the book in the sense of the ordinary reader ; for it is to the ordinary reader that we must here appeal. No one who reads our stately English translation of the third chapter, representing so well as it does the sweeping periods of the Jewish rhetorician, can hesitate to say that it is one and the same picture of the same persons and their destiny. The dissecting critic,

^a Dr. Charles (*Eschat.*, p. 133, notes) suggests that a partial resurrection of the wicked is taught also in the Ethiopian Enoch, chaps. 1-36. He thinks that even in Isaiah 24-27 a 'resurrection to punishment' is indicated, but his texts are not convincing as against the denunciation of absolute annihilation quoted above.

^b Charles, *Eschat.*, p. 168, whose excellent summary of their history (pp. 166-167) contains practically all that we know of the destinies of this noble body of men. But when he speaks of 'Palestinian Judaism' Dr. Charles is referring to a distinct theory of his own. He thinks that whereas the Palestinian Jews always held the belief in an intermediate state for the righteous, the Alexandrians regarded them as entering on a blessed immortality immediately after death. He claims as exponents of this theory (p. 244) the author of Wisdom, Philo, the writer of 4 Maccabees, and the Essenes. The question of 'Wisdom's' view is dealt with in the additional note on 37.

Bousset, *Rel. des Judenthums*, p. 260, thinks that in Alexandrian Philo and Wisdom, 4 Macc., the Slavonic Enoch, and the doctrine of the Essenes, the 'Judgment' was to be that of the living only, and so roundly concludes, in direct opposition to Dr. Charles, that there is no sharp differentiation between Palestinian and Alexandrian eschatology at all.

with his disregard of context, is here at a disadvantage ; the appeal lies to common-sense against him.

With the idea, then, of a blessed immortality for the righteous, there disappears completely the old half-heathen idea of the supreme good fortune of a long life^a as a mark of Divine favour, while a short life is to be regarded as the lot of the wicked. We have next the detailed account of a day of judgment (4¹⁷-5²³). There will be also a theocratic kingdom apparently to be established upon earth, when the Lord shall reign for evermore (3⁸), in which the righteous shall have dominion over the wicked. The old idea of a temporary Jewish theocracy has disappeared utterly. We may quote Dr. Burney's excellent remark on the advance on all previous theories which is here displayed. 'In the earlier literature which we have examined the idea of immortality appears at best as a conviction of individual souls, or a hope which is nothing more than a hope, almost beyond the reach of

^a Cf., however, Schwally *op. cit.* That writer holds that belief in the resurrection of the flesh appears (tentatively) in Job 14⁷. 'There is hope of a tree if it be cut down that it will sprout again,' etc., but he thinks the idea original, contrary to popular belief, and succeeded by the writer's relapse into despair in the next few verses (pp. 109-112). He would also interpret the famous 'Redeemer' passage as meaning expectation of a justificator either in this life or in another. Job, he says, certainly hoped for nothing in Sheol. Then all that he expected must come in a new life after a resurrection.

Like Harnack, Schwally holds that the belief in such resurrection was based upon Messianic hopes, and had indeed a certain political motive behind it. For the restoration of Israel the living Hebrews would not be sufficient; the dead ones must be raised again (Isa. 26¹⁹, as opposed to the popular theory stated in 26¹⁴). Nor have we any right to restrict this to the righteous only; there is no word of such distinction. Why such arguments cannot be applied to Wisd. 3⁷ it is hard to see.

But, further, there is another cause for the belief in immortality generally. Schwally notes that there is no Hebrew word exactly corresponding to *ἀθανασία*. The Israelite believed in long life as the greatest blessing. Instances are innumerable. We have the actual patriarchs at one end of the history and the prophecies of future blessedness in this respect in Enoch 10¹⁰ at the other. The good shall live 500 years and beget (10¹⁷) 1000 children. We have also long life mentioned as a concomitant of the Messianic period in Isa. 65²⁰ *sqq.* Such long life was no longer attainable on earth; the age of the patriarchs had passed; therefore it must come in another life; hence belief in immortality. This is the meaning of the 'destruction of death'; that death no longer puts a barrier at the end of life (pp. 120-121). Of the tree of life and of the immortal Enoch, Schwally will take no account. 'These are all myths,' he says (p. 118), 'and perhaps Enoch himself was originally a god of some kind.'

aspiration. In Wisdom, on the contrary, it appears, we may say, as a developed dogma ; at any rate it is the goal of the writer's religious aspirations not merely for himself as an individual but for the elect among his nation.'

We come now to our last point. It is made almost a charge against the author of Wisdom (as by Farrar, p. 410a) that in his book 'as in Ecclesiasticus (!) there is no personal and no suffering Messiah. The Messianic hope has come to mean nothing but the dominance of Israel and the universal worship of Jehovah. . . . The advent of a Divine Deliverer of the tribe of David has been merged . . . into a vast, a dazzling, and an incoherent dream.' We may question the applicability of the word 'incoherent.' We have seen that 'Wisdom' is fairly definite in his idea of what that kingdom is to be. That he does not enter into greater detail is natural enough in a writer who may well have been disgusted by the sensuous ideas current in his time. The saints were each to beget 1000 children (Enoch 10¹⁷), every vine to bear 10,000 branches, every branch 10,000 twigs, every twig 10,000 clusters, each cluster 10,000 grapes, each grape 25 measures of wine. This was repeated and improved upon in Baruch's Apocalypse (29^{4,5}), where Behemoth and Leviathan^a are reserved as a banquet for the saints. The latter book, it is true, is later than Wisdom, but it no doubt represents popular views.

Noack, however, who has been already mentioned, believed the whole book to be Messianic in character. His views have been much misrepresented not only by Farrar, who could not have seen his book, but possibly even by Grimm (*Einl.*, pp. 25, 26). As a matter of fact his theory is this (*Ursprung des Christenthums*, pp. 220-242). The story of the sufferings and death of Jesus of Nazareth and of Stephen, himself an Alexandrian Jew, had penetrated to Egypt and greatly impressed the mind of a devout Israelite there. This Israelite Noack afterwards identifies with Apollos ; but that is by the way. Whoever he was, he was stirred up by this narrative to Messianic hopes, and wrote a book in which chaps. i.-vi. depict a suffering Messiah and the confusion of his enemies, and chaps. x.-xix., under the similitude of the deliverance of Israel out of Egypt, foretell the Messianic kingdom. But the intervening or Salomonic chapters puzzle the critic ; all he can do with them is to suppose that the Messiah is here personified as the wise

^a Possibly the earliest mention of Behemoth and Leviathan in their legendary character is to be found in 2 Esdr. 6⁴⁹⁻⁵².

king of Israel; and here for the first time he identifies this Messiah with our Lord. Grimm notes that such an identification is found in Origen (*Hom. in Levit.*, xii. 4; *In Luc.*, xxi.); in Noack it is supported by references to Matt. 12⁴², 'a greater than Solomon is here,' and to Matt. 11¹⁹, 'Wisdom is justified of her children,'—not very convincing texts. It is only in a single place (p. 240 n. 66) that he actually goes so far; the remainder of his exposition is consistent with the theory of a non-Christian Messianic expectation.

Not entirely unlike the theory of Noack was that of Grotius (followed, it would appear, by Grätz), who believed that the book had been manipulated by some learned Christian. But he made this theory depend on the existence of a Hebrew original; it was a translator who had done the mischief. He mentions expressly only one passage—4⁷, 'a righteous man though he die before his time shall be at rest': but Grätz adduces four—viz. 2²⁴, 'by the envy of the devil death entered into the world'; 3¹³, 'she who hath not conceived in transgression'; 4¹, 'better than this is childlessness with virtue'; and 14⁷, 'blessed hath been wood (*i.e.* the cross) through which cometh righteousness.' The reader can judge if these passages indicate a Christian interpolator.

§ 8. Language of the Book.

That we have here not a translation but an original Greek text, full of Hebraisms^a as it may be, may now be regarded as an established fact. Jerome himself writes in the preface to the 'Books of Solomon,'

^a Those adduced by Grimm (*Einl.*, p. 5) and copied from him by Farrar are ἀπλότης καρδίας (1¹), μερίς and κλῆρος (2⁹), τρίβοι for the 'path of life' (2¹⁵, 5⁷, 9¹⁸, 10¹⁰), λογίζεσθαι εἰς τι (2¹⁶), πληροῦν χρόνον (4¹³), δσιοι τοῦ θεοῦ (4¹⁵), εύρσκεσθαι, meaning 'to be recognised as' (7²⁹, 8¹¹), εὐθύτης ψυχῆς (9³), δριστον ἐν δρθαλμοῖς τινος (9⁹), ἐν χειρὶ τινος (3¹, 7¹⁶, 11¹), ἐξ δλης καρδίας (8²¹), νιοὶ ἀνθρώπων (9⁶), αἰών, meaning 'world' (13⁹, 18⁴), πλήττειν ἀρασίᾳ (19¹⁷).

To these Margoliouth adds (besides doubtful instances) ἡ κτίσις for 'the world' (2⁶), στενοχωρία πνεύματος (5³), τὸ διάδημα τοῦ κάλλους (5¹⁸), γηγενοῦς πρωτοπλαστοῦ (7¹), and σύστασις κόσμου (7¹⁷).

As against all this we may of course adduce the two remarkable passages, 2¹² and 15¹⁰, in which the writer quotes the *Gr* of Isa. 3¹⁰ and 44²⁰, which differs widely from the Hebrew. He either did not know the latter at all, or at all events had it not before him when he wrote.

It is probable, says Westcott in *Smith D. B.*, that the assumption of a Hebrew original first arose from the tradition that the book was the genuine work of Solomon, and that it was long before this idea finally died out.

‘Liber qui sapientia Salomonis inscribitur apud Hebraeos nusquam est, quin et ipse stylus Graecam eloquentiam redolet.’ Nevertheless critics of a hundred years ago, Bretschneider and Engelbreth, in books now wellnigh forgotten, maintained that a Hebrew original had existed, and had been here and there mistranslated, quoting passages to which we shall have to refer hereafter. Other early writers, and especially Huet (late seventeenth century), referred to Moses, son of Nachman (thirteenth century), as having seen a Hebrew original of the book; but it seems that what he really saw (Grimm, *Einl.*, p. 9) was a translation of the books—most probably the Syriac version.

Professor Margoliouth (in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1890, pp. 263 *sqq.*) took up the defence of this lost cause.^a He argued (1) that many passages could be better explained if a Hebrew original, often misunderstood, were presupposed; (2) that ‘a part at least of the variants of the Peshitto of Wisdom may be explained by the hypothesis that it was made or corrected from a Hebrew original,’ and as a corollary that the old Latin version often agrees with the Syriac and not with the Greek. To the Hebraisms already noted he added others, and in the course of the article made very useful suggestions from a partial collation of the very valuable and exact Armenian version, for the treatment of which we have still apparently to rely upon the imperfect labours of F. H. Reusch. He argued, moreover, on very slight grounds, already stated, that the book was not written in Egypt at all.

But his main thesis was traversed, and, it may be said, confuted by Dr. Freudenthal in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, iii. (1891) pp. 722 *sqq.* This critic had little difficulty in adducing (as had indeed been already done by Grimm and earlier writers) a multitude of specimens of Greek rhetoric, and also of paronomasiae, which it would be wellnigh impossible for a mere translator to construct.^b Naturally, also, he

^a In the *Expositor*, (1900), i. 38, he goes even further, and argues that Wisdom was the first Hebrew book to be translated into Greek; that it attracted the notice of Ptolemy of Egypt, and that it was the reading of this which induced him to enlist the services of the LXX. to translate the whole of the Hebrew scriptures.

^b Paronomasiae are, however, found in translations. Grimm cites (*Einl.*, p. 9) the not very convincing one from the Septuagint of Ps. 13 (14)³, $\delta\mu\alpha\dot{\eta}\chi\rho\epsilon\dot{\omega}\theta\sigma\alpha\mathfrak{n}$, οὐκ ἔστιν ποιῶν χρηστότητα, and Margoliouth (p. 289) one from the Syriac of 6¹⁰, $\underline{\sigma\omega\mathfrak{l}}$ and $\underline{\sigma\omega\mathfrak{l}\mathfrak{l}}$.

Of the paronomasiae so-called in Wisdom there are a great number; it is

pointed out the prevalence of Greek ideas in the book. With regard to the depth of knowledge underlying those ideas, we may perhaps, as has already been indicated, be sceptical; but with respect to the use in 'Wisdom' of Greek philosophical terms there can be no doubt, and Freudenthal employs a sound argument when he tells us that Wessely,^a a Hebrew scholar of the first rank, had endeavoured to translate the book into the ancient tongue, and had altogether failed: Hebrew words to express the Pseudo-Solomon's ideas could not be found. It may be noted in passing, that Dr. Freudenthal takes a most disparaging view of our book. Ben-Sira, he thinks, represents a genuine Hebrew philosophy: Wisdom, 'a heterogeneous product of the Jewish and Greek spirits, remained for a thousand years out of the ken of the Jews.'^b

Admitting, then, that we have here a Greek original, what light does the language throw on the character and attainments of the author? Here again we encounter considerable exaggeration on the part of the critics. 'He shows,' says Farrar (p. 404b), 'a singular mastery of the Greek language in its later epoch of mingled decadence and development.' He was 'a master of the Greek vocabulary' (405a). This we may contrast with the note on 5¹⁴.

Now with regard to the earlier chapters this is more or less true; but no candid scholar will refuse to acknowledge that between these and the last few there is a world of difference both in style and language; so much so that Eichhorn conjectured, with some show of reason, that the latter half of the book was written in the author's

probable, however, that many may be assigned to another reason rather than to deliberate play on words. Of the great quantity adduced by Grimm (*Eint.*, p. 7) we may accept Farrar's selection: *ποταμοί . . . ἀποτόμως* (5²³), *ἀτραπὸν . . . τρόπως* (5¹⁰), *στενοχωρίαν . . . στενάζονται* (5³), *προδοσία . . . προσδοκία* (17¹²), *ἄργα . . . ἔργα* (14⁵), *μύσους . . . μυστας* (12⁶).

^a Cf. Grimm, *Eint.*, p. 17 n. 6. Wessely's authority is not much enhanced by the fact that he seems to have believed the book to be a genuine work of Solomon. S. J. Fränkel (1830) seems, according to Grimm (*loc. cit.*), to have made a similar attempt at translation.

Dr. Margoliouth remarks (p. 297) that the connection of Wisdom with the Midrash has never been worked out, and adds that 'it would be more profitable than the comparison of Wisdom with Greek philosophy.'

^b Margoliouth in the *Expositor* (1900), i. 189, points out that even in the time of Melito the book had passed out of Jewish knowledge, for the Jew whom he asked about it identified Wisdom with Proverbs, and knew of no other book, presumably, than the latter.

youth (before, we might add, he had learned Greek properly), and that the first few chapters were the more scholarly and careful product of his later days.

At the risk of repeating what has already been said by others, we must here summarise the features which are considered to prove the writer's deep acquaintance with the Greek language.

(a) He uses compounds^a with great freedom: as *ὑπέρμαχος* (10²⁰, 16¹⁷), *ὅμοιοπαθής* (7³), *γηγενής* (7¹), *πολυχρόνιος* (2¹⁰, 4⁸), *ὅλιγοχρόνιος* (9⁵), *πολύφροντις* (9¹⁵), *πετροβόλος* (5²²), *παντοδύναμος* (7²³, 11¹⁷, 18¹⁵), *παντεπίσκοπος* (7²³), *φιλάνθρωπος* (1⁶, 7²², 12¹⁹), *κακότεχνος* (1⁴, 15⁴), *ἀδελφοκτόνος* (10³), *σπλαγχνοφάγος* (12⁵), *γενεσιουργός* (13⁶). The following indeed appear to be his own invention: *πρωτόπλαστος* (7¹, 10¹), probably copied by the Fathers (cf. Deane's note on 7¹), *νηπιοκτόνος* (11⁷), *τεκνοφόνος* (14²³), *γενεσιάρχης* (13³), *κακόμοχθος* (15⁸), *βραχυτελής* (15⁹), *μετακιρνᾶσθαι* (16²¹), *εἰδέχθεια* (16³).

(b) In addition to these there are cited various expressions which are held to prove deep acquaintance with Greek civilisation and Greek customs; 14¹ may allude to the placing of images of protecting gods at the prow of vessels. But this custom was common to ancient heathen nations (cf. Deane's note *ad loc.*); 2⁸ certainly refers to the use of garlands at banquets—but these were used by Hellenized Jews (cf. Judith 15¹³), and the crowning of victors in a contest (4²) is open to the same criticism. 13¹⁵ shows acquaintance with the custom of setting up little shrines (*οικήματα*) for domestic gods, and 8⁴ proves a general acquaintance with the fact that there are such things as mysteries and initiates. If all this knowledge was displayed in 200 B.C., it certainly would be rather striking; but in the reign of Caligula it proves nothing more than that our author was an educated person.

(c) Of ordinary rhetorical devices he employs many. 'Chiasmus' is frequent, occurring even in the first two verses of the book. But 6¹⁷⁻²⁰ contains a fair example of 'Sorites.' The accumulation of epithets, as in 7^{22.23}, is common to the writer with Philo, St. Paul, and later writers; and the curious fact that in 'Wisdom' they number exactly thrice seven points, as Grimm remarked, rather to eastern than to western doctrines. -

^a On the facility with which the Hellenistic writers invented new compounds as they were wanted, cf. Winer (ed. Moulton), p. 26, and generally, on the questionable acquaintance of such writers with Greek, p. 23 and the notes there.

(d) Of alliteration and assonance or juxtaposition of similarly sounding words we have enough and to spare. The best instances of the latter (intentional, that is) are found in 1¹, ἀγαπήσατε . . . φρονήσατε . . . ζητήσατε; ἐν ἀγαθότητι . . . ἐν ἀπλότητι; 7¹³, ἀδίλως . . . ἀφθόνως; 1¹⁰, οὐσ . . . θροῦς; 13¹¹, εὐμαθῶς . . . εὐπρεπῶς; 4², ποθοῦσιν . . . ἀπελθοῦσαν; 6²², παροδεύσω . . . συνοδεύσω; 12²⁶, παισὶν . . . ἐμπαιγμόν . . . παιγνίοις. Others, as we shall see, may be otherwise accounted for.

On all these grounds Pseudo-Solomon is claimed as a kind of Jewish Isocrates, but Bois in his *Essai critique* goes further, and would have him a poet too.^a He discovers^b (p. 212) iambic trimeters, as in 17¹².

οὐθὲν γάρ ἔστιν φόβος εἰ μὴ προδοσία.

4¹⁶ is, according to him, made up of a trochaic trimeter and a trochaic tetrameter catalectic, as thus :

κατακρινεῖ δὲ δίκαιος καμῶν τοὺς ζῶντας ἀσεβεῖς.
καὶ νεότης τελεσθείσα τάχεως πολυνετὲς γῆρας ἀδίκου.

9¹⁵, he says, is composed of two almost perfect hexameters (!)

φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχήν,
καὶ βρίθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν πολυφροντίδα.

The force of fancy can hardly go farther than this. As a matter of fact, the second line is much more like a Galliambus, of which instances, though always imperfect, repeatedly occur elsewhere (cf. 2^{4a}, 2^{10c}, 3^{11a}, 4^{16a}, etc.). That metre lends itself admirably to the antithetic style.

These are the facts. But is not Dr. Freudenthal (*l. c.*, p. 734) right when he says that the author was writing in a foreign language which he really did not know? Is the wealth of language and the mastery of vocabulary anything more than what might be acquired by any

^a An elaborate note by Mr. H. St. John Thackeray in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, vi. 232, deals with the rhythmical ending of lines in 'Wisdom,' and does not attempt to prove the existence of the ordinary Greek metres. In spite of a few mistakes (cf. p. 237) a good number of instances are adduced. Mr. Thackeray's object is to prove a close resemblance between 'Wisdom' and Hebrews, which contains many rhythmical sentences. Of neither can a stronger word than this be used. Both authors write rhythmically and occasionally slip into metre, limited to a few syllables. Cicero occasionally did the same.

^b There is really an iambic line in 15 : ὅν δψις ἀφροσιν εἰς δνειδος ἔρχεται.

educated hearer of a Greek rhetorician in the schools of Alexandria? We know that the learner of a new language, if he belongs to an intelligent race accustomed to fluency of talk, is apt to appropriate the rhetorical element in the foreign tongue almost before he learns its grammar. Of this we have abundant instances in the case of English-speaking Bengalis. It is by no means certain that a native Greek would not have regarded the fervid outpourings of Pseudo-Solomon very much as we do the fervid rhetoric of the intelligent Babu.

That this is no mere fancy may be argued from startling facts. The first few chapters of Wisdom undoubtedly represent the writer's Greek at its best; they have probably been touched and retouched with the literary file till they are as perfect as the author could make them. Yet in the very middle of these chapters (4¹²) we find the statement, 'the giddy whirl of desire goes a-digging for the innocent mind,' the author having mistaken *μεταλλεύω* ('to mine') for *μεταλλάσσω* ('to change'). It is no slip: he repeats it in 16²⁵.^a That in 11²⁶, *φιλόψυχος*,^b a common enough word meaning 'cowardly,' is used as meaning 'a lover of souls,' is not much to be wondered at when we consider the character of the last few chapters. The writer there loses himself—there is no other phrase for it—in the mazes of a foreign tongue, and much of his turgid and even grotesque diction may be referred to this cause.^c

If we are right in this supposition, we have a ready explanation of several peculiarities of the book.

(a) Grimm (*Einl.*, p. 6) notes the constant recurrence of what he calls 'pet expressions' of the writer. He collects some thirty of these, of which it will suffice to give a few examples. The word *ἀπότομος* occurs seven times; *παροδεύειν* five times; the rare word

^a *πάχνη* in 5¹⁴ for *ἄχνη* is probably another mistake; and the alteration in meaning of words like *όπλοποιέω* might be ascribed to ignorance also, but cf. Winer 23 (b), who gives a long list of words so altered in meaning.

^b He thinks, moreover, that *θρασύς* means 'savage' (11¹⁷), and that *ἀδικηθῆναι* means 'to be punished' (14²⁹), but see note *ad loc.*

^c The most remarkable instance of all, however, if Ed. Pfleiderer (*Heraklit*, p. 330 *sqq.*) is right, is to be found in the case of the word *ἄγεωχία*, 2⁹, cf. notes *ad loc.*

Of real ignorance of Greek on the part even of professed translators, at least of the Apocryphal books, the recent discovery of the Hebrew original of part of Ecclesiasticus furnishes us with some striking examples (cf. Ryssel in Kautzsch, *Apokr.*, i. 243).

καταδυναστεύειν, thrice; *εὐεργετεῖν*, four times. Of words to which the writer attaches his own sense we have *γενέσεις*, for 'species,' four times; *ἔκβασις*, with the meaning of 'result,' thrice; and so forth. The explanation of these repetitions is probably poverty of diction; the writer's vocabulary is peculiar but not extensive.

(b) To a kindred cause—that want of knowledge of synonyms which is a pretty sure test of ignorance of a language—we may ascribe the tautologies which become frequent towards the end of the book. In the single passage, 16¹⁻⁵, we have the following: *ἔκολάσθησαν—κολάσεως*: *ἐπιθυμίαν—ἐπιθυμοῦντες*: *ὅρεξεως—ὅρεξιν*: *ξένην γεύσιν—ξένης γεύσεως*: *τροφήν—τροφήν*: *ἐνδεεῖς—ἐνδειαν*: *ἐπελθεῖν—ἐπῆλθεν*: *δειχθεῖσαν—δειχθῆναι*.

Under this head we may probably class many of the instances which Grimm (p. 7) would assign to intentional juxtaposition of similar words, as in 5¹⁸, *πανοπλίαν—όπλοποίησει*; 2²³, *ἰδίας—ἰδιότητος*; 17¹⁷, *δυσάλυκτον—ἀλύσει*; 9³, *κρίσιν—κρίνη*; 17⁸, *νοσούσης—ἐνόσουν*; 17²⁰, *λαμπρῷ—κατελάμπετο*; 19²¹, *τηκτὸν—εὔτηκτον*. The author is incapable of variety. We may add to Grimm's instances *βαρεῖα—βαρύτεροι* (17²¹), *όδηγόν—όδοιποριάς* (18³).

(c) Lastly, to this fact—that the writer is handling a language with which he is only half-acquainted—we may ascribe some at least of the difficulties which we meet in trying to find out his real meaning (e.g. in 17⁶), *τῆς μὴ θεωρουμένης ἐκείνης ὅψεως ἥγοντο χείρω τὰ βλεπόμενα*.

Much is made of the use by our author of the technical terms of Greek life: as *στεφανηφορεῖν*, *πρυτάνεις*, *πομπεύειν*, and the like. But does he always understand them? He certainly did not understand the meaning of *βραβεύειν*, which means 'to act as umpire in a contest'; he thought it meant to 'give the victory to a competitor.' St. Paul (Col. 3¹⁵) knew the significance of the word better.

In any case, no one will dispute the opinion of Grimm as to the last few chapters (*Einl.*, p. 7). 'The writer's effort to produce a lively and picturesque representation here breaks away from his formal arguments, and he commits the error of tricking out historical material, intended for doctrinal instruction, with fantastic adornments and exaggerations; those additions to the Mosaic account which the author permits himself cannot in all cases be even justified by later tradition. The parallel drawn between the Egyptians' sins and their punishment, and also that between their plagues and the Israelites' blessings, are overstated and wearisome, and at times degenerate into trifling and childishness. It is an unnatural and unpardonable

mistake to present the long dogmatic-historical treatise, ch. 11-19 (in bulk the greater half of the book), in the form of a prayer.'

It is needless to say that these considerations in no way detract from the value of the book, either as the work of a good man or as representing the 'hope full of immortality,' which had only just established itself as a doctrine among the chosen people of God.

§ 9. Unity of the Book.

The subject of the unity and homogeneity of 'Wisdom' is very generally dismissed with the remark that the hand and style of one writer are traceable throughout. This may be so, but it does not exclude the possibility that that writer may have composed different parts of the book at different times, under different circumstances, and perhaps even with a different object in view. A greater contrast, for example, could hardly be found than that between the Goethe of the first part of *Faust* and the philosophic Goethe of the second part, which Dr Cheyne (*Job and Solomon*, p. 12) quotes. Unluckily, all attempts at analysis of the book on the lines indicated have been discredited beforehand by the extravagant theories put forward by early critics. Houbigant^a suggested, and not without some show of reason, that the latter chapters were the work of a translator who, having turned the first few chapters from Hebrew into Greek, added the last himself. It is certainly true that the acknowledged Hebraisms of the book are almost entirely (Farrar, 404b) confined to chs. 1-11¹. This earlier portion Houbigant, in accordance with the views of his time, ascribed to Solomon himself. Eichhorn (*Einleitung in die Apokr. Schriften*, 1795, pp. 86 *sqq.*), on grounds presently to be examined, divided the book sharply into two parts (chs. 1-11¹ and 11² to end), and Bretschneider (1804) dissected the first of these, making chs. 1-6⁸ a separate fragment of Palestinian origin, 6⁹-10 another, and the rest of the book a third work altogether. But the climax of fanciful criticism had already been reached by Nachtigal (1799), who is said to have dis-

^a So many misquotations and false references to Houbigant exist, that it may be well to give his exact words from *Notae Criticae*, Francof., 1777, p. ccxvi: 'Nec tamen putandum est Librum Sapientiae totum esse unius ejusdemque Autoris, sed potius partem priorem in qua extant et vaticinationes et sententiae Salomonis Proverbiis fere similes esse ipsius Salomonis, partem posteriorem alterius scriptoris; forte ejus qui priorem Graece converterat quique addiderat de suo partem posteriorem.'

covered in the book seventy-nine antiphons in praise of Wisdom composed by different authors (Farrar, 415a; cf. Grimm, *Einl.*, 14).^a

The soberer hypothesis of Eichhorn was likely to suffer from these later extravagances, but he had certainly some grounds for his doubts as to homogeneity. That the different parts were by different authors he did not maintain; rather he considered that the later chapters were the work of this author's youth, the earlier of his mature age. But he pointed out (1) that in the earlier part the history of Israel was treated with sobriety and restraint, in the last chapters with gross exaggeration; (2) that at first freethinking is the cause of all vices—afterwards idolatry; (3) that first virtue, then the recognition of God, is the basis of immortality; (4) that throughout the first section no sign of particularism^b is to be found, while the second is full of it; (5) that *σοφία*, the mainspring of the first part, is only even mentioned once in the second, and is then used of God's wisdom in guiding Noah's Ark. To these points he might have added the complete degeneration of style which is evident in the last few chapters—incessant tautology, accompanied by obscurity of expression, and at times apparently ignorance of Greek.

With these objections Gfrörer (*Philo*, ii. pp. 202 *sqq.*) dealt, but not with distinguished success.^c With the fourth point, which is

^a The question is by no means dead. Kohler in the *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, s.v. 'Wisdom,' maintains the opinion that '9¹⁸-19²² is devoid of all connection with what precedes.' 'The whole appears to be part of a Passover Haggadah recited in Egypt with reference to Gentile surroundings, and accordingly abounds in passages of a genuinely Haggadic character.' Chap. 10, according to this writer, is merely inserted as a connecting link between the Solomonic chapters and the 'Passover Haggadah.'

^b The supposed instance of particularism in 6⁴⁻⁷, quoted by Farrar 414b, is in reality nothing of the kind; the meaning of the text is simply that a man in high office will be called upon to render a stricter account in proportion to the advantages he has had.

^c Grimm (*Einleitung*, p. 10) is not much more successful. Dealing with another objection of Eichhorn's, viz., that the part of Solomon is dropped from chap. 11 onwards, he points out that even in the first chapters the invective against sexual licence is foreign to Solomon's character, which supports the theory here maintained—namely, that the Solomonic chapters are superimposed on an original work.

Bois, p. 304, points out that after all there is not so entire a division between the later ('retributive') and the earlier (eschatological) chapters; for the idea of retribution 'according to sin' is fully set forth in 3¹⁰ (cf. notes there). He acknowledges the disappearance of parallelism in the latter chapters (p. 212),

thoroughly well grounded, he could not wrestle at all. The second, it may be remarked, explains itself away on the hypothesis which we have adopted—that apostate Jews raised to high positions are aimed at in this book. With them it would no doubt be true that the Epicurean tenets of Koheleth led to apostasy from their own religion, and this in turn to an easy acceptance of idolatry. Hence both parts of the book would equally apply to them.

While fully agreeing with the belief that the book is the work of one writer, the present writer would venture to point out the peculiar and indeed anomalous nature of one section,^a that, namely, included between chs. 6²⁴ and 9¹⁸—the whole of chapters 7-9—with a couple of introductory (or conjunctive) verses. In these three chapters are included the most peculiar, and in some respects the most objectionable, parts of the book; the references to Platonic philosophy and the direct claims to Solomonic authorship. This latter, if we accept the ideas of Kuennen on the subject, is not nearly so innocent as some would make it appear.^b

But the fact that the very kernel of a book is contained in three chapters in the middle of it is surely no reason for eliminating those chapters. It is not necessary to eliminate them; only to point out that they possibly belong to a later period of development of the writer's ideas, and were inserted by him with a definite purpose; that they can be removed without injuring the general construction of the book; and that they contain statements in advance of, if not inconsistent with, those elsewhere put forward.

1. With regard to definite purpose: apart from the claim to Solomonic authorship, only here conveyed, it is here only that we find any trace of that attempt to reconcile Jewish and Greek philosophy

but remarks that it is gradual, and therefore does not imply different authorship.

Gfrörer's theory is that practically adopted by Westcott in Smith's *D. B.*, viz. that the first part is theoretic, the second historical, consisting in fact of 'pièces justificatives' to support the statements of the earlier chapters.

^a This separation of chs. 7-9 from the rest of the book is no new thing. We find it in Lorinus, Corn. à Lapide, Tirinus and Calovius, quoted by Grimm (*Einl.*, p. 4 n. 2).

^b Cf. Bickell quoted in Cheyne, *Job and Solomon*, p. 208 n. 1, as maintaining that all the Solomonic passages in Koheleth are interpolations, made presumably to facilitate the recognition of the work as canonical. Possibly the author of 'Wisdom' (or an interpolator) had such hopes.

which Siegfried (*Philo*, p. 23) seems to regard as one main purpose of the writer. It is to be questioned whether such purpose is really discoverable at all; but if it is, it is certainly only to be found here.

2. In chap. 6^{24 a} the writer states his intention of immediately tracing the operations of wisdom in the history of the world, disregarding literary rivalries, and this history, we may point out, had been begun in 4¹⁰⁻¹⁴; then comes the abrupt remark that 'a multitude of wise men is salvation to the world,' and we only recover our philosophy of history in chap. 10. Leaving out the questionable chapters, we have a connected statement.

'I will trace her out from the beginning of creation and bring the knowledge of her into clear light, and I will not pass by the truth, neither will I take pining envy for my companion in the way, because envy shall have no fellowship with wisdom. Wisdom guarded to the end the first formed father of the world,' etc., and so follows quite consecutively that sketch of the work of Wisdom in history which the author seems to have planned, but certainly never executed.

3. So we here find language and ideas differing from those current in the remainder of the book. With regard to language, this question may be answered at once. *All* the distinctively Platonic expressions are contained in these three chapters. The supposed exceptions are references to *πρόγοια* in 14³ and 17² (for which see the notes on those passages), to *Ὕλη ἄμορφος* in 11¹⁷ (also questionable, cf. notes), and the 'soul of the world,' which can hardly be identified in the 'spirit of the Lord' (*not* Wisdom) that 'hath filled the world,' in 1⁷, but is indicated under the name of 'Wisdom,' perhaps a little more distinctly, in 7²⁴ and 8¹—both included in the questionable section. That the body is the 'source of sin' is simply not affirmed or assumed, either in 1⁴ or in 8²⁰; all that is said is that some bodies are held in bondage or defiled by sin—surely a common idea enough wherever the results of sin in disease or loss of vigour are apparent. The other allusions mentioned by Farrar, 407b, may be similarly taken as the commonplaces of all philosophy, whether Jewish or Greek.

On the other hand, the undoubtedly Platonic theories of the four cardinal virtues (8⁷) (perhaps) of the pre-existence of souls (7¹, 8¹⁹⁻²⁰), and (perhaps) the description of the body as oppressing the soul (9¹⁶,

^a Ewald (*Gesch. Israels*, iii. 2, p. 550) thought that the original work extended to 6²² only. He says, 'in these first six chapters there is no word too much or too little.' The thought with which the writer began is absolutely complete, and concluded even in outward form.

see notes *ad loc.* and Additional Note A), are all contained in these three chapters. The same may be said of the allusions, such as they are, to Greek art and science. If the three chapters under consideration be simply left out, the book will not suffer as regards its construction, and it will represent a Jewish theory of the world untainted with Greek dilettantism. But not only do we find here, and practically nowhere else in the book, Platonic views expressed in Platonic language: we have here also the plain statement of views as to Wisdom, which amount to claiming for her existence as a separate entity.^a Farrar's statement that 'wisdom is throughout the book repeatedly *personified*, but never in reality hypostatised,' is only true if we omit these three chapters. Passages like 9⁴, 'Give me Wisdom, her that sitteth by thee on thy throne,' or 8³, 'the Sovereign Lord of all loved her,' are very hard to explain away. Of all those which Siegfried (in Kautzsch, i. 477) has collected to prove the writer's extreme views of Wisdom as a person, two only (1⁴, 'Wisdom will not enter into a soul that deviseth evil,' and 1⁶, 'Wisdom is a spirit that loveth man'—with the variant, 'the spirit of wisdom is loving to man'—'and will not hold a blasphemer guiltless for his lips; because *God* beareth witness,' etc.) are found outside the Solomonic chapters; and the reader can at once judge for himself how much weaker and vaguer these latter texts are. Of personification there are plenty of examples, though with the distinct mention of *σοφία* only in the first ten chapters and in one verse (14⁶) later on. Under the circumstances it is hardly exaggerating to say that the chapters 7-9 contain a doctrine peculiar^b to themselves.

It is not suggested that we have here the work of a different writer: the resemblances of style are too striking for that; the ingenious compound words; the *ἀπαξ λεγόμενα*; the assonances (Farrar, 405) and the

^a Reuss, p. 531. What we have read before in this book does not exceed 'une personification poétique ou rhétorique d'un attribut du Dieu créateur. Ici, il y a positivement quelque chose de plus. La sagesse est maintenant représentée très-nettement comme une substance propre, une émanation de la Divinité, un *esprit* (ou l'*esprit*) de Dieu, possédant l'intelligence et la volonté, et ce qui dans le langage des anciens prophètes, n'était encore qu'une circonlocution rhétorique devient une conception métaphysique. Il ne manque plus grand' chose pour faire de cette sagesse une personne, ce qu'elle est devenue effectivement, sous le nom de *Logos*, dans le système de Philon.'

^b It is, moreover, to say the least, doubtful if 9¹³⁻¹⁷ does not contain a doctrine (the impossibility of man's recognising God of his own unaided power) directly opposed to 13¹⁻⁹, where we are told that it was his duty to find out God. Cf. Gfrörer, *Philo*, ii. 212.

rhythm are as remarkable here as anywhere in the book. But it is possible that a writer who had laid aside his work, dictated in the beginning by irritation at apostasy and persecution, gave it a new colour by adapting it to philosophic ideas^a which he had only lately assimilated, and, its original interest having passed with the times of persecution which suggested it, should endeavour to obtain a vogue for it by the direct ascription of it to Solomon.

It seems indeed extraordinary that later critics should have so entirely neglected or condemned the sensible opinion of Heinrich Ewald (*Gesch. des Volkes Israel*, iii. 2, 250 *sqq.*): 'Up to a certain point,' he says (with him the certain point is 6²²), 'the initial thought is carried out and rounded off.' . . . But now the author must have considered it well to continue his work in another fashion. All that follows after 6²² we can easily recognise as the work of the same author, and as naturally attaching itself to what goes before; and at times we have brilliant flashes of his genius: but on the whole the style and the matter have changed both in generals and in particulars. Possibly two considerations may have influenced the writer. Firstly, it seemed to him well to send the book into the world recommended as definitely the work of Solomon; secondly, he desired to let that world know his true Jewish feeling, and understand that the wisdom which he praised could only be reconciled with the true religion of Jehovah. And then we come to the prayer: 'the prayer,' says Ewald, 'might very well end with the general expressions of chap. 9,' but it does not: 'and so with chap. 10 begins a third or historical part of the book.'

This is practically the view of the present editor, who holds, however, that the three Solomonic chapters were added after the composition of chaps. 1-6 and 10-19. What could possibly be more consecutive than 6²², 'I will trace her out from the beginning of creation and bring the knowledge of her into clear light, and I will not pass by the truth,' and 10¹, 'Wisdom guarded to the end the first formed father of the world that was created alone, and delivered him

^a This would account for the downright contradictions which editors have so much trouble to explain away, *e.g.* in 6¹³ *sqq.* we are told that wisdom is only too ready to come to men who will receive her. In 8¹⁸ Solomon is going about to get her. In 7⁷ he prays, but not very distinctly, for wisdom. She comes to him, and he finds out what benefits she brings. Then in 8²¹ he again prays that he may get her. Possibly this last passage refers to possession of her *as a wife*.

out of his own transgression,' and what follows thereafter? A perfect history of Wisdom in the lives of the patriarchs is the natural sequence of 6²². It follows: the intervening chapters are either an interpolation or a later addition.

Quite recently more attempts have been made, on far less conservative lines, to divide the book into separate compositions. W. Weber, in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theol.*, xlvii. (1904) 145-169, endeavours to prove that no less than four treatises are amalgamated in the one traditional book of Wisdom. His arguments are chiefly based on the difference in the views of idolatry discovered in various parts of the work—the worship of the elements, of men, and of beasts—and also on such well-worn and thoroughly discussed points as the disappearance of parallelism in the later chapters. His division, which cannot be regarded as other than arbitrary, is as follows: chs. 1-5 are an eschatological treatise; 6-11¹ is the real Book of Wisdom; 11²⁻¹⁹²² is the book of God's way of punishment, and there is also an interpolated Book of Idols (presumably 13 and 14 to v. 21; 14²⁻⁷, moreover, being regarded as an interpolation). Similarly Kohler in the *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, s.v. 'Wisdom of Solomon,' divides the book into three parts (1-6, 7-9¹⁷, and 9¹⁸ to end), arguing that these cannot be by the same author, on account of difference of style and subject. Lastly, Lincke, *Samaria und seine Propheten*, p. 135, seeks to prove that while the first part is by a Samaritan patriot, the latter half (12¹⁹ to end) is a forgery by an Alexandrian Jew.

Of all such efforts the words of Mr. Porter (*Semitic Studies*, etc., p. 247) may be used with conviction, 'the analyses do not agree, and the grounds are not convincing.'

§ 10. The Manuscripts and Versions.

The editor does not profess to have handled the Greek MSS. of Wisdom. During the last hundred years, since the classic edition of Holmes and Parsons (1798-1827), for a full account of which see Swete's *Introduction*, pp. 185 *sqq.*, these have been dealt with over and over again, and the last word concerning them would seem to have been said, though something may no doubt yet be gleaned from a careful study of the better cursive MSS. Of this we have a good example in Margoliouth's collation of the cursive 254 as contained in his article in *J. R. A. S.* quoted above. It may be here noted that some MSS. de-

scribed by Holmes and Parsons, in accordance with their information, as cursives, are really uncials. The fine Venetian codex (Saec. viii.), of which, however, part only is now at Venice, and the rest at Rome, was regarded as a cursive, and numbered 23. Students of apparatus critici will do well to remember this: the authority of 23 is widely different from that of, say, 248, which generally agrees with it. Fritzsche adopts the notation of Holmes and Parsons, be it observed; and with his apparatus criticus, combined with Swete's and (with reservations) that of Deane, we must, pending the promised publication of the great Cambridge edition of the LXX., be content. Discoveries of further texts are of course always possible, and these may modify our views of certain passages, but are not likely to affect the general conspectus of a book like Wisdom. In the meanwhile, a uniform system of notation for the existing uncial MSS. is greatly to be desired.

It is no longer customary to designate the Latin version of Wisdom and of Sirach by the name of 'Vulgata,' which implies the authorship or at least the correction of Jerome. That he did not touch these two books we have already seen, and 'Old Latin' is the common term used to describe this version (L in this edition). That it is full of 'Africanisms' is apparent to the most casual reader. This is hardly the place to discuss such peculiarities minutely, but it is a fact that scores of words occur for which our only other authority is to be found in African writers like Tertullian, Apuleius, and Augustine. We nevertheless note the warning of Kennedy in *Hast. D. B.*, iii. 54: 'It must be borne in mind that the Latin literature of the second and third centuries which we possess is almost exclusively African; and so we are in danger of labelling with that name a type of diction which may well have prevailed throughout the Latin-speaking provinces of the Roman Empire. . . . In short, the current investigation of Late-Latin is more and more tending to reduce the so-called Africanisms, and to establish a wider basis for their occurrence.' Indeed, the present editor has been able to note one or two cases in which words supposed to be peculiar to African writers occur in inscriptions from other countries.

Unfortunately, Professor Burkitt's striking article on 'The Old Latin and the Itala,' in *Texts and Studies*, vol. ii., does not deal with the Apocrypha at all. The language of the Latin Wisdom and Sirach yet remains to be investigated from his point of view. It would be

outside the scope of the present work to pursue such investigation: we must be content to refer, for the variant readings of the Latin (many of them of great exegetical importance), to the works of Vercellone, Sabatier, and the numerous minor treatises mentioned in *Hast. D. B.*, iv. 889b.

In this edition special attention has been paid to the variations of the Syriac versions. Of these three are now available: the Peshitto, printed in Walton's Polyglot, and also, with slight differences, from a Brit. Mus. MS. by Lagarde (*Libri apocr. Vet. Test. Syriace*, Lips. 1861); the Hexaplar, published by Ceriani in *Monumenta Sacr. et Prof.*, vol. vii., Milan, 1874; and the fragment of a Palestinian version from a Bodleian MS. recently made known by Mr. Gwilliam in *Anecdota Oxoniensia* (the lacunæ conjecturally filled up by Mr. J. F. Stenning).

With regard to the Peshitto, a point must be noticed which seems hitherto to have escaped the attention of scholars. Down to the end of chap. 10 of Wisdom, the translation, though occasionally paraphrastic, is never entirely erratic. From that point onwards it would almost seem that another interpreter had taken the task in hand, who had little or no knowledge of Greek. He seizes on a single word in the verse which he can understand, and weaves round it a web of his own construction, generally with reference to subjects alluded to in the immediate context. For purposes of textual criticism, therefore, this portion of the translation is almost valueless, though Dr. Margoliouth has utilised a few passages for comparison with the Armenian and other versions. Many of these aberrations are noted in the Commentary.

The Hexaplar Syriac^a has been used throughout. It is a rendering of Origen's Septuagint text, and is understood to have been the work of Paul, bishop of Tella in Mesopotamia, and to have been written in 616-617 A.D. All that has been said of its slavish adherence to the letter of the Septuagint (Swete, *Introd.*, p. 114) is perfectly true; it presents a perfectly unintelligent rendering of the Greek, supplemented here and there by marginal notes in an almost contemporary hand, and occasionally by much later annotations, identifying certain

^a Dr. Barnes, in his defence of the Ambrosian MS. (the Hexaplar) in *The Peshitta Text of Chronicles*, Camb., 1897, is concerned only with its relation to the Massoretic text, and does not refer to the version of Greek books like 'Wisdom.'

words with the Greek they are intended to represent. Once or twice, as in 12⁶, the older notes are valuable, but as a rule the text is too literal to afford much help. For examples of slavishness we may quote 4⁴, 5⁷, etc. (cf. notes *ad loc.*). At times this version does violence to the usual Syriac order of words by adhering exactly to their position as they appear in the Greek. Its comparatively late date is shown by (1) the continual use not only of δέ (δέ) but of μέν (μέν) for the Greek particles; (2) the transliteration not merely of κίνδυνος and ἀνάγκη, which had become naturalised Syriac words, but even of μᾶλλον and αὐτομάτη; (3) the painful breaking up of every word which contains the prefix εὐ- or κακο- into corresponding Syriac expressions. In short, it is not classical Syriac at all, and a comparison of it with the Peshitto induces us to believe that centuries must have separated the two. It is to be noted that the Greek text which the translator obviously followed approximates more nearly to Fritzsche's than to Swete's, and that wherever variations occur, these are almost always in accordance with the readings of the cursive MS. 261. Lastly, we may observe that the main differences from the literal renderings occur in chaps. 18 and 19 (cf. notes *ad loc.*). Either the translator had grown weary and careless, like Pseudo-Solomon himself, or he had a different text from our own before him.

Of the Palestinian version we have but a fragment, containing a few verses of chaps. 9 and 10. It is understood that this version is that of the Malkite (or Greek) church in Palestine and Egypt (Nestle in *Hast. D. B.*, iv. 649b), and that it is written in 'a dialect more akin to that of the Jewish Targums.' Our fragment is too brief to display any wide discrepancies from the Syriac of the Peshitto, with the exception of one curious form mentioned in the notes. On this version generally, see Burkitt in *Jour. of Theol. Stud.*, ii. 175, who, however, says nothing of the fragments of the Apocrypha.

With regard to the Arabic version, a long-standing error needs to be corrected. It is commonly supposed that here, as in some of the historical books (Judges, Samuel, Kings, and Chronicles, cf. Burkitt in *Hast. D. B.*, i. 137), the Arabic translator simply gave his own rendering of the Peshitto. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In no important instance does the Arabic copy the aberrations of the Syriac. Often paraphrastic, it never strays far from the Greek text, and is occasionally more accurate than the Old Latin. In determining between various readings it is of considerable value, and it is difficult

to believe, if the late dates assigned to such versions of the other parts of Scripture are correct, that this is not a far earlier translation.

Of the Armenian version the editor can only speak at second hand. That it is 'word-true' far more than the Syriac is vouched for by Conybeare in *Hast. D. B.*, i. 151, but the greatest care must be exercised in accepting the Armenian variants as stated *e.g.* by Deane. The collation of Reusch was relied upon for many years: it is now understood to be both inaccurate and imperfect; and in the passages where the Armenian is cited the editor has considered only those variations which are vouched for by Professor Margoliouth.

The Authorised English Version of the Apocrypha is not to be compared to that of the Old Testament either in accuracy or in literary merit. This seems to have been the result of the practical surrender of it into the hands of one man, Andrew Downes. Selden, *Table Talk* (quoted by Lupton in *Hast. D. B.*, v. 254*b*), explains the method pursued, which he considered excellent, but which seems to us hasty. In 'Wisdom' Downes was fortunately influenced to a great extent by the vivid and nervous Genevan translation. His best renderings are those which correspond with those of that version (*cf.* notes *passim*). But the English is at times too diffuse; at times quite inadequate to express the meaning of the Greek. And the same faults, due probably to the same cause, are to be observed in the English Revised Version. According to the Revisers' own preface, the Book of Wisdom fell ultimately into the hands of a single Reviser, and that one of the New Testament company. According to Dr. Lupton's sufficiently keen^a estimate of the revised version of the Apocrypha, 'Wisdom' is one of the best translated books (*Hast. D. B.*, v. 269*a*). To the ordinary scholar it will seem as if the best readings had invariably been

^a After noticing one or two passages (1⁴, 7³, 17¹⁸) in which an improvement on the Authorised Version is effected by the Reviser, Dr. Lupton adduces two passages in which the characteristic fault of the N.T. revision—unnecessary change—is conspicuous: (1) 8⁷, where 'soberness and understanding, righteousness and courage' is substituted for 'temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude'—a very crucial instance; (2) similarly in 11¹⁵, 'being deceived they worshipped serpents void of reason, and wild beasts,' which almost repeats the Genevan version, is replaced by 'they were led astray to worship irrational reptiles and wretched vermin'; the change is not for the better. Cf. the Preface to this work.

relegated to the margin, while it is impossible to agree with Dr. Lupton (*ubi supra*, 267b) that in 'Wisdom' 'the versions have been freely resorted to and with very happy effect.' It would be difficult to find many passages in which the Reviser has been influenced by any translation more recondite than the Vulgate.

§ 11. Synopsis of the Book.

If by a synopsis is meant an analysis of a work orderly arranged, in which each section follows naturally on its predecessor as containing kindred or resulting matter, and in which a regular argument is pursued to the end, then no synopsis of 'Wisdom' is possible. More to the purpose would be a table of contents arranged under heads in the manner of Dr. Charles's Index to his *Eschatology*. Few editors have taken the trouble to engage in the thankless task of dissection; a running analysis is sufficient for Farrar and for Grimm, who, however, is at great pains to show the coherence of succeeding sections. Gregg's synopsis is the fullest, but except with regard to the last four chapters, where five contrasts between Israel and Egypt are more or less systematically worked out, his analysis amounts to little more than a *catalogue raisonné* of the kind alluded to. Blunt's brief conspectus, with modifications, may here suffice us.

Sect. A. Wisdom with regard to human life (chaps. 1-6).

- § 1. Introductory: the spirit in which Wisdom should be taught (1¹⁻¹¹).
- § 2. God created man for life and not for death—life through righteousness (1¹²⁻¹⁵).
- § 3. The Epicurean position stated (1¹⁶⁻²⁰).
- § 4. The truth about death and life (2²¹⁻³¹⁹).
- § 5. Acknowledgment of their folly by the adherents of Unwisdom at the Judgment Day (ch. 5).
- § 6. Connecting link to introduce the historical survey in chaps. 10-19 (ch. 6, and especially as a connecting clause 6²²⁻²⁵).

Sect. B. The superimposed Solomonic chapters (7-9).

INTRODUCTION

Sect. C. Illustrations of the conflict between Wisdom and Un-wisdom.

- § 1. The Patriarchal history (10¹⁻¹⁴).
- § 2. The story of Israel before the Exodus (10¹⁵⁻¹²).
- § 3. The history of Idolatry (13-15).
- § 4. The history of Israel after the Exodus (16-19).

Here Gregg's analysis of the last four chapters may be safely adopted, viz. :

A series of five contrasts between the fortunes of Israel and Egypt, in respect of—

- (1) Animals (16¹⁻¹⁴).
 - (a) Quails, vv. ¹⁻⁴.
 - (b) Fiery serpents, vv. ⁵⁻¹⁴.
- (2) Fire and water, heat and cold (16¹⁵⁻²⁹).
- (3) Light and darkness (17¹⁻¹⁸⁴).
- (4) Death (18⁵⁻²⁵).
- (5) Passage of the Red Sea (19¹⁻²¹).

And the whole ends with a kind of doxology (19²²).

THE BOOK OF WISDOM

1. 1. Cherish righteousness, ye that judge the land,
 Think of the Lord in goodness,
 And in singleness of heart seek ye him.
2. For he is found of them that tempt him not,
 And is manifested unto them that disbelieve not in him.

1. 1. Our view of this verse will depend much on the question of the persons to whom it is supposed to be addressed. If heathen kings and princes generally are referred to the sentiment is of the vaguest description; but if, as we suppose, the passage is directed to Jewish apostates holding high office, the words acquire a distinct meaning. *δικαιοσύνην* will contain at once a plea for a fairer treatment of their fellow-countrymen and a reminder of the 'righteousness' of the Law which they have abandoned (Matt. 5²⁰). So ἀγαθότης will mean 'kindliness' to compatriots and ἀπλότης *καρδίας* 'fairness,' 'with no reservations, with no attempt to face both ways or to serve two masters' (Farrar), which is exactly the meaning in Eph. 6⁵ (addressed to servants), *ὑπακούετε τοῖς κατὰ σάρκα κυρίοις μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου ἐν ἀπλότητι τῆς καρδίας ὑμῶν ὡς τῷ Χριστῷ*. Cf. 1 Macc. 2³⁷, 'Let us die ἐν τῇ ἀπλότητι ἡμῶν,' as straightforward worshippers of God.

γῆ will then mean not the world at large but 'the land' in which the writer and his readers live. So Engelbreth, cited by Grimm and Größer, *Philo*, ii. 206, who insists that the actual rulers of the land where the author lives must be addressed, if there is any force in the passage.

The rendering of *κρίνοντες τὴν γῆν* as 'explorers of the earth,' suggested by Zenner in *Zeitschr. für Kath. Theol.*, xxii. 430, seems unjustifiable. For a criticism of it cf. Cornely, p. 37, n. 1.

2. Here again the meaning of *πειράζειν* becomes clear if we assume it to be used of Jewish rulers. For them to forsake the God of their fathers was to tempt him indeed.

In the second half of the verse we find a variant, supported by *Ἑ*^A, and according to Feldmann *Σ^h*, *τοῖς μὴ πιστεύοντιν αὐτῷ*. On the principle of 'the more difficult reading is the better' this should be accepted, and it does not want support. The accepted reading *τοῖς μὴ ἀπιστοῦντιν αὐτῷ* introduces a verb (*ἀπιστεῖν*) which is rare in Hellenistic Greek; and secondly the

3. For crooked reasonings do separate from God,
And his power being put to proof confuteth the fools.
4. For into a soul that deviseth evil wisdom will not enter,
Nor abide in a body enslaved unto sin.

case of the ‘unbelievers’ seems to agree better with what follows. But *ἀπιστεῖν* occurs in three other places (10⁷, 12¹⁷, 18¹³) in Wisdom. The Fathers quote the passage (cf. Deane’s note) with the common reading; and the second part of the verse, with this rendering, corresponds in the usual way to the first part. *S^P* and *L* seem to have read simply *τοῖς πιστεύοντιν αὐτῷ*—a very suspicious reading and suggestive of forcible simplification. If we accept the variant we must render ‘is displayed (in wrath) to them that believe not in him,’ and we note that in the New Testament, when the word *ἐμφανίζειν* is used in the sense of ‘appearing’ at all (John 14^{21,22}), it signifies a beneficent appearance. That of the risen saints (Matt. 27⁶³) is doubtful. But little can be argued from ‘Wisdom’s’ specific use of Greek words (cf. Introduction). Zenner (*op. cit.*, p. 418) deserts the *L* for the harder reading.

3. It is unnecessary to attach any far-fetched meaning to *σκολιοί λογισμοί*. The word *σκολιός* has precisely the same meaning as it has in Deut. 32⁶ (G); that of the apostatising temper. The reference is not to the Epicurean theories of the second chapter, but to the turnings and twistings by which the Jewish renegades had argued themselves out of their allegiance to the God of their Fathers. *λογισμοί*, moreover, in Hellenistic Greek has almost always a bad sense: ‘chicanery’ or something like it. *E.g.* in 16¹⁵ R.V., renders it senseless ‘imaginings’; in Prov. 6¹⁸ we have ‘imaginings,’ and so in 2 Cor. 10⁴. The idea of sober ‘reasoning,’ in the classical sense, has deserted the word altogether.

It is marvellous to find that early commentators, following *L*’s ‘probata virtus corripit insipientes,’ referred the expression *δύναμις δοκιμαζομένη* to human excellence. Grimm gives Calmet’s paraphrase: ‘sola probi hominis praesentia assidua est improborum accusatio,’ no doubt with reference to chap. 2. There is a slight difference of opinion among commentators as to whether *δοκιμαζομένη* can mean ‘asserting itself on trial,’ or whether it can only signify ‘being tried’ (as *S^Ph* Arab.), but the point is not one which affects the interpretation of the passage. Similarly the question whether *ἐλέγχει* means ‘confute’ or ‘convict’ is unimportant.

4. ‘Some have deduced from this passage that the author saw in the body the source of all moral evil’ (Deane). Exactly the contrary is to be deduced. All bodies are not evil (8²⁰, ‘I came into a body undefiled’), and if all are not evil the theory of the inherent wickedness of the flesh, which even Grimm attributes to our author, fails at once. The idea is simply that of 2 Cor. 6¹⁴, ‘What communion hath

5. For a holy spirit of discipline will flee from deceit,
 And hold aloof from witless reasonings,
 And where wickedness cometh on fast will be put to con-
 fusion.

light with darkness?' or as Farrar well puts it, 'the dove cannot live in unclean places.'

The point is of importance as bearing on the Eschatology of 'Wisdom.' A writer who believed the body to be altogether evil could not well believe in the resurrection of that body (cf. Introd., § 3).

Another question of interest raised by the text is the division of man's nature into body and soul simply. This corresponds to the simple Old Testament view, as reflected in 2 Macc. 7³⁷, 'I give up both body and soul'; 14³⁸, 'body and life'; 15³⁹, 'in body and soul.' So our author in 9¹⁶ and 16¹⁴ makes no distinction between *νοῦς* and *ψυχή* and *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*. Philo, on the contrary, insists on the Platonic trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit, which is to a certain extent sanctioned by 1 Thess. 5²³, 'may your spirit and soul and body be preserved entire at the coming of our Lord.'

With respect to the language, *καταχρέω ἀμαρτίας* is perhaps best expressed by Farrar's 'impawned to sin.' Corn. à Lapide explains 'oppignerato (corpore) et velut aere peccati obaerato et obstricto.' It is a vivid expression only paralleled in the New Testament by John 8³⁴, 'the bondservant of sin,' and Rom. 7¹⁴, 'sold under sin.' *Σ*^P has 'subjected to sins' (*ἀμαρτίας* is a variant found in the Fathers), and Margoliouth (*op. cit.*, p. 286) speaks of it as an ordinary Rabbinic expression for 'sinful,' which he says is the rendering of the Coptic version.

κακότεχνος, 'devising evil,' is peculiarly appropriate if applied to the malicious feelings of the Jewish apostates towards their faithful fellow-countrymen.

5. In spite of the use of *πνεῦμα ἄγιον* (never, be it observed, in the nominative, and always without the article) in Matt. 1¹⁸⁻²⁰, John 20²², Acts 2⁴, for the Holy Spirit, it seems better here to adopt the view of Grimm that no technical meaning is intended; 'a holy spirit (so R.V.) having nothing in common with what is sinful and impure.' There is no personification of the Holy Spirit; if any such is found in Wisdom it is in the 'Solomonic' chapter 9¹⁷. This passage cannot therefore be quoted as the first mention of the 'Holy Ghost.' *¶* in Ps. 50 (51)¹³ and Isaiah 63¹⁰⁻¹¹ has *τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἄγιον*. Farrar blindly copies Grimm, who most unaccountably cites both passages as containing the words *πνεῦμα ἄγιωσύνης*.

Just as in the preceding verse we find a variant *παιδεία* for *σοφία*, so here *¶*^A with several Fathers reads *σοφίας* for *παιδείας*. It is tempting to attach *παιδείας* to *δόλον*, and to render 'treacherous teaching' such as the book of Koheleth afforded to the apostates (cf. Introd., p. 23), but the versions and one Father (cf. Deane *ad loc.*) are

against this. \mathfrak{S}^p reads 'a holy spirit and discipline,' which Lagarde corrects to 'of discipline.' This \mathfrak{S}^h supports.

The third part of the verse is almost inexplicable. A.V. renders 'will not abide'; R.V. 'will be put to confusion'; Vulg. 'corripetur a superveniente iniquitate.' \mathfrak{S}^p 'will be rebuked.' Reuss: 'il quitte la place.' Gfrörer: 'cannot live where iniquity rules.' All these renderings correspond to the first two members of the verse, but Siegfried, remarking that it is the function of $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\nu}\mu\alpha\ \hat{\alpha}\gamma\mu\omega$ (which he takes to mean *the* Holy Spirit) to 'convince,' as in John 16⁸ ($\hat{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\gamma\zeta\epsilon\iota\ \tau\omega\ \kappa\sigma\mu\omega\ \pi\epsilon\hat{\nu}\iota\ \hat{\alpha}\mu\pi\pi\alpha\ \kappa\tau\lambda$) renders 'will be full of the spirit of reproof.' Bois, *Essai Critique*, p. 379, would even remove the line altogether and place it between v. ⁸ and v. ⁹, so as to read 'justice convicting will not pass him by (v. ⁸), but he will be convicted under the weight of his iniquity.' His grounds are that $\hat{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\gamma\chi\omega$ is so often used in this chapter (vv. ^{3.8.9}) in the sense of 'convict,' and could not well bear any other meaning here. But (1) the change would involve the tautology of $\hat{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\gamma\chi\omega$ in two succeeding lines; (2) no one can argue that Pseudo-Solomon will not use a word in one sense in one line and in another in the next: cf. the case of $\hat{\epsilon}\pi\iota\sigma\kappa\omega\pi\eta$. It is very possibly a case of ignorance of the precise force of the Greek word on the writer's part. At all events, if any of the ordinary renderings be accepted, it can hardly be *the* Holy Spirit that is referred to.

Churton, however, with Cornely, supports this latter idea, quoting Gen. 6³, 'my spirit shall not always strive with man,' so, he says, 'whilst Adam was upright the Holy Spirit was with him; when he fell and dissembled with God the Spirit of discipline fled from his deceit. For the same reason the Spirit of the Lord departed from Saul.' Brucker, *Hist. Phil.*, ii. 694, argues that in these verses the 'anima mundi' is meant; a good example of the way in which Platonism used to be read into 'Wisdom.'

Another explanation of all this is suggested by Cornely, which, if adopted, would affect the meaning of the first five verses. He would translate $\pi\epsilon\mu\alpha\zeta\epsilon\omega$ to trifle with religion; to indulge in idle and superfluous speculations about God of the kind from which the son of Sirach dissuades his readers in Eccl. 3²¹⁻²⁴. Further, he would render $\mu\eta\ \hat{\alpha}\mu\iota\sigma\tau\epsilon\iota\ \alpha\hat{\nu}\tau\hat{\omega}$, 'to have full confidence in him,' i.e. to surrender one's speculative judgment to one's faith; in short, to adopt the maxim 'intelligo quia credo.' He quotes the words of Azariah in 2 Chron. 15² as justifying this attitude of mind.

If we adopt this explanation, a different sense will be given to 'crooked reasonings' (v. ³), the devising of evil (v. ⁴), and 'witless reasonings' (v. ⁶). But it is questionable if this interpretation can be made to agree with the theory which Cornely holds with most modern critics, that it is the Jews in high places who are being addressed. With their position the renderings given in the notes seem to agree much better.

6. For the spirit of wisdom is kindly to man,
 And will not hold a blasphemer guiltless of his lips ;
 Because God is witness of his reins,
 And a sure inspector of his heart,
 And a hearer of his tongue.

6. The connecting particle 'for' has caused more discussion than it deserves (Gfrörer even translates it 'although') ; for the connection is fairly clear. The spirit of wisdom is too kindly to man either to abide where wickedness is rampant and men are condemning themselves, or to allow the apostate to blaspheme his God without penalty. Siegfried simply removes the line and puts it between v. ¹³ and v. ¹⁴, therein following Bois (*Essai*, 379). Zöckler takes the commonsense view : Wisdom loves man and therefore abhors blasphemy, which brings about man's ruin.

The variant *σοφίας* for *σοφία*, adopted in the text, is of importance. It is supported by **G^A** **L** **S^P** Arabic, and (it is said) the Armenian. Its importance is that it avoids the hypostatisation of 'Wisdom,' which we believe to occur only in the Solomonic chapters 7-9. For the importance of the difference cf. Bois, *Essai Critique*, 234, who bases an argument on the old reading which, with the variant, is hardly possible, for the old reading runs, 'Wisdom is a spirit kindly to man.'

βλάσφημος in Hellenistic Greek means always a reviler of *God*, a sense it seems never to bear in the classics. *νεφροί*, which means really 'the kidneys,' is also non-classical in the sense of 'the inmost dwelling of thought,' though *φρένες*, 'the midriff,' for 'the mind,' is a well-known Greek expression. The ancients were fanciful in their assignation of the passions to particular organs. With the Romans the liver was the seat of fervid emotion (Horace, Juvenal, etc.), and so we find it in the Greek tragedians. The heart (in Latin at least) is rather the place of reason and memory ; but in Hebrew Psychology heart and kidneys are conjoined. Ps. 7¹⁰, ἐτάξων καρδίας καὶ νεφρούς, almost exactly repeated in Jer. 11²⁰, 17¹⁰, 20¹², and with a variation in Rev. 2²³, ὁ ἐρευνῶν νεφρούς καὶ καρδίας. They are not, however, synonymous, 'heart' being the seat of the intellect, the kidneys of the affections. In interpreting this passage **S^P** (not the Arabic) adds 'heart' to 'reins.'

'Guiltless of his lips' can hardly be misunderstood, though the temptation to paraphrase for the sake of clearness is strong. Genev. 'him that blasphemeth with his lips,' and A.V. 'will not acquit a blasphemer of his words.' This is of course the meaning ; but the plain word is illustrated by the use of **נֶפֶל** in Judg. 9³⁸, 'Where is now thy mouth, that thou saidst, Who is Abimelech?' Cf. also the expressions 'Transgress the mouth of Yahwe,' 1 Sam. 15²⁴, Num. 14⁴¹ ; 'Rebel against the mouth of Yahwe,' 1 Sam. 12^{14,15}, Num. 20²⁴, 1 Kings 13²¹, etc.

7. For the spirit of the Lord hath filled the world,

And that which embraceth all things hath knowledge of the spoken word :

Some light is thrown upon this use of the word *νεφρῶν* by Weber (*Jüd. Theol.*, 211), who cites a Rabbinic tract in which it is stated that man has two kidneys ; one urging him to good, the other to evil, in support of which Ps. 15 (16)⁷, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἔως νυκτὸς ἐπαίδευσάν με οἱ νεφροί μου, is quoted.

The rendering of *ἐπίσκοπος* is to be pressed in view of the importance of the term *ἐπίσκοπή* afterwards used. ‘Beholder’ (A.V.) and ‘overseer’ (R.V.) are quite inadequate. The ‘scrutator’ of **L** is much better, and has the support of **S^P** also. There is no sense of ‘benevolent protection’ about the word as used here.

7. The indefinite translation of Reuss, ‘comme il embrasse toutes choses’ is here deliberately adopted. It is absurd to expect from a writer who in the previous line has used *οἰκουμένη* for *κόσμος* an exact philosophical meaning of the Greek word *συνέχω*. *οἰκουμένη* is never used by any Greek writer to signify anything but the ‘habitable earth.’ Grimm’s quotations from Luke 21²⁶, Acts 11²⁸, and Joseph., *Ant.*, VIII. xiii. 4, all bear this meaning. The nearest approach to the sense of ‘universe’ is found in Heb. 2⁵, οὐ γὰρ ἀγγέλοις ὑπέταξεν τὴν οἰκουμένην τὴν μελλοῦσαν. Bretschneider, who assumes a Hebrew original for ‘Wisdom,’ suggests that the Greek translator confused נִיר, a voice, with נָבָל, or rather מָלָל, ‘all.’

Yet the word *συνέχον* is pressed by those writers who will at any cost discover Platonism or Stoicism in ‘Wisdom.’ Bois, *Essai Critique*, 234, argues from it that the Holy Spirit and *σοφία* are the same, and even Grimm appears to think that the ‘Anima Mundi’ is here alluded to. The quotations, ancient and modern, given by Farrar depend on a somewhat different idea—the ‘holding together’ of the world by an outside influence, which is a different thing from permeation. The latter must be sought, if anywhere, in the preceding line, and if *οἰκουμένη* have its natural sense, that line means simply ‘the Spirit of God fills the dwelling-place of mankind.’ It is impossible to discover any Pantheistic idea (which is what the ‘Anima Mundi’ really implies) in either line. Deane’s note is worth quoting : ‘the writer speaks only of the Omnipotence and Omnipresence of God, even as the Psalmist, Psalm 139 (‘Whither shall I go from thy spirit,’ etc.), and Zech. 4¹⁰ (‘they run to and fro through the whole earth’). Cf. Eph. 1²³ (‘the fulness of him that filleth all in all’).’ St. Augustine says that there is no necessity to refer this passage to the spirit that is supposed by some to animate the world ‘invisibilem scilicet creaturam cuncta visibilia universali quadam conspiratione vegetantem atque continentem ; sed neque hic video quid impediat intelligere Spiritum Sanctum, cum ipse Deus dicat apud Prophetam, Caelum et

8. Therefore shall no man that speaketh naughty things escape,
Nor shall convicting justice pass him by.

terram ego impleo,' Jer. 23²⁴. But nearly all commentators seem to confound this idea of 'holding together' with that of permeation.

Now the former idea is appropriate to God; the latter to the 'Holy Spirit' however designated, and the reading of **S^P**, 'he that holdeth together the whole,' followed by the Arabic, keeps this plainly in the foreground (cf. Margoliouth, *l.c.*, 286).

With regard to the last line, there can be no better explanation than that quoted by Grimm from Nannius (whose book is not so scarce as he supposed): 'Ut vehiculo aeris omnes voces ad aures perferuntur, ita nihil dici potest quin vehiculo spiritus sancti ad eum perferatur qui continet omnia et voces omnes intelligit. Ex eo enim quod dicit *continet*, id videtur significare quasi omnes voces intra ambitum complexumque Dei fiant, non foris, quare illum latere nihil potest ne vel tenuissimum murmur.'

8. The writer seems to have found the word *παροδεύειν* in Theocritus (as he also found *τήκεσθαι*) and to have been pleased with it. He uses it five times (here and in 2⁷, 5¹⁴, 6²², 10⁸), and only once in its natural intransitive sense as we find it in Theocr., xxiii. 47 ('Traveller, pass not by'), and indeed in **G** of Ezek. 36³⁴, 'in the sight of all that passed by.' The Vulg. translates 'praeteriet,' an impossible form (on the analogy of 'ambire,') but found also in **L** of Eccl. 11²⁰, etc. Margoliouth, in *Expos.*, 1900, i. 32, suggests that Theocritus himself was a Jew.

The passages quoted by the commentators (Eccl. 11²⁰ *παρελεύσεται*, 39³⁷ *παραβήσονται*, Jer. 5²² *οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται αὐτό*) do not illustrate or explain the matter. We have here a Greek word which the writer of 'Wisdom' simply did not understand. It means 'to pass along'; he thought it meant 'to pass over,' as it does in much later authors. To argue from the Greek of such a writer is hopeless. It is very probable that he wrote *οὐδὲ μὴν* (which Swete retains) for *οὐδὲ μὴ* at the beginning of line 2, and followed it by a subjunctive. This is certainly the more difficult reading. But a precisely similar variation is found in the **G** of Job 28¹³.

S^P Arab. give no help; the first has 'he (the blasphemer) shall not escape the judgment of rebuke,' the latter, which is a superior version, reads 'detecting punishment shall not be removed from them.' Both translators probably had our present Greek text before them.

We have here something very like a personification of *δίκη*. It seems natural enough to us, and we do not find in it any indication of a separate entity called 'Justice,' any more than (elsewhere) of 'Wisdom': cf. 11²⁰, and 'pursued by Justice,' Acts 28⁴. A striking use of this word for 'vengeance' occurs in 4 Macc. 4¹³ ἐξ ἀνθρωπίνης ἐπιβουλῆς καὶ μὴ θείας δίκης ἀνηρῆσθαι τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον. That Philo (*in Flacc.*, § 18) personifies Justice will surprise no one.

9. For of the plots of the unrighteous man shall inquisition be made,

And the echo of his words shall come unto the Lord
For a conviction of his lawless deeds :

10. For the ear of jealousy overheareth all,

And the muttering of murmurings is not hidden.

9. For 'of the plots' the Greek is *ἐν διαβούλιοις ἀσεβοῦς*; a peculiar use of *ἐν*, but not unclassical: cf. Thuc. i. 77, *ἐν τοῖς νόμοις ποιεῖν τὰς κρίσεις*, with a slightly different meaning: *ἐν ἐμοὶ θρασύς*, Soph. *Aj.*, 1315, is perhaps nearer.

We have here a difference of rendering which for once is absolutely unimportant as regards the force of the doctrine inculcated. The A.V. translates, 'inquisition shall be made into the counsels of the ungodly'; and the Syriac interpreter took the words in the same sense. The R.V., taking *ἀσεβοῦς* with *ἐξέτασις*, renders rather awkwardly, 'in the midst of his counsels the ungodly shall be searched out,' and has the support of the Arabic, 'examination shall be made of the wicked as concerning his designs.' The slight verbal difference is of no account; the force of the passage, if addressed, as we suppose, to apostate Jewish princes, is unmistakable. The whole verse is indeed a fervid denunciation of the sin of such renegades, and a warning as to the penalty which awaits them.

Διαβούλιον and *διαβούλια*, which are hardly classical, are favourite words with *¶*, who no doubt connected them with *διάβολος*. They occur in Ps. 5¹⁰, 9²³ (*¶* 10²); Hos. 4⁹, 5⁴, 7¹², 11⁷; Ezek. 11⁵, the Hebrew varying.

'Echo' (Reuss) is of course no literal translation; but it seems to express the sense of the Greek *ἀκοή*. Churton renders 'the sound of his words,' and quotes (on 5⁷) the forcible utterances of Mal. 3¹³⁻¹⁶. There is a book of remembrance before the Lord, and the 'words that have been stout against him' are all recorded.

10. The 'ear of jealousy' is 'the common Hebrew adjectival genitive' (Farrar), and does not need much illustration. The idea is originally anthropomorphic, and in certain cases (as in Joel 2¹⁸, 'Then was the Lord jealous for his land and had pity upon his people'; Ezek. 39²³, 'Now will I bring again the captivity of Jacob and have mercy upon the whole house of Israel; and I will be jealous for my holy name') expresses the zeal of Yahwe for his chosen flock. But in other passages a personal demand for respect is enunciated, e.g. Exod. 20⁵, *θεός ζηλωτής*, and 30¹⁴ (R. V.), 'For thou shalt worship no other god; for the Lord whose name is Jealous is a jealous God.'

The general sense of the passage, leaving out of account the anthropomorphic view, cannot be better expressed than by Churton: 'Even man's jealousy makes him listen to everything and watch for every word that is whispered against him; much more should the dread of

11. Beware ye therefore of unprofitable murmuring,
 And refrain from idle slander of the tongue ;
 For there is no word so secret that shall go for nought,
 And the mouth that lieth it slayeth the soul.

Him, who is the witness of all our actions, restrain us from vain murmuring, detraction, and other sins of the tongue.' This is no doubt the large application of the text ; but in all probability it is directed primarily to the Jewish apostates, whose 'mutterings' (Reuss, 'fussentils proférés à voix basses') will not escape the ear of God. *γογγυσμός* is not a classical word, but it is effective, and is found in Exod. 16⁸, Numb. 17⁵⁻¹⁰, used of the 'murmuring' of the Israelites against Moses.

Siegfried gives a different rendering : 'muttering of murmurings' is for him a kind of superlative like the 'Holy of Holies.' This is highly improbable : most likely the author had picked up the Greek word *θρούς* and thought it would sound well with *οὐς* (Grimm).

Bois, 228, has an excellent note on the anthropomorphisms and anthropopathies of 'Wisdom.' They are very rare, he points out, and all in the latter chapters : 10⁹⁰, 'Thy hand that fought for them' ; 11¹⁷, 'Thine all powerful hand' ; 16¹⁵, 'Thy hand it is not possible to escape' ; 19⁸, 'These that were carried with thy hand.' He even attributes all such expressions to a desire to illustrate the feelings of Solomonic times.

11. These words, if really addressed to the kings and princes of the earth, sound rather absurd. If, however, they are intended for the ears of a Tiberius Alexander and his likes, they are reasonable enough. *Γογγυσμός* and *καταλαλία* must then mean their cavillings against the God of their fathers and his laws.

'Slayeth the soul' has been unduly pressed by those commentators who are determined to find in this book the doctrine of the absolute annihilation of the wicked as it is enunciated, for example, in Enoch 22¹³, 'Their spirits will not be punished on the Judgment Day, but they will not even be raised up from hence.' It is needless to say that such a doctrine is totally at variance with what is taught in Wisdom 4²⁰. This rather corresponds with what is stated in Enoch 100-103. (It is unnecessary, perhaps, to say that the so-called 'Book' of Enoch is really a collection of tractates.) What we find there is no doctrine of annihilation but of a miserable continued existence. 'Their souls will be killed, scream, and lament in an immense and desolate place, and burn in a flame where no earth is.' This is almost exactly the idea of Wisdom as expressed in 4¹⁹, 'They shall be in anguish' ; and they shall moreover know the recompense of the righteous, 5¹⁻³. However unphilosophical and vague in his language the writer of Wisdom may be, he certainly does not teach the annihilation of the wicked. The expression *ἀναρπεῖν ψυχήν* means no more than it does in a famous sermon of Mr. Spurgeon on 'Soul-murder,' which

12. Seek not after death by your erring way of life,
Neither draw destruction unto you by the works of your hands.

certainly does not imply 'annihilation.' Siegfried's translation of *ἀναρρεῖ* is loose, but probably not looser than the Greek: 'Verlogener Mund rafft die Seele dahin.'

καταλαλία is not a classical word, but occurs in 2 Cor. 12²⁰, 1 Pet. 2¹, both times in the sense of 'backbiting' (or so it appears from the context). Deane, however, would render it here 'blasphemy,' which certainly agrees with the first part of the verse.

Grimm (p. 59) takes the opportunity to sum up the eschatology of Wisdom, such as it is; and like every other critic who has attempted it, is involved in contradictions. He quotes, for example, 4¹⁹ and this verse 1¹¹ as proving that 'the wicked will be utterly destroyed by God and their souls perish.' But in commenting on 4¹⁹ (p. 109) he admits the precise contrary: 'that annihilation of the soul is not meant is plain from the following *ἔσονται ἐν ὁδύνῃ*.' That this can refer to an intermediate state he himself denies (p. 60), and we are left face to face with an absolute contradiction, which is not improved by the statement that 'getötet werden' may mean merely 'torments beyond the grave,' for which Tatian c. 13 is cited as saying that *θάνατος* means the eternal punishment to be assigned to the wicked at the Judgment.

Reuss probably expresses the writer's meaning when he says 'immortality is reserved for the just; the life reserved for the wicked after their death does not deserve the name.'

This was certainly the Rabbinic view (Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, 338); the souls of the good go straight to God; those of the wicked wander to and fro, chased by angels from one end of the world to the other; but they are not annihilated, they still exist.

With regard to the language, *κενὸν οὐ πορεύσεται* (with which may be compared Isa. 55¹¹, 'So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth; it shall not return unto me void') seems to be an early instance of an idiom which has become common in European languages—'to turn out bad' or the like. In Italian the verb 'to come' has actually become a periphrasis for the passive: 'to be loved' may be expressed by 'to come loved.' The same idiom is possibly to be found in 4²⁰, *ἔλευσονται*. Grimm takes it somewhat differently, 'shall proceed out' (of the mouth), on the analogy of the Hebrew נִצְרָא, and quotes from the New Testament, Matt. 4⁴, 15¹¹, etc., where, however, *ἐκ τοῦ στόματος* is used. Of the passages from the Old Testament which he cites, only one (in *¶*) contains *ἐκπορεύεσθαι* (Deut. 8³).

12. 'Ἐν is used in a strictly classical sense, of the instrument; cf. Lidd. and Sc. s.v. A. III. Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, 267, discovers in *πλάνη*

a mistranslation of a Hebrew word meaning 'folly,' and would render 'acquire not death by the folly of your mind.' This seems at least unnecessary. 'Do not court the death of your soul by your epicurean vagaries' is the general meaning. The writer probably had in mind Prov. 8³⁶, where Wisdom says *οἱ μισοῦντές με ἀγαπῶσι θάνατον*, and very possibly attached no exact meaning to 'death.' Cf. Ezek. 33¹¹, *ἴνα τι ἀποθνήσκετε οἶκος Ἰσραὴλ*;

If it has any distinct force, however, it is that of the loss of the blessed immortality of the righteous. Drummond, *Philo*, i. 210, says of v.¹³, 'That the reference is to spiritual death, that is, the loss of the soul's true and blessed life, may be inferred with some probability from the words which immediately precede the statement that God did not make death.' 'A lying mouth,' it is said, 'kills the soul,' an expression which is itself of doubtful import; but its meaning is determined by the succeeding exhortation not to strive after death, because God is not pleased with the destruction of the living,—as though death were so opposed to the divine purpose that it could be obtained only through a criminal zeal. Such language could not be used of our physical dissolution in a world where every plant withers and every animal restores his body to the dust. All doubt is removed by the added statement that 'righteousness is immortal,' for the antithesis will hold good only in the spiritual realm—the righteous, as our author confesses, dying to this world as surely and as easily as the wicked.' Dr. Drummond further refers to 'Wisdom's' denial of the reality of death (ch. 3) in the case of the righteous.

It will be seen that he is very far from attributing to 'Wisdom' the doctrine which Grimm insists upon: that of the annihilation of the wicked. Indeed it involves that commentator in hopeless confusion. The wicked will die and yet will continue to exist in torment. The difficulties are well set forth by Bois as quoted in Add. Note B. One way out of them was to suppose that Pseudo-Solomon alluded to a temporary condition in which the souls of the godless remained till on the day of judgment they were totally destroyed. Cf. Grimm as quoted above. Bois' suggestion of a prophetic confusion of ideas will hardly stand. Pseudo-Solomon is not a prophet.

With the second line we may compare Isa. 5¹⁸, 'Woe unto them that draw iniquity with cords of vanity and sin as it were with a cart rope.' The word *ἐπισπάσθαι* is there used, and also in Judith 12¹² ('if we draw her not unto us'), where the allusion is to sexual relations. This is just possible here, and more than possible in *ἐτάκησαν*, verse 16.

It should be noted with regard to the strong word *ζηλοῦτε*, 'be zealous for death,' that it is the term used (Joseph., *B. J.*, II. viii. 7) of the candidates (*οἱ ζηλοῦντες*) for admission into the sect of the Essenes.

13. For God made not death,
 Nor hath he pleasure in the destruction of them that live ;

14. For he created all things for to endure,
 And the generative powers of the world are full of health,
 And there is not in them the poison of destruction,
 Nor is the kingdom of death upon earth.

13. The whole idea is very much that of James ¹^{13.15}, 'Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God, for God is untried in evil, and he himself tempteth no man. But each man is tempted when he is drawn away by his own lust, and enticed,' etc., i.e. God is not the author of sin (and death). Cf. also Ezek. 33¹¹, 'I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live : turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways ; for why will ye die, O house of Israel ?' Cf. also 18², 2 Peter 3⁹. A highly illustrative passage is quoted by Deane from the *Const. Apost.*, vii. 1, *φυσικὴ μὲν εστίν ἡ τῆς ζωῆς ὁδὸς. ἐπεισάκτος δὲ ἡ τοῦ θανάτου, οὐ τοῦ κατὰ γνωμὴν Θεοῦ ἵπαρξιντος, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐξ ἐπιθυμίης τῆς ἀλλοτρίου.* Similarly St. Augustine, *Contra Jul. op. imperf.*, iv. 32, explains that death is not God's will, 'nec operi ejus convenit mors, but required by justice : 'mortem non fecit, et tamen quem morte dignum censem, occidet.' Contrast Tennant in *Journ. of Theol. Studies*, ii. 215, cited below.

The passage seems to denote the absolute freewill of man as regards sin, as set forth in Deut. 30¹⁸ (cf. 2 Esdr. 8⁵⁹), 'I have set before thee life and death, the blessing and the curse ; therefore choose life.' Ecclus. 15¹⁷, 'Before man is life and death ; and whichever he liketh, it shall be given him' (cf. Porter in Add. Note A).

14. The language is loose. *εἰς τὸ εἰναι* can hardly mean existence for ever ; Deane is probably right in explaining that it means that the creatures were to carry out the laws of their proper existence, which would include the growth and decay of plants and brutes and the immortality of man. If, then, a creature dies *before its time*, this is the work not of God but of Satan. There is probably a reference to Gen. 1³¹, 'God saw everything that he had made, and behold it was very good.'

Γενεσίς is of uncertain meaning. Two older interpretations : 'the beginnings of the world were healthy' (Vatablus), and 'the origin of the world was without harm' (Castellio) have both some claims to notice. But the question lies between 'creatures' and 'generative powers.' The former is very generally adopted, as by Wahl, Gfrörer ('Alle Kreatur'), Siegfried, Grimm, Deane, Bissell ('productions'), Farrar, and is supported by *Л* 'sanabiles fecit nationes orbis terrarum,' where 'nations' means 'species' of animals : it is used of bees by Plin., *N. H.*, xxii. 24, 50. *§P* favours the version of Castellio, 'In the birth of the world there was life.' Reuss translates loosely 'tout dans la nature doit servir à l'entretien de la vie.' Pfleiderer

(*Heraklit*, 358) quotes the fifth (forged) letter of Heraclitus, of which he believes Pseudo-Solomon to be the author: 'Ὑγεία ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον· λατρικώτατον φύσις.'

The rendering of R.V. is retained with great hesitation, on the logical ground that all creatures are *not* healthsome, and that some of them have the 'poison of death' in them. This difficulty has to be got over by supposing that such animals only received power to hurt when Adam lost his immortality by sin. This is the Rabbinic idea. It was only in consequence of the Fall that the earth produced poisonous insects and reptiles. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, 223.

Φάρμακον in itself does not imply an evil agency. It may mean any 'medicine,' and is even applied to the Holy Eucharist by Ignatius, Ephes. 20. So Λ has 'medicamentum exterminii.' Gfröer (*Philo*, ii. 208) discovered here a reference to the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

"Αἰδον βασιλείου" is translated 'kingdom' as R.V. A.V. Λ Σ^p Σ^h. No doubt, however, in classical Greek the word does mean 'palace,' and it may refer to the idea of Sheol as the royal house of Hades. Cf. the πνλαὶ ἄδον of Matt. 16¹⁸. There is a 'prince of the power of the air' (Eph. 2²); and 'world-rulers of this darkness' (Eph. 6¹²); Satan may be 'king of this world' (John 16²); but he and death are but temporary usurpers (2²⁴).

For the personification of Hades cf. Porter's note quoted on verse 16. Grimm will not allow any such. It cannot, he says, be proved that Hades here denotes a personal existence as prince or angel of death as in Rev. 6⁸, 'a pale horse: and he that sat upon him his name was Death; and Hades followed with him'; 20¹⁴, 'Death and Hades were cast into the lake of fire.' Cf. *Evang. Nicod.*, c. xx. *sqq.*, where Hades is introduced speaking and acting side by side with Satan. We need not even assume a *rhetorical* personification of the lower world as in Hos. 13¹⁴, 'O grave, where is thy destruction?' Isa. 5¹⁴, 'Hell hath enlarged her desire and opened her mouth without measure; ' Job 18¹⁴, 'He shall be brought to the king of terrors.' The conjunction of death and Hades occurs often: Rev. 6⁸ and 20¹⁴ are quoted above; Rev. 1¹⁸, 'the keys of death and of Hades.' The remaining three passages quoted by Grimm: viz. Isa. 38¹⁸, Hos. 13¹⁴, Wisdom 61¹³, may all imply the *identity* of 'death' and 'Hades.'

The sense of the passage certainly, as Grimm says, is that Death, according to God's original plan (spoiled by Satan), has no power over created beings on earth; and the proof of this is given in 5². The righteous are immortal, and in them at least the original design of the Creator is fulfilled. It is difficult to see how, in the face of this, Tennant (*I.c.*) can argue that our author believed that death formed part of God's original scheme. Such a conclusion can only be arrived at by persistent pressing of two doctrines which probably do not exist in 'Wisdom' at all—(1) the pre-existence of

15. For righteousness is immortal :

16. But the impious by their deeds and their words summoned him ;

Deeming him their friend they pined for him,
And made a covenant with him ;
For worthy are they to be of his sort.

the soul ; (2) the desperately evil character of the body. If these two points be granted, death, as separation of pure soul and impure body, might be a blessing.

15. The A.V. places this sentence in a parenthesis ; and indeed it seems to break the thread of the argument, though Grimm's reasoning (cf. note on verse 14) justifies it to some extent.

If, however, we accept the supplementary line given in the Sixtine Vulgate and the Complutensian—

'But injustice is the very attainment of death,'

we have a connection both with what follows and what precedes, it being understood that 'injustice' is used generally for 'wickedness.' Cf. Cornely, *ad loc.*

Against the genuineness of this addition, which is accepted by Fritzsche and Grimm, but which certainly stands on a less stable foundation than the second line of 2⁸ (see notes *ad loc.*), it may be urged that (1) it occurs in no Greek MSS. at all ; (2) according to Deane it is found in very few Latin ones of weight. Grimm, on the other hand, says it is wanting in few MSS. of **L** ; (3) it is not included in **L** as commonly read ; (4) it is not found in Arab. or **S^P**. Corn. à Lapide regards it as unauthentic.

On the other hand it (1) completes the parallelism ; (2) supplies an imperatively needed substantive to which to refer *aὐτὸν* in the next verse ; (3) makes up with the second line of 2⁸ the 1100 verses of which Nicephorus says the book consists (cf. authorities quoted by Grimm).

As to what Greek original is represented by the line there are various conjectures. Grimm : *ἀδικία δὲ θανάτου περιποίησις ἔστιν*, on which Siegfried remarks that though *περιποίησις* is found in the New Testament, it is unknown to our author. He suggests *ἡ δὲ ἀδικία ἄγει εἰς θάνατον*, which is not much like the Latin.

In any case we have in **L** a peculiar addition 'justitia autem *perpetua* et *immortalis* est,' which would seem to suggest that the translator had before him a text varying from our own in the first line.

16. The translation 'deeds' is given as the real force of 'hands' or 'handywork.' 'Sort' is used in the Elizabethan sense as in *Rich. II.*, IV. i. 246, 'a sort of traitors,' etc. It seems imperatively necessary to accept the addition of **L** if we are to find a subject for *aὐτὸν* and *ἔκεινον*. To extract *θάνατος* from *ἀθάνατος* is hardly allowable. The

passage is important as involving the question of the personality of 'Hades.' 'Death is personified as Hades is in 1¹⁴, where it is said that he has no palace (or crown, cf. 5¹⁶) on earth. The ungodly make death their friend ὅτι ἀξιοι εἰσιν κτλ. When now we compare this with 2²⁴, πειράζουσιν δὲ αὐτὸν (θάνατον) οἱ τῆς ἐκείνου (διαβόλου) μερίδος ὄντες, our impression is that the devil is scarcely more than the personification of death.' . . . 'Our writer's mode of thinking made it quite possible for him to accept the reality of the devil of current thought, and yet give him practically the value of a mere symbol of temptation and death.' Porter, *op. cit.*, 236. Bois, 295.

The word ἐτάκησαν, 'melted away,' causes the chief difficulty in the text, but if the whole passage be considered as having a sexual meaning (this is rendered easy for Reuss, the French word for 'death' being feminine), this is much diminished. Pfleiderer, *Heraklit* 319, thinks that an actual marriage contract is alluded to. The use of τήκομαι for the wasting effects of love is illustrated from Theocritus, ii. 28. 'Ως τοῦτον τὸν καρὸν ἐγὼ σὺν δαίμονι τάκω, ὡς τάκοιθ' ὑπ' ἔρωτος ὁ Μύνδιος αὐτίκα Δέλφις.

It occurs again in this book as representing the effect of envy, 7²³ (φθόνῳ τετηκότι) and in Ps. 22¹⁶ of sorrow, ἡ καρδία μου ὥστε κηρὸς τηκόμενος. But here it is undoubtedly used of love, and represents exactly the Latin 'deperierunt' rather than the meaningless 'defluxerunt,' (L); for deperio cf., among other instances, Plaut. *Cistell.* I. iii. 43, 'Is amore illam deperit et illa hunc contra.'

Bretschneider and Engelbreth (the latter cited by Grimm) had already suggested that here was a mistranslation of a Hebrew word ; נמסו, 'they melted away,' instead of נסכו, 'they poured' (a libation) for a treaty, as in the uncertain passage Isa. 30¹. The suggestion is revived by Dr. Margoliouth (*op. cit.*, 269), who cites the New Hebrew נחפשך as meaning both to 'melt away' and 'to make terms.' Freudenthal denies this latter meaning. It signifies, he says, 'to reconcile two opponents.' It is possible, of course, to take ἐτάκησαν literally as R.V., A.V. and apparently ל סָפָר אַלְכָלָל 'they perished,' and this meaning appears in 3 Macc. 6⁸. But if they perished, how could they be said to make a covenant with death? סָפָר 'they melted.'

Συνθήκη is somewhat fancifully interpreted by Bois as referring to 'initiation' into the hated mysteries. In the well-known passage, Isa. 28¹⁵, the 'covenant with hell' is used in an entirely different sense, viz. a covenant to escape from hell. Yet a third sense is found in Eccl. 14¹², where διαθήκη ἀδον (probably) means 'the law of the lower world,' according to which men die at a certain time. If the book is mainly addressed, as we believe, to Jewish apostates, the allusion is pointed, drawing a contrast between Israel's holy covenant with God and their unholy compact with evil.

In spite of the personal terms here applied to 'death,' Grimm, p. 63, will not hear of the conception of him as a 'Prince of Death,' either here or elsewhere ; cf., however, Porter as above quoted.

2. 1. For they said in themselves, reasoning not aright,
 Brief and sorrowful is our life,
 Yea in the end of a man is no cure,
 And none was ever known that returned from Hades.

2. For at random were we begotten,
 And hereafter we shall be as though we had not been ;
 For smoke is the breath in our nostrils,
 And our reason but a spark in the beating of our heart,

2. 1. With the whole passage Deane compares 1 Cor. 15³² (a direct quotation from Isa. 22¹³ , 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we shall die.' Cf. 56¹² , 'We will fill ourselves with strong drink ; and to-morrow shall be as this day, etc.'). The allusions to Ecclesiastes are clear and indubitable.

Grimm would take *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς* 'with one another,' which is a classical use, but incorrect here, for the allusion is plainly to Eccl. 2¹, I said *in my heart*, Go to now, I will prove thee with mirth ; therefore enjoy pleasure. So *Ἐ* 'apud se cogitantes,' apparently taking *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς* with *λογιστίμενοι*.

'In the end of a man there is no cure :' the words are capable of two entirely different senses. (a) 'In a man's end there is no cure for his earthly troubles,' *i.e.* there is no immortality as a recompense for this world's evils : and (b) 'there is no remedy or escape from the end of a man.' The first would undoubtedly have been adopted by all, as it is by Grimm, had it not been for the passage, Eccles. 8⁸, 'there is no man that hath power over the spirit to retain the spirit ; neither hath he power over the day of death.' The resemblance of this passage to various texts of Wisdom, and especially to 16¹⁴, 'the spirit that is gone forth he turneth not again,' induced the commentators to force the Greek to bear this second meaning. *Ἐ*'s curious rendering 'non est refrigerium in fine hominis' favours the first. Cf. Pseud.-Ambros. *Serm. xix.* (quoted by Deane), 'Lazarus apud inferos in sinu Abrahae refrigerium consecutus.'

On the rendering of these words depends also in part that of those which follow. If the close connection between Eccles. 8 and Wisd. 16¹⁴ is maintained, then to correspond to that passage ('neither giveth release to the soul that Hades hath received') we must translate with Grimm 'a redeemer from the lower world has not yet been discovered.' But the other rendering is more in accordance with the common use of *ἀναλύειν* (cf. Luke 12³⁶, 1 Esdr. 3³, Tobit 2⁹), is supported by the versions, and gives an excellent meaning, 'None of the dead have returned to tell of a life beyond the grave : therefore let us enjoy the present life' (Churton). 'Wisdom' itself gives us no help. In 16¹⁴ *ἀναλύειν* certainly means to release, but the author is capable of using it in an entirely different sense here.

2. If *ἐγενήθημεν* (Swete) be read, the R.V. 'we were born' may stand ;

but if with some of the best MSS. we read ἐγεννήθημεν we must translate 'were begotten,' which is physically more correct. We may illustrate this from the German satirical poet Büsch :

‘Und man zeuget viele Kinder,
 Ohne Sorg’ zu tragen bei ;
 Und die Kinder werden Sünder
 Wenn’s den Eltern einerlei.’

αὐτοσχεδίως (A.V. ‘at all adventure’) is wrongly translated by L ‘ex nihilo,’ S^P ‘unexpectedly.’ The reference to Eccles. 3¹⁰ ‘that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts,’ would be much clearer if we could there translate (with Hitzig) ‘a mere chance are all men,’ a rendering adopted by R.V. marg., and clearly intended by the Massoretic vocalisation (R.V. text involves a tacit emendation *מִקְרָרָה* *status constructivus* for *מִקְרָרָה*).

The Epicurean philosophy as set forth by Lactant., *Instt.*, II. i. 2 (quoted by Grimm), implied that men ‘supervacuos et frustra omnino natos (esse) quae opinio plerosque ad vitia compellit.’ Grimm truly remarks that belief in a higher destiny of man is bound up with belief in the immortality of the soul; and it is for this (and not merely to illustrate the word *αὐτοσχεδίως*) that he cites Cic., *Tusc.*, i. 49. ‘Non temere nec fortuito sati et creati sumus, sed profecto fuit vis quae ad quae consuleret generi humano; nec id gigneret aut aleret, quod quum exantlavisset omnes labores, tum incidet in mortis malum sempiternum.’

What follows is, as Reuss says, ‘a well formulated expression of materialism; breath does not prove the existence of a soul; it is produced by the play of the organs.’ For ἐν πνεύ, cf. Gen. 2⁷, ‘breathed into his nostrils the breath of life.’ Job 27³, ‘the spirit of God is in my nostrils.’ Λόγος (A.V. follows the Complut. in reading δλίγγος) is certainly ‘reason’ and not ‘speech.’ As Siegfried remarks, the ancients had no idea of the functions of the *brain*, and conceived of thought as a fiery matter. This idea does not seem to be confined to the school of Heraclitus, (Pfeiderer, *Heraklit*, 313), but to have been common to Stoics and Epicureans. Isidor. Pelus., *Eph.*, iv. 146, is cited as quoting οἱ ἀστεβεῖς σπινθῆρα νομίσαντες εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν κτλ with part of verse 3.

The idea conveyed in *κινήσει* seems to be that as two bodies rubbed together produced heat, so perpetual motion in the heart produced sparks which within meant ‘thought,’ without, in the form of breath, emitted vapour (*πνοή*). Churton seems to take *λόγος* as meaning ‘speech’: ‘they supposed that their speeches would pass away with the sounds which they uttered, and knew not of the reckoning for every idle word.’ For οὐχ ὑπάρξαντες, cf. Obad. 16. ἔσονται καθὼς οὐχ ὑπάρχοντες.

Cic., *Tusc. Disp.*, i. 9, illustrates our passage as regards the heart. ‘Aliis cor ipsum animus videtur, ex quo excordes, recordes, concor-

3. Which being quenched, the body shall turn into ashes,
And the spirit be dispersed as empty air;

desque vocantur.' And there is a curiously corresponding verse in Tennyson ('Vision of Sin') :—

'Every heart, when sifted well,
Is a clot of warmer dust,
Mixed with cunning sparks of hell.'

For the general argument against the Epicureans, cf. Enoch 102⁶⁻¹⁰, 103⁹⁻¹⁶, quoted in full in Appendix B.

3. R.V. has 'thin air,' for which there is not the slightest justification : L (and A.V.) 'mollis aer.' Churton's paraphrase deserves quotation (noting that he seems to take *λόγος* as 'speech') : 'when we die, it will be as when a fire is extinguished and cold ashes alone remain ; and our breath, together with the words which we have uttered, will be like the smoke of the fire, dispersed and mingled with the soft air.' There would appear to be more intended in the second line than the ordinary Biblical and classical comparison of life to a vapour or the like. *πνεῦμα* to these materialists might well denote the life itself. Just as the ancient Hebrews, recognising that when the blood was gone the life was gone, identified blood and life, so it was possible to say that when the breath was gone the life was gone ; therefore the breath was the life. (For the ancient Hebrew psychology in this matter cf. Porter in Additional Note A.) It is possible that this materialistic idea is found in Eccles. 3¹⁹, 'that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts. . . . as the one dieth, so dieth the other ; yea, *they have all one breath*,' and v. ²⁰, 'All go unto one place ; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again.'

A clear distinction must be drawn between the Biblical and classical parallels to this and the following verses. The former are merely metaphors : man's life is *like* a breath, a vapour : the latter are generally frankly materialistic : man's life *is* a breath. Of the former we may note Ps. 144⁴ (¶) 'man is like to a breath' ; Job 7⁷, 'Remember that my life is wind.' Compare with these Hom. Il., xxiii. 10, *ψυχὴ . . . ἡῦτε καπνὸς ὥχετο*. Plato, *Phaedo*, 70a, 'Men fear lest the soul on the day of death εύθὺς ἀπαλλαγμένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνοντα ὥσπερ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς δίασκεδασθεῖσα οἴχηται κτλ. Lucret., iii. 233, 'Tenuis enim quaedam moribundos deserit aura mista vapore' ; iii. 456, 'Ergo dissolvi quoque convenit omnem animai naturam, ceu fumus in altas aeris auras.' Seneca, *Troades*, 394, 'Ut calidis fumus ab ignibus vanescit . . . sic hic quo regimur spiritus effluet.' Soph., *El.*, 1158 (*δαιμῶν*) ὅς σ' ὥδέ μοι προύπεμψεν ἀντὶ φιλτάτης μορφῆς σποδόν τε καὶ σκιὰν ἄνωφελῆ. Hor., *Od.*, IV. vii. 16, 'Pulvis et umbra sumus.'

The whole of the metaphors of this chapter are summed up by Greg. Naz., *Epitaph. in Caesar.* : ὅναρ ἔσμεν οὐχ ιστάμενον, φάσμα τι

4. And our name shall be forgotten in time,
 And none shall call to remembrance our works ;
 Yea, our life shall pass away as the traces of a cloud,
 And as mist shall it be dispersed,
 Chased by the sun's rays,
 And weighed down by his heat.

5. For our life is the passing of a shadow,
 And there is no prevention of our end,
 For it hath been sealed and none reverseth it.

μὴ κρατούμενον, πτῆσις οὐρίου παρερχομένου, ναῦς ἐπὶ θαλάσσης ἵχνος οὐκ ἔχουσα, κόνις, ἀτμὶς, ἐωθινὴ δρόσος κτλ.

4. *Μνημονεύει* is rather more than 'remember' (R.V.). It seems to include some form of commemoration. The connection with Eccles. is here plainer, 2¹⁶, 'Of the wise man as of the fool, there is no remembrance for ever ; seeing that in the days to come all will have been already forgotten.' 9⁵, 'The dead know not anything ; neither have they any more a reward ; for the memory of them is forgotten. As well their love as their hatred and their envy is now perished.' In orthodox Jewish belief such oblivion is counted a severe punishment. Cf. 4¹⁹ and notes there. The point for the ungodly is contained in the last clause quoted from Koheleth : our bad deeds as well as our good will be forgotten.

ἵχνη νεφέλης is rather curiously taken by Grimm as 'the remains of a cloud' which pass away more quickly than the main mass of it. Churton, 'the mist which is the last vestige of a cloud,' which is not the idea here. Bretschn. suggests that the Hebrew *רָקַע נָע*, 'morning cloud,' was mistaken for *רָקַע נָע*, an expression which could scarcely denote 'trace of a cloud,' as he postulates. A *morning* mist is plainly meant, dispersed by the sun's rising rays and 'driven down' (*βαρυνθεῖσα*) into the earth by them. *βαρυνθεῖσα* is a clumsy word, which no good Greek scholar would have used. Indeed Arnald (from one M.S.) suggested *μαρανθεῖσα*, which is only too plainly a gloss. *¶* has 'aggravata,' which does not help us much.

For comparison of life to a cloud or vapour cf. Job 7⁹, 'as the cloud is consumed and vanisheth away, so he that goeth down to Sheol shall return no more.' Hos. 13³ conjoins the ideas as here, 'they shall be as the morning cloud and as the dew that passeth away early.' James 4¹⁴, 'What is your life? for ye are a vapour that appeareth for a little time and then vanisheth away.'

¶ transposes the sentence 'Even our name . . . works' to the end of the verse. There is a less serious dislocation in 12¹². One referred to by Deane as in 4¹⁹ is not in his own edition of the Vulgate text.

5. Comparisons of life to a shadow (a fresh metaphor) are plentiful.

6. Come then, let us enjoy the good things that are,
And eagerly use creation like youth ;

We have one below in v. ⁹. Cf. Job 8⁹; 14², 'he fleeth as it were a shadow and never continueth in one stay.' Ps. 39⁶ (Heb.) 102¹¹, 144⁴, 1 Chron. 29¹⁵. The like occurs in one of the orthodox (?) interpolated passages of Koheleth : Eccles. 8¹³. 'It shall not be well with the wicked ; neither shall he prolong his days, which are as a shadow.' So Enoch, 49², 'Unrighteousness will pass away like a shadow.' Pindar, *Pyth.*, viii. 133, has *σκιᾶς ὅναρ ἀνθρωπος*. Cf. Soph., *Aj.*, 126, and several modern instances collected by Farrar.

For *βίος ἡμῶν*, *¶* A.V. and good MSS. of *¶* have *κατρός* (*§P* 'our dwelling'). *βίος ἡμῶν* is perhaps a reminiscence of vv. ¹⁻⁴. *Κατρός* will not mean our fixed span of life, as *βίος* does in Job 14⁵ : the wicked would admit no such arrangement of Providence. It must be taken in the ordinary Hellenistic sense of 'time' generally.

ἀναποδισμός is not easy to interpret. It means rather 'repetition' than 'returning' (the commonly accepted meaning), but occurs neither in *¶* nor New Testament. *¶* 'non est reversio finis nostri' is ambiguous, and *§P* 'there is no remedy *¶* in our departure,' which is copied from v. ¹. The solution seems to lie in the Arabic *تعويق* which plainly read *ἐμποδισμός*, 'hindering.' With this the exact Armenian (according to Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, 285) also agrees, and this would seem to settle the point. 'There is no preventing death'—possibly the meaning of v. ²⁰. If *ἀναποδισμός* be retained, it might mean either 'there is no returning of our end' (a man can only die once, Heb. 9²⁷), or 'There is no return from death,' A.V. practically. But if *ἀναστρέφει* means also 'returns,' this is mere tautology. In any case it would seem that there is almost a repetition of v. ¹ in other words.

κατεσφραγίσθη. 'Is closed'; has been sealed up, as if in a sealed tomb. Cf. Dan. 6¹⁷; Matt. 27⁶⁶, and compare Job 14¹⁷. *ἐσφράγισας δέ μου τὰς ἀνομίας ἐν βαλλαντίῳ*. Siegfried notes the expression as a Hebraism, quoting Deut. 32³⁴, 'Is not this laid up in store with me, sealed up (*מִתְחִזָּה*) among my treasures ?'

If *ἀναστρέφει* has the common meaning 'to reverse' (cf. examples from Homer to Xenophon in Liddell and Scott), it seems appropriate here. This throws some light on the possible meaning of *ἀναλύειν* in 2¹ ('redeem').

6. 'The good things that are' may denote either those ready to hand (A.V. 'are present') or 'that really exist,' are not clouds or shadows or imaginary delights like those of virtue, but tangible sources of enjoyment.

The polemic against Koheleth is here marked. Cf. Eccles. 2²⁴,

7. Let us be filled with costly wine and perfumes,
And let not the flower of the spring pass us by ;

‘There is nothing better for a man than that he should eat and drink and make his soul enjoy good in his labour’ (the same in 3¹², with the later addition that ‘this is the gift of God ;’ 9⁷ is similarly qualified). 11⁹, ‘Rejoice, O young man, in thy youth ; and let thy heart cheer thee in the days of thy youth, and walk in the ways of thine heart, and in the sight of thine eyes,’ followed by the famous interpolation, ‘but know thou,’ etc.

For *κτίσει*, ‘creation,’ *κτήσει*, ‘riches,’ is a well-supported reading. To ‘use the world’ in this sense is exactly the opposite of 1 Cor. 7³¹, ‘use the world as not abusing it.’ Classical quotations exhorting to immediate enjoyment are plentiful (see Grimm’s and Farrar’s notes). One striking one is from Petronius, *Satyr.* 34, where the guests exclaim, as the ivory skeleton is carried round at Trimalchio’s banquet, ‘Sic erimus cuncti postquam nos auferet orcus. Ergo vivamus, dum licet esse bene.’ With this compare the Egyptian hymn quoted in Appendix A.

νεότητι presents a serious difficulty (*νεότητος* is also read and might mean ‘as in the time of youth’). That the difficulty was plain to the translators is clear from the variety of versions. 3¹ ‘tanquam in juventute.’ 8⁹ ‘in our youth ;’ Arab. ‘as long as youth lasts.’ Grimm once suggested ‘eagerly as is fitting for youth’; but now would read *ἐν νεότητι*, and Siegfried, noting that the writer probably had Eccl. 11⁹ *בִּילְרִיתְךָ* ‘in thy youth’ in his mind, approves. Other suggestions are ‘as in the days when we were young,’ and ‘let us use the world as we do, or did, our youth.’ Bretsch. thinks there is a confusion between בְּ ‘in’ and בְּ ‘as,’ which would agree well with Pfleiderer’s suggestion that *νεότης* is a slang word for ‘a girl’ (something like the German ‘junges Blut’), and that the meaning is, ‘let us use God’s creation as we would a harlot.’ This idea derives some support from the use of *χρῆσθαι* in Ecclus. 26¹⁰. Cf. Liddell and Scott, *s.v.*, *χράω*, C. III. 2. Cornely would translate ‘as if we were still in our youth,’ which would confine the phrase to the case of aged sinners. Gregg’s suggestion is ingenious : he would read *κτίσεως* for *κτίσει* ὡς, and translate ‘let us use the youth of creation’; but there is no support for such a conjecture.

7. There seems no occasion to suppose a double use of the verb as does Farrar ; ‘let us fill ourselves with costly wines and sate ourselves with unguents.’ It is probable that Pseudo-Solomon was, as usual, writing loosely, but passages are not wanting which indicate that the ‘perfumed brandy’ of the luxurious modern Indian had its prototype in classical times. Cornelius à Lapide translated *οἴνον καὶ μύρον* ‘vinum unguentosum,’ and we find in Aelian, *Var. Hist.*, xii. 31

8. Be we crowned with rosebuds ere they fade away,
And let there be no meadow uncoursed by our debauch.

(quoted by Grimm), *μύρῳ οἶνον μιγνύντες οὔτως ἔπινον*. A most remarkable verbal correspondence occurs in Anacreon xiii. 9-13, *ἔγὼ δὲ τοῦ Διαίου καὶ τοῦ μύρου κορεσθείς*, and again in xv. 5-8, *ἔμοὶ μέλει μύρουσι καταβρέχειν ὑπῆρην, ἔμοὶ μέλει ρόδουσι καταστέφειν κάρηνα*. It is, of course, possible that the 'ointments' were those applied to the body—a custom common to Jews and Greeks, cf. Amos 6⁶, 'that drink wine in bowls and anoint themselves with the chief ointments'; Luke 7⁴⁶, 'my head with oil thou didst not anoint'; Ps. 23⁶ and 45⁸. Pseudo-Heraclitus in *Epistle* vii. laments over 'the waste of good olive oil in perfumes' or ointments. The question is really unimportant.

For 'flower of the spring' the common text reads *ἄνθος ἀέρος*, and Swete retains it. The versions most certainly had this reading. *S^P* translates 'leaves of air,' and the Arabic 'smell of flower' or 'flowers.' But *L* most likely had the original reading as *G^A* has preserved it; *ἄνθος ἔαρος*, 'the flower of spring.' No transcriber would have altered *ἀέρος* into *ἔαρος*; many would be puzzled by *ἔαρος* and write the more familiar *ἀέρος*. *L* renders the phrase 'flos temporis,' and from other passages (James 5⁷ and Isa. 28⁴ quoted by Deane) it would seem that this or a similar periphrasis meant 'early.'

There are various attempts to utilise *ἀέρος*, e.g. Arnald, 'Let no fragrant breath of air arising from the wine or the ointments pass by or escape us.' Churton, 'The flower that scents the air.' But the most ingenious conjecture is that of Bois (*Essai*, 381). He discovered in Aristotle's *Hist. Anim.* *ἄνθος* as the name of a bird—'probably the yellow wagtail' (Liddell and Scott), and reading *ἄωρος* for *ἀέρος* translates the 'early lark,' explaining that transcribers, confounded by the apparently neuter noun coupled with a masculine adjective, altered *ἄωρος* into *ἀέρος*. Siegfried, however, points out that *ἄωρος* always means 'untimely,' 'unripe.' Nor would the introduction of the lark among all these garlands and perfumes be probable. An even stranger idea is that of Calmet, quoted by Cornely. He rendered *ἄνθος ἀέρος*, 'flower of life.' But *ἀήρ* with the meaning of 'life' never occurs in classical or Hellenistic Greek.

8. For the first part of the verse there are parallels without number. The best known, perhaps, is Herrick's

Gather ye rosebuds while ye may,
Old Time is still a-flying ;
And this same flower that smiles today,
Tomorrow may be dying.

Horace, *Od.* I. xxxvi. 15 and II. iii. 13, and Anacreon are quoted by Farrar. The latter combines roses and perfumes, as here. Cornely quotes in addition the lines, most apposite to this entire passage, of Lucr., *Rer. Nat.*, iii. 910 :

Hoc etiam faciunt, ubi discubuere tenentque
Pocula saepe homines et inumbrant ora coronis,
Ex animo ut dicant: Brevis hic est fructus homullis ;
Iam fuerit neque post unquam revocare licebit.

The latter part of the verse is supplied from the Latin version : 'nullum pratum sit quod non pertranseat luxuria nostra.' This addition stands in a different category from that already noticed in 1¹⁵, and is almost certainly genuine. It must have fallen out (probably owing to the fact that the line began with $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\iota\lambda\epsilon\mu\omega\nu$ and the next with $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\iota\eta\mu\omega\nu$) at an early date, for none of the versions recognise it ; but (1) it restores the balance of periods so carefully maintained in the rest of the paragraph. (2) It makes up one, at least, of the two $\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\chi\omega\iota$ which are presumed to have fallen out. Nicephorus (Deane, *Proleg.*, 28) reckoned 1100 $\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\chi\omega\iota$ in 'Wisdom,' and at present there are but 1098. (3) An ancient glossary attached to Cod. Coislinianus, cccxciv. gives the word $\lambda\epsilon\mu\omega\nu$ as occurring in 'Wisdom.' It is nowhere to be found if not here. Siegfried objects that the form is too prosaic for Pseudo-Solomon ; but it is impossible to say what the original verse was. Gregg's remark is acute : 'it does not seem to have been noticed that Vulg. is simply a rendering of the first line of verse⁹ with $\lambda\epsilon\mu\omega\nu$ substituted for $\eta\mu\omega\nu$ [i.e. $\mu\eta\delta\epsilon\iota\lambda\epsilon\mu\omega\nu\ \alpha\mu\omega\iota\sigma\omega\tau\eta\eta\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\mu\alpha\lambda\gamma\epsilon\mu\omega\chi\iota\alpha\mu\omega\nu$]. Either this line was introduced to complete the apparently unfinished verse⁸, or it is the original reading, and verse^{9a} is the interpolation. Verse^{9a} as it stands is somewhat pointless, and adds nothing to the sense.'

Too much stress seems to be laid upon the crowning with roses as a Greek rather than a Jewish custom. No doubt to the heathenised governors like Tiberius Alexander all such usages might rightly be attributed. But in all nations, from Greece to the Sandwich Islands, flowers and garlands have been used as symbols of rejoicing. Cf. Judith 15¹³, 'they put a garland of olive upon her . . . and all the men of Israel followed in their armour with garlands.' Such a custom is mentioned by Ezek. 23⁴² as one of the usages of heathendom, and is doubtless implied in Isaiah's scornful allusion to the debauches of the drunkards of Ephraim in 28¹. Grimm has a most curious and learned note on the subject, quoting Plutarch, who held that 'warm flowers opened the pores and provided an exit for the spirit and vapour of the wine.' Josephus, *Ant.*, xix. ix. 1, couples the celebration of a feast 'with garlands on their heads' with 'ointments and libations to Charon.'

9. Let none of us go without his share in our insolent revelry ;
 Leave we everywhere the tokens of our joy ;
 For this is our lot and our portion is this.

9. *Insolent revelry.* The word *ἀγερωχία* occurs also in 2 Macc. 9⁷, where its meaning is undoubtedly as the A.V. translates it ‘bragging, R.V. ‘rude insolence.’ It is here rendered (Gen.) ‘wantonness.’ A.V. ‘voluptuousness,’ which is wholly insufficient. R.V. ‘proud revelry.’ *S^P* seems either to have had an augmented text before him, or, as is more likely, to have extracted from the single word a whole sentence of meaning. Deane *ad loc.* gives us the clue to this. He derives *ἀγερωχία* ‘from ἀ intensive, γέρως, and ἔχω,’ and so *S^P* renders ‘Let none of us be without pleasure until our old age,’ apparently connecting *ἀγερωχία* with the root of *γέρων*, and thinking it meant ‘revelry which knows no old age.’

Taking the meaning usually assigned to the word, we have no difficulty in finding parallels to the kind of revelry which may be indicated. Milton’s (*Par. Lost*, i. 500)

When night
 Darkens the streets, there wander forth the sons
 Of Belial, flown with insolence and wine.

They had their successors in the ‘Mohocks,’ the ‘Thuns,’ and the ‘Tityre Tu’s’ of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, as they had had their prototypes in Imperial Rome. Cf. Juvenal, iii. 278, ‘*Ébrius ac petulans qui nullum forte cecidit dat poenas*,’ etc., with the following twenty lines and Mayor’s comment thereon : a perfect picture of the Roman Mohock.

Pfleiderer (*Heraklit*, 330 *sqq.*) has a suggestion as to the whole of this verse, which is at least interesting. It is quite possible that Pseudo-Solomon in his ignorance of Greek thought that *ἀγερωχία* came from *ἀγείρω*, and meant a joint entertainment, or, as Pfleiderer puts it, a ‘picnic.’ To these feasts every one contributed ; they were *ἔρανοι* in short ; and Bernays explained the mysterious passage in Heraclitus, *Epistles*, vii. (quoted at the end of Additional Note D) *τοῖς* (or *τὰς*) *ἐν συνδείπνοις γυνομένοις διὰ δακτυλίων παροινίας*, ‘those who take part in picnics by means of rings,’ i.e. they gave their rings to the caterer as pledges that they would pay the score. This, says Pfleiderer, is the meaning of the *σύμβολα* of our text : he rejects altogether Grimm’s idea that this word can mean merely ‘marks of our joyousness,’ and would render rather ‘let us have a score at every tavern.’ For the objectionable nature of these club-feasts he quotes (p. 331 n.) the Council of Laodicea (372 A.D.) *οὐ δεῖ ἱερατικοὺς ἡ κληρικοὺς ἐκ συμβολῆς συμπόσια ἐπιτελεῖν ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ λαϊκούς.*

μερίς quite possibly refers also to such forms of festivity. It is used in Plutarch for the contribution to an *ἔρανος*. Such a play on words would be quite like our author ; but it is probable also that he had

10. Let us oppress the poor righteous man by our might.
 Spare we not the widow,
 Nor reverence the old man's grey hairs full of years.

Koheleth in his mind, who uses the word repeatedly. 2¹⁰, 'This was my portion from all my labour.' 3²², 'A man should rejoice in his works ; for that is his portion ; for who shall bring him back to see what shall be after him ?' 9⁹, 'Live joyfully with the wife whom thou lovest, etc. . . . for that is thy portion in life.' But a different interpretation is suggested by Cornely : translating as above, he would explain, 'Let there be no concealment and no hypocrisy about our debauches : let every one see our revelry and the tokens of it.' *Κλῆρος* with the meaning of destiny is unclassical, though the ambiguous English word 'lot' enables us to translate it with propriety. It is used with a slightly different meaning in 3¹⁴, 'a lot in the sanctuary of the Lord.' The two words are found conjoined in Deut. (6) 12¹², 14^{27.29}, and Acts 8²¹.

10. Tyler (*Koheleth*, p. 80), who does not favour the idea that Ecclesiastes has been 'edited,' points out with justice that there is nothing of all this in that book : 'Koheleth, when he summons to enjoyment, never incites to lying in wait for the righteous or oppressing the widow ; but Wisdom might well think that all this followed from his denial of immortality.' As a matter of fact, Koheleth speaks of oppression with abhorrence (4¹). The sequence of ideas is well brought out by Churton ; 'sensuality first produces indifference to the sufferings of others, and then it inflames the darker passions, and makes men delight in inflicting pain.' That cruelty is a form of lust is a psychological fact which has not yet been fully recognised.

But it is to be noted that in most of the passages where *καταδυναστεύειν* is used (15¹⁴, 17², Eccl. 48¹², Ezek. 22²⁹, Acts 10³⁸), it is used not of one private person wronging another, but of men in authority misusing their power. Coupling this with v. 12 below, 'He upbraideth us with our sins against the law,' and 3¹⁰, 'They which lightly regarded the righteous man and revolted from the Lord,' we may conclude that it is the apostate Jews in high places, like Tiberius Alexander, who are aimed at. Here, therefore, for a time we take our leave of Koheleth, and return to the circumstances of everyday life.

It is unnecessary to suppose that 'righteous man' is ironical. No other description would put the case before us. As it is, we have parallels in James 2^{6.7} (where *καταδυναστεύειν* is used of private persons), and in Ep. Barnab. 6⁷.

An exact parallel to the 'dishonouring of the grey hairs of the aged' is found in the story of Eleazar, 2 Macc. 6¹⁸⁻³¹, but, as Grimm points out, the perpetrators there were heathen soldiery. The words which especially bear on our text are ὁ δὲ λογισμὸν ἀστεῖον ἀναλαβὼν καὶ

11. Be our strength the rule of our justice,
For weakness is approved to be unprofitable.

12. But let us lie in wait for the righteous, for he serveth not our
turn,
And he is opposed to our doings;
Yea and reproacheth us with our breaches of the law,
And denounceth to us our breaches of our discipline.

ἀξιον τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ τῆς τοῦ γήρως ὑπεροχῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπικτήτου καὶ ἐπιφανοῦς πολιᾶς . . . ἀκολούθως ἀπεφήνατο κτλ.

11. R.V. clumsily and insufficiently 'let our strength be to us a law of righteousness.' An utter misconception of the passage led some copyists of the **L** to write 'injustitiae.' For the meaning is plainly We mean to make might answer for right. Cf. Juv., *Sat.*, vi. 223. *Nil fecerit, esto : hoc volo, sic jubeo, sit pro ratione voluntas*, and the counsel of vice to Heracles in Xen., *Mem.* II. i. 25. *οἴς ἀν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐργάζωνται, τούτοις σὺ χρήση, οὐδενὸς ἀπεχόμενος ὅθεν ἀν δυνατὸν ή τι κερδάναι. πανταχόθεν γάρ ὠφελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἔμοὶ ξυνοῦσιν ἔξουσίαν ἔγωγε παρέχω.*

In the second line of the verse we have the justification of their conduct by the oppressors. Weakness is not only contemptible; it is unprofitable, and therefore should be exterminated. It is difficult, however, to believe with Grimm that *ἐλέγχεται* means that the weak is convinced of his own unprofitableness.

12. Whether δέ be omitted or not is of little consequence. The connecting particles seem to be used by the writer in the most haphazard way, and it is useless to found arguments upon them. The constant repetition of *καὶ* often renders it advisable, both for the sake of variety and to emphasise its intensive use, to translate it 'yea' or 'yea, and.'

The first line is a quotation from the entirely erroneous **G** version of Isa. 3¹⁰, 'say ye to the righteous that it shall be well with him'; **G** has *δῆσωμεν τὸν δίκαιον ὅτι δύσχρηστος ἡμῖν ἐστι*. This mis-translation was accepted by the Fathers, following its citation in Ep. Barnab. 6⁷, and referred by them to the sufferings of Christ. Deane gives the patristic quotations. The most interesting is the use of the words by Hegesippus in his account of the martyrdom of James the Just.

ἀμαρτήματα νόμου and *ἀμαρτήματα παιδείας* are clearly parallel in meaning and construction. If the first means 'breaches of the law,' the second must mean 'breaches of the system in which we were brought up'; and renderings of the first like Fritzsche's (quoted by Grimm), 'sins which the law forbids,' may be dismissed at once. It is obvious that apostate Jews are speaking, and that they have been reproached with breaking (1) the actual law of Moses, (2) the traditional observances.

13. For he professeth to have knowledge of God,
And calleth himself the Lord's child.

The rendering adopted by Grimm and Siegfried is 'our sins against morality,' taking *ἡμῶν* generally. There are, however, variant readings. *Ἑκταῖα* have *παιδίας*, which may be either *παιδιᾶς* 'of our sport,' or *παιδίας*, 'of our youth.' For the latter cf. Ps. 25⁷ *ἀμαρτίας νεότητός μου . . . μὴ μνήσθης*, Ezek. 23²¹. But one cannot render 'sins against our sport,' or 'against our youth,' as the parallel of *ἀμαρτήματα νόμου* would require.

Lastly, *Σ^ρ* seems to have read *ἀναιδείας* (it translates 'sins of impudence'), which Grimm thinks arose from attaching the final letter of *ἀμαρτήματα* to the beginning of *παιδείας*. Margoliouth (*op. cit.*, 273), approves *Σ^ρ* *לענומת* 'rebelliousness,' for he argues that as the New Heb. *מְרֹדוֹת* may mean either *παιδεία* or rebelliousness, the Syriac translator of a Hebrew text took the wrong signification. But Freudenthal denies the double meaning.

13. R.V. relegating 'child' to the margin, renders 'servant of the Lord.' It is true that *παῖς θεοῦ* is often used in *Ἑ* to translate *עבד יהוה*, and also that *παῖς* in classical Greek does mean 'servant'; but surely the meaning is here fixed by v. 16^a, 'he vaunteth that God is his father,' and v. 18^a, 'if the righteous man is God's son (*νιός θεοῦ*) he will uphold him.' That the two expressions are used interchangeably in 9⁴⁻⁷, 12¹⁹⁻²⁰ may be doubted, though *Ἄ Σ^ρ* translate *παῖς* 'servant,' in rather arbitrary fashion, at times. It is probable, however, that in Acts 3¹⁸ *παῖς θεοῦ* means 'servant of God,' and it is true that elsewhere where the Sonship of Christ is stated, *παῖς* is not the word used, but the unambiguous *νιός*.

If any passage in Wisdom refers to the doctrines of Christianity it is this. For actual coincidence of language cf. Matt. 27⁴³ and v. 18, *πέποιθεν ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν, ρύσασθω νῦν εἰ θέλει αὐτόν*, John 19⁷ *ὁφείλει ἀποθανεῖν, ὅτι νιὸν θεοῦ ἔαυτὸν ἐποίησεν*. The early Fathers treated this as a prophecy, from the Epistle of Barnabas onward. Justin, *Dial. cum Tryph.*, xvii., Euseb., *P. E.*, xiii. 13, and Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, v. 14 are cited. These two latter, however, seem to quote a variant: *ἄρωμεν ἀφ' ἡμῶν τὸν δίκαιον*. Among Latin Fathers (Tertullian, Cyprian, Ambrose, Lactantius) Augustine is worth quoting (*de Civ. Dei*, xvii. 20). 'In uno (libro) qui appellatur sapientia Salomonis, passio Christi apertissime prophetatur. Impii quippe interfectores ejus commemorantur dicentes Circumveniamus justum.'

Another theory was that of interpolation by a Christian hand. But against this we may remark (with Farrar), first, that no Christian would have introduced the subject of the Passion of Christ without a reference to his Resurrection (?), and secondly, that Christ's persecutors are not such as could be reproved for 'breaches of the law' (v. 12), but of the strictest sect of the Pharisees. The features of the

14. He was to us for a reproach of our devices ;
Grievous is he to us even to look upon.

case as described are those which accompany (in the idea of the sufferers) every religious persecution, and here the description is coloured by reminiscences of Isa. 53.

À Lapide saw in the 'shameful death' of v. ²⁰ a direct allusion to the cross, and in the word *ἄχρηστος* (v. ¹¹) an insulting play on the name *Χριστός*, which was indeed confounded with *χρηστός*. Cf. Suet., *Claudius*, 25, 'Impulsore Chreste.' A similar play on words may be found in 1 Pet. 2³, *εἰ ἐγεύσασθε ὅτι χρηστὸς ὁ κύριος*.

The theory of a real Messianic prophecy or reference in these verses has been revived by Cornely, and is defended by him with considerable force and argumentative power. Into his reasonings it is impossible to enter here. He starts, of course, from the assumption that 'Wisdom' is canonical and inspired. But if this premise be denied, his arguments, verbally good as they are, fail to convince us that anything more than the 'poor just man' of ordinary life is in question ; and the persecution of the poor by the rich is almost a commonplace of the prophets : cf. Hab. 1⁴, Zech. 7¹⁰, Ezek. 18¹², Isa. 10², Mal. 3⁶, Jer. 22³.

The words *ἄχρηστος* and *δύσχρηστος* would be out of place if the reference were really to Christ, and this difficulty can only be overcome by translating them 'molestus,' a meaning which they would hardly bear, though it would no doubt accurately describe our Lord's relation to the Jewish rulers. *Παῖς κυρίου* Cornely takes as meaning 'servant,' and justifies this by its use in the second Isaiah.

That there is any reference to the torments of the just man in Plato, *Repub.*, 362 A, is unlikely, but this passage is worth quoting. If he boldly rebukes injustice, *οὐ δίκαιος μαστιγώσεται, στρεβλώσεται, δεδήσεται, ἐκκαυθήσεται τῷ φθαλμῷ, τελευτῶν πάντα κακὰ παθὼν ἀνασχινδυλευθήσεται καὶ γνώσεται ὅτι οὐκ εἶναι δίκαιον ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν δεῖ ἐθέλειν.*

14. It is not necessary to suppose that the righteous actually rebuked the apostates. The mere sight of his exact piety would be sufficient reproach for them. *L* is extraordinarily literal, 'factus est nobis in traductionem cogitationum nostrarum.' This the older commentators (e.g. Holcot), ignorant of the Greek, seem to have interpreted 'conviction of our thoughts,' i.e. penetrating knowledge of our thoughts. This would correspond well to Matt. 9⁴, 'Jesus knowing their thoughts said, Wherefore think ye evil in your hearts?' and to the similar passage in Luke 6⁸. But Cornely, though this would suit admirably with his theory of Messianic meaning in the text, quotes the rendering only to reject it as impossible.

The dislike of the world for the *δίκαιος* was extended also to the Christian. Cf. John 3²⁰, *πᾶς γὰρ φαῦλα πράσσων μισεῖ τὸ φῶς.* 15¹⁹, *ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου οὐκ ἐστέ, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἐξελεξαμην ὑμᾶς ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου, διὰ*

15. For his life is not like to others,
And his ways are peculiar.

16. For false coin were we reckoned by him,
And he abstaineth from our ways as from filthinesses ;
He blesseth the end of the righteous,
And vaunteth that God is his father.

τοῦτο μισεῖ ὑμᾶς ὁ κόσμος. 1 Pet. 4⁴, ἐν ὧ ἔχειζονται, μὴ συντρεχόντων ὑμῶν εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν τῆς ἀστοτίας ἀνάχοντιν. So also to the philosopher. Philo, *Quod om. lib. prob.*, § 5, 'Αντισθένης δυσβάστακτον εἰπεν εἴναι τὸν ἀστείον· ὡς γάρ ἡ ἀφροσύνη κούφον καὶ φερόμενον, ἡ φρόνησις ἐρημεισμένον καὶ ἀκλινὲς καὶ βάρος ἔχον ἀσάλευτον. Max. Tyt., *Diss.* 29, ὁ μὲν φιλόσοφος Βαρὺ καὶ πρόσαντες τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀκούσμα, ὡς ἐν πένησι ὁ πλούσιος θέαμα Βαρύ. κτλ. Horace, *Eph.* II. ii. 81, 'ingenium . . . quod . . . studiis annos septem dedit insenuitque libris et curis, statua taciturnius exit . . . et risu populum quatit'

The behaviour and habits of the 'philosophers' were often such as to make them ridiculous, if not actually offensive. The name 'cynic' in itself is a sufficient reproach, and the anecdotes recounted of members of that school correspond to it.

15. In line 1 R.V. and A.V. have 'unlike other men's,' which is no doubt the meaning, but is not expressed in the Greek; the idiom is not uncommon. Cf. Hom. *Il.*, xvii. 51, κόμαι Χαρίτεσσιν ὄμοιαι, 'like those of the Graces,' Rev. 13¹¹ κέρατα ὄμοια ἀρνιώ, and below, 7³ φωνὴν ὄμοιαν πάσιν κλαίων.

Ἐξηλλαγμένος had acquired the meaning of 'strange,' or rather 'peculiar' (which modern-sounding word is therefore used in the above translation). **L** 'immutatae' is simply a literal translation of a word not understood by the translator. We have the real meaning which had attached itself to the word clearly expressed in Aristot., *Poetics*, xx. 20, ἀπαὶ ὄνομά ἔστιν ἡ κύριον . . . ἡ ἐξηλλαγμένον. 'Every word is used either in its "master-sense" (i.e. its original meaning) or in some interchangeable (or peculiar, unnatural) meaning.' Thereafter the word appears among the later classics with the sense of 'peculiar,' 'strange.' 'The freethinkers,' says Grimm, 'reckon all piety and observance of the law as a fancy of eccentric persons.' The A.V., 'his ways are of another fashion,' is hardly tenable.

Bretschneider (*Dissert.*, pp. 12-15), relying on passages like this, refers the whole passage to persecution of the Jews by Gentile oppressors. So he considers v. 15²³ as describing the vengeance of God, not against the wicked, but against those who disbelieve in Him.

16. It is evident that some serious variation existed from an early period in the text of the first line. **L** has 'tanquam nugaces aestimati sumus ab illo,' and 'nugaces' certainly does not correspond to κιβδηλος. On the other hand, the **S^P** and Armenian versions (the

17. Let us see if his words be true,

Yea, and make trial of what will happen at his going forth.

latter cited by Margoliouth) have 'filthiness.' This may, of course, be derived from the next line ἀπὸ ἀκαθαρσιῶν, but it seems to denote a distinct difference of reading. Margoliouth (*op. cit.*, 289) speaks of a Hebrew word נַגֵּן, which is supposed to mean both 'unclean' and 'not genuine.'

κιβδηλος, which the A.V. well renders 'counterfeits,' is capable of easy explanation. It is not the counterfeit morality of the 'Scribes and Pharisees hypocrites,' but the pretence of the Jewish apostates to be real Israelites that is indicated. Cf. Rom. 2²⁸, δὲν τῷ φανερῷ Ιουδαῖος.

τὰ ἔσχατα, 'the end of life,' good or bad. In the Psalms it is used of the destiny, during life, of men, cf. Ps. 73¹⁷, 'I went into the sanctuary of God, and considered their latter end' on earth. The passages quoted from Proverbs are ambiguous. In Job 42¹² the meaning is undoubtedly 'the latter days of a man's life on earth'; but in Ecclesiasticus the term invariably denotes the end of a man, *i.e.* his death. Cf. Ecclus. 1¹³, 7³⁶, 51¹⁴. It surely means 'death' here, and not, as Grimm thinks, possibly the good fortune of the righteous upon earth. Cf. Reuss *ad loc.*, 'il affirme que le juste finit toujours par être heureux'; which, if the present world be referred to, is certainly untrue. Cf., however, Ecclus. 2¹⁰.

Αλαζονεύεται, which Deane considers 'a fine expression,' is probably used in scorn. 'He boasts, vaunts, brags,' cf. John 5¹⁸. He not only broke the Sabbath, but also called God his own Father. It is possible, but unlikely, that ἀλαζονεύεται means 'feigneth.' Cf. Aristot., *Oec.*, I. iv. 3.

17. 'In the end of him' (A.V.) and 'in the ending of his life' (R.V.) are inadequate to express the force of ἔκβασις, which includes the meaning of 'result'; the result of all his self-sacrifice. Cf. Polyb., *Hist.*, III. vii. 2 (quoted by Deane), περὶ τὴν ἔκβασιν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Φιλίππου πολέμου, and the same sense appears in Wisd. 11¹⁴, ἐπὶ τέλει τῶν ἔκβάσεων ἔθαύμασαν. But it is impossible to argue from one passage to another in Wisdom. "Ἐξόδος is similarly used of death in Luke 9⁸¹, 2 Pet. 1¹⁶.

L translates, favouring the rendering 'result,' 'quae eventura sunt illi,' but with the addition, 'et sciemus quae erunt novissima illius,' of which no trace is found in the versions, and which does not appear to have found its way into the text till a late date; for though it is quoted by Aug. *de Civ. Dei*, 22²⁰, it is not found in Cyprian, *Test. adv. Jud.*, ii. 14. It seems to be a mere expansion of what goes before, starting from the word ἔσχατα, v. 16 ('novissima'). Gutberlet, of course, defends it. On this addition cf. Westcott in Smith's

18. For if the righteous be God's son, he will uphold him,
And save him from the hand of them that rise up against
him.

19. With insult and torture let us test him,
That we may know his tolerance,
And judge of his endurance of evil.

D. B., art. 'Wisdom of Solomon.' It may very possibly be the result of a confusion of two Latin renderings. The first, 'tentemus quae ventura sunt illi,' does not represent the Greek well, for it leaves out *ἐν ἐκβάσει* altogether. It is therefore likely that an alternative translation 'sciemos quae erunt novissima (*ἐκβάσις*) illius,' was current, and that the two appear here side by side.

Churton remarks that the words in the second line resemble those said of Joseph by his brethren (Gen. 37^{19.20}), 'Let us see what will become of his dreams.'

18. The similarity to Matt. 27⁴³ (quoted on v. ¹³) is certainly quite remarkable. But in this, as in so many other cases, verbal agreement may probably be traced to a common source (cf. Additional Note C), in this instance Ps. 22⁹, *ἥλπισεν ἐπὶ κύριον, ῥυσάσθω αὐτὸν σωσάτω αὐτὸν, ὅτι θέλει αὐτὸν*. Deane aptly quotes Euseb., *H. E.*, v. 1, where he tells the story of martyrs so derided by their persecutors. *Νῦν ὥσμεν εἰ ἀναστῆσονται, καὶ εἰ δύναται βοηθῆσαι αὐτοῖς ὁ θεὸς αὐτῶν καὶ ἔξελέσθαι ἐκ τῶν χειρῶν ἡμῶν.*

But that this is either a prophecy or a Christian interpolation is out of the question. The reasons against such theories as given in the note on v. ¹³ are well summed up by Reuss. (1) In the following chapter, closely connected with this, the 'just man' and 'just men' are used indiscriminately; (2) the persecutors of our Lord were not materialists—quite the contrary; (3) a Christian interpolator would not have failed to allude to the purpose of Christ's death. This is really a clear abstract of Grimm's remarks, p. 80.

Ἄλλος has 'si enim verus filius Dei,' which is generally understood as corresponding to ὁ δίκαιος. But the Armenian version (Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, 285) reads δικαίως, 'if he be really the son of God' (cf. Soph., *Ajax*, 547, *εἴπερ δικαίως ἐστ' ἐμὸς τὰ πατρόθεν*). The reading may be the true one. There is no occasion for a repetition of ὁ δίκαιος, and if δικαίως were found by copyists, so clumsily used in such a place, they would probably think it wrong and substitute the adjective.

19. 'Ἐτάσωμεν in the sense of 'torture him' is paralleled by Acts 22²⁴, *εἴπας μάστιξιν ἀνετάξεσθαι αὐτὸν*. We may compare the mediæval euphemism of 'the question' for torture. *ἐπιείκεια* (R.V. 'gentleness,' A.V. 'meekness,' which are both inadequate). Ἄλλος 'reverentiam ejus,' which seems inexplicable. In Heb. 5⁷ the similar word, *εὐλαβεία*, is

20. Condemn we him to a shameful death,
So shall there be made examination of him from his own words.

translated by the same word in **L** ('Godly fear,' R.V.), but here the **L** translator must surely have had another reading before him.

This is quite possibly no fancy picture. It is unnecessary to go back to the half legendary stories of the books of Maccabees to find examples of sufferings for the Jewish faith. The quelling of the disturbances in Alexandria by Tiberius Alexander would, at least to the heated fancy of the Israelite enthusiast, furnish plenty of material for such general descriptions. A not very obvious parallel to the verse is cited by the commentators from Jer. 11⁹, but the nearest is in James 5⁶, *κατεδικάσατε, ἐφονεύσατε τὸν δίκαιον*. In one passage Christ is distinctly called *ὁ δίκαιος*, Acts 7⁵² *ἀπέκτειναν τοὺς προκαταγγείλαντας περὶ τῆς ἐλεύσεως τοῦ δικαίου*.

20. The dative *ἀσχήμονι θανάτῳ* is of course late Greek (the classical form could be either *καταδικάζειν τινα θανάτου* or *καταδικάζειν θάνατόν τινος*), but it is well supported. Grimm quotes Diod. Sic., i. 77, xiii. 101. Aelian, *V. H.*, xii. 49, and Matt. 20¹⁸. *κατακρινούσιν αὐτὸν θανάτῳ*. Cf. Winer 263 and Moulton's note. **L** 'morte turpissima condemnemus eum' apparently took *θανάτῳ* as equivalent to the Latin ablative 'by death.'

The second line is variously interpreted. A.V. 'By his own saying he shall be respected'—a dark saying, of which the solution is probably to be found in **L**, 'erit enim ei respectus ex sermonibus illius': the meaning being, as Deane says, 'with an ironical turn,' 'God is sure to respect him.' Churton's paraphrase, 'there shall be an inquiry into the truth of his words,' though rather loose, fairly represents Grimm's interpretation, 'There shall be an *ἐπισκοπή* in accordance with his words,' and R.V. 'He shall be visited according to his words.' Cf. v. ¹⁷, *ἴδωμεν εἰ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ ἀληθεῖς*. A slight variation gives 'as his words deserve,' with which we may compare Matt. 12³⁷, *ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου δικαιωθήσῃ καὶ ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου κατδικασθήσῃ*. The general idea of all who thus translate seems to be that 'a severe examination' on the ground of the man's own professions is intended: an examination by God Himself. Cf. 3⁷. That the wicked would not be likely to talk of such a judgment would matter little to the author of Wisdom. For this severe judgment cf. **S^P**, 'there shall be an inquiry upon him from his talk.' Whether Grimm is quite justified in translating **στολέ** 'adversus eum' may be questioned. Vatablus and Calmet (quoted by Grimm), 'explorabitur, damnabitur, punietur sumpta ex illius sermonibus occasione,' seem to refer the *ἐπισκοπή* to the action of the wicked, as in Matt. 26⁶⁰. It is possible that the Syriac took this view also. Other renderings are loose, e.g. Luther: 'he will be known by his words.' Osorius: 'Let us decide

21. Thus reasoned they, and were led astray ;
For their malice blinded them.

22. Yea, they know not the mysteries of God ;
Neither hoped they for the reward of holiness,
Nor recognised the prize of blameless souls.

on his mental state (*ἐπιείκης* or not) by the words which torment will extort.'

But a very popular rendering is that of Siegfried and others (akin to that of A.V.). 'According to his talk, he will be protected.' Farrar goes so far as to say that *ἐπισκοπή* 'can only refer to God's oversight and protection of His child,' and cites Luke 19⁴⁴, where 'visitation' certainly has not this sense. Zenner translates 'if we hearken to Him, He cannot fail of protection.' Even another rendering is suggested by Cornely : 'We shall know from what he says at the hour of death' (lit. from our inspection of him then) 'whether his boasts are true.'

21. Cf. 2¹, *λογισάμενοι ὅνκ όρθως*. Why this verse should have been singled out by Grätz as one in which the hand of a Christian interpolator may be seen it is difficult to see. There is certainly a resemblance to John 9^{40.41}, *ἴνα οἱ μὴ βλέποντες βλέπωσιν καὶ οἱ βλέποντες τυφλοὶ γένωνται*. "Ηκουσαν ἐκ τῶν Φαρισαίων ταῦτα οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ ὄντες, καὶ εἶπαν αὐτῷ, Μὴ καὶ ἡμεῖς τυφλοί ἐσμεν; κτλ. Luke 23³⁴, 'They know not what they do.' Cf. Eph. 4¹⁸, *ἐσκοτωμένοι τῇ διανοίᾳ ὄντες*: but there is no particularly Christian sentiment or dogma involved. 'What is here said of the relations between the pious and the worldly-minded has always been true, and the similarity of the language used to that used by the Jews against Christ arises solely from a natural similarity of circumstances' (Bissell).

κακία is well represented by the German 'Bosheit.' Grimm on 1⁵ quotes Theoph. Ant., *ad Autol.*, i. 2. *ἔχεις ὑποκεχυμένους τοὺς ὄφθαλμοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς σου ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων καὶ τῶν πράξεών σου τῶν πονηρῶν.*

22. There seems no reason for taking *μυστήρια* to mean the esoteric doctrine of immortality, as Gfrörer, *Philo*, ii. 234 (translating *γέρας* loosely as 'future exaltation'), supposes. It is merely the mysterious dealing of God with the righteous upon earth--their troubles, to be succeeded by future happiness--that is referred to. To the orthodox Jew with his traditional ideas of the temporal reward of piety, such dealing must be particularly difficult to fathom. *Ἄ* has 'sacramenta Dei,' but the meaning seems to be simply that indicated in 4¹⁷. 'They shall see the wise man's end and not understand God's intentions about him.' The force of the word in the New Testament is generally plain, as in Rom. 16²⁵, Eph. 1⁹, and 1 Cor. 15⁵¹, but in Col. 1²⁶ its exact force is questionable. For *μυστήρια θεοῦ*, the

23. Because God created man to be imperishable,

And as an image of his own everlastingness created he him.

common reading, Swete has *μυστήρια αὐτοῦ*, which can only mean 'the mysterious ways of the righteous man,' and certainly, if it be correct, would support the Messianic interpretation of the passage. Cornely naturally presses this point.

Οὐραὶ and *ὅσιότης* are terms which occur continually in Wisdom; the first in 4¹⁶, 6¹⁰, 7²⁷, 10¹⁶, 18^{1.6.9}, the second in 5¹⁹, 9³, 14³⁰. Grimm very well distinguishes between the meaning of this word, which denotes inward piety, and *εὐσέβεια*, which rather expresses strict observance of ceremonial, and does not occur in Wisdom at all. This is the more remarkable, inasmuch as Pseudo-Solomon, with his tirades against apostate Jews, might be expected to lay great stress on this *εὐσέβεια*. (Wellnigh all the martyrs of Maccabees die because they will not eat pork.) That he attaches such importance to being *ὅσιος*, which in the Psalms always answers to the Hebrew *חסיד* ('Chasidim,' 'Asidaeans'), might give some colour to the theory, widely supported, that he belonged himself to an ascetic sect—the mystics of later Hebrew times—Essenes or Therapeutae.

Ἐκριναν is quite well expressed by the A.V., 'discerned a reward for blameless souls.' Their marginal note is mysterious. 'Greek: preferred, or esteemed the reward': *κρίνω* is 'cerno,' 'to distinguish,' and so in modern language to 'recognise.' It seems hardly necessary to supply *εἶναι* for *γέρας*.

Zenner's translation seems eccentric: 'They were without reverence for the nobility of pure souls.'

23. *Αὐθαρσία* is difficult to express in English, but the German 'Unvergänglichkeit' comes near to it. It certainly includes the notion of *blest* immortality, which *ἀθανασία* also implies in certain passages of this book (3⁴, 8^{13.17}, 15³). *ἀφθαρσία* is found in this sense in I Cor. 15^{42.50.53}, etc. There is possibly a distinction made between *ἀφθαρσία* and *ἀθανασία* in the last quoted verse, *δεῖ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσασθαι ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ τὸ θνητὸν τοῦτο ἐνδύσασθαι ἀθανασίαν*; and so it may be that the first refers to eternal life beyond the grave, while the second denotes deliverance from that second death which seems to be meant in the next verse. **L** 'inextinguishable' is a fair rendering of *ἐπ' ἀφθαρσίᾳ*. In 6¹⁹ we have a somewhat different meaning of the word.

Even retaining *ἴδιότητος* in line 2 with Swete and R.V., and translating it 'proprietatis,' we have an argument for immortality. God created man in his own image and with his properties. Those must include immortality. If, however, with A.V. we read *ἴδιοτητος*, the argument becomes a direct statement. It was supposed that this reading was supported only by a few MSS. and various patristic

24. But through the devil's envy came death into the world,
And they which are of his party do experience it.

quotations, *e.g.* Tatian (in Grimm), c. 7 (of the Logos), *εἰκόνα τῆς ἀθανασίας τον ἀνθρωπον ἐποίησε*, while Method., *de Resurr.*, xi., and Athan., c. *Apoll.*, i. 7, quote the two lines word for word with *ἀἰδιότητος*. It is now discovered that *Σ^h* reads the same, which seems strong confirmation. *Σ* and *Σ^P* read *δομούότητος*, probably from a reminiscence of Gen. 1²⁶. *ποιήσωμεν ἀνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὅμοιωσιν*. A reading *ἰσότητος* is also mentioned. For the expression *κατ' εἰκόνα* or the idea implied, cf. also Gen. 5¹, 1 Cor. 11⁷, *εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ ὑπάρχων*, Col. 3¹⁰, *κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτὸν*. Cf. also Eccl. 17¹⁻³, where the idea is completely opposed to that of Wisdom, apparently denying that God ever intended man to be immortal. He 'created man of the earth and turned him back unto it again. *He gave them days by number and a set time . . . and made them according to his own image.*'

24. It is to be noted, firstly, that the serpent (with the same curious reticence which 'Wisdom' shows in the case of proper names) is not actually mentioned. Those who object to the doctrine of a personal devil argue hard to prove that 'Wisdom' treats the whole matter allegorically, like Philo, who held that the 'serpent' is a periphrasis for sensual pleasure, termed *διάβολος* by reason of its seductive lies. The omission of the article with *διάβολος* might seem to lend some colour to this; but it is so found in Acts 13¹⁰, *νὶè διαβόλου*, as in 1 Pet. 5⁸, *ὁ ἀντίδικος ὑμῶν διάβολος*. Against this view is to be urged that 'the devil's' envy is a categorical reference to a person, capable of passions; and secondly, that such a theory assumes 'Wisdom's' full acquaintance with the completed doctrines of the Philonian school, which he certainly did not possess; and if he were acquainted with this abstract meaning assigned to *διάβολος*, he surely would not have used a word so capable of misconstruction. (Dähne, *Alex. Relig. Philos.*, ii. 172, n. 100.)

For the belief in a personal devil the attitude of the LXX. is of interest. They identified the gods of the heathen with 'demons.' Deut. 33¹⁷, *ἐθύσαν δαιμονίους* (דְּמִשְׁׁרָשָׁן) *καὶ οὐ θεῷ*; Ps. 96⁵, *πάντες οἱ θεοὶ τῶν ἐθυῶν δαιμόνια* (אֱלִילִים); 106³⁷, *ἐθύσαν τοὺς νιόντας αὐτῶν καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας αὐτῶν τοῖς δαιμονίους* (דְּמִידִים); Isa. 65¹¹, *έτοιμάζοντες τῷ δαιμονίῳ* (נְזָרָת ? Fortune) *τράπεζαν*. Now it is argued that in the Philonian philosophy (Dähne, ii. 70) *δαιμόνια* are only *good* spirits; therefore the LXX. must have meant good spirits. Grimm, p. 83 n., asks if the שָׁרִים, the satyrs of Isa. 13²¹, who are to dance among the ruins of Babylon, are to be reckoned good angels? In Isa. 34¹⁴ even the word צִוִים (? wild cats) is rendered by שְׁרִים δαιμόνια. These are stronger instances than those in which שְׁרִים or אֱלִילִים are used, for those terms involve no ascription of malignity. They simply describe the deities of foreign

nations—inferior but not on that account fiendish. (Cf. Whitehouse in Hastings' *D. B.*, art. 'Demon.') Later on **שָׁטָן** does come to mean 'devil.' Jos., *B. J.*, VII. vi. 3, seems to have believed that demons were the spirits of wicked dead men. 'Those called demons, which are no other than the spirits of the wicked that enter into men that are alive and kill them, unless they can obtain some help against them.'

It was always thought that our text contained the first distinct literary reference to the identity of the serpent and 'Satan.' But if the date assigned to the Slavonic Enoch (beginning of Christian era) be right, we have an earlier case, which also bears upon 'the devil's envy.' In 31³ of that book we read: 'The devil took thought as if wishing to make another world, because things were subservient to Adam on earth. . . . He became Satan after he left the heavens. His name was formerly Satanail. He conceived designs against Adam in such a manner that he entered and deceived Eve. But he did not touch Adam.'

The date of the Apocryphic book (or rather books, for there are several recensions) called the 'Life of Adam and Eve' is uncertain, but probably it contains fragments of very early Jewish tradition. (Cf. Fuchs *Einleitung* in Kautzsch, *Apokr.*, ii. 510.) Here the devil induces the serpent (which had previously bitten Seth) to enter into the plot separately, Satan himself appearing as an angel (cf. 2 Cor. 11¹⁴), in which form he tempts Eve a second time while she is doing penance for her sin. Eccl. 25²⁴ simply says that 'from a woman was the beginning of sin, and because of her we all die,' which may involve the immortality of man before the curse.

Under what particular form 'Wisdom' supposed the devil to have effected the temptation is a question of no great importance. Possibly he thought, in accordance with the Jewish tradition embodied in the 'Life of Adam and Eve,' that the evil one merely employed the serpent; possibly that he borrowed the serpent's form; to suppose (Grimm, p. 85) that he thought of the serpent as a mere 'Bild des Satans' is perilously like Philonian 'arguing away of the devil' (Gfrörer, *Philo*, ii. 236).

Gregg makes out an exceedingly good case for his theory that the temptation of Eve and the Fall is not here in question at all, but that the first murderer, Cain, is referred to. He points out with perfect truth that the Fall is treated as of small account in 10¹⁻⁴, while all the stress is laid on the sin of Cain, the first 'unrighteous man,' and that the root of his sin was indeed envy and jealousy. 'This motive,' he says, 'was at work in those who condemned and slew the righteous man' (vv. 12-20). It is their action that is traced to its source in this line, which would be pointless if referring to Gen. 3.'

This view is tenable. Clem. Rom. i Cor. 3⁴ apparently quotes the passage in the words ζῆλον ἀδικον καὶ ἀσεβῆ . . . δι' οὗ καὶ θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τὸν κόσμον, and immediately applies it to the

story of Cain and Abel. This is plain. But the quotation of 1 John 3¹², 'Not as Cain, who was of that wicked one, and slew his brother. And wherefore slew he him? Because his own works were evil, and his brother's righteous,' does not seem very decisive in regard to this text.

Taking the commonly received interpretation, the 'envy of the devil' is not against God, as the Zoroastrian mythology described it (cf. the Babylonian legend of the enmity of Tiāmat, the great dragon or serpent, and Marduk, the god of light), but against man, either as being created after the image of God or (Slavonic Enoch) as having control of all creation. Josephus, *Ant.*, I. i. 4, is rather indefinite: ὁ δῆμος συνδαιτώμενος τῷ τε Ἀδάμῳ καὶ τῇ γυναικὶ φθονερῶς εἰχεν ἐφ' οἷς αὐτοὺς εὐδαιμονήσειν φέτο πεπεισμένος τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ παραγγέλμασι. Grimm quotes the *Koran*, *Sur.* ii. 7, 15, 17, for the envy of the devil both against men and (for revenge) against God. The Gospel of Nicodemus (c. 23 Thilo, p. 736), which is quite a repertory of demonology, speaks of Satan as the arch-devil, the beginning of death, the root of sin. Elsewhere, however, death is made his servant. *Ibid.*, 20 *sqq.*, cf. Heb. 2¹⁴, ἵνα διὰ τοῦ θανάτου καταργήσῃ τὸν τὸ κράτος ἔχοντα τοῦ θανάτου, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸν διάβολον.

πειράζουσι has its meaning settled by 12²⁰, ἀξίαν θεοῦ κρίσιν πειράσουσι. **L** which renders these rightly by 'experiiri,' has here the singular translation 'imitantur illum.' Reusch is probably right in thinking that this is a mistake of a transcriber who did not understand 'tentant.' All the Fathers, says Cornely, quote the verse with 'imitantur.' It may be that the original translator did not see that αὐτὸν meant θάνατος, and took it as referring to the devil, of whom it was hardly sense to say that they 'made trial of him.' 'Imitantur,' on the contrary, would make sense in connection with the devil, and would be supported by John 8⁴⁴, ὑμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ διαβόλου ἔστε· καὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν θέλετε ποιεῖν. Zenner translates 'they challenge him.'

μερὶς will have the same force as in 1¹⁶, but it is to be noted that the Armenian (Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, 282) has 'are of the number of his lot'; **S^P** 'of his portion'; Arab., 'worthy to serve him.' It may be added that in *Eccl.* 17¹⁶ Israel is called the μερὶς Κυρίου.

Grätz (*Geschichte*, iii. 444) condemns this verse as a Christian interpolation. His reasons are three: (1) the verse disturbs the connection of the passage; (2) the last few words have no sense; but cf. Drummond, *Philo*, i. 195, 'though blameless souls only appear to die, those who are on the devil's side really experience death'; (3) in the Jewish writings of this period no analogy can be found to the doctrine of the cosmical power of the devil. But interference of the fallen angels in human affairs was part of the Jewish belief of the time, and so was demoniacal possession. If it be urged that these prove no 'cosmical power' but are isolated cases, so is this one—the temptation of Eve.

3. 1. But the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God,

And there shall no torment touch them.

2. In the eyes of the foolish they seemed to have died,

And their departure was accounted punishment,

Dähne's theory that *διάθολος* is after all only a name for the serpent, and that the serpent is Philo's serpent, a mere allegory of evil pleasure, deserves notice only as a specimen of the work of such critics. Gfrörer adopts the same method. They 'first give a complete account of Philo's philosophy, and then hunt for pieces of that philosophy in the remaining literature' (Drummond); to which it may be added that they 'grudge if they be not satisfied,' and will distort meanings to produce agreement with their theories.

3. 1. The Arm. (*Margoliouth, op. cit.*, 285) has *θάνατος* for *βάσανος*, a doubtful improvement; and *L* adds 'mortis' to 'tormentum.' Otherwise there are no variants.

ἐν χειρὶ θεοῦ means 'under the protection of God.' The passages quoted from the Old Testament justify this translation (Deut. 33³, Isa. 51¹⁶), but do not contain the exact phrase. Rather cf. John 10²⁸, *οὐχ ἀρπάσει τις αὐτὰ ἐκ τῆς χειρός μου*. There is a slightly different meaning in ch. 7¹⁶, 'we are dependent on him,' 'in his power.'

βάσανος undoubtedly means 'torment after death,' and not the sufferings inflicted by the wicked upon earth. This idea of punishment of the wicked after death may be said to have become current by the time of 'Wisdom,' though, as Farrar truly says, 'the nature and continuance of their future torment are not defined, and were not clearly recognised.' The eschatology of these verses is pretty fully dealt with in Additional Note B, and it may be sufficient here to remark that the idea of such torment (to which 'Wisdom' fully adheres, cf. 4¹⁹, *ἔσονται ἐν ὁδύνῃ*) is incompatible with the notion of the annihilation of the wicked. For the term as used of future punishment, cf. Luke 16²³ (the rich man *ὑπάρχων ἐν βασάνῳ*); Rev. 14¹⁰, *βασανισθήσεται ἐν πυρὶ καὶ θείῳ*. Compare also Isa. 66²⁴, 'their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched.'

With the whole of the passage we may compare Eth. Enoch, 102⁴-105². And with this verse in particular 102⁴, 'Fear not ye souls of the righteous, and be ye full of hope that die in righteousness. Mourn not if your soul travel to the lower world in great tribulation, in grief, sighing, and sorrow, and if your body survived not to the period which answered to your worth.' With the latter clause cf. Wisd. 5¹⁶.

2. There is no occasion to cite instances of 'in the eyes of' for 'in the judgment of,' or to call it a Hebraism. The expression is perfectly common in English. For *ἄφρονες* see v. ¹² and the notes there. The meaning here, however, is rather different, and liker to

3. And their going from us ruin ;
But they are in peace.

that in 1³, where wickedness is implied in 'folly.' It is supposed to correspond to the Hebrew לְבַב, and does so in 2 Sam. 13¹³, cf. 1 Sam. 25²⁵ : *Νάβαλ ὅνομα αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀφροσύνη μετ' αὐτοῦ*. For ἔξοδος cf. note on ἔκβασις 2¹².

The 'unwise,' however, may very well be represented, as Farrar remarks, not by the actually wicked, but by stupid adherents of traditional orthodoxy like Job's friends, who certainly furnish here a case in point. But they are not wicked in the ordinary sense.

The question of the possibility that the death of the body is not the death of the soul is an ancient one indeed. It is formulated by Euripides in the two celebrated lines, *τίς οἰδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μέν ἔστι κατθανεῖν τὸ κατθανεῖν δὲ ζῆν*. This is clumsily put, but no doubt was meant to express what Shelley wrote :

‘Ah no, he is not dead, he does not sleep,
He is awakened from the dream of life.’

Grimm quotes Maxim. Tyr., *Diss. xxv.*, ὃν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ θάνατον, αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἦν ἀθανασίας ἀρχὴ καὶ γένεσις μέλλοντος βίου. A passage from Philo, *Quod Det. Pot. insid.*, § 15, runs thus : ὁ μὲν σοφὸς τεθνηκέναι δοκῶν τὸν φθαρτὸν βίον ζῆ τὸν ἀφθαρτόν, though his standpoint must have differed widely from Wisdom's. The other side of things is illustrated by the anonymous epistle to Diognetus (10), which distinguishes between ὁ δοκῶν ἐνθάδε θάνατος and ὁ ὄντως θάνατος ὁ φυλάσσεται τοῖς κατακριθησομένοις εἰς τὸ πῦρ τὸ αἰώνιον. For death regarded as the gate of life (in the New Testament) cf. Phil. i. 23, τὸ ἀναλῦσαι καὶ σὺν χρίστῳ εἶναι, 2 Cor. 5⁸, ἐκδημῆσαι ἐκ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐνδημῆσαι πρὸς τὸν κύριον.

3. ἡ ἀφ' ἡμῶν πορεία is best paralleled by Eccles. 12⁵, ὅτι ἐπορεύθη ὁ ἀνθρωπός εἰς οἰκον αἰῶνος αὐτοῦ. Luke 22²², ὁ νίος μέν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τὸ ὀρισμένον πορεύεται.

σύντριμμα, 'breaking in pieces,' 'destruction.' **L** 'exterminium.' It is possible that the apostates believed that death meant annihilation for all. συντρίβω with the meaning of 'break in pieces' is found in **G** in Ps. 2⁹, etc., and the actual word σύντριμμα in Isa. 22⁴, 59⁷, σύντριμμα καὶ ταλαιπωρία ἐν ὁδοῖς αὐτῶν (quoted Rom. 3¹⁶), Eccl. 40⁹, 1 Macc. 2⁷ (twice).

For ἐν εἰρήνῃ cf. Eth. Enoch, 102¹⁰, 'Have ye seen how that the end of the righteous is peace?' Peace (1) is a rest (ἀνάπαυσις 4⁷, ἐν ἀναπαύσει ἔσται, Rev. 14¹³, ἀναπαήσονται ἐκ τῶν κόπων αὐτῶν), from earthly troubles ; (2) is positive blessedness under God's protection. There is a slight indication of such 'peace' in Isa. 57², ἔσται ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἡ ταφὴ αὐτοῦ. For the old views in all their various forms cf. Charles, *Eschatology*; Burney, *Israel's Hope of Immortality*; Schwally, *Das Leben nach dem Tode*. The salient texts on the subject in the Old

4. For even if they shall have been punished in the sight of men,
 Yet is their hope full of immortality ;

5. Yea, having been chastened but a little, they shall be blessed
 much ;
 For God did try them,
 And found them worthy of himself.

Testament are cited by Farrar. *ἀνάπαυσις* is the usual word in the New Testament, but in Heb. iv., where the word 'rest' constantly occurs, it is *κατάπαυσις*.

4. R.V. entirely misses the grammatical point in *κολασθῶσιν*, which plainly refers back these 'punishments' to the time of mortal life ; the education or chastening of God's people by trouble. This seems to favour the meaning 'before the eyes of men' for *ἐν ὅψει*, but it is probably better to take it as equivalent to *ἐν δόθαλμοις*, v.², 'in the judgment of men.' The 'men' referred to are the unreasoning multitude at large, and not, as Bois (*Essai*, 383) would have it, the freethinkers only. For St. Paul's low estimate of men at large cf. I Cor. 4³.

πλήρης may be conjoined either with *ἐλπὶς* or with *ἀθανασία* : 'their sure hope is that of immortality,' or 'their hope is full of immortality.' For the former cf. *πληροφορία ἐλπίδος* (Heb. 6¹¹) and *πίστεως* (Heb. 10²²) are quoted, but the latter seems preferable, whether we refer it to hopes they cherished on earth (as Bois, *l.c.*) or expectations entertained now that they are in the hand of God. Grimm favours the former theory. *S^P* has simply 'their hope is full of life'; *S^H* 'full of immortality.'

We note that not the definite *ἀφθαρσία* is used here, but the looser *ἀθανασία*, which, as in 8¹³, is capable of wide interpretation. For the idea in the text cf. Heb. 6¹⁹, (*ἐλπὶς*) *ἥν ὡς ἄγκυραν ἔχομεν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ βεβαίαν καὶ εἰσερχομένην εἰς τὸ ἐσώτερον τοῦ καταπετάσματος*; I Pet. 1³, *εἰς κληρονομίαν ἀφθαρτον καὶ ἀμίαντον καὶ ἀμάραντον*. We have also in 2 Macc. 7⁹ a strong assertion of immortality and the resurrection. *εἰς αἰώνιον ἀναβίωσιν ζωῆς ἡμᾶς ἀναστήσει*. Cf. (for the resurrection of the body) 2 Macc. 14⁴⁶. 'To the carnal and worldly death has torment ; it is to them the loss of all that they have lived for, a state of exile, poverty, and nakedness' (Prov. 14³², 'But the righteous hath hope in his death'), (Churton).

5. *ὅλιγα* cannot even grammatically mean 'for a short time' (Churton), as does *ὅλιγον* in I Pet. 1^{6.5.10}. *L* curiously renders 'in paucis vexati in multis bene disponentur,' possibly reading for *εὐεργετηθήσονται* something like *εὐθετηθήσονται*. *S^P* expands : 'a little he inquired of them ; a little he tried them ; much shall they inherit,' apparently indicating another variant.

2 Macc. 7³³, 'Though the living Lord be angry with us a little

6. As gold in the smelting-furnace did he test them,
And as the whole offering of a burnt sacrifice did accept
them.

while for our chastening and correction, yet shall he be at one again with his servants.'

ἐπείραστε: 'Put them to the proof.' The word is the same as that used in Gen. 21¹ of the 'trial of Abraham. For ἀξίος ἔαντοῦ cf. Matt. 10³⁷, ὁ φιλῶν πατέρα ἢ μητέρα ὑπὲρ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἔστιν μου ἀξίος κτλ. 1 Thess. 2¹², εἰς τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑμᾶς ἀξίως τοῦ θεοῦ; Rev. 3⁴, 16⁶.

Grimm, remarking on the solution offered by Wisdom for the enigma of the sufferings of the good on earth, cites Prov. 3¹¹, 'Whom the Lord loveth He reproveth,' and Ecclus. 2¹⁻⁵, as attempts to explain it without the belief in immortality. He further points out that Pseudo-Solomon, in accordance with his narrow particularism, would only find the righteous, who were to be rewarded, among the Jews. This, he says, is absolutely incompatible with the love of God for all his creatures as enunciated in 11²³ sq., and herein lay a fatal fault of the Jewish Alexandrine school—in the attempt to hold at once with philanthropic universalism and Jewish particularism. In 11²⁴ and 12⁸, 'even these (the Canaanites) didst thou spare as being men,' there is some recognition of the difficulty.

Dr. Farrar professes himself unable to discover this particularism. It is only necessary to compare the terms applied to the punishment of the Gentiles κολάζεσθαι (11⁸), ἔξεράζεσθαι (11¹⁰), βασανίζεσθαι (11⁹), καταδικάζεσθαι (11¹⁰), μαστιγοῦσθαι (12²²), with those used of Israel, παιδεύεσθαι (as here), νοοθετεῖσθαι (11¹⁰), δοκιμάζεσθαι (11¹⁰), πειράζεσθαι (as here) to be convinced (cf. Introd., p. 20). A full statement of such views is in 2 Macc. 6¹⁴⁻¹⁶: 'In the case of other nations the Sovereign Lord doth with long suffering forbear, until that he punish them when they have attained unto the full measure of their sins; but not so judged he as touching us, that he may not take vengeance on us afterwards when our sins be come to their height. Wherefore he never withdraweth his mercy from us.'

6. Smelting-furnace, χωνευτήριον, is a word found only in *¶* and in ecclesiastical writers; but the imagery of the trying of gold by fire is so common both in ancient and modern writers that quotations are superfluous. Grimm cites eight from the Old Testament and Apocr. besides 1 Pet. 1⁷, ἵνα τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως πολυτιμότερον χρυσίου τοῦ ἀπολλυμένου διὰ πυρὸς δὲ δοκιμαζομένου εὑρέθῃ. Isocrates, *ad Demon.* 25, and Ovid, *Tristia*, I. iv. 25, are also quoted. δοκιμάζειν for 'to test' and 'purify' (possibly used with some reference to κίβδηλος in 2¹⁶) is also common.

It is tempting to translate δοκάρπωμα, 'the complete fruit of a burnt offering' using *καρπὸς* in its metaphorical sense. Indeed the idea of 'fruit' in connection with offerings seems to have wholly dis-

7. And in the day of their inspection they shall shine forth,
And as sparks in the stubble shall run to and fro.

peared. Cf. Lev. 1¹⁴, ἐὰν ἀπὸ τῶν πετείνων κάρπωμα προσφέρει δῶρον αὐτοῦ τῷ κυρίῳ; 16²⁴, ἐξελθὼν ποιήσει τὸ δλοκαύτωμα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ δλοκάρπωμα τοῦ λαοῦ. For the idea cf. Rom. 12¹, παραστῆσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζώσαν ἀγίαν τῷ θεῷ εὐάρεστον, and 1 Pet. 2⁵. Sh has 'like fruits of an offering of slaughter.'

L adds to this verse 'et in tempore erit respectus eorum,' and begins the next verse 'Fulgebunt justi, etc.,' and so the Douai version. Deane accepts this. Reusch (quoted by Deane) suggests that the Latin originally ran 'et in tempore respectus illorum fulgebunt': 'respectus' was then mistaken for a nominative, and 'erit' added.

7. The natural meaning of this much disputed passage seems to be that of a general judgment, in which those already referred to as the righteous, who are in the hand of God (no fresh subject having been supplied), will shine forth and run to and fro among the wicked like sparks emitted from the 'consuming fire' of God, i.e. as the agents of his vengeance; and they shall judge the nations, etc.

Modern criticism, in its anxiety to prove that 'Wisdom' could not have believed in a Judgment Day or in the Resurrection of the Body, violently wrests vv. 7-8 to mean a reference to a class of persons of whom not a word has so far been heard—the righteous who shall be found alive when God shall come to judge the earth. These, who are not even thought worthy of a separate nominative to distinguish them, appear for two verses only and are never heard of again. Grimm very skilfully softens away the abrupt introduction of these folk (p. 86). Earthly trials, he says, will so chasten and purify the just who yet remain upon earth (vv. 4-6), that they will have new strength to vanquish their foes, conquer the world, under God, and carry out all his designs. For the whole question cf. Additional Note B. We may confine ourselves here to the explanation of the text.

'Ἐπισκοπή' is no doubt used with wide varieties of meaning (cf. notes on 2²⁰), but Deane's 'time of their recompense in the other world' seems hardly admissible. On v. 13 he gives a better rendering: 'the visitation of souls is the judgment when all anomalies shall be righted.' (L 'respectus' seems to have influenced translators much.) He expresses the opinion of rational readers when he notes that 'as the whole passage evidently refers to the life beyond the grave, it is a mistake to understand the time of visitation as referring to this world.' Pseudo-Solomon could hardly have used a more puzzling word. Cf. Isa. 14²², διὰ πολλῶν γενεῶν ἐπισκοπή ἔσται αὐτῶν.

'Ἀναλάμψοντι' in like manner would naturally mean that the 'souls of the righteous' shall shine forth in glory, and all the parallel passages confirm this idea, e.g. Enoch 104², 'The righteous shall blaze and shine in the lights of heaven. Persevere in your warm desire for the Judgment, and it will appear to you; for on the

potentates and all the helpers of them that plundered you will your tribulation be visited.' Dan. 12³, 'They that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and . . . as the stars for ever and ever.' Matt. 14⁴³, *τότε οἱ δίκαιοι ἐκλάμψουσιν ὡς ὁ ἥλιος ἐν τῇ βασιλείᾳ τοῦ πατρός.* 2 Esdr. 7⁵⁵, 'The faces of them which have used abstinence shall shine above the stars.' And to this passive state of glorification is added the activity denoted by *διαδραμοῦνται ὡς σπινθῆρες*, to which St. Thomas Aquinas *In Symb. Apost. Expos.*, xxviii. (cited by Deane) refers, to prove the agility of the glorified body. But this is said to be impossible, because there is no trace of the doctrine of the resurrection of the body in this book; which is begging the question. Similarly Grimm, in speaking of Gfrörer's idea that 'glorified bodies' are here meant, remarks that this does not conflict with Wisdom's theory of 'the body as home and origin of evil': which is begging another question. (See Additional Note 'On the Pre-existence of the Soul.') He objects, however, that such bodies would have to return *upon earth* to 'run to and fro, etc.': which is begging a third question. The execution on the wicked is surely to be done in the world to come. Preconceived theories discover themselves in every line of such reasoning.

'Like sparks among the stubble' seems, as Farrar says, 'to be a general metaphor to express the victorious and consuming power of the just hereafter.' It is fully illustrated by passages of the Old Testament. 'The house of Jacob shall be a fire and the house of Joseph a flame, and the house of Esau for stubble; and they shall burn among them and devour them.' Joel 2⁵ (in a description of the day of the Lord), 'Like the noise of a flame of fire that devoureth the stubble.' Mal. 4¹, 'The day cometh, it burneth as a furnace; and all the proud, and all that work wickedness, shall be as stubble.' The stubble was apparently set on fire to serve, in the form of ashes, as a primitive manure for a new crop. Churton seems to refer the whole scene to this life, but on the next verse, when he speaks of the martyrs as looking forward to this triumph (which must consequently be after death), he speaks otherwise. In 2 Esdras 1³³ the Israelites themselves are spoken of as 'stubble.' 'Your house is desolate, I will cast you out as the wind doth stubble'; cf. also Ps. 83¹³, 'O my God, make them like the whirling dust; as stubble before the wind. As the fire that burneth the forest, and as the flame that setteth the mountains on fire; so pursue them with thy tempest,' etc.

Blunt's idea is that no vengeance of the saints is here indicated, but their 'martyrdom,' which would raise a flame (cf. Latimer's dying speech at the stake) in the midst of the stubble of heathendom, by which it would be consumed. Cf. Phil. 2¹⁵, 'A crooked and perverse generation, among whom ye are seen as lights in the world.' This interpretation would involve the rendering of *ἐπισκοπή*, 'visitation,' in its sense of 'trial,' 'tribulation,' and surely martyrdom is not alluded to at all.

§^h has for *ἐν καλάμῃ* 'and stubble'; no doubt a mistake.

8. They shall judge nations and have dominion over peoples ;
And their Lord shall be king for ever.

9. They that trust in him shall understand truth,
And the faithful shall abide with him in love.

8. There is no need to refer this to an earthly Messianic kingdom in accordance with the carnal views set forth in Apoc. Baruch. (Syr.), c. 29, Enoch 58, 2 Esdr. 6⁵², 2^{18.19}, etc. In the New Testament, where such ideas are certainly not to be found, the saints appear as assessors with Christ at the final judgment. Matt. 19²⁸, 'Ye shall sit upon twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.' 1 Cor. 6², οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι οἱ ἄγιοι τὸν κόσμον κρινοῦσιν; Rev. 20⁴, which, however, refers to the millennium. The locus classicus on which such ideas depended (Siegfried) seems to have been Dan. 7²², 'Judgment was given to the saints of the Most High ; and the time came that the saints possessed the kingdom.' In Eccl. 4¹⁵ the privilege is reserved for 'the adherents of wisdom,' which means little there ; for the wise and the righteous are the same.

'Their Lord' is the rendering of A.V. and **L**, 'Regnabit dominus illorum.' This translation gives a better sense than 'shall be their king,' (R.V., Grimm, **S^P**, etc.), for God is already the king of the righteous ; what is promised here is that he shall be king not only over them, but over all the world, in which his sway is certainly at present disowned. Gregg remarks that 'except for the added *them*' this is a verbatim transcript from Ps. 10¹⁶, Βασιλεύσει Κύριος εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα καὶ εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ αἰῶνος. But this is precisely the point at issue, and as regards eschatology, no unimportant one. There is really no 'added *them*' in this passage at all. The *αὐτῶν* is simply a casual qualification of *κύριος*.

9. To this verse is appended in some MSS. the whole of 4¹⁵, 'Grace and mercy are with his chosen, and his ἐπισκοπή (whatever be the meaning) with his holy ones.' **L** and **G^B** omit the latter half, and they are followed by R.V., Siegfried, Zenner ; but A.V. following the Complutensian, as usual, retains both, as do **G^NA** and all the versions.

But the minor variations in the text are many. Even **L** seems to have read *εἰρήνη* for *ἔλεος* ('quoniam donum et pax est ejus electis'). Other differences are given in full by Grimm *ad loc.* He thinks they render the passage suspect.

συνήσοντιν ἀλήθειαν, 'shall understand the truth of God's mysterious dealings with men.' It is not general knowledge or a higher insight into truth, that is meant. That is a Platonic idea. *Phaedo*, 81a, which is quoted, only expresses this very indistinctly. It refers rather to relief from earthly folly than to actual 'knowledge.' Our text comes nearer to John 7¹⁷, *ἔάν τις θέλῃ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ ποιεῖν γνώσεται περὶ τῆς διδαχῆς πότερον ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστιν ή ἐγώ ἀπ' ἐμαυτοῦ λαλῶ*.

10. But the impious shall receive punishment in accord with their reasonings,

Which neglected the right and were runagates from the Lord.

ἐν ἀγάπῃ may be construed either with *προσμενοῦσιν* or with *οἱ πιστοί*. The first seems better, on account of the parallel afforded by John 15¹⁰, ἐὰν τὰς ἐντολὰς μου τηρήστε, μενεῖτε ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ μου.

It seems to be implied here that the righteous will, after judging the wicked, abide with God in heaven. If this be so, we have a distinct step in eschatology. Possibly Enoch (91-104) represents the earliest example of this belief. The righteous are there the objects of angelic intercession (104¹): to them will the portals of heaven be opened (104²): their joy will be like that of the angels of heaven (104⁴): and they will yet become companions of the heavenly host (104⁶). So, according to the Apocalypse of Baruch (about 60 A.D.), the righteous will be made like unto the angels (51¹⁰), while in the Similitudes of Enoch they are actually to become angels (41², 51⁴), cf. Charles, *Eschatology*, 235, and Fairweather in Hastings, *D. B.*, v. 305a. Heaven is also spoken of as the everlasting home of the good in *Assumptio Mosis*, x. 9. *Jubilees*, xxiii. 31, which is quoted and requoted to this purpose, contains no mention of heaven at all.

10. Ἐπιτιμία is again the wrong word. It is a mistake, repeated in 2 Cor. 2⁶, ἵκανὸν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἡ ἐπιτιμία αὐτῇ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν πλειόνων, and in ecclesiastical Greek (Grimm). It is very likely that the error arises from confusion with the constantly used plural of the real word ἐπιτίμιον; ἐπιτίμησις is actually used in 12²⁶. But the only correct meaning of ἐπιτιμία is 'citizenship.' *S^h* translates 'blame.'

The λογισμοί referred to are the σκολιοὶ λογισμοὶ of 1³, 2¹ (where the idea is fully expanded). We seem to have here the first trace of the theory of punishment of like offences by like punishments, which is worked out with such wearisome detail in the last chapters. Its germ is to be found in Prov. 1^{30.31}, 'They would none of my counsel, they despised all my reproof: therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with their own devices.'

δίκαιον may be either neuter or masculine. Bois (*Essai*, 385) prefers the first on account of the parallel in v. 11, *σοφίαν καὶ παιδειαν δὲ ξουθενῶν*, and on the commonsense ground that the wicked did not neglect the righteous at all—far from it. Siegfried objects that δικαιοσύνη would have been used, and that the parallel to be preserved is 'neglected the just man, and revolted from the Lord.' But the neglect of 'justice' (meaning Jewish discipline) and apostasy from the Lord run hand in hand. Τὸ δίκαιον for 'justice' does, moreover, occur in Luke 12⁶⁷, τί ἀφ' ἔαντῶν οὐ κρίνετε τὸ δίκαιον; Col. 4¹, τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὴν ἴσοτητα . . . παρέχεσθε. Job 34¹⁰, 2 Macc. 10¹². And it is to be noted that St. Augustine (cited by Deane) quoted the passage in the form 'qui neglexerunt justitiam.'

11. For he that setteth at naught wisdom and discipline is unhappy.

And vain is their hope and their labours unavailing,
And their works unprofitable.

12. Their wives are lightminded and their children evil ;
Accursed is their generation.

11. The best way to avoid the difficulty of the change of number from singular to plural is not to put the first line in a parenthesis (as R.V. and Bois), or to translate with Siegfried 'vain is the hope of *such*', but simply to refer this line to the preceding verse, and begin a fresh statement (which indeed joins naturally with what follows) at 'vain is their hope.'

σοφία is internal obedience to God's commands (the moral law); *παιδεία* the observance of ordinances (the ceremonial law). It is plain that the 'runagates from God' are here meant as in the verse before. We have already heard that the wicked will be punished in the next world. We are now to see that they will be *ταλαιπωροι* (a somewhat rare word, occurring twice in the New Testament : Rom. 7²⁴, 'O wretched man that I am !' and Rev. 3¹⁷ in this world also.

There is no occasion to suppose a 'litotes' in *ἀνόνητοι* and *ἄχρηστα*. The curse of unprofitableness would be terrible enough for an Israelite. The passages quoted by Farrar scarcely seem to bear upon the subject, but the one, quoted by Grimm, which he omits, sc. Job 6⁷, *ὅ βίος μου . . . ἀπόλωλεν ἐν κένη ἐλπίδι* appears pertinent. A reading *ἀνόντοι* for *ἀνόνητοι* is quoted by Grimm as from 'Orig. Syr.' There is no trace of it in the *Σ^h*.

12. The word 'lightminded' is designedly used to express the idea not only of folly but of wantonness, which seems to be required. The A.V. margin so renders it 'light *or* unchaste.' It is unnecessary to suppose with Margoliouth (*op. cit.*, p. 267) that we have here a rendering of the Hebrew *תִּבְשַׁע* which, he says, may bear both meanings. Freudenthal denies that it can. It is sufficient to assume that the writer had in his mind any Hebrew word which, like our 'light' woman, might imply both. So in 2 Sam. 13 Tamar says to her brother *σὺ ἔσῃ ὡς εἰς τῶν ἀφρόνων ἐν Ἰσραὴλ*, and Deut. 22²¹, of an unchaste bride, *ἐποίησεν ἀφροσύνην ἐν σιοῖς Ἰσραὴλ*. So in Prov. 5⁵ (*¶*) the feet of the harlot are *πόδες ἀφροσύνης*. Bretschneider translates simply 'adulterous,' citing *לְבָב* and *לְבָבָךְ* from 2 Sam. (*l.c.*) and Deut. 22²¹ : he even thinks that *φρόνησις* in 10⁸ may be 'chastity.' Cf. notes on v. 2 above.

'Accursed is their generation' seems to belong naturally to this verse rather than to the next. The ambiguous word 'generation' is adopted because both the Greek *γένεσις* and *Λ* 'creatura' are equally capable of the two renderings, 'their begetting' (R.V.) and 'their offspring' (A.V., *¶*, Grimm, Siegfried). If the former view is taken,

13. For blessed is the barren that is unstained,
 She that hath not known wedlock in transgression,
 She shall have fruit in the examination of souls.

the meaning may be 'their sexual relations are unhappy.' If the latter, we have a return to the old doctrine of heredity, which has been strained to the uttermost in modern times. This may be called the old-fashioned Israelitish view, as the exponent of such things, the Son of Sirach, expresses it in 41⁶, 'The children of sinners are abominable sinners,' etc.; 2 Esdr. 9¹⁷, 'Like as the field is, so is also the seed.' But the revolt against such teaching is found in Job 21¹⁰, '(Ye say) God layeth up his iniquity for his children; let him recompense it unto himself that he may know it,' and is fully set forth in Ezek. 18¹⁻⁵, where, after quoting the proverb of the sour grapes and the teeth of the children, the prophet says, 'ye shall not have occasion any more to use the proverb in Israel. Behold all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine. The soul that sinneth it shall die.' The healthier notion of personal responsibility was here adopted. Is it possible that 'Wisdom' surrenders it? If he does, it is but one more instance of his confused philosophy.

13. 'Unstained' is given as the rendering of *ἀμίαντος* in preference to 'undefiled' (S^h, 'not led astray'), the meaning being apparently moral rather than physical, and referring to a 'mixed' not an 'adulterous' union. The word 'examination' is used rather in a modern sense, 'inspection' with a view to approbation or condemnation.

The argument, such as it is, does not seem 'confused' (Farrar). The object is twofold, (1) a rebuke of mixed marriages between Jewesses and Gentiles; (2) the refutation of the old-fashioned idea that many children were a blessing and a proof of divine favour. The first point is proved by Siegfried. Mixed marriages are condemned in Ezra 9 and 10, Neh. 13²³ (where the result is that the children forget their mother-tongue), Mal. 2¹¹, Tobit 4¹² (cf. Bertholet in Budde, *op. cit.*, p. 406), and that they are not mentioned in 1 Macc. 1¹¹ *sqq.* and 2 Macc. iv. 13 *sqq.* among the signs of 'Graecomania' (Grimm) proves nothing. Grimm will have it that here, as in *παράνομος κοίτη* (v. 16) *ἀνομοι ὑπνοι* (4⁶), all unlawful unions, whether adulterous or contracted with *ἀστεβεῖς*, are meant. Bruch, *Weisheitslehre*, 329, interprets 'a wife joined to an apostate Jew is happy if she have no children.' But how could she be 'unstained'?

οτεῖρα must mean a barren *wife*. It is never used of a virgin, though commentators, both Romanist and Protestant, have taken it so, in order to discover in the passage the praise of celibacy. Grätz even, *Gesch. der Jud.*, iii. 495, thought the reference was to conventional life, and condemned both vs. 13, 14 as Christian interpolations of late date. *κοίτη* is an euphemism for sexual intercourse, found only in Biblical Greek, the classical words so used being *εὐνή* and *λέχος*.

14. Yea, and the eunuch who hath not wrought unlawfulness with his hand,

Nor devised evil things against the Lord ;

For to him shall be given faith's peculiar grace,

And a portion in the temple of God more pleasing to his soul.

In *καρπός* (fruit) there seems a distinct reference to Ps. 127 as below.

The second point, that many children are not always a divine blessing (cf. Ps. 127³, 'children are an heritage of the Lord ; and the fruit of the womb is his reward,' and Rachel's cry in Gen. 30¹, 'Give me children or else I die'), is already put strongly even by Ben-Sira, 16¹, 'Desire not a multitude of unprofitable children . . . for one is better than a thousand ; and to die childless than to have ungodly children.' For the old idea cf. also Exod. 23²⁶, Lev. 20^{20,21}, Deut. 7¹⁴, Ps. 128³. On the question of asceticism cf. Bois (*Essai*, 278), 'Sterility is conceived not as a merit but as a misfortune, to be compensated in the next world.' The barren is happy, *if she be pure* ; the eunuch if he be a righteous man ; not otherwise. Cornely has collected the texts where multitude of children is cited as a proof of God's blessing, and those where childlessness is mentioned as a reproach ; but he very candidly refuses to connect *ἡ στεῖρα* with the idea of voluntary celibacy, and quotes the passages where *στεῖρα* certainly means the barren married woman. These are Gen. 11³⁰, *καὶ ἦν Σάρα στεῖρα καὶ οὐκ ἐτεκνοποίει*, 25²¹ (of Rebekah), 29³¹ (of Rachel). In Exod. 23²⁶ we have *οὐκ ἔσται ἄγονος οὐδὲ στεῖρα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σου*. All these plainly refer to the woman who is married but who does not bear children. To this purpose Cornely quotes Tertullian (without any reference), 'Sterilem mulierem appellabant, quam Graeci *στεῖραν* dicunt, quae non capit semen genitale.'

14. This translation follows the A.V. and **L**. The R.V. translates, 'there shall be given him for his faithfulness a peculiar favour,' with margin, 'the grace of God's chosen.' **S^P** has 'on account of his goodness and faithfulness.'

Those who would extract from the text a glorification of celibacy think that *εὐνοῦχος* is the 'spado evangelicus' or voluntary celibate, *i.e.* the third kind of eunuch mentioned in Matt. 19¹² ; but cf. note on *στεῖρα* in the preceding verse. To this word *εὐνοῦχος* plainly corresponds, and this alone is sufficient to upset Margoliouth's theory (*op. cit.*) that the other meaning of **εὐστέρος** 'faithful,' is here to be taken. This would rob the passage of all point.

The word is no doubt used in its natural sense, of a person *incapable* of begetting children, and the reference to Isa. 56³⁻⁵ seems clear. In Deut. 23^{1,2} the eunuch and the bastard were classed together as excluded from the assembly of the Lord. Isaiah consoles

15. For the fruit of good labours is glorious,
And the root of understanding never faileth.

them, 'Neither let the eunuch say, Behold I am a dry tree. For thus saith the Lord of the eunuchs (Gr., 'to the eunuchs,' which may also be the meaning of **Ἠ**) that keep my sabbaths and choose the things that please me, and hold fast by my covenant: unto them will I give in mine house and within my walls a memorial and a name better than of sons and of daughters.' Probably on account of these last words the R.V. adds, to explain *θυμηρέστερος*, 'more delightsome than wife or children.' There seems no reason for this expansion. The word (L 'acceptissima') means simply 'more pleasing' (than any other), cf. 2 Macc. 12¹⁴, *ἀναγωγότερον ἐχρῶντο τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ιούδαν*: 'behaved very rudely to,' etc.

The 'temple of the Lord' is heaven, as in Ps. 11⁴, *κύριος ἐν νάῷ ἀγίῳ αὐτοῦ* (repeated in Habak. 2²⁰), 18⁶, *ἥκουσεν ἐκ ναοῦ ἀγίου αὐτοῦ φωνῆς μου*. 'Faith's peculiar grace' seems an indefinite term without exact meaning. 'The gift of true faith' (Grimm) seems the best explanation of it.

It is difficult to resist the conclusion that some definite person is here referred to: possibly some Jewish prince who was high in favour at the Roman court, like Daniel at that of Nebuchadnezzar. To such a person this text might well be addressed, as adjuring him in spite of his position to keep true to the religion of his fathers.

For *κλῆρος* S^h has 1010, probably a mistake for 1000.

15. A curious connection between this and the preceding verses is suggested by Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 287. He quotes from a Rabbinic tract, 'In the hour when a man is taken from the world without children, he weeps and laments. God says to him: "Why weepest thou? because thou hast not established fruit in the world, there is a fruit for thee that is fairer than children." *Thus the generations of a man are good works.*' *πόνοι*, however, is probably more than mere 'labours,' and refers as in v. 1 to the tribulations of the righteous endured on earth.

ἢ *ρίζα τῆς φρονήσεως* is not 'the origin of understanding,' but is used exegetically: 'the root, which is understanding.' *ἀδιάπτωτος* ('quae non concidat,' L) is properly 'not falling in ruin,' and so here 'flourishing,' like to bring forth perfect fruit, in opposition to v. 16.

In this verse Farrar discovers an instance of 'Chiasmus.' 'In the first clause,' he says, 'the adjectives in the original are placed at the beginning and end, and each clause balances the other.' 'For of *good* toils the fruit is *glorious*, and unfailing is the root of *good* intelligence.' Unfortunately the last adjective 'good' is wanting altogether. The order of words is a perfectly natural one, and the attempt to extract from such passages the rhetorical devices of an Isocrates is ridiculous.

16. But the children of adulterers shall not come to maturity,
And seed from unlawful wedlock shall vanish away.

17. For even if they be long lived, they shall be reckoned for
naught,
And at the end their old age shall be without honour ;

16. The idea that *μοιχοί* here meant apostate Jews is an old one, and was held by Luther, whose marginal annotation on v. 12 *sqq.* is quoted by Grimm, Nachtigal, Engelbreth, and Dereser, and is maintained by Siegfried, who points out that since the time of Hosea adultery had been a common image for unlawful dealings with the heathen. If *ἀμύαντος* in v. 13 be taken as 'pure from all sexual intercourse,' then *μοιχοί* does literally mean adulterers ; but that is questionable.

'Shall not come to maturity' is the natural meaning of *ἀτέλεστα* *ζοσται*, and corresponds well to the preceding verse *ἀδιάπτωτος ἡ ρίζα τῆς φρονήσεως*, but in the margin of A.V. we find the strange rendering 'shall not be partakers of holy things.' This has its origin in the meaning which *ἀτέλεστα* might possibly have : 'not initiated in the mysteries.' Cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 69c, *ὅς ἀν ἀμύντος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς Αἰδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κείσεται.* Liddell and Scott cite Gregor. Naz. for the use of the word in the sense of 'unbaptized.'

The passage in 23^{1,2}, which speaks of bastards as to be excluded from the services of God, was also clearly in the mind of the translators. But the meaning seems settled by 4⁵, *κλῶνες ἀτέλεστοι.* *Ὡ* has 'in inconsummatione erunt.' This is not necessarily a mistake for 'inconsummati erunt' (which Farrar took from Grimm to be the actual text), but is supported by a passage in Tertullian (*Adv. Val.*, x., quoted by Deane), 'inconsummatio generationis.'

17. *μακρόβιοι* of course refers not to the adulterers, as Grotius thought, but to their offspring. The construction is 'ad sensum,' and not strict. If Pseudo-Solomon is really referring to technical adultery, the judgment on these unfortunates seems cruel indeed. If an apostate generation is meant, the denunciation is more intelligible, cf. Keerl, quoted by Bissell *ad loc.*

The idea of the accursedness of the children is, however, that of Eccl. 41⁵, *τέκνα βθελυκτὰ γίνεται τέκνα ἀμαρτωλῶν.* But if 'Wisdom' here maintains generally the doctrine of hereditary sin, extending even to children, he is contradicting 11²⁴, *ἔλεεῖς πάντας ὅτι πάντα δύνασαι κτλ.*

ἐπ' ἐσχάτων is, with slight variations, (Zenner translates 'their old age is unhonoured in its end') generally rendered 'at the end of life.' *Ὡ* has 'sine honore erit novissima senectus,' and the expression is well supported in *Ἑ*, Prov. 25⁸, Eccl. I¹³, 3²⁶, 6²⁸, 14⁷, in all which cases it has the sense of 'at the last.' Siegfried, however, refers it to the final judgment, and makes it correspond to *ἡμέρα διαγνώσεως* in the next verse. Bois (*Essai*, 386) would apparently do the same.

18. And if they die quickly, they have no hope,
Nor consolation in the day of decision.

19. For hard are the destinies of an unrighteous generation.

4. 1. Better is childlessness with virtue;
For there is immortality in the remembrance of her,
Since both with God is she recognised and with men.

For such children, he remarks, are not particularly despised in this world.

On the whole verse Reuss remarks, 'This is the opinion of the Israelites, according to which longevity is the supremest good fortune. The author opposes this idea, of which he has no need, as believing in a future life.'

18. *όξεως* is a curious word to use with the meaning of 'early.' In 16¹¹ it has the natural signification of 'speedily.' There may be some notion of 'suddenness,' 'untimeliness,' involved.

Διάγνωσις is a fairly technical expression for the 'decision' of a suit, and is so used in Plato, *Laws*, 865c, *τῆς δὲ ἀξίας οἱ δικασταὶ διάγνωσιν ποιεῖσθωσαν*, and in Acts 25²¹ of the 'decision' of the Emperor. The verb *διαγνώσκω*, for 'to decide a suit,' is fairly common. There may be here included the sense of 'separation,' 'discernment' between the good and bad; the sheep and the goats. *Λ* strangely reads 'in die agnitionis.'

Gfrörer, *Philo*, ii. 243, appeals to this passage (and not without some reason) as proving that 'Wisdom' held that the wicked also would exist after the judgment, and would not be annihilated.

παραμύθιον, 'comfort': *ἐλπίς* is 'hope of acceptance with God' hereafter, not as in 1 Thess. 4¹³, hope in this world, cf. Eph. 2¹² *ἐλπίδα μὴ ἔχοντες καὶ ἀθεοὶ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*, which would seem to afford an excellent parallel were it not for *ἔαν τελευτήσωσιν*.

Here again *Λ* has a curious word for comfort, viz., 'allocutio'; but this has classical authority: Catull. xxxviii. 5, 'Qua solatus es allocutio,' etc. 'Alloqui' is used also in the same sense. Deane quotes Senec., *Consol. ad Helviam*, i. Cf. 8⁹, where *Λ* translates *παραίνεσις* also by 'allocutio.'

19. This is regarded (by Farrar, Deane, etc.) as a summary of the doctrine of 'the sins of the fathers,' etc., for a full statement of which see Exod. 20⁵ (the second commandment), almost repeated in Exod. 34⁷ and Deut. 5⁹, cf. 2 Kings 24^{3.4}. But for the reversal of the doom see also Ezek. 18^{19.20}.

Λ uses for *γενέα* the contemptuous word 'natio,' which in classical Latin is applied to the outer or barbarian 'hordes,' as of Germany.

4. 1. The translation 'of her' seems to give the necessary reference to 'virtue' and not 'childlessness.' The R.V. inserts 'of virtue.' A.V. 'the memorial thereof is immortal,' either from a different rendering

or as a gloss. **L** has the extraordinary rendering, 'O quam pulchra est casta generatio cum claritate,' in which there is no trace of the Greek except 'cum claritate' for *μετ' ἀρετῆς*. Grimm is probably right in condemning it as mere wanton change, especially as he can quote Ambros., *de Virg.*, i., who read the passage 'melior est sterilitas cum virtute.' Cf. also Method., *Conv. dec. Virg.*, iii. (quoted by Deane), for the exact Greek. Cornely's explanation seems to meet the case: (p. 143) 'forsitan sciolus quidam librarius, qui substantivum ἀρετή apud Alexandrinos aliquoties id valere animadverterat quod gloria et splendor (cf. Habak. 3³ et Zach. 6¹³ ἀρετή pro Hebr.

תְּהִלָּה gloria Dei vel Messiae; plur. ἀρεταί pro Hebr. תְּהִלָּה laudes; cf. Isa. 42¹², 43²¹, 63⁷) eandem interpretationem nomini in nostro loco attribuendam arbitratus est, atque deinde, ut eam sententiae adaptaret, ad praecedentia respiciens quibus piorum castorumque sterilitas celebratur, nomen ἀτεκνία utique liberrime et parum apte latino *casta generatio* expressit.'

For the general sentiment cf. Eccl. 16³, 'One is better than a thousand, and to die childless than to have ungodly children'; and Eccles. 6³, 'If a man beget an hundred children . . . but his soul be not filled with good . . . I say, that an untimely birth is better than he.'

We have here one of the spurious forms of immortality, in which some writers maintain that 'Wisdom's' whole idea of that condition was comprised. A reference to it has already been made in 2⁴, where Grimm has collected passages to show the great importance assigned in late Jewish literature to such 'immortality.' We have in Ps. 112⁶, 'The righteous shall be had in everlasting remembrance'; in Prov. 10⁷, 'The memory of the just is blessed, but the name of the wicked shall rot.' With Ben-Sira this was probably the one real idea of immortality, as in the famous passage Eccl. 44⁸⁻¹⁵. For this form of 'immortality' cf. Introd., p. 29, and notes there, and also Additional Note B. In 8¹³ (below) and 10¹⁴ it is *wisdom* that renders immortal—if any one likes to take it literally. Grimm quotes Diod. Sic., I, 2, πάντες δὲ μεγάλων ἐπαίνων ἡξιώθησαν, τὰς ἀρετὰς αὐτῶν τῆς ἴστορίας ἀπαθανατιζόντης. Surely no one would suppose that Diodorus meant anything but figurative immortality. A better-known passage is that in Xen., *Mem.*, II. i. 33, where Virtue says, when my friends die, οὐ μετὰ λήθης ἀπιμοι κείνται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ μνήμης τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ὑμνούμενοι θάλλουσι. Bois (*Essai*, 386) points out that it is remarkable that after chap. 3 'Wisdom' speaks only of an 'immortalité mnémonique'; still more so that he should call it ἀθανασία. He suggests that the second line originally ran ἀθανασία γάρ ἔστι καὶ μνήμη ἐν αὐτῇ. **S**h has 'the memory of it is immortality.' Menzel, rejecting the idea of Greek influence, cites also Eccl. 37²⁶, 39¹³, 41¹²; Eccles. 2¹⁶, 9⁵. **F**—Gregg's note is to the point: 'The Jew of the Old Testament was a part of a whole: his conception of life hardly allowed him to ask, "What will become of me?"' A subjective immortality, such as in

2. When it is present men do imitate it,
 And when it is gone do regret it:
 And in eternity it walketh crowned in pomp,
 As having conquered in a contest of stainless struggles.

Ps. 112⁶, was what he had been taught to desire. It is strange how this doctrine has again come to the front with the revival of the corporate consciousness through the teaching of Comte. Cf. the lines of his English disciple, George Eliot :

Oh may I join the choir invisible
 Of those immortal dead who live again
 In minds made better by their presence, etc.

But this is surely the purest rhetoric ; the merest metaphor. It is *not* the immortality of the soul.

2. Hor., *Od.*, III. xxiv. 31, 'Virtutem . . . sublatam ex oculis quaerimus invidi.' We note the cacophony in *ποθοῦσιν ἐπελθοῦσαν*.

ἐν τῷ αἰώνι A.V., ¶, Grimm, translate 'for ever.' R.V. 'throughout all time.' §^p ¶ is indefinite, like αἰών itself. Deane explains the difference between the two uses of *αἰώνιος* as applied to mountains, Hab. 3⁶, βοῦνοι αἰώνιοι, and to God in Bar. iv. 8, θεὸς αἰώνιος. In ¶ βοῦνοι αἰώνιοι is immediately followed by πορείας αἰώνιας (θεοῦ). But *αἰώνιος* is not *αἰών*, and if the controversy on Eternal Punishment had not arisen, *αἰών* when used absolutely would probably have been unhesitatingly translated 'eternity,' as in 4 Macc. 17¹⁸. Here, compared with the preceding verse, it seems correct.

στεφανηφοροῦσα. The crown is claimed as a trace of Greek custom, and as the reward of a victor in games it is so (cf. 1 Cor. 9²⁵) ; but as a sign of rejoicing or festivity it is common enough in later Jewish life, cf. 2⁸ ; Eccl. 1¹¹, 6³⁰, 15⁶. Grimm's references to Lamentations, Psalms, Proverbs, and Ezekiel seem indefinite and the passages figurative ; but cf. Judith 15¹³ for 'garlands' in rejoicings.

Two distinct renderings of the last line are possible. ἀμιάντων ἀθλῶν may either mean 'of unstained prizes' (R.V., A.V.) or 'of unstained struggles' (¶ 'in coinquinatorum certaminum praemium,' where possibly 'proelium' should be read). With the first translation the meaning is 'perfect rewards, unstained by unfairness of winning or savage passions on the part of the competitors,' as in earthly contests. The second, which Grimm adopts and §^p seems to support, is explained 'the struggles of the virtuous life, unstained by selfishness or sin.' The latter is more in accordance with the philosophic idea of life as a warfare, which is found in Plato, *Phaedo*, 114c, *Rep.* 621c, and often in Epictetus, and is elaborated in 4 Macc. 17¹⁶. For the first interpretation the 'amaranthine crown' of 1 Pet. 5⁴, and the 'undefiled inheritance' of 1 Pet. 1⁴ are cited, but neither of these

3. But though it be prolific, the multitude of the impious shall be of no profit,

And from its bastard slips shall not send its root deep,
Nor shall establish a firm foundation.

exactly answers to *ἀμίαντον ἄθλον*. If we translate 'contests,' *ἄθλος* is probably the true nominative.

3. The literal sense of *πλῆθος* is simply 'multitude,' as in **L**. The meaning 'brood' (R.V., A.V.) is attached to it by its conjunction with *πολύγονον*. The first 'Psalm of Solomon' contains similar ideas, which are, however, interpreted allegorically. **S^h**, 'The multitude of the offspring of the wicked shall not profit.'

χρησιμεύσει, which is wrongly rendered by A.V. here, 'shall thrive' is correctly translated by it in Ecclus. 13⁴, 'if thou be for his profit he will use thee.' Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 270, endeavours to prove from a Hebrew analogy that *χρησιμεύειν* (a late Greek word) may mean 'prosper'; but the idea of uselessness is further developed by *ἄχρηστος* in v. ⁵.

Grimm thinks *γενόμενον* should be supplied with *ἐκ νόθων μοσχευμάτων*, but it seems unnecessary if the translation given above is accepted. Indeed *νόθων* should not be pressed. It need not mean literally 'bastard,' but 'spurious' generally (as of children, e.g. born of the hated mixed marriages). **L** has 'spuria vitulamina'—the latter a curious word apparently coined from 'vitulus' = *μόσχος*, with a side reference to 'vitis.' St. Augustine, *De Doctr. Chr.*, ii. 12, finds fault with the derivation, but *μόσχος* may mean a young shoot as well as a calf (Lidd. and Sc. give two separate words), and the word seems to be used by St. Ambrose (quoted by Deane) in the sense of 'young plants of grace.' The word, however, was so little understood that some translators of the Vulgate substituted 'adulterinae plantationes,' possibly on the hint of St. Augustine, *l.c.* **S^h**, 'deceitful suckers.' An ancient glossary quoted by Ducange (Cornely, p. 149) has 'vitilamen planta illa infructuosa qui nascitur a radice vitis,' than which nothing can be plainer. Lévi (*Ecclésiastique*, i. 22) notes that we have here a certain imitation of Ecclus. 40¹⁶, but that none of the Greek expressions of the original appear in the paraphrase. Hence he argues that Pseudo-Solomon had the Hebrew before him and not the Greek. This statement is, however, not quite correct. There is much resemblance between the Greek of Wisdom, *πολύγονον ἀσεβῶν πλῆθος οὐ χρησιμεύσει καὶ ἐκ νόθων μοσχευμάτων οὐ δώσει ρίζαν εἰς βάθος*, and Ecclus. *l.c.*, 'ἴκυοντα ἀσεβῶν οὐ πληθυνεῖ κλάδους καὶ ρίζαι ἀκάθαρτοι ἐπ' ἀκροτόμου πέτρας.'

'Shall not send its root deep': cf. the Parable of the Sower in Matt. 13⁶, Luke 8¹³, and for the contrary idea Eph. 3¹⁸, Col. 2⁷, and Ecclus. 24¹², *ἐρρίζωσα ἐν λαῷ δεδοξασμένω*. Col. 2⁷, *ἐρρίζωμένοι καὶ ἐποικοδομούμενοι*.

4. For even if in their shoots they blossom for a season,
 Standing unstably they shall be shaken by the wind,
 And be rooted out by the violence of the winds.

5. Their branches shall be broken off ere they be full grown,
 And their fruit be unprofitable, unripe for eating,
 Yea, meet for nothing.

4. It is better to translate ἀναθάλη (with Grimm) 'put forth buds and leaves,' for there can be no real 'flourishing' in such a case; only an outward show. Still less can it mean as in classical Greek, 'revive,' 'flourish again.' *πρὸς καιρόν* is used in Luke 8¹³, 1 Cor. 7⁵ in a like sense, in the former case of a similar growth.

The sudden change of subject from *πλήθος* to *μοσχεύματα* caused Beza to read *βεβηκός* for *βεβηκότα*. The expression *ἐπισφαλῶς βεβηκότα* is an awkward one, but may be justified by Archil., 52, *ἀσφαλέως βεβηκώς*: 'standing steady' (quoted by Deane) Soph., *El.*, 979 (εὖ βεβηκώς), Hdt., ix. 106, etc., *οἱ ἐν τέλει βεβώτες*, 'standing in office.' We may compare the use of *κεῖμαι* to supply parts of *ἰστημι*. But others would translate 'ascendentia' or 'succrescentia': 'growing up' unstably. Cf. Ps. 92⁷, 'the wicked spring as the grass, and all the workers of iniquity do flourish.' For *βεβηκότα* Sh slavishly, 'they walk not safely.'

ὑπὸ βίᾳς ἀνέμων. The same word *ἀνέμος* is used in both clauses—the first instance of the tautology which disfigures the last few chapters of the book. For 'violence' L has the unusual word 'nimietas.' Cf. Deane's note.

For the metaphor of 'uprooting' cf. Deut. 29²⁸, 'the Lord rooted them out of their land,' and Jude 12, 'autumn trees without fruit, twice dead, plucked up by the roots.'

If children of mixed marriages are referred to, the allusion in the verse may be to their want of firm grounding in the religion of their fathers.

5. The position of *ἀτέλεστοι* at the end of the line shows that it is predicative, and not as in A.V. a mere epithet. The word is uncommon: cf. Deane's note. In *ἄχρηστος* there is a reference to *οὐ κηπησμεύσει* in v. 3.

For more or less parallel passages (as respects the metaphor) we may refer to Rom. 11¹⁷ *sqq.* (the breaking away of the unprofitable branches of the Jewish Church for the benefit of the Gentiles) and John 15²⁶ (the True Vine). But the clearest parallel is found in Ecclus. 23²⁶ (of the adulteress), 'Her children shall not spread into roots and her branches shall bear no fruit': this passage may have been in 'Wisdom's' mind. Comparisons of the godly to flourishing trees and of the ungodly to unfruitful ones are very numerous both in Old Testament and New Testament. Grimm quotes ten such.

Grimm is probably right in thinking that the meaning is that 'the

6. For children born of unlawful wedlock

Are witnesses of wickedness against their parents in the scrutiny.

works of the wicked cannot stand before God's power *and judgment*, but that he can prevent their success, as is expressed in another form in 1 Cor. 3¹⁶, *τὸ ἔργον κατακαήσεται*. The interpretation of the older commentators—of the brief life of the ungodly—is clean contrary to the admission in v. ⁷ *sqq.* that the wicked often live long. This, however, is apparently Churton's view also.

6. *ὕπνος* is (like *κοίτη* 3¹³) a euphemism. Cf. 7². The passage quoted from Hom., *Od.*, xi. 245, *λῦσε δὲ παρθενίνης ζώνην, κατὰ δ' ὑπνον ἔχενεν*, is in several ways unsatisfactory as a parallel.

Farrar, taking the verse to refer to actual bastards, truly remarks 'that (such children) are living witnesses to the sins of their parents is obvious.' Indeed the passage loses all point if we take it thus. There can be little doubt that here at least the children of mixed marriages are alluded to. Bastards are a reproach to their parents even in this life; but it is only 'in the day of scrutiny' that the offspring of marriages tolerated by human laws, and only condemned by strict Jewish orthodoxy, will rise up against their parents.

The language is no doubt strong, but from the days of Hosea onwards we find Israel's connection with the heathen and their religions compared to 'adultery' and 'whoredom.' Cf. the symbolic union of Hosea with the adulteress in Hos. 3 and the denunciations of Israel as having 'played the harlot' in 2⁵ *sqq.* The most remarkable instance is the doom of Oholah and Oholibah in Ezek. 23. Reuss thinks the two ideas are confused: 'on voit que l'auteur continue à associer les deux notions de l'impiété (de la méchanceté du paganisme théorique ou pratique) et de l'adultère comme si elles étaient absolument inséparables': which is quite another idea.

Strangely enough, many of the older commentators, including Luther and A. Lapide, rendered *ἐν ἐξετάσμῳ αὐτῶν*, 'when inquiry is made after them' (i.e. the parents). It is equally unnecessary to suppose with Grimm that *αὐτῶν* refers to the children. It plainly does refer to the parents, but in the sense of 'when the parents are put on their trial.' The reference is to the final judgment, though *ἐπισκοπή* would seem to be the word appropriated to that; but Siegfried *ad loc.* points out that other synonyms are used, as *ἐπ' ἐσχάτων*, 3¹⁷; *ἐν ήμέρᾳ διαγνώσεως*, 3¹⁸. Gregg, however, argues strongly that *αὐτῶν* is used of the children, and that *ἐξετασμός* implies the traditional view that children were actually punished for the sins of their parents: a view illustrated by John 9², 'Who did sin, this man or his parents?' and 9³⁴, 'Thou wast altogether born in sins.' So also Eccl. 41⁵⁻⁷, quoted in the notes on 3¹². The verse, he says, is without point if it does not lay stress on the misfortunes threatened in verses 3-5.

7. But the righteous though he be early in his death shall be at rest.
 8. For honourable old age is not so by reason of length of time,
 Nor is it reckoned by number of years;

Cornely may be right in taking the word so generally as to include the 'trial' of both parents and children: 'for the words clearly show,' he says, 'that the children are referred to, who, displaying their own wretched condition, rise up as witnesses against their wicked parents; but again, as the sin of the parents is made manifest by the witness of the children, their trial is also necessarily implied.' This certainly has the merit of reconciling several conflicting opinions, and, considering 'Wisdom's' loose use of language, has much to commend it.

7. R.V. 'though he die before his time' is too strong. The A.V. 'though the righteous be prevented with death,' answering to **L**, 'si morte praecipitatus fuerit,' is correct, but the English expression is now strange to us. Neither rendering is exactly classical, and $\phi\theta\acute{a}v\epsilon\iota\omega$ with the infinitive, instead of the participle, is rare.

S^P adds an extraordinary interpolation: 'And if he die in length of days, he shall be found in honour,' which is inconsistent with the context, and can only be explained as an attempt to add a second member to a verse supposed to be too short.

L translates *ἐν ἀναπαύσει* 'in refrigerio,' by which word it renders in Acts 3¹⁹(20) *ἀνάψυξις* and in Ps. 65¹² *ἀναψυχή*. But neither of these words appears here in any MS. Older Romanist commentators found in this passage, and especially in this rendering 'refrigerium,' a reference to the lightening of the pains of purgatory by the prayers of the living and the comfort of the angels. But J. A. Schmid (quoted by Bissell), himself of the same church (and with him Cornely), regards this as absurd, though he says that 'heaven in the language of the ancient church is locus refrigerii.' Farrar is no doubt right when he says that 'it is unlikely that these general expressions correspond to any rigid or detailed system of eschatology in the mind of the writer, and it is idle to quote them as authorities for purgatory, the intermediate state, etc.'

The meaning seems to be simply rest after trials and sufferings, as in 3³ 'they are in peace.' Rev. 14¹³, 'Yea, saith the Spirit, for they rest from their labours.' Isa. 57¹, 'The righteous is taken away from the evil to come. He entereth into peace.'

It is hardly necessary to say that in this passage, as in those referring to childlessness, the writer is combating a deep-rooted traditional view, according to which not only was long life a sign of God's favour, but early death a severe punishment.

8. Grimm rather strangely seems to regard the second line as meaning, 'the limit of age is settled, but not by number of years; rather

9. But understanding is grey hair unto men,
And an untarnished life is ripe old age.

by the decree of God or the moral laws of the universe.' This might correspond to the disputed expression *διαθήκη ἄδου* in Eccl. 14¹², which is by some interpreted the 'limitation of life allowed to man by the lower world' (Ryssel: 'die mit der Unterwelt ausgemachte Vertragsfrist'). But surely the meaning is 'is estimated not by years but by the righteousness of the man who lives and dies.'

Grimm himself quotes an exactly parallel passage from Seneca, *Epp. 93*, 'Actu vitam metiamur non tempore.' He cites also Cic., *Tusc.*, i. 45, 'Nemo parum diu vixit qui virtutis perfectae perfecto functus est munere.' Philo (?) *de Vita Contempl.*, § 8, says of the Therapeutae: *πρεσβυτέρους οὐ τοὺς πολυνετεῖς καὶ παλαίους νομίζοντιν ἀλλ' ἔτι κομιδῆ νέους παῖδας, ἐάν ὁψὲ τῆς προαιρέσεως ἐρασθῶσιν*: a passage which made Zeller account Pseudo-Solomon to belong to the sect. (See Introd., p. 45.) Again Philo, *de Abrah.*, § 46, *ὁ ἀληθείᾳ πρεσβύτερος οὐκ ἐν μῆκει χρόνου, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐπανέτω βίῳ θεωρεῖται.* Plutarch, *Consol. ad Apoll.*, c. 17, *οὐχ ὁ μακρότατος βίος ἄριστος ἀλλ' ὁ σπουδαιότατος . . . τὸ γὰρ καλὸν οὐκ ἐν μῆκει χρόνου θετέον, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀρέτῃ καὶ τῇ καιρίᾳ συμμετρίᾳ . . .* and again, specially illustrating our text, *μέτρον γὰρ τοῦ βίου τὸ καλὸν, οὐ τὸ τοῦ χρόνου μῆκος.*

The remarks of Drummond, *Philo*, i. 179, on the weakness of this comparison with Therapeutic ideas are good. 'Our author is combating an objection to the doctrine of the providential government of the world, founded on the fact that the righteous not only were sometimes without the blessing of children, but even subject to premature death. This he repels not by reference to a Therapeutic practice, but by saying that the real value of life depends not on its length but on its contents,' etc. But, on the other hand, Eccl. 7¹⁷, 'Be not overmuch wicked, neither be thou foolish; why shouldest thou die before thy time?' which is quoted by Churton, seems rather to illustrate the traditional view than that here given.

9. ^L somewhat obscurely translates 'Cani sunt sensus hominis,' which requires A Lapide's gloss: 'Canities hominis aestimatur et censemur esse non coma cana, sed ipse sensus et prudentia.'

We have here again an idea which may be plentifully illustrated from classical sources. Menander, *Fragm.* ed. Meineke, p. 226, *οὐχ αἱ τρίχες ποιοῦσιν αἱ λευκαὶ φρονεῖν.* Seneca, *de Brev. Vitae*, c. 8, 'Non est quod quemquam propter canos aut rugas putas diu vixisse. Non enim ille diu vixit sed diu fuit.' Cic., *de Sen.*, xviii. § 62, 'non cani non rugae repente auctoritatem arripere possunt; sed honeste acta superior aetas fructus capit auctoritatis extremos.' There is possibly actual reference to the passage in Chrysost., *de Sacerd.*, II. vii. 163, *οὐ χρὴ τὴν σύνεσιν ἡλικίᾳ κρίνειν, οὐδὲ τὸν πρεσβύτην ἀπὸ τῆς πολιᾶς δικιμίζειν.* On the other hand, Shakespeare's 'How ill white hairs become a fool and jester' (*Hen. IV.* (2) v. iv.) will occur to all.

10. Being acceptable to God he was cherished,
And dwelling among sinners was translated;

ἥλικία γήρως seems at first pleonastic (L 'aetas senectutis'), and one older critic suggested 'stature' for ἥλικία, as in Matt. 6²⁷, ('add one cubit to his stature'), Luke 2⁵², προέκοπτεν τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν ἥλικίαν.

But having regard to the derivation of *ἡλικία*, there is no difficulty in translating it 'the age which is required to count as old age'; for this 'ripe old age' is a sufficient rendering. \mathfrak{S}^h has 'stature of old age,' as \mathfrak{S}^p , but writes λέπτη for λέπτον , corrected in margin.

10. There is no doubt that Enoch is meant. Cf. Gen. 5²⁴, εὐνήρέστησεν 'Ενώχ τῷ θέω καὶ οὐχ εύρισκετο, ὅτι μετέθηκεν αὐτὸν ὁ θεός. Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 269, objects that there is tautology in εὐνήρεστος and ἡγαπήθη, and suggests from the Chaldee מִרְאָת, which may mean either 'he was loved,' or 'mercy was laid on him,' the latter interpretation (supposing always an original Hebraic text), but ἀρέσκειν and ἀγαπᾶσθαι have quite different meanings. Cf. Bretschneider, *Dissert.*, to the same effect.

The words are almost exactly repeated in the Greek of Eccl. 44¹⁶, 'Ενώχ εὐηρέστησεν Κυριώ καὶ μετετέθη, but the words have little or no relation to the Hebrew text (Ryssel in Kautzsch, *Apokr.*, i. 450). Cf. Heb. 11⁵ for the same turn of expression. It is not necessary to suppose any connection between the three writers; they may all have followed the Greek text of Genesis.

For legends of Enoch cf. Bousset, *Antichrist* (Eng. trans.), 27, 58, 203-208. He and Elias are at times designated as the 'two witnesses': this legend, Bousset says, appears in Irenæus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian.

We have here the first example of the curious avoidance of proper names which marks the author of Wisdom. To suppose with Lincke, *Samaria und seine Propheten*, p. 131, that the names of Jewish saints were omitted through hostility to the Jewish hierocrats is hardly possible. Farrar's explanation, that Enoch is not expressly named because his case is treated as being typical and not isolated, does not explain why *no* Old Testament saint is mentioned by name. The other suggestion, viz. that it was unnecessary to name them because the book was addressed to Jewish apostates or waverers, is in accordance with the view above expressed (Introd., p. 18), as to the real object of the work. So Stade, *Gesch. des Volkes Israel*, ii. 436. A precisely opposite explanation, viz. that the *heathen* princes to whom the book is addressed would not care to know the names of Hebrew saints, is suggested by Grimm. But the point remains a mysterious one. In another place (p. 190) Grimm attributes the peculiarity to mere 'Ziererei' or affectation. Margoliouth's idea

11. He was plucked away, lest wickedness should alter his understanding,
Or guile deceive his soul.

12. For the fascination of wickedness doth obscure things that are good,
And the vertigo of desire perverteth the guileless mind.

(*Expositor*, 1900, i. 40) that the writer avoided proper names because he did not wish to spoil the appearance of his Greek, is peculiar.

11. The motive here given for the removal of Enoch is different from that assumed both in the Greek ('an example of repentance to all generations') and the Hebrew ('a sign of recognition,' or 'an instructive example') in Eccl. 44¹⁶. Siegfried cites *Bereshith Rabba*, c. 25, as giving the same motive as 'Wisdom' for Enoch's removal.

Grimm remarks that the case of Enoch is connected with what goes before, as a proof that even an untimely death may be a positive blessing—a gift of God—a release. (Cf. possibly 2¹, 'There is no healing in the end of a man'). Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 270, points out that the idea that death may be a mercy was not first introduced by Christianity. He quotes *Bereshith Rabba*, § 9, 'All the time the righteous are alive they are at war with their inclinations; when they are dead they are at peace.' Cf. Eccl. 22¹¹, 38²³, 30¹⁶ (猶). This agrees with the sense of this passage, but it is incorrect to quote μακαρίτης (used of a dead man) as an illustration from the Greek. That is probably a euphemism. Noack (*Ursprung des Christenthums*, i. 228), in accordance with his theory of authorship, referred the verse to Christ's ascension to heaven.

The A.V. 'speedily was he taken away' seems merely intended to express the notion of suddenness contained in ἡρπάγη. Cf. Acts 8³⁸, πνεῦμα Κυρίου ἡρπασεν τὸν Φίλιππον. Sh translates μή, 'before that.'

Gregg holds that Enoch is not the person referred to: 'the righteous man of v. 7 is still the subject, his death being spoken of in terms used to recount the translation of Enoch, a typical instance.' He would therefore render μετετέθη not 'was translated' but 'was transferred,' i.e. killed and received into a happier state.

12. *βασκανία* is exactly the Latin 'fascinatio,' and the verb is found, spoken of the evil eye, in Deut. 28⁵⁴. *βασκανεῖ τῷ ὀφθάλμῳ αὐτοῦ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ*; Eccl. 14⁸, πονηρὸς ὁ βασκαίνων ὀφθάλμῳ. Cf. Prov. 23⁶, μὴ συνδείπνει ἄνδρι βασκάνῳ. In a modified sense Gal. 3¹, τίς ὑμᾶς ἐβάσκανεν; L renders 'fascinatio nugacitatis,' which again requires À Lapide's note; 'malitia nugax, h.e. nūgis suis illiciens.' There is no occasion for any such unusual word to explain φαυλότης, which is simply 'badness,' 'wickedness.'

Two senses are possible for the end of the line, according as we

interpret τὰ καλά of 'things good' generally or 'the good qualities of the human soul.' In the first case ἀμαυροῖ means that the bright fascinations of evil throw the duller virtues into the shade. In the second, it has the force of 'bedim' (R.V.), 'corrupt' even. Grimm quotes Pythagoras in Stob. *Floril.* 18, τεθνάναι πόλλω κρέπτον η δι' ἀκρασίαν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀμαυρώσαι.

'Ρεμβασμός is a word invented by the author; 'a powerful but strange word' (Farrar). It seems to be an illegitimate formation from ῥέμβομαι, 'to gad about,' as in Prov. 7¹², of the harlot. 'Ρεμβάζω, which might justify such a form, does not exist, and the word seems rather a proof of the author's ignorance of Greek than of his deep knowledge of it. As used in M. Aurel., ii. 7, σχολὴν πάρεχε σεαυτῷ . . . καὶ πανσαι ῥεμβόμενος, and in the *Orac. Sibyll.* (quoted by Deane), it means nothing more than 'wander restlessly about,' as does ῥεμβεύειν in Isa. 23¹⁶. ῥεμβάς, which occurs in some MSS. of Eccl. 26⁸, is not used, as Farrar says, of an *intoxicated* woman, but of γυνὴ μέθυσος—a very different thing; and A.V. rightly translates it there 'a gadder abroad.' There would appear to be no justification for translating ῥέμβομαι as anything else but 'to wander,' and so far A.V. and L. ('inconstantia concupiscentiae') seem right; but Pseudo-Solomon may have thought that 'whirling about' was a meaning which he could attach to ῥεμβασμός; and the above translation represents such a sense. It is only with this interpretation that the passage of Seneca, *de Vita Beata*, 28, is applicable: 'nonne turbo quidam animos vestros rotat et involvit fugientes petentesque eadem?' 'Ρεμβῶν means not 'a top' but 'a sling.' S^h has ΛΟΤ, 'a dazzling' for ῥεμβασμός.

μεταλλεύει is an obvious blunder for μεταλλάσσει. It means 'digs for metals,' and is repeated in its false sense in 16²⁴ sq., η κτίσις . . . εἰς πάντα μεταλλευομένη. If it were not for this second convicting passage the commentators would have explained the blunder away. L has 'transvertit,' which A.V. most ingeniously parallels by 'undermines.' A Lap., 'sicut fossores fodiendo e terrae visceribus erunt . . . metalla; sic concupiscentia e visceribus mentis effodit et exhaerit omnem sensum.' Two other editors (Hasse and Heydenreich, quoted by Grimm) translated 'melt down,' and Grabe proposed to read—without the slightest MS. authority—μεταλλοιοῦν. The rendering of μεταλλεύειν: μεταφέρειν, in Suidas, seems to be taken from these two passages of Wisdom. The anxiety of commentators to defend the qualifications of Pseudo-Solomon as a Greek scholar is proved by Gregg's suggestion that 'papyri yet to be discovered may prove this to have been a popular Alexandrian use.' Cornely even (p. 161) was inclined to fall into this snare; but his editor, Zorell, will have none of it. He remarks that 'μεταλλάσσειν does occur repeatedly in the papyri with the meaning "to change," μεταλλεύειν never'; which seems decisive.

The mistake must be simply recognised, as possibly in the case of

13. He being perfected in brief space fulfilled long times ;

14. For his soul was well-pleasing to God,

Therefore hastened he him away from the midst of wickedness.

πάχνη (5¹⁴), as an instance of the author's imperfect knowledge of Greek. A parallel is afforded by Mark 12⁴, where *κεφαλαιοῦν*, meaning properly 'to sum up,' is used for 'to wound in the head'; but St. Mark is also a Hellenistic Jew.

For the general sense of the passage it is hardly necessary to quote Menander's 'evil communications corrupt good manners,' 1 Cor. 15³³. Scarcely less known is Theognis 355:

ἔσθλων μὲν γὰρ ἀπ' ἔσθλὰ μαθῆσει· ἦν δὲ κάκοισι
συμμίσγγει, ἀπολεῖς καὶ τὸν ἔοντα νόον.

Churton remarks that the passage may be regarded as a paraphrase on Isa. 57¹, 'the righteous is taken away from the evil to come,' or (5) 'from the presence of iniquity'; probably Pseudo-Solomon took the latter interpretation, and there is no occasion to suppose with Farrar that he misunderstood the text.

13. An idiomatic English translation is almost impossible (R.V. 'long years' is not satisfactory), but the sense is plain enough. His moral training was completed early in life, and his few years were as good as very many. Cf. Seneca, *Epp.* 93, 'Longa est vita si plena est; impletur autem quum animus sibi bonum suum reddidit et ad se potestatem sui transtulit.'

Τελειωθεῖς is not 'dead' as some older editors supposed. Cf. Hooker on the early death of Edward VI. (*Eccl. Pol.*, IV. xiv. 7), who renders: 'though he departed this world soon, yet fulfilled he much time.' It obviously implies completion in contrast to *τέκνα μοιχών ἀτέλεστα* (3¹⁶), *κλῶνες ἀτέλεστοι* (4⁵), and is said to have been used in connection with the Greek mysteries. The verb is used in the sense of 'to perfect' in Eccl. 7³². Phil. 3¹², *οὐχ ὅτι ἥδη ἔλαβον ἡ ἥδη τετελείωμα*. Heb. 5⁹, 10¹⁴, *μία γὰρ προσφόρα τετελείωκεν εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς τοὺς ἀγιαζομένους*.

Grimm quotes Philo, *Legg. Alleg.*, ii. § 23, ὁ ψυχή . . . ὅταν τελειωθῆσι καὶ βραβείων καὶ στρεφάνων ἀξιωθῆσι, and *de Somn.*, i. § 21, *ψυχὴ . . . τελειωθεῖσα ἐν ἀρετῶν ἄθλοις*.

πληροῦν χρόνον is a Hellenistic expression. Eccl. 26², *τὰ ἔτη αὐτοῦ πληρωσει*. Jos., *Antt.*, IV. iv. 6. In Latin we have 'implere annum sexagesimum,' etc. Tibull., I. iii. 53, 'fatales explevimus annos.' Hor., *Ep.*, I. xx. 27, 'Me quater undenos sciat implevisse Decembres.'

Of the various parallels quoted, the closest seems to be in Ambros., *De Obitu Theod.*: 'perfecta est aetas ubi perfecta est virtus.'

14. The R.V. 'hasted he out of the midst of wickedness' spoils the whole passage : if it was Enoch himself who voluntarily left the world,

15. But the nations seeing and not understanding,
 Nor taking such a happening to heart,
 That grace and mercy are with his chosen,
 And his visitation with his holy ones :—

how is his leaving the world a sign of God's favour? A modification of this view is adopted by Grimm; 'His soul hastened away,' which he endeavours to bring into harmony with line 1 thus, 'his early removal was in accordance with the wish of his soul, which joyfully hastened to obey God's call'—an obviously tame explanation. There is no difficulty in using *σπεύδω* transitively of things, but no example of its use with a person as object seems to exist elsewhere. Cf. Lidd. and Sc. s.v.

It seems better to adhere to the traditional translation. **L** 'properavit educere illum,' which is supported by the patristic authorities cited by Sabatier. With this interpretation agree Nannius, Junius Lorinus, A Lapide, and the Zürich Bible, as also Luther and Grotius. Nannius, quoted by Grimm, would read *ἔσπασεν*, and **S^P** simply says 'he took him away.' Siegfried thinks the construction imitated from that of the Hebrew *מִהָה* with the accus. as in Gen. 18⁶, 'make ready quickly'; 1 Kings 22⁹, 'Fetch quickly (מִהָרָה) Micaiah the son of Imlah.'

For the general idea underlying the passage we have as parallels Aeschin., *c. Axioch.* c. 9, *οἱ θεοὶ . . . οὐς ἀν πλειστοῦ ποιῶνται, θάττον ἀπαλλάττουσι τοῦ ζῆν.* Menander, 425, *ὅν γὰρ θεοὶ φιλοῦσιν ἀποθνήσκει νέος.* Plaut., *Bacch.*, IV. vii. 18, 'Quem dii diligunt, adolescens moritur.' Cf. also Hom., *Od.*, xv. 244 *sqq.*

Excellent modern parallels are quoted by Farrar *ad loc.*

15. The anacoluthon in the sentence is obvious, and it is preserved in **L**. The use of *μὴ . . . μηδέ* instead of *οὐ . . . οὐδέ* for 'not' . . . 'nor,' prevents us from simply supplying *εἰσὶ* or the like, as does A.V. and translating with it, 'this the people saw and understood it not': *μὴ*, etc., must imply a cause or quality. The best explanation would seem to be to regard v. ¹⁶ as an interpolation (possibly of the author's own), and *γὰρ* at the beginning of v. ¹⁷ as added by the interpolator or an editor. There will then be no need to supply, as does R.V., a fresh subject for *ὅψονται*, and the passage will run smoothly thus: For the peoples, being such as could see such an event without laying it to heart, will in like manner behold the end of the righteous without understanding what the Lord purposed, etc. This view is adopted by Gutberlet and practically by Deane. That *οἱ λαοὶ* is the regular word in **G** for the Gentiles, the '*gōyîm*' (Grimm), does not seem entirely accurate. In Isa. *ζέθνῃ* is used without distinction for *עַמִּים*

גָּזִים, and cf. Ps. 2¹. It is usually understood here, however, of the Gentiles, among whom the renegade Jews were reckoned. All

16. But the just man when dead shall condemn the impious
that are alive,

And youth soon perfected the old age of the unrighteous
man, though rich in years.

reference to the people actually existing in the time of Enoch seems to have been tacitly dropped.

Gregg's emendation of *οἱ δὲ ἀνομοι* for *οἱ δὲ λαοὶ* would certainly simplify matters, but it altogether lacks support. He argues as follows: v. ¹⁷ of the text shows the word that is required, 'the ungodly.' \mathfrak{G}^A has the variant reading *ἄλλοι*, which probably conceals *ἀνομοι*, 'lawless,' a very simple uncial confusion. *Ἄνομοι* serves as a substitute for *ἄσεβεῖς*, the keyword required for the beginning of the new section. *Ἄνομοι* is found in 4¹⁶, and in this section it is echoed in *ἀνομήματα* (4²⁰) and *ἀνομίας* (5⁷).

No doubt the reading of *ἀνομοι* would remove the necessity for the insertion of 'the ungodly' by R.V. in v. ¹⁷, but it may be questioned whether *ἄλλοι* and *ἀνομοι* could be easily confused in an uncial MS. Such conjectures, if they are merely intended to remove the blame of an anacoluthon from the text of a writer like Pseudo-Solomon, are superfluous.

The clause 'Grace and mercy . . . holy ones,' occurs entire in 3⁹, according to many MSS., cf. note there. The indefinite word 'visitation' is retained as the translation of *ἐπισκοπή*, because of the various forces both of the word itself and of the Hebrew **רָקַע** which it represents, *e.g.* in Isa. 10³ we have an ill meaning; but in Ruth 1⁶ **רָקַע** 'the Lord had visited His people (*ἐπέσκεπται κύριος τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ*) to give them bread.' No doubt this is the force here, but it is difficult to express it in one English word (? 'protection'). The *ἐκλεκτοί* occur in Tobit 8¹⁶, 1 Chron. 16¹³, 2 Macc. 1²⁵.

Margoliouth cites the Armenian version 'justice is upon his saints,' which he thinks represents the original Hebrew text. Certainly *θέντες ἐπὶ διανοίᾳ* exactly represents the Hebrew **שָׁוִם עַל־לִבּוֹ** in Isa. 57¹, (none) 'layeth it to heart.' (\mathfrak{G} has *οὐδεὶς ἐκδέχεται τὴν καρδίαν*, which is inexact).

\mathfrak{S}^h for *μηδὲ θέντες ἐπὶ διανοίᾳ τὸ τοιοῦτο*: 'not thinking that it was like this.'

16. \mathfrak{S}^p (the Arabic is hopelessly confused with v. ¹⁵) presents a most extraordinary variation: the literal translation of it is, 'He shall judge (or judgeth) the righteous and destroy the wicked alive; and youths who go forth for a brief time more than the long time of old men of falsehood.' The first clause is explicable. *Δίκαος* is mistaken for the object, and *καμών* for some verb meaning 'destroy';

17. For they shall see the wise man's end,

And shall not understand what the Lord purposed concerning him,

Nor for what end he took him into safety.

but the second part is a mystery. It might seem as if the translator had a different text before him, and this, coupled with the unhellenistic *καμών*, the use of *τελεσθεῖσα* immediately after *τελειωθεῖσα*, and the indefiniteness of *κατακρινεῖ*, which seem to indicate the hand of a later writer, appears to be in favour of the theory put forward in the notes on v. ¹⁵, that the text has been tampered with. Bois, *Essai*, 387, recognises this, but tries to remedy it by removing v. ¹⁵ to the middle of chap. 3, and putting v. ^{14b} at the beginning of v. ².

καμόντες or *κεκμηκότες* 'those whose sufferings are over,' or as *S^h* slavishly, 'he that is weary,' is a purely classical expression for 'the dead' found in Homer, and never elsewhere in *G*. Quite naturally the copyists substituted *θανόντες*, which they understood, and this found its way into the best MSS. and into Ephrem Syrus (quoted by Deane). But *GEBN* retained *καμών*, and it is generally read, as the 'difficilior lectio.' *L* may have read either.

κατακρινεῖ presents a difficulty. It may refer (1) to condemnation in a future existence; but *ζῶντας* is against this: (2) to the moral shaming of the wicked that remain behind; but this, says Grimm, would be expressed by *ἐλέγξει*: (3) to a figurative condemnation, as in Heb. 11⁷, 'Noah condemned the world'; Rom. 2²⁷ (*κρίνειν*), 'the uncircumcision shall judge thee': (4) but the other passage quoted by Grimm (Matt. 12⁴¹) tells directly in favour of the natural sense of the passage. 'The men of Ninive' (and 'the queen of the south') 'shall stand up in the judgment with this generation and shall condemn it.' If it were not for the *a priori* view of the critics—that Pseudo-Solomon *could* not believe in a Judgment Day—this explanation would be at once adopted. If the writer, or interpolator, was later than Ps.-Sol, it is even more likely. Siegfried adopts this meaning, citing Matt. 19²⁸, 'Ye shall sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel.'

17. Γάρ, which is probably inserted to cover the interpolation, 'refers,' says Grimm, to *κατακρινεῖ*. 'A reason for their condemnation is their failure to understand God's purpose in the early departure of the righteous'; which does not seem very cogent reasoning.

σοφός has the same meaning as *δίκαιος*, for the man who has *σοφία* must of necessity be just, but it adds to our doubts as to v. ¹⁶ to find the same person (presumably) described by two different epithets in two succeeding verses.

ἡσφαλίσατο is better rendered in A.V. 'set him in safety,' 'in Sicherheit gebracht' (Siegfried), than in R.V., 'he safely kept him.' The point is the removal to a place of safety.

18. They shall see it and account it as naught,
 But the Lord shall laugh them to scorn ;
 And they shall thereafter be for a dishonoured carcase,
 And for a mockery among the dead for ever.

Grimm quotes Plutarch, *Consol. ad Apoll.*, δ θεός . . . προορώμενος τὰ μέλλοντα συμβήσεσθαι, προεξάγει τινὰς ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἀώρους.

18. The rendering of A.V. and L, 'They shall see him and despise him,' is unlikely. The man is gone from their sight : it is the event that they contemplate and deride. R.V. is indefinite, 'They shall see and they shall despise.'

Grimm translates 'despise also' (citing Ps. 58⁹, καὶ σὺ, κύριε, ἐκγελάσῃ αὐτὸν· ἐξουδενώσεις πάντα τὰ ἔθνη, on the ground that the scorn of men is answered by the scorn of God). ἐκγελάσεται is also used with the accus. in Ps. 2⁴, 37¹³.

μετὰ τοῦτο must refer to a future beyond the tomb, on account of the immediate reference to 'the dead,' and not to an immediate happening 'after all this contempt of the righteous' (Deane). Farrar cites the description of the fall of the king of Babylon (Isa. 14⁴⁻²⁰), of which one passage in the Hebrew (G is entirely different) corresponds closely to our own. Cf. v. ¹⁹, 'Thou art cast away from thy sepulchre . . . as a carcase trodden under foot.' On the strength of this it is probably right to assume that ἀπιμον means 'deprived of burial.' Cf. Ps. 79^{2,3}.

For εἰς τι εἶναι cf. Winer (ed. Moulton), p. 229. But with regard to πτῶμα there should be no difference of opinion. It is the later Greek equivalent of πτῶμα νεκροῦ, and occurs in G, Ps. 110⁶ (Engl., 'he shall fill the places with dead bodies'), Ezek. 6⁵ (in some MSS.), as also in Matt. 24²⁸ ('wheresoever the carcase is,' etc.), Matt. 6²⁹, Rev. 11⁸. Yet the feeble translation of L, 'decidentes sine honore,' apparently with reference to trees, is followed by Deane (on the ground that it seems unnatural to speak of all the wicked as being a carcase), of course by A Lapide, and by many early commentators quoted by Grimm, especially Nannius, who paraphrases 'poma excussa vel ipsa arbor evulsis radicibus projecta,' as in vs. 3⁴. In Eccl. 34⁸ πτῶμα does mean 'ruin,' and Gutberlet so translates it. S^p and S^h both translate ~~τάλαρο~~ 'a fall,' distinctly not 'a carcase.'

For the derision of the dead cf. Ezek. 32^{24,25}.

The R.V. translates δι' αἰώνος 'for ever,' though in v. ² they render ἐν τῷ αἰώνι 'throughout all time.' Its meaning is undoubted in Deut. 5²⁹, 12²⁸, not so clear in Isa. 60²¹; and Farrar considers it as 'a phrase which the Jews used to express their vague notions of continuous time.'

19. For he shall dash them down, speechless and falling headlong,
 And shake them from their foundations ;
 To the uttermost shall they be dried up,
 And shall be in torment,
 And their remembrance shall perish.

19. A worse instance of confusion of thought than is afforded by this and the neighbouring verses can hardly be conceived. For Bois' remarks on it cf. Additional Note on 3¹⁻⁷. Reuss says : 'The death of the wicked does not conduct to life like that of the just. Yet there is question of torment awaiting them, and a judgment which will cause them to reflect.' Grimm (p. 64) is utterly at variance with himself : he says 'the expression ἔως ἐσχάτου χερσωθήσονται cannot on account of the addition ἐν ὁδύνῃ ἔσονται be understood of complete destruction of existence, but only as a poetic hyperbole to express the loss of true life on the analogy of the New Testament. ἀπόλλυσθαι and ἀπώλεια are opposed to σώζεσθαι and σωτηρία.' Compare with this his note quoted above on 1¹¹, and Reuss on this text. ρήξει πρηνεῖς is cited by those who translate πτῶμα 'ruin' of tree or house as only appropriate to such things and not to a 'carcase' ; but we are accustomed to 'Wisdom's' mixed metaphors. L translates 'disrumpet inflatos,' and according to Margoliouth the Arm. has the same. Much ingenuity has been exercised to find out what possible reading this represents. Cornely's conjecture seems the best. He thinks the L translator, not understanding πρηνεῖς, connected it with πρήθειν, which does exactly correspond to 'inflate.'

ρήξει, 'he shall dash down,' means apparently in later Greek καταβαλεῖν (Hesych., *Lex.*, quoted by Grimm), but the passage quoted from Dem. 1259, 10 (c. *Conon*, § 8), has really ράξαντες, from ράσσω, the word used in that sense of combatants. ρήξει is probably from ρήσσω, which is cited as an Ionicism together with πρηνής, by Winer (ed. Moulton), p. 23. This latter word undoubtedly means 'headlong,' and with the sense we may compare Ezek. 31¹⁶, 'I made the nations to shake at the sound of his fall, when I cast him down to hell with them that descend into the pit.' So Grimm thinks that the idea here is of a headlong descent down a steep into an abyss. Sh has for πρηνεῖς, 'on their faces.' χερσωθήσονται has been neglected by the editors. It apparently occurs only once in G, Prov. 24³¹, where it is used of land, 'shall be laid waste,' 'go to ruin' (of the sluggard's farm), but it is doubtful if such a term could be applied to persons, and the above translation is given as a conjectural one on the analogy of *Corph. Inscr.* (Boeckh), 8801, where it is used of the drying up of a brook. It is supported by Gregg, who ingeniously explains 'the parching of a land by the failure of its rivers,' and cites Isa. 19⁶⁻¹⁰, where there is a vivid description of the desolation of Egypt from such a cause. Cf. also Ps. 107³³, 'He turneth rivers into a wilderness,

20. In the casting up of their sins they shall come as cowards,
And their transgressions shall convict them to their face.

and watersprings into a thirsty ground ; a fruitful land into a salt desert, for the wickedness of them that dwell therein.' **S^h**, 'they shall lie waste.'

There follows another mixed metaphor, that of rooting up : but the addition of *ἐκ θεμελίων* turns us aside from the subject of trees, and we are apparently dealing with buildings. Yet the expression as applied to persons is classical. Grimm is no doubt right in explaining 'that the wicked are by death completely torn away from their earthly surroundings, in which they were so happy, and in which they in their pride thought themselves so secure.' Their souls, he adds, will not perish (cf. Gfrörer, *Philo*, ii. 243). Here at least, then, he does not believe in 'annihilation.'

In 'their remembrance shall perish' we meet with another inconsistency ; for though in v. ¹ the remembrance of mankind is considered a blessing, and to be forgotten is a punishment (Ps. 9⁶, 'Their very memorial is perished' ; 34¹⁶, 'The face of the Lord is against them that do evil, to cut off the remembrance of them from the earth,' cf. Job 18¹⁷, Prov. 10⁷), yet to be forgotten is what the wicked anticipate, and apparently with contentment, in chap. 2⁴.

Classical parallels for this idea of oblivion as a grief are found. Grimm quotes Sappho from Plutarch, *prae Conjug.* c. 48, *κατθανοῦσα δὲ κείσεαι, οὐδέ τις μνημοσύνα σέθεν ἔσεται*, and Hesiod, *Opera et Dies*, 138, *βῆσσαν ἐς εὐρώεντα δόμον κρυερῶν Αἴδαο νώνυμον*. We may add Hor., *Od.* IV. ix. 25, 'Vixere fortes ante Agamemnona multi ; sed omnes illacrimabiles urguntur ignotique longa nocte.'

20. *'Ελεύσονται* might possibly be translated 'they shall be proved' cowards ; cf. *Il.*, xviii. 180, *σοὶ λάβῃ αἴκεν τι νέκυς ἡσχυμένος ἔλθῃ*, where *ἔλθῃ* is little more than 'become.' But if the Judgment Day really be referred to, 'they shall appear there' is a better rendering. Many commentators, with A.V. and **L**, take the 'reckoning up of sins' subjectively : 'when they come to reckon up their own sins' ; but this is contrary to the whole tenor of the passage, and 'something more seems to be meant than the appearance of the sinner before the bar of his own conscience' (Farrar). One can hardly doubt that the *ἐπισκοπή* (3¹⁸) or *ἔξετασμός* (4⁶) is referred to. **S^h** is indefinite : 'in the connection of the counting of sins.'

The view that the anticipatory effect of conscience is meant is held by Deane, who quotes Jer. 2¹⁰, 'Thine own wickedness shall correct thee and thy backslidings shall reprove thee,' and Rom. 2¹⁶. But the latter refers distinctly to 'the day when God shall judge the secrets of men.' Cf., however, for the general idea Luke 19²², Matt. 12³⁷.

For the dramatic idea of the personified sins cf. 1 Tim. 5²⁴, 'Some men's sins are open, going before to judgment, and some they follow

5. 1. Then shall the righteous man stand forth with great boldness

In the face of them that tormented him
And them that count his labours as naught.

after'; Gen. 4⁷, 'Sin coucheth at the door'; Num. 32²³, 'Be sure your sin will find you out'; Ps. 140¹¹, 'Evil shall hunt the violent man to overthrow him.'

The question whether this verse is to be interpreted of the final judgment or not is of importance as bearing on the eschatology of 'Wisdom.' Giegg, who very appositely quotes the *G* of Hab. 1⁶, *ἰδετε οἱ καταφρονταὶ καὶ ἐμθεψατε, καὶ θαυμάσατε θαυμάσια καὶ ἀφανισθητε*, remarks that the line is an adaptation of Ps. 37¹², and accepting either the colourless rendering of Deane above given, or the still weaker explanation of Grimm, 'after the wicked have ceased to despise,' says that 'the verse evidently points to a retribution beginning on earth.' We may ask whether the wicked are to become 'carcasses' and 'a reproach among the dead for ever' while still on earth, and how they can while still on earth speak of their life and death as things past and over (5⁷⁻¹¹).

Cornely, who explains *τοιοῦται* 'decidentes' as caused by a mistranslation of *ἔστοιται εἰς πτώμα*, as if it meant 'erunt in casum,' an idea supported by *S^h*, which, as already stated, has 'a fall,' and not a 'carcase,' very properly argues that *μετὰ τοῦτο* means something after this life, and that this idea is supported by the promise of the eternal punishment of the wicked.

5. 1. A better example of a *parti pris* in criticism can hardly be found than the remark of Reuss on this passage. 'One might conclude that this was a representation of the Last Judgment, as the Jewish theologians contemporary with our Lord represented it. But as this idea does not occur elsewhere, we may be satisfied to see here a poetic tableau of the late repentance of the sinner.' Similarly Grimm speaks of all this as a 'dramatic representation' of the conviction of the impious and their recognition of God's judgment of them and of the righteous. One would have thought that a scene to which a writer devoted twenty-six verses (4¹⁸⁻⁵-2³), coupled with his constant references to *ἐπισκοπή* and *ημέρα διαγνώσεως*, might be considered to form an integral part of his belief, if he has any at all. It would be just as easy to explain away the description of the Judgment in Matt. 25³¹⁻⁴⁶ as a 'poetic tableau,' a 'dramatic representation'; on the ground that nowhere else do we have in the Gospels so full a depiction. St. Augustine at least refers the passage to the Judgment. *c. Gaud.*, i. 38, etc.

Farrar goes a step further than Grimm. For him all this is the dramatic illustration of the eternal principle which has found expression in so many proverbs: 'Magna est veritas et praevalebit.' Grimm

2. Seeing, they shall be dismayed with terrible fear,
 And shall be astounded at the unexpectedness of his
 deliverance.

3. They shall say within themselves, changing their view,
 Yea and shall groan for oppression of spirit,
 This was he whom we held for our laughing-stock
 And for a byword of reproach, we fools.

remarks that 'rational preachers use the orthodox expectation of a visible judgment to clothe and illustrate the idea of future eternal reward.' He is rightly rebuked by Cornely.

The text needs little comment. *παρρήσια* is well illustrated by Prov. 13⁵, *ἀσεβῆς αἰσχύνεται καὶ οὐχ ἔξει παρρήσιαν*. There is a curious change of tense in lines 2 and 3, explained by the fact that *θλιψάντων* refers to the actions of the ungodly in past time, *ἀθετούντων* to their habitual contempt for the painful life of the righteous. Cf. Enoch 103⁹ *sgg.*, 'Say not of the just and good whose life is over: in the days of their life they plagued themselves with toilsome labour and underwent all kinds of hardships. . . . They accomplished and attained not the least thing; they were tormented and destroyed and had no hope,' etc.

L most inexplicably translates *ἀθετούντων* 'qui abstulerunt labores eorum.' **S^P ॥** may mean 'plunder,' or 'defraud.' 'Labours' is not expressed in that version. **S^h** has also 'oppress.'

2. There is no occasion to supply either 'him' or 'it' with *ἰδόντες*. 'Beholding the scene' is the meaning. Nor need we add 'God's salvation' (R.V.); if anything is supplied it should be (with **EN**) *αὐτοῦ*. The revisers apparently considered that *σωτηρία* could not mean 'the rescue of a man' (for many examples of which cf. Liddell and Scott *s.v.*). 'God's salvation' would be the more unclassical of the two renderings.

The word *παράδοξον* (*τῆς σωτηρίας*) betrayed the A.V. into unusual and unneeded prolixity, 'his salvation, so far beyond all that they looked for.' Deane suggests a rather curious rendering, 'the unlooked-for allotment of happiness.'

For *παράδοξον* we have again a strange word, 'subitatio,' in **L**. If it be true that that version was of African origin (cf. Introduction on the Versions), we have an explanation of the use of many such words as this, which occur elsewhere only in the African writers. There is, however, an explanation of this to be found in the fact that practically all the Latin writers whose works we possess, of the period to which we attribute the Old Latin, were African.

It must be remembered that Jerome did not revise the translation of Wisdom. It is much older than his time.

3. *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς* may, as in 2¹, be either 'one with another' or 'in them-

4. We accounted his life madness,
And his end unhonoured.

5. How was he reckoned among the sons of God
And his portion is among the saints !

selves.' The point is unimportant. To attach any theological importance to *μετανοοῦντες* as denoting the possibility of repentance beyond the grave would of course be absurd, and we need not do so ; for *μετανοοῦντες* probably has its original meaning of a change of opinion. It is true, however, that Athan., *Serm. Mag. de Fide*, 28 (quoted by Deane), who applies the whole passage to the judgment of Christ, uses *μεταμελόμενοι* (the word used of Judas in Matt. 27³) ὅνπερ ἐν τῇ κρίσει δρῶντες κρίνοντας ζῶντας καὶ νεκροὺς . . . *μεταμελόμενοι* ἐροῦσιν, οὗτος ἡνὸν ἔσχομέν ποτε εἰς γέλωτα. §^P has also 'repenting.'

στενοχωρία πνεύματος seems to have also a physical significance. Λ 'prae angustia spiritus,' they are 'choked' with confusion ; they cannot speak ; they can only groan. It is characteristic of 'Wisdom' that they speak all the same. The best illustration of the bodily meaning is in 4 Macc. 11¹¹, τὸ πνεῦμα στενοχωρούμενος καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀγχόμενος, which Deissmann translates 'with breath oppressed and body suffocating.' In the New Testament it seems to be invariably coupled with *θλίψις*, and therefore to have lost the physical meaning : Rom. 2⁹, 8³⁵, 2 Cor. 6⁴.

For *εἰς παραβολὴν ὀνειδισμοῦ* Λ has 'in similitudinem improperii,' which is simply a mistranslation. No 'parable' is meant, but a 'byword.' Ps. 44¹⁶, ἔθον ἡμᾶς *εἰς παραβολὴν* ἐν τοῖς ἔθνεσι. Cf. 68¹². Jer. 24⁹, ἔσονται *εἰς ὀνειδισμὸν* καὶ *εἰς παραβολὴν*. Cf. 2 Chron. 7²⁰. Tobit 3⁴, παραβολὴ ὀνειδισμοῦ. For *παραβολὴ* meaning a 'proverb,' see Luke 4²³, ἐρείτε μοι τὴν παραβολὴν ταυτὴν Ἰατρέ, θεράπευσον σεαυτόν.

οἱ ἄφρονες seems properly joined by Swete to the end of this verse. Siegfried follows him.

4. The charge of 'madness' is brought against Christ himself, Mark 3²¹, ἔξηλθον κρατῆσαι αὐτὸν, ἔλεγον γὰρ ὅτι ἔξεστη. John 7²⁰, ἀπεκρίθη ὁ ὄχλος Δαιμόνιον ἔχεις, cf. 8^{48.52}, 10²⁰; 1 Cor. 4¹⁰, ἡμεῖς μωροὶ διὰ χριστόν. The word *μαίνομαι* itself is only used in Acts 26²⁴ (Agrippa's scoff at St. Paul).

Deane quotes (as does Hooker, *Eccl. Pol. Pref.*, iii. 14) Merc. Trism., *ad Aesculap.*, xv. 43, οἱ ἐν γνώσει ὄντες οὕτε τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκουσι, οὕτε οἱ πολλοὶ αὐτοῖς, μεμηνέναι δὲ δοκοῦσι καὶ γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνουσι.

5. The sons of God are by some taken to mean 'the angels,' as in Job 1⁶, 2¹, and the well-known passage 38⁷, 'All the sons of God shouted for joy.' (Ω translates 'angels' in all cases.) Cf. Enoch 104⁴, 'Ye (the righteous) shall have great joy like the angels of heaven.' But in Hos. 1¹⁰, 'the sons of the living God' are the re-

6. We then erred from the path of truth,
And the light of righteousness shone not upon us,
Yea and the sun rose not for us.

pentant folk of Israel, and the meaning here may be ‘saints’ generally. In Wisd. 18¹³ a rather different meaning is evident. ‘They confessed the people to be God’s sons,’ *i.e.* the chosen people of God on earth. Cf. notes *ad loc.*

κλῆρον is most indefinite. It may mean ‘lot,’ ‘portion,’ ‘inheritance.’ In 3¹⁴ it means the inheritance of the eunuch hereafter; and so in Col. 1¹², *εἰς τὴν μερίδα τοῦ κλήρου τῶν ἀγίων ἐν τῷ φωτί*. A curious parallel is afforded by Acts 26¹⁸, *τοῦ λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς ἄφεσιν ἀμαρτιῶν καὶ κλῆρον ἐν τοῖς ἡγιασμένοις πίστει τῇ εἰς ἐμέ*. Cf. Dan. 12¹³, *ἀναστῆσῃ εἰς τὸν κλῆρόν σου εἰς συντέλειαν ἡμερῶν*, where **¶**, however, has *ἐπὶ τὴν δόξαν σου*.

6. *Ἄρα* is common enough in New Testament Greek at the beginning of a sentence, though not in the classical writers. But it may be well conceded that what goes before—surprise at the good fortune of the righteous—takes the place of the protasis of a sentence: *ἄρα* is thus conclusive: ‘so then after all it is we who were wrong.’ **¶** ‘ergo.’ R.V. ‘verily’ is both meaningless and incorrect.

‘The path of truth’ is a natural metaphor; ‘the way which corresponds to true religion,’ and, in the Jew’s eyes, to all ceremonial observance. The exact phrase is found in 2 Pet. 2², *δι’ οὓς ἡ ὁδὸς τῆς ἀληθείας βλασφημηθήσεται*. For its opposite cf. 12²⁴, *ὅδος πλάνης*. ‘The way,’ with Christian writers, had a technical sense, ‘the religion,’ as the latter phrase was used among the Huguenots of France. Cf. Acts 9².

‘The light of righteousness’ is another natural similitude. Cf. 2 Sam. 22²⁹, *σὺ ὁ λύχνος μου, κύριε*. John 12³⁵, *περιπατεῖτε ὡς τὸ φῶς ἔχετε*. 2 Cor. 4⁶.

The sun (of righteousness) has the same meaning, *τῆς δικαιοσύνης* being actually supplied by one version of **¶** Armenian (?) and Compl. which A.V. of course follows. The words are apparently a reminiscence of Mal. 4², *ἀνατελεῖ ὑμῖν . . . ἥλιος δικαιοσύνης*, but here they seem to be an interpolation. A few MSS. have them. The expression ‘sun of righteousness’ has often been supposed to refer prophetically to Christ.

The dogmatic meaning of the passage, if it has any, is most obscure. Had the words been put into the mouth of heathen they would have been intelligible; but these are Jews, who had enjoyed all the advantages of the Jewish education and the covenanted mercies of God. The text can only mean that they had not been prepared to receive or assimilate such education, being blinded by sensual pleasure. Cf. Isa. 26¹¹, ‘Lord, Thy hand is lifted up, yet they see not,’ etc. St. Aug., *Serm.*, ccxcii. 4, ‘*Illis non est ortus Christus*,

7. We were surfeited with the ways of lawlessness and destruction,
 Yea and traversed pathless deserts,
 But the way of the Lord we knew not.

8. What profited us our overweening pride?
 What did riches with boasting help us?

a quibus non est agnitus Christus,' which may well be paraphrased. 'Our wilful ignorance was a darkness, upon which the sun has not risen.'

7. The difficulty in line 1 is caused chiefly by the order of the words, rather than by the mixture of metaphor. *ἀνομίας ἐνεπλήσθημεν* certainly looks as if it meant 'we were surfeited with lawlessness,' and as if *τριβοῖς* had been an afterthought. But there is no variation in the MSS., and it is better to translate the text as it stands than either to accept conjectures like *ἐνεπλέχθημεν* or *ἐνεπλάγχθημεν* (from *ἐμπλάζεσθαι*, to wander about), or to suppose a mixture of constructions, *ἀνομίας ἐνεπλήσθημεν* and *ἐνεπορεύθημεν τριβοῖς ἀπωλείας* (though the latter is possible). The matter is complicated by the **L** reading 'lassati sumus.' Bretschneider (*Diss.*, i. p. 32), adhering to his idea of a Hebrew original, supposes a misreading of **גַּנְאַלְמָנָה** 'we were filled,' for **גַּנְיָנָלָה** 'we were wearied.' The A.V. virtually follows **L**. Cf. Isa. 57¹⁰, 'Thou art wearied in the greatness of thy way.'

But accepting the usual reading, we must construe *ἐνεπλήσθημεν* with *τριβοῖς* and not with *ἀνομίας* as Grimm, who translates *τριβοῖς* separately 'on paths,' which is not classical Greek, and hardly Hellenistic. Cf. Winer (ed. Moulton), p. 274. For the 'way of destruction' cf. Matt. 7¹³, *εὐρύχωρος ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ ἀπάγονσα εἰς τὴν ἀπώλειαν*.

The idea in 'pathless deserts' is that of Isa. 53⁶, 'All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way.' *ἔρημοι ἄβατοι* is used in a rather different sense in Jer. 12¹⁰ of fertile land converted into a desert. **L** has 'vias difficiles,' for which no real explanation is forthcoming.

'We knew not' really bears the sense of 'we ignored,' for the same remarks apply here as in v⁶.

8. *ἀλαζόνεια* is glorification of oneself; *ὑπερηφανία* contempt for others. The latter substantive is only found once in the New Testament (Mark 7²²), but the corresponding adjective five times. In the Apocrypha its worst sense is given by its application to the people of Sodom. Ecclus. 16⁹ and 3 Macc. 2⁵.

L 'divitiarum jactantia' gives the sense but not the translation of *πλούτος μετ' ἀλαζόνειας*. **S^P** has 'inhabitation of pride,' using the

9. All those things are passed away as a shadow,
Yea like a message that hurrieth by :

10. As a ship that passeth through the billowy waves,
Of which having passed it is not possible to find a trace,
Nor the track of her keel in the waves :

same word for *ἀλαζόνεια* as for *ὑπερηφανία*. It is impossible to conjecture what the translator may have read.

For *συνβάλλομαι*, 'to assist,' many classical examples can be adduced, and from the New Testament, Acts 18²⁷, *ὅς παραγενόμενος συνεβάλετο πολὺ τοῖς πεπιστευκόσιν*.

9. The meaning of *ἄγγελία* is ambiguous, as is the Latin 'nuntius' and the English (A.V.) 'post.' The rendering 'message' preserves this indefiniteness, but it is highly probable that the abstract is used for the concrete, and that 'messenger' is meant. Cf. Job 9²⁵, 'My days are swifter than a post.' Such concrete use is said to be unprecedented, but anything is better than to translate with Grimm and Siegfried, 'a rumour that hurrieth past.' The image of 'Fama volans' in Virg., *Aen.*, iv. 172, is very well as a piece of rhetorical personification, but the notion of a single rumour 'hurrying past' is grotesque. So, however, *S^h* *S^p* have 'a message of a runner.'

10. For 'it is not possible to find' (*οὐκ ἔστιν εὑρεῖν*) R.V. and A.V. alike translate 'is not to be found,' 'cannot be found,' and Grimm supports this, remarking that the German idiom is the same. In line 2 the rendering is possible, but the accusative *ἀτραπὸν* in line 3 makes it absolutely ungrammatical. *L* translates correctly, 'non est invenire vestigium,' and Deane and Siegfried also give the accurate construction. It is possible that *ἥς διαβάσης* may be a genitive absolute, and A.V. seems to take it so, rendering 'which when it is gone by.'

τρόπιος is the epic form of the genitive. 'Wisdom' is eclectic in his Greek, as were the New Testament writers, cf. Winer (Moulton), pp. 22-24. One or two MSS. give the Attic form *τροπέως* and the Compl. *τροπέιας*, which for once the A.V. does not follow. *S^h* and *S^p* both have 'path,' not understanding the word.

The metaphor of the ship may be derived from Prov. 30¹⁹, where one of the four 'wonderful things' is 'the way of a ship in the midst of the sea.' Grimm notes the fondness of Hellenistic writers for metaphors taken from those nautical matters with which the older Jews were so little acquainted. He cites 14¹ *sqq.*; Prov. 23³⁴, 'He that lieth on the top of a mast'; Eccl. 36² (33²), 43²⁴; Enoch 101⁴ *sqq.*; but omits James 3⁴, 'Behold, the ships also, though they are so great . . . are yet turned about by a very small rudder.'

11. Or as of a bird that fieth through the air

No token of passage is found ;

But the light wind being whipped by the beating of her pinions,

And divided by the force of her rushing,

Was traversed as her wings moved,

And thereafter was found no sign of her going in it ;

11. Here both R.V. and A.V. translate as a genitive absolute ὅρνέου διῆπτάντος (Swete), but others read διαπτάντος. The variation was known to A.V. But the existence of διαπτάντος is questioned, the verb being διῆπταμαι. This, however, renders the reading 'difficilior,' and therefore 'potior.' L's rendering is in defiance of all grammar, 'nullum invenitur argumentum itineris (which is good) sed tantum sonitus alarum verberans levem ventum et scindens per vim itineris aerem.' μαστιζόμενον and σχιζόμενον are taken as actives, and πνεῦμα κοῦφον as an accusative. Of 'aerem' no trace is to be found in the Greek.

The aorists are not to be taken as presents (R.V.) to which εὐρίσκεται seems to point, but represent often-recurring events, of which one concrete example (in the past) is taken. So James 1¹¹, ἀνέτειλεν ὁ ἥλιος σὺν τῷ καύσων καὶ ἔξηρανεν τὸν χόρτον. (Cf., however, G of Isa. 40⁷.) Deane thinks they represent the rapidity of the actions described, but the common idea of the 'gnomic' aorist will meet the case.

Grimm points out that we have here a very apt metaphor, the life of the wicked having been accompanied with noise and tumult (ἀγερωχία, 2⁹) while they were alive : and Farrar is wrong in saying that the whole gist of the comparison lies in the first line. It is this only which is illustrated by Virg., *Georg.*, i. 409, 'illa levem fugiens raptim secat aethera pennis.' The point is in the utter disappearance of all token of a course which made a noise, cf. Virg., *Aen.*, v. 215 :

(Columba) fertur in arva volans, plausumque exterrita pennis
Dat tecto ingentem ; mox aere lapsa quieto
Radit iter liquidum, celeres neque commovet alas.'

So Shelley, *Prom. Unbound*, Act i., 'On swift still wings glide down the atmosphere.'

For μαστιζόμενον the Armenian (Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 84) has 'tearing' (? torn), and S^P uses լից (to 'tear') twice, as equivalent both to μαστιζόμενον and to σχιζόμενον βίᾳ քուչու. S^H translates 'blowing of a storm,' and renders (πνεῦμα) κοῦφον, 'swift.'

Zöckler *ad loc.* compares not ineptly the famous story in Bede of the flight of the bird through the king's banqueting-hall from door to door, and the apologue of human life founded thereon.

12. Or as when an arrow is shot at a mark,

The air being cleft immediately returned into itself again,
So that its path is not to be recognised.

13. So also we being born ceased to be,

Yea, and had no token of virtue to show,
But in our wickedness were quite consumed.

12. Here there is no ambiguity about the genitive absolute. The difficulty is with *ἀνελύθη*, for which various substitutes are suggested, e.g. *ἀνελήλυθε* (which is attractive), *ἀνήλυθε*, and even *ἀνεκλείσθη*, in accordance with *Ἐ in se reclusus est.* But there is no serious variation in the MSS. *S^p* has ‘forthwith the air is in its place,’ i.e. of the bird’s flight.

ἀνελύθη is variously explained. Siegfried renders ‘dissolved into itself,’ Bissell ‘resolved,’ R.V. ‘closeth up again,’ which is too indefinite. It is best, with Deane, to take it ‘returns to itself.’ Pseudo-Solomon knows that *ἀναλύειν* means (2¹) ‘to return’ in the concrete. He here uses it, quite illegitimately, and in the passive, in a semi-abstract sense. It is always necessary to keep in mind the limitations of his knowledge of Greek.

With *ἀγνοῦσαι* Grimm would supply *τινά*, which seems unnecessary; the usage seems like that of *ὡς εἰκάσαι*, an active for a passive, which Grimm himself suggests in v.¹⁰ (cf. note). If, however, *ὡς* is for *ῶστε*, a subject must be supplied.

With regard to the construction of the whole prolonged clause vv. 10-13, the first three form a protasis, the latter, as *οὕτως* at the beginning of it shows, the apodosis. Possibly v. ⁹ is included in the protasis.

13. A.V. following the Complutensian *ἔξελείπομεν* for *ἔξελίπομεν* rendered ‘began to draw to our end.’ But this is not necessary. The expression is very graphic. ‘No sooner were we born than we died, our life in between was not worth calling one; not only was it as futile and traceless as the three preceding verses have shown, but it had no token of virtue in it. We wasted it all in frivolous wickedness,’ or as ‘Wisdom’ puts it, ‘we were wasted.’

It is possible that in *ἀρετῆς σημείον οὐδὲν ἔσχομεν δεῖξαι* there is a tragic antithesis to the words of chap. 2, *σύμβολα εὐφροσύνης καταδίπωμεν*; but see the notes there.

Grimm’s translation of the third line is remarkable, ‘in the midst of our wickedness we were snatched away,’ for *καταδαπανάω* can surely never be used except of a slow and lasting process. For the general sense cf. Ps. 78³³, ‘Their years did he consume away in vanity.’ *Ἐξέλιπον ἐν ματαιότητι αἱ ἡμέραι αὐτῶν.*

At the end of the verse *Ἐ* adds, ‘Talia dixerunt in inferno hi qui peccaverunt,’ for which there is no external support whatever, and which seems obviously a marginal note that has crept into the text.

14. For the hope of the impious man is as chaff borne away by the wind,

Yea, as thin rime that is chased away by a storm,
And as smoke by the wind was it scattered,
And as the remembrance of a guest that tarried but a day
it passed.

Farrar for some reason separates 'in inferno' as 'unauthorised' from the rest of the sentence.

Reuss' terse French excellently expresses the sense of the passage, 'La vie du méchant semble n'avoir que deux moments ; celui de la naissance et celui de la mort ; dans le trajet il n'y a rien qui vaille. Le méchant est consumé dans sa méchanceté. Il y est comme absorbé ; il s'y fond ; il n'est rien hors de là.'

14. Some critics, as Siegfried, would make this verse a part of the speech of the sinners, but this is unlikely. They could hardly be supposed to speak of themselves as 'impious.'

It is difficult to discover what authority the 'received' reading $\chi\nu\bar{\nu}\bar{s}$ in line 1 possesses. Yet the A.V. follows it; 'like dust that is blown away by the wind,' and so \mathfrak{S}^P .

$\chi\nu\bar{\nu}\bar{s}$, 'chaff,' 'down,' A.V. marg. 'thistledown,' \mathfrak{L} 'lanugo,' is the more difficult reading; the word is often confused with $\chi\bar{\nu}\bar{s}$. (Trommius cites the Greek of Ps. 7⁵, 17⁴⁶, 21^{16,23}, etc.) It occurs repeatedly in \mathfrak{C} , Ps. 1⁴, $\delta\chi\nu\bar{\nu}\bar{s}$ $\delta\bar{n}$ $\dot{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{r}\bar{i}\bar{p}\bar{t}\bar{e}\bar{u}$ $\delta\bar{a}\bar{n}\bar{e}\bar{m}\bar{o}\bar{s}$; 35⁵, $\dot{\omega}\bar{s}\bar{e}\bar{i}$ $\chi\nu\bar{\nu}\bar{s}$ $\kappa\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{a}$ $\pi\bar{r}\bar{o}\bar{s}\bar{a}\bar{p}\bar{o}\bar{n}\bar{o}$ $\dot{\alpha}\bar{n}\bar{e}\bar{m}\bar{o}\bar{s}$; Isa. 17¹³, $\pi\bar{o}\bar{r}\bar{\rho}\bar{w}$ $\dot{a}\bar{u}\bar{t}\bar{o}\bar{n}$ $\delta\bar{i}\bar{a}\bar{w}\bar{\zeta}\bar{e}\bar{t}\bar{a}\bar{i}$ $\dot{\omega}$ $\chi\nu\bar{\nu}\bar{s}$ $\dot{\alpha}\bar{c}\bar{h}\bar{r}\bar{o}\bar{u}\bar{s}$ $\lambda\bar{i}\bar{k}\bar{u}\bar{m}\bar{a}\bar{n}\bar{t}\bar{a}\bar{w}\bar{o}$ $\dot{\alpha}\bar{p}\bar{e}\bar{n}\bar{a}\bar{n}\bar{t}\bar{i}$ $\dot{\alpha}\bar{n}\bar{e}\bar{m}\bar{o}\bar{s}$; 29⁵; Hos. 13³. These passages seem to establish $\chi\nu\bar{\nu}\bar{s}$ as the true reading.

$\pi\bar{a}\bar{x}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$ (rime) presents a fresh difficulty. Hoar-frost is not 'chased away by a storm.' $\dot{\alpha}\bar{x}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$, 'foam,' which is not much more appropriate, is read by a few MSS. \mathfrak{S}^P , \mathfrak{L} also have 'foam.' Arab. 'husk.' \mathfrak{S}^h has here 'dust,' but evidently read for $\kappa\bar{a}\bar{p}\bar{v}\bar{o}\bar{s}$, $\dot{\alpha}\bar{r}\bar{a}\bar{x}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$ (spider's web), which appears in some MSS. for $\pi\bar{a}\bar{x}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$. This reading is not to be despised. It occurs in good MSS., and in \mathfrak{C} of Job 8¹⁴ ($\dot{\alpha}\bar{o}\bar{i}\bar{k}\bar{e}\bar{t}\bar{o}\bar{s}$ $\dot{a}\bar{u}\bar{t}\bar{o}\bar{n}$ $\dot{\epsilon}\bar{o}\bar{r}\bar{t}\bar{a}\bar{i}$ $\dot{\delta}\bar{o}\bar{k}\bar{o}\bar{s}$, $\dot{\alpha}\bar{r}\bar{a}\bar{x}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$ $\dot{\delta}\bar{e}$ $\dot{a}\bar{u}\bar{t}\bar{o}\bar{n}$ $\dot{\alpha}\bar{p}\bar{o}\bar{b}\bar{h}\bar{\sigma}\bar{e}\bar{t}\bar{a}\bar{i}$ $\dot{\eta}$ $\sigma\bar{k}\bar{e}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$) we find it in the verse immediately succeeding 'the hope of the ungodly shall perish.' Gregg quotes to support it \mathfrak{C} of Job 27¹⁸ and of Ps. 90⁹, and Sura 29⁴⁰ of the Koran; 'The likeness of those who take to themselves patrons besides God is as the likeness of the spider who taketh to herself a house; and verily the frailest of houses is the spider's house.' It is possible that some copyist in the earliest times did not know that $\dot{\alpha}\bar{r}\bar{a}\bar{x}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$ might mean a spider's web as well as a spider, and so altered it into $\pi\bar{a}\bar{x}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$ or $\dot{\alpha}\bar{x}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$. It is remarkable to find Farrar, who in his Introduction is never tired of praising Pseudo-Solomon as a master of Greek, here admitting the truth—that he is dealing with a foreign and imperfectly known language.

$\kappa\bar{a}\bar{p}\bar{v}\bar{o}\bar{s}$ is plain enough, but the A.V. margin suggests 'chaff,'

15. But the righteous live for ever,
 And their reward is in the Lord,
 Yea, and the care of them with the most High.

16. Therefore shall they receive the kingdom of splendour,
 And the diadem of beauty from the Lord's hand ;
 For with his right hand shall he cover them,
 And with his arm shall he shield them.

apparently with reference to Hos. 13³, where chaff and smoke are connected.

καταλύτης (a guest at an inn) and *μονοήμερος* are both rare. The latter occurs only in the Batracho-myomachia, and there in a different sense, 'finished in a day.' 'Wisdom' probably misunderstood it. Cf. Omar Khayyam's

Life is a tent wherein one night doth rest
 A sultan to the realms of death addrest.
 The sultan rises, and the dark Ferrâsh
 Strikes, and prepares it for another guest.

15. If *ζῶσι* be taken in the sense merely of 'continued existence,' it would seem to imply the annihilation of the unrighteous ; but Grimm, who insists upon the latter doctrine, insists also here on the meaning 'blest existence.' Indeed he could not do otherwise in the face of John 6⁵⁷, ὁ τρώγων με κάκείνος ζῆσει δι' ἐμέ ; I John 4⁹, τὸν νιὸν . . . ἀπέσταλκεν ὁ θεὸς εἰς τὸν κόσμον ἵνα ζήσωμεν δι' αὐτοῦ. *S^h* and *S^P* have both 'shall live,' and Arab. also. *L* 'in perpetuum vivent.' Bressneider thinks *הַשְׁבָּה*, 'care,' is a misreading for *מִשְׁבָּה*, 'rest.' But this fem. form never occurs, nor is the masc. *מִשְׁבָּב* the word which would be used in such a sense.

εἰς αἰώνα here *must* be translated 'for ever' (cf. notes on 4²), as in I John 2¹⁷, ὁ ποιῶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ μένει εἰς τὸν αἰώνα ; Eccl. 41¹³, ἀγαθὸν δύνομα εἰς αἰώνα διαμενεῖ.

Not much is to be gained by discussing the precise force of *ἐν κυρίῳ*. For the varieties of meaning of which it is capable, cf. Winer (ed. Moulton), p. 486. That it means 'with the Lord' is not, as Deane says, more likely because of the next line : rather the contrary. Grimm's rendering is peculiar, 'their reward consists in the possession of the Lord.'

16. A curious variant occurs in the Arm. (*Margoliouth, op. cit.*, p. 285) and Coptic, *τοῦ βασιλείου τὴν εὐπρεπείαν* for 'the kingdom of splendour.' Margoliouth thinks a Hebrew original *כַּרְמָלִכָּה*, 'a royal crown,' is indicated. 'Kingdom of splendour,' 'diadem of beauty,' might well be considered Hebraisms, but whether from such influence or not, 'genitives of quality' are frequent in New Testament Greek, cf. Winer (ed. Moulton), pp. 40, 297.

17. He shall take his jealousy as complete armour,
And make all creation his weapons for the repulse of his
foes.

βασιλειον is variously translated 'crown' (unlikely considering the next line) and 'palace.' But as in I¹⁴, 'kingdom' seems the right rendering, 'regnum decoris' *L*, 'a fair kingdom' *S^P*.

Διάδημα is the oriental form of crown, 'a band of purple silk sewn with pearls' (Farrar). Such a reward, as Deane remarks, shows a distinct advance on the carnal Jewish views of the reward of the righteous, with its 'feast on Leviathan' and the like.

For *ὑπερασπιεῖ* cf. Ps. 18², where *G* has for 'shield' *ὑπερασπιστής*. Cf. *S^P* of Ephes. 6¹⁷, which has *πλακόν* for 'a helmet.'

The critics as usual take immense trouble to prove that whatever else is referred to here, it cannot be the Final Judgment. Grimm summarises the opinions of his predecessors (1) that the whole is merely figurative (cf. notes on v. ¹); (2) that the picture is 'mythological-eschatological'—a fanciful representation of the prophesied rule of God on earth—the 'Day of the Lord,' to use the indefinite term so often used by the prophets; (3) that a real Messianic rule (without a Messiah) is meant, in which God is to crush all his enemies on earth and reward the saints. To the last of these opinions Grimm adheres, chiefly on account of the expression (v. ²⁴) *έρημώσει . . . θρόνον δυναστῶν*, which he thinks must refer to an earthly happening—a concrete victory. Reuss also thinks that an earthly victory is meant, but he finds his opinion on the idea that the theory of a 'jugement d'outre-tombe' was still in process of formation; which is hardly true of the time of Caligula.

17. For the correspondence between this passage (17-20) and Eph. 6¹¹⁻¹⁷ (and their divergences) cf. the full discussion in Additional Note C. It may suffice to say that both passages appear to have been independently inspired by Isa. 59¹⁷. The same may be said of I Thess. 5⁸. The idea of God as a 'man of war' is common enough. Cf. Exod. 15³, etc.

'Jealousy' for *ζῆλος* is an inadequate word; the meaning is God's zeal for the interests of His people as against apostolic and heathen adversaries; but 'zeal' is by usage employed only of men, and therefore cannot be here used.

ὅπλοποιήσει seems to be a word of the writer's own invention, and an incorrect one; for on the analogy of *ὅπλοποιός* (Pollux) it should mean 'be a maker of arms.' An old rendering, which is adopted by Siegfried, was 'shall arm his creation,' which would be *ὅπλιζειν*. Similarly Zenner: 'shall call to arms.' The meaning is plain, and is illustrated to satiety in the last few chapters. The very insects

18. He shall clothe himself with righteousness as a breastplate,
And put on as a helmet judgment undissembled.

19. He shall take holiness for an invincible shield,

20. And sharpen his stern anger into a sword,
And with him the world shall fight it out against the madmen.

which they are supposed to have worshipped are turned as weapons against the Egyptians. So also the elements are employed (v. ²² 16 ^{16.23}). But the idea is much older; Judg. 5²⁰, 'The stars in their courses fought against Sisera.' That 'Wisdom' had any idea of the philosophical truth that nature does avenge the violation of God's laws is of course out of the question, though common experience might have taught him it. The passages quoted by Grimm in illustration are repeated by Farrar, and the salient points alone are given here. They are Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. § 17, *τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντός, γῆ καὶ ὑδωρ καὶ πῦρ, ἐπιτίθενται, δικαιώσαντος θεοῦ τὴν ἀσεβῶν χώραν φθαρῆναι*, cf. the devastation of the hornet, Ex. 23²⁸ (Cf. etc., and 12⁸ below. So Josephus, *Ant.*, II. xiii. 4, *τούτοις* (the provokers of God) *οὕτε γῆ, οὕτε ἀὴρ φίλος*; Clem. *Homil.*, xi. 10, *οὐκ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ θεοῦ) αὐτόχειρος ἀμυνομένου, ἀλλὰ πάσης τῆς κτίσεως ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἀγανακτούσης καὶ φυσικῶς ἐπεξερχομένης*, and a fine sentence in the Clementine *Recognitions*, v. 27, 'Festinat creatura in impios movere vindictam.' Cf. also Eccl. 39²⁵⁻³¹ (where the Hebrew original is now available). The idea is there worked out that for the wicked even good things turn to evil—with many examples.

18. Righteousness as the breastplate appears also in Eph. 6¹⁴, but in a different sense. Here it is the perfect justice of God: there it means the observance of God's laws by the Christian.

'Judgment undissembled' is administration of straightforward justice, where there is no question of the judge presenting a stern front to a prisoner whom he secretly means to favour. So in 18¹⁶, *ἀνυπόκριτος ἐπιταγή* means 'a command which is meant,' not a mere show of orders which are not expected to be obeyed. A.V. 'true judgment' (L 'certum judicium') is quite inadequate. S^P 'without falsehood.' S^H employs the usual Syriac phrase, 'not accepting persons.'

19, 20. For *ὅσιότητα* L gives 'aequitatem,' and the A.V. marg. 'equity.' Justice has been already mentioned in v. 1⁴, and it is not the meaning of *ὅσιότητα*, which denotes the absolute impeccability of God, rendering all argument against his decisions useless. The word is used of him in Deut. 32⁴, Rev. 15⁴, *δόξασε τὸ ὄνομά σου, ὅτι μόνος ὅσιος, 16⁵, Δίκαιος εἰ, ὁ ὁν καὶ ὁ ἡν, ὁ ὅσιος.*

ὅσιότης when used of man means piety towards God, but also includes the meaning in general of saintly and (so far as possible) impeccable life.

21. There shall go forth the well-aimed shafts of his lightnings,
 And as from a well-curved bow of clouds shall leap to the
 mark,

22. And from a sling shall hailstones full of wrath be cast ;
 The water of the sea shall rage against them,
 Yea and the rivers inexorably drown them ;

ἀπότομος is inadequately rendered by **L** 'duram,' A.V. 'severe,' or indeed by any English word in use. The idea is that of an abrupt ending, as of a cliff ending in a precipice. The Latin 'abscisus' quoted by Grimm from Valer. Max. fairly represents it, and the adverb *ἀποτόμως* in v. ²² illustrates its force. **S^h**, keeping closely to the Greek, renders *ἀπότομος* 'cutting,' but in v. ²² *ἀποτόμως*, 'suddenly.'

ῥομφαίαν is translated by **L** 'lanceam,' an unusual meaning. The like expression occurs in Rev. 2 ¹⁶, *πολεμήσω μετ' αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ ρομφαίᾳ τοῦ στόματός μου*. **S^P** has 'marvellously shall he sharpen the lance of his anger.'

In the last line we have the same idea as in v. ¹⁷, where see the notes. But *παράφρονες* seems a much stronger word than *ἀφρονες*, and seems to denote positive lunacy on the part of God's opponents. For the word cf. Plutarch, *Romp.*, 72, *παράφρων καὶ παραπλήξ τὴν διάνοιαν*.

21. The comparison of lightnings to God's arrows is fairly common, as in 2 Sam. 22 ¹⁵, which corresponds to Ps. 18 ¹⁵, *ἐξαπέστειλεν βέλη καὶ ἐσκόρπισεν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀστραπὰς ἐπλήθυνεν καὶ συνετάραξεν αὐτούς*, nearly repeated in Ps. 144 ⁶. Cf. also Habak. 3 ¹¹, *εἰς φῶς βολίδες σου πορεύουνται, εἰς φέγγος ἀστραπῆς ὄπλων σου*; 2 Esdr. 16 ¹³, 'sagittae ejus acutae quae ab ipso mittuntur,' etc.

εὔκυκλος is of course 'well bent,' 'tightly stretched,' but the construction of *τῶν νεφῶν* is rather doubtful. A.V. has 'from the clouds as from a well-bent bow, shall they fly to the mark.' But the allusion seems to be to the rainbow. The token of forgiveness (Gen. 9 ¹³) is now turned into a weapon of destruction; or, as Deane rather fancifully puts it, 'the sign of mercy is turned away from the earth; this, the engine of wrath, is aimed at the earth.'

L's rendering, 'tanquam a bene curvato arcu nubium exterminabuntur et ad certum locum insilient,' is correct except for the unexplained introduction of 'exterminabuntur.' Possibly Reusch is right when he thinks that we have in the word an alternative (and incorrect) translation of *ἐπὶ σκόπον ἀλοῦνται*, which *might* be rendered 'ad terminum mittentur.'

22. This is nearly the rendering of A.V. and R.V. The latter has 'an engine of war' instead of 'a sling.' The only difficulty is the omission of *ὡς* before *ἐκ πετροβόλου*, which seems awkward. But if the word be really a noun, the English 'stone-bow,' the boy's

23. A breath of power shall rise up against them,
 And like a storm shall winnow them away ;
 Yea, lawlessness shall lay waste the whole earth,
 And ill-dealing overthrow the thrones of potentates.

6. 1. Hear now, ye kings, and understand ;
 Learn, ye judges of the ends of the earth ;

'catapult' of to-day, is an excellent rendering. Cf. Shakesp., *Twelfth Night*, II. v. 49, 'O for a stone-bow to hit him in the eye.' Both the substantive and the adjective are classical (Lidd. and Sc.), and a plural *πετροβόλα* is also found in Josephus.

Alternative renderings are (1) *L* 'a petrosa ira plenae mittentur grandines,' where 'plenae' seems otiose and poor, and 'stone-casting wrath' somewhat grotesque. Nevertheless it is the reading of *S^h*. What *S^P* read it is hard to conjecture, but *S^h* has undoubtedly 'stone-casting wrath.'

(2) 'From the sling of his anger' (Grimm) translating *πλήρεις*, 'dense' or 'thickly.' The passage which he adduces, however, from Josh. 10¹¹ (Ἑ) κύριος ἐπέρριψεν αὐτοῖς λιθούς χαλάζης ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, does not seem to favour this more than the other versions.

συγκλύσουσιν, 'shall wash over them,' 'drown them all together.' The passive only is classical, and means 'to be washed over by waves.' But Grimm following *L* 'concurrent' renders 'shall unite,' 'dash together' (for their destruction). The idea no doubt answers well to the description in Exod. 14²²⁻²⁸. With the ordinary interpretation cf. Judg. 5²¹, 'The river of Kishon swept them away.'

23. *πνεῦμα δυνάμεως*, 'a wind of might,' A.V., might stand were it not for the following line. To say that a wind shall winnow them like a storm is meaningless ; and, moreover, there is an exact parallel in 11²⁰, *λικμηθέντες ὑπὸ πνεύματος δυνάμεως σον* ; cf. 2 Thess. 2⁸, ὁ ἄνομος, ὁν ὁ κύριος ἀνελεῖ τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ στόματος αὐτοῦ.

καὶ in line 3 is certainly 'yea' : the destruction depicted is the result of the action of 'dynasts,' who by their *κακοπραγία* have brought down God's vengeance. It must be allowed, however, that *κακοπραγία* in the sense of ill-doing is exceedingly rare. It seems only to occur in Jos., *An.*, II. v. 4, and there means 'misdeed.' Yet it can hardly have the meaning of 'misfortune' here. *S^h*, 'badness of practice.'

There is no reason why we should not interpret *δυνασταί* (making allowance for the exaggerated language of 'Wisdom') as the apostate Jewish officials of chap. 1. Grimm thinks the heathen must be included, and henceforward no doubt this is true. But up to this point there is nothing that need necessarily refer to pagan rulers. Just as he transferred his attention in chap. 2 from the oppressive governors to the 'grex Epicuri,' so here he neglects both and launches out into wider admonitions.

6. 1. *L* prefaches this chapter by the sentence 'Melior est sapientia

2. Give ear, ye that are rulers of the people,
And that make your boast of the multitude of nations.

3. For from the Lord was your rule granted to you,
And your sovereignty from the most High,
Who shall examine your works and hold scrutiny of your counsels.

quam vires, et vir prudens quam fortis,' apparently a compound of two passages : Eccles. 9¹⁶, ἀγαθὴ σοφία ὑπὲρ δύναμιν, and Prov. 24⁶, κρείσσων σόφος ἵσχυροι.

It may be that the writer already assumes the personality of Solomon, which is emphasised in 7⁹ (cf. Introd. 'On the Unity of the Book'), and this is borne out by the similar apostrophe in the Psalms of Solomon, 2³⁶ (Fritzsche) καὶ νῦν ἔδετε οἱ μεγιστᾶνες τῆς γῆς τὸ κρίμα κυρίου ὅτι μέγας βασιλεὺς καὶ δικαίως κρίνων τὴν ὑπ' οὐρανοῦ. But the writer's own personality appears also as in 1¹. The Jewish apostates now high in power are addressed, and herein lies the connection with the last verse of chapter 5. It is possible that 'judges of the ends of the earth' refers even to the emperor.

πέρατα γῆς is used in Hom., *Od.*, iv. 563, literally for the ends of the earth : ἐς Ἡλύσιον πεδίον καὶ πέρατα γαίης. But elsewhere it means, as here, simply distant parts. In Thuc. i. 68 the Persian comes to the Peloponnese, ἐκ περάτων γῆς. In Ps. 2^{8b} the phrase is equivalent to ἔθνη in the preceding line. In 21²⁸ it means simply 'distant nations,' and so in Matt. 12⁴², where the Queen of Sheba ἦλθεν ἐκ τῶν περάτων γῆς ἀκοῦσαι τὴν σοφίαν Σαλομῶνος. The allusion here may very well be to distant Rome. Zeller referred it to the events of the second triumvirate, but there is nothing to confirm this, or to fix the date of the book at such a period.

2. ὄχλοις ἔθνῶν is a poor expression, 'mobs of nations.' Pseudo-Solomon has used the proper word πλῆθος already, and his vocabulary is too limited to allow him to select a better synonym. γεγαυρώμενοι is, according to Margoliouth (*op. cit.*, p. 272), a mistranslation of an Aramaic word which means both to 'boast' and to 'rule over.' If it means the latter, the sense is singularly weak.

ὄχλος seems never to be used save in a disparaging sense. So Zenger, apparently following L, 'qui placetis vobis in turbis nationum,' translates 'look down with pride on the confusion of nations.'

We may consider this apostrophe addressed to the rulers of the world not, certainly, as one that would be likely to be read by them or known to them, but, as Grimm remarks (*Einl.*, 27), to be compared with the utterances of the old prophets in denunciation of foreign nations and princes—as in Isaiah the doom of Egypt, of Moab, of Tyre ; threats not intended for the ears of those peoples themselves, but for the comfort and encouragement of Israel against them.

3. The doctrine of the reigning of kings 'Dei Gratia,' to use the style

4. For being servants of his kingdom ye gave not right judgment,
 Nor kept the law,
 Nor walked according to the will of God.

of our own monarchs, is found repeatedly in the Bible—1 Chron. 29¹², ‘In thine hand it is to make great, and to give strength unto all’; Dan. 2²¹, ‘He removeth kings and setteth up kings’; John 19¹¹, ‘Thou wouldest have no power against me, except it were given thee from above’; Rom. 13¹, ‘The powers that be are ordained of God’; 1 Pet. 2¹⁴, ‘Governors as sent by him for vengeance on evil-doers.’ Cf. Ecclus. 10⁴, ‘In the hand of the Lord is the authority of the earth, and in due time he will raise up over it one that is profitable.’ Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 61¹, ‘Thou, Lord, hast given to our rulers and governors upon the earth the power of their sovereignty.’ But in Prov. 8¹⁵ Wisdom claims this power for herself: ‘By me kings reign and princes decree justice.’ Joseph., *B. J.*, II. viii. 7, mentions that the Essenes held this doctrine, in the form, as it would seem, of passive obedience.

κράτησις is, as Farrar says, ‘a late bad word,’ *κράτος* being quite sufficient for the purpose. It only occurs elsewhere in Josephus and in two inscriptions.

4. A question arises as to *vόμος* in the second line; whether it means the ‘Law’ in the Jewish sense, or the general principles of justice. A.V. takes the second alternative, R.V. the first (as it appears), following *L*, ‘legem justitiae’ which is explanatory, but not a translation. It is questionable, however, whether such a particularist as Pseudo-Solomon could recognise any ‘lex justitiae’ as of universal application; and it seems better to translate ‘the Law,’ relying on such passages as Rom. 2¹⁴, ‘When Gentiles, which have no law, do by nature the things of the law, these, having no law, are a law unto themselves; in that they show the work of the law written in their hearts,’ *i.e.* not a ‘lex justitiae’ at all, but a reflection of the law of Moses. Some stress has been laid on the fact that there is no article before *vόμον*, which is therefore supposed to have an indefinite meaning. But the word is used without the article both in the New Testament (Rom. 2^{13.23.25}, 3²⁰) and in *G* of the Old (Isa. 2³, Hag. 2¹¹, Mal. 2⁶). ‘The Law’ indeed, as Cornely remarks, had become a separate entity which needed no definite article. For proof of this we may refer to Ecclus. 24 and (as concerns the Rabbinical doctrines) to Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, the whole of the first part of which is devoted to the question of the half-deification of the Torah.

Reuss’s comment is weak: ‘the pagan government, Greek or Roman, and those of the Jewish nation who have associated themselves with it, are alike to be regarded as apostates’ (from the law). But we have here certainly a step beyond narrowest particularism; foreign rulers are regarded as actually receiving their authority from

5. Terribly and swiftly shall he come upon you ;
 For judgment in case of them that are exalted is abrupt :
 6. For the lowest is pardonable of grace,
 But the mighty shall be mightily tested.

God. This is indeed the Rabbinic doctrine : the seventy heathen nations are ruled over by seventy patron angels, Michael being the prince of Israel (Dan. 10¹³, 12¹). This teaching is fully set forth in Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, 170, and is possibly alluded to in Eccl. 17¹⁷, 'For every nation he appointed a ruler ; and Israel is the Lord's portion.' Cf. the rendering of οὗτοι in Deut. 32⁸, οἵτησεν ὅρια ἐθνῶν κατὰ ἀριθμὸν ἀγγέλων Θεοῦ.

οὐκ ἔκρινατε ὄρθως is translated as above in order to give the clear sense : unjust or perverted judicial decision is meant, as in Deut. 16¹⁹, 'Thou shalt not wrest judgment,' etc., 24¹⁷. Cf. Prov. 17²³, Isa. 1²³, 'Every one loveth gifts and followeth after rewards ; they judge not the fatherless, neither doth the cause of the widow come unto them.'

5. There is no difficulty in ἐπιστῆσαι. The verb is used of hostile confronting in the New Testament, 1 Thess. 5³, αἰφνίδιος αὐτοῖς ἐπίσταται ὅλεθρος, from which the Ven. MS. transferred ὅλεθρος to serve as subject of the verb here. ἀπότομος is translated by the modern word 'abrupt,' which seems to be the only one to suit the case here, the sense of 'inexorable' being implied also. Cf. 5²².

The sense of this verse, coupled with the next, is plainly that the higher men are placed the more sternly they will be judged ; for the lowly there will be more hope of mercy. Cf. Hor., *Od.*, II. x. 9 :

Saepius ventis agitatur ingens
 Pinus et celsae graviore casu
 Decidunt turre ; feriuntque summos
 Fulgura montes.

Hdt. vii. 10, ὁρᾶς τὰ ὑπερέχοντα ζῶα ὡς κεραυνοῖ ὁ θεὸς οὐδὲ ἐξ φαντάζεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ οὐδὲν μιν κνίζει.

Churton, *ad loc.*, gives excellent examples of the truth inculcated, from the Bible, besides the familiar one of Luke 12⁴⁸, φέδοθη πολὺ, πολὺ ζητηθήσεται παρ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ φέδοθεντο πολύ, περισσότερον αἰτησουσιν αὐτόν. He cites Mal. 2⁷, 'The priest's lips should keep knowledge . . . for he is the messenger of the Lord of Hosts,' and Lev. 4³, where the sin of the anointed priest is only to be expiated by the same sacrifice which was required for the sin of the whole congregation. Compare the cases of Aaron, who abused his position in the matter of the calf, and Num. 25⁴, where it is the chief of the people who are to be hanged for the sin of the congregation in the matter of Baal-peor.

6. The passages quoted to justify this use of συγγνωστός with a 'genitive of origin' as it is called, do not apply to this passage. συγγνωσ-

7. For the Lord of all will not shrink from a countenance,
 Nor have respect for greatness ;
 For small and great he made himself,
 And alike is his forethought concerning all ;

τὸς φιλοτυπίας in Philostr. *Soph.* I. viii. 3 seems to mean 'pardonable for ambition,' and in Max. Tyr., iv. 3, *ψυχὴ συγγνωστὸς τῆς ἀγνοίας* certainly means 'forgivable for ignorance': whereas the sense required here is very nearly pardonable 'by grace.' The Genevan version has the right solution: it translates 'is worthy mercy,' and that is no doubt what the writer meant. The word *συγγνωστός*, he argued, means 'worthy of forgiveness,' i.e. *ἄξιος συγγνώμης*: *ἄξιος* takes a genitive; then why not *συγγνωστός*? None of the genitives quoted by Winer at all correspond to this. The translation given 'of grace' is on the model of the language of Art. xiii., 'neither do they . . . deserve grace of congruity,' Lat. 'neque gratiam de congruo merentur.'

Σ^P has an extraordinary reading, 'a lowly wise king is near to compassions,' which is not followed by the Arabic. The latter gives a good rendering of *ἔλεόνς*, 'on the score of pity.' The *Σ^P* 'near' is probably owing to mistranslation of *συγγωστός* as *γνωστός*, which might conceivably mean 'cognatus,' and as 'cognatus' and 'propinquus' may mean the same, we have a clue to the rendering. But the 'king' is inexplicable.

έτασθησονται is translated by A.V. 'shall be mightily tormented'; following *Σ* 'tormenta patientur,' which is too strong. It is true that in Gen. 12¹⁷ we read *ἡτασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν Φαραὼ ἔτασμοις μεγάλοις καὶ πονηροῖς*, but the bad sense of the word seems to depend a good deal on *πονηροῖς*, and in any case the meaning 'torment' is not suitable here.

7. Siegfried translates *ὑποστελεῖται πρόσωπον*, 'withdraw his countenance' literally, with the explanation 'will not shrink to meet them (the great) face to face'; this shows some confusion of idea as to the construction of *πρόσωπον*, which is certainly not the direct object. Cf. Deut. 1¹⁷, *οὐκ ἐπιγνώσῃ πρόσωπον ἐν κρίσει, κατὰ τὸν μικρὸν καὶ κατὰ τὸν μέγαν κρινεῖς, οὐ μὴ ὑποστείῃ πρόσωπον ἀνθρώπου ὅτι ἡ κρίσις τοῦ θεοῦ ἔστιν*. *Σ*, however, seems to make *ὑποστέλλεσθαι* govern *πρόσωπον*, translating 'Non subtrahet personam cuiusquam Deus,' which is certainly wrong. The ordinary construction as translated is common enough (cf. Lidd. and Sc.), and the verb is found repeatedly in Biblical Greek, but not with an accusative: Job 13⁸, Hab. 2⁴, Acts 20²⁷, Heb. 10³³ (except perhaps Acts 20²⁰).

The actual sense is conveyed in Job 34¹⁹, *ὅς οὐκ ἐπαισχύνθη πρόσωπον ἐντίμου, οὐδὲ οἴδε τιμῆν θέσθαι ἀδροῖς, θαυμασθῆναι πρόσωπα αὐτῶν*, cf. Eccl. 4²⁷, and especially the fine passage Eccl. 35¹²⁻¹⁶ (32¹⁴⁻²⁰).

In 'small and great' there seems to be implied the idea that God

8. But over the mighty a strict scrutiny impendeth.
 9. Unto you, therefore, O despots, are my words,
 That ye may learn wisdom and fall not away.

can raise the lowly and make the great small if he will. Cf. an apt passage in Xen., *Anab.*, III. ii. 10, *οἵτινες* (*θεοί*) *ἴκανοί εἰσι καὶ τοὺς μεγάλους ταχὺ μικροὺς ποιεῖν, καὶ τοὺς μικροὺς, κανὸν ἐν δεινοῖς θῶσι, σώζειν εὐπεπτῶς, ὅταν βούλωνται.* *όμοιος* is 'all alike'; impartially. Matt. 5⁴⁵, *ἡλιον αὐτοῦ ἀνατέλλει ἐπὶ πονηροὺς καὶ ἀγαθούς.* Cf. Ps. 145⁹, 'His tender mercies are over all his works.'

προνοεῖν is the first mention of that divine providence, *πρόνοια*, which has so engaged the notice of critics: cf. notes on 14³. The simple word (taking a genitive after it) is found in 13¹⁶, 1 Tim. 5⁸, and 2 Macc. 14⁹ (middle voice).

8. The present is quite natural. It is impending over them *now*, just as God *now* foresees their end. *¶* 'cruciatio' is far too strong. A.V. has 'sore trial,' which, considering the ambiguous meaning of 'trial,' might stand. *¶* it should be noticed, takes an unwarrantable liberty with the text for the sake of effect, translating 'Fortioribus etiam instat cruciatio.' There is no sign of the comparative in the Greek.

Churton aptly quotes Jer. 49¹⁰, 'Who is the shepherd that will stand before me?' For the impartiality of God's judgment cf. Eccl. already quoted, and 2 Chron. 19⁷, 'There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor respect of persons, nor taking of gifts.' Rom. 2¹¹, 'There is no respect of persons with God,' Eph. 6⁹, Col. 3²⁵. 1 Pet. 1¹⁷, 'The Father, who without respect of persons judgeth according to each man's work.'

For the general sentiment of these verses cf. Dyer's 'My mind to me a kingdom is.'

I see how plenty surfeits oft,
 And hasty climbers soonest fall ;
 I see that such as sit aloft
 Mishap doth threaten most of all.

9. The term *τύραννος* had acquired a bad sense even by the time of Sophocles (*ὕβρις φυτεύει τύραννον*, *Oed. Tyr.*, 873), and as the preceding passage, v. 4, distinctly implies arbitrary power, it seems well to translate it by a word which includes that meaning. Genev., as might be expected, has 'O tyrants.' In *¶* the word means simply 'ruler,' e.g. in Job Bildad the Shuhite is called *τύραννος* and the other two friends *βασιλεύς*, the Hebrew having no word for either.

σοφία here is still used in the ordinary sense of human wisdom, coupled, according to the context, with understanding of and obedience to God's will. The etherealised Wisdom—God's handmaid—appears first in v. 12, and for this reason some critics fixed the begin-

10. For they that holily observe holy things shall be made holy,
And they that be taught them shall find a defence.

11. Desire ye then my words,
Long for them and ye shall be taught.

12. Bright and unfading is Wisdom,
And easily is she discerned by them that cherish her,
And is found by them that seek her.

ning of the second part of the book (whether from the same hand or by another writer) at that verse. Cf. Introd., § 'On the Unity of the Book.' In Eccl. 4¹⁶ and elsewhere the guidance of 'judges of the nations' is attributed to the divine *σοφία*.

παραπίπτειν does not mean, it would appear, 'fall away from wisdom,' but is used absolutely as in 12², *τοὺς παραπίπτοντας κατ' ὄλιγον ἐλέγχεις*. Cf. Heb. 6⁶.

10. A dull play upon words. *ὅσιος* really has three senses in the one line—(1) *ὅσιως*, 'strictly'; (2) *ὅσια*, the 'holy' precepts of God; (3) *ὅσιωθήσονται*, 'shall be justified' (L, in the technical sense. R.V. 'hallowed,' is indefinite, but may contain the true meaning, 'set apart from the unjustified.'

ἀπολογίαν is translated by A.V., R.V., and L 'invenient quid respondeant.' But Arab. with Grimm, Siegfried, Genev. has 'defence,' which Grimm explains as meaning excuse for the sins they committed before they knew wisdom, and also for their slips afterwards. Reuss's 'obtiendront un décret favorable' is not a translation of the Greek. S^P has لِوْلِو 'beauty.' This 'defence' apparently is to avail them in the day of trial. Eccl. 18²⁰, *ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπισκοπῆς εὐρήσεις ἔξιλασμάν*, where the coming of God to hold judgment is generally accepted as the meaning. Heb. 4¹⁶ (which does not contain such reference), 'Let us approach with confidence to the throne of grace,' ἵνα λάβωμεν ἔλεος καὶ χάριν εὐρώμεν εἰς εὔκαιρον βοήθειαν.

11. There is more implied in *παιδευθήσεσθε* than mere learning. *παιδεία*, 'training in moral discipline,' is certainly alluded to, cf. I's. 89¹², *τοὺς πεπαιδευμένους τὴν καρδίαν ἐν σοφίᾳ*, 1 Cor. 11³², 2 Cor. 6⁶, and 1 Tim. 1²⁰, where the meaning is very forcible, 'that they may be taught not to blaspheme.'

12. The third line, weak as it is, is found in MSS. of good repute, including G^N, and is translated in L, S^P, and Arabic, A.V., R.V., and Genev. It can hardly be altogether omitted.

It is possible that we have here a reasoned description of the qualities of Wisdom: it is possible also, as Reuss says, that 'ce n'est encore là que de la rhétorique ou, si l'on veut, de la poésie.' The latter seems more likely; but if we adopt the former view, then

13. She forestalleth them that seek her, to be known of them beforehand.

14. He that riseth up early for her shall have no travail ;
For he shall find her sitting by his gates.

λαμπρὰ indicates the shining nature of Wisdom, which renders her easy to be found in the darkness of ignorance, while ἀμάραντος points the contrast between earthly and perishable rewards and the unfailing beauty of Wisdom. Cf. 1 Pet. 1⁴ and especially 5⁴, κομιεῖσθε τὸν ἀμάραντον τῆς δόξης στέφανον.

For the general sense (and for a similar personification of τὸ δίκαιον) cf. Eccl. 27⁸. 'If thou followest righteousness thou shalt obtain her, and put her on like a long robe of glory.' Σοφία seems also to be personified in Matt. 11¹⁰, ἐδικαιώθη ἡ σοφία ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς.

13. The construction is peculiar. φθάνειν with the accusative of the persons affected is regular and classical; Xen., *Anab.*, v. vi. 9, φθάνοντι . . . τὸν πολεμίον; but it is generally coupled with a participle. The infinitive here is that of purpose or intention, generally represented in Hellenistic Greek by the prefixing of τοῦ, e.g. Matt. 2¹³, μέλλει γὰρ Ἡρώδης ζητεῖν τὸ παιδίον τοῦ ἀπολέσαι αὐτό.

The English and Latin renderings (L, 'ut illis se prior ostendat') are all clumsy, but all give the sense: (Churton) 'God prevents those who ask wisdom of Him. He begins to make Himself known to us before we begin to seek Him.' Sh has the best rendering of all, 'she goeth forth early (or first) to be known of them that seek.'

14. Dr. Margoliouth includes this among the passages in which he finds traces of mistranslation of a Hebrew original. He says (*op. cit.*, p. 272), 'It is well known that the translation of ὁρθρίζειν for ־רַחֲשׁ, "to seek," is occasioned by a wrong connection of the word with ־רַחֲשׁ, "the dawn," just as the Latin "evigilare" may be due to a connection of it with the new Hebrew ־רַחֲשׁ, "sleeplessness." This might be a Hebraism if the mention of the dawn were here appropriate, but clearly it is not so, mere seeking being alluded to. Freudenthal, however, points out that in G the verb ὁρθρίζειν has precisely the sense of 'to seek,' and quotes Hos. 6¹, ἐν θλίψει αὐτῶν ὁρθριοῦσι πρὸς με; Ps. 63¹, θεὸς ὁ θεός μου πρὸς σε ὁρθρίζω, where ἐδίψησέ σοι ἡ ψυχή is a parallel clause; Ps. 77³, ἐπέστρεφον καὶ ὁρθριζον πρὸς τὸν θεόν, to which ἐξήτουν αὐτόν is parallel. Job 8⁶, σὺ δὲ ὁρθρίζει πρὸς τὸν κύριον. In all these passages ־רַחֲשׁ is the Hebrew word used; so that Margoliouth's idea of a mistranslation on the part of 'Wisdom' fails. The connection, however, of the dawn with seeking is certainly not obvious. Cf. Ryssel's note on Eccl. 4¹². To strike out this reference to early rising and translate simply 'seek,' as in Prov. 8¹⁷, would destroy much of the point of the passage, and upsets the obvious connection with ἀγρυπνεῖν in v. 15. Siegfried,

15. For to think upon her is perfection of understanding :
And he that waketh for her sake will soon be without care.

16. For she goeth about seeking them that are worthy of her,
And in the ways she graciously sheweth herself to them,
And in every thought encountereth them.

however, thinks that 'Wisdom' did misunderstand משחרִי in Prov., and read the meaning 'dawn' into it.

οὐ κοπιάσει is plainly 'will not have to journey far to seek her,' but the exact force of *πάρεδρος* (which occurs with the genitive in 9⁴) is questioned; it may very well have the same meaning here as there—'a counsellor' at the gate. Heydenreich, quoted by Grimm, supposed that it implied the waiting of the mistress for her lover as in Cant. 3² (cf. 5²). It is more like a reminiscence of Prov. 8³, 'Beside the gates, at the entry of the city, at the coming in at the doors, she crieth aloud.'

πάρεδρον *Σ^h* translates 'an inhabitant,' which can hardly be right.

15. The R.V. is followed in translating *φρόνησις*, 'understanding' rather than 'prudence' (Grimm), a purely worldly virtue. It is true, indeed, that the relation of *σοφία* to *φρόνησις* is ill-defined in Wisdom. (1) in 8²¹ they seem absolutely identical; in 7⁷ *φρόνησις* is the same as *πνεῦμα σοφίας*; (2) in 8⁷ Wisdom teaches *φρόνησις* as in Prov. 10²³ (*¶*), *ἡ σοφία ἀνδρὶ τίκτει φρόνησιν*; (3) here *φρόνησις* is a quality whose completion is the attainment of Wisdom; nevertheless the idealistic character of our book prevents us from seeing in the term only the 'prudence' of the Old Testament and of the son of Sirach, which seems indeed to have much in common with that of the unjust steward (Luke 16⁸) who *φρονίμως ἐποίησεν*.

ἀγρυπνεῖν is a common enough term (lit. 'to be watchful') to denote perpetual activity and watchfulness. The word *ἀγρυπνία* occurs four times in Eccl. (31^{1,2}, 38²⁸, 42¹⁰), but in the last case it appears to be a mistranslation. Cf. Eph. 6¹⁸, *εἰς αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀγρυπνοῦντες*. 2 Cor. 11²⁷, *ἐν ἀγρυπνίᾳ πολλάκις*. Heb. 13¹⁷, *αὐτοὶ γὰρ ἀγρυπνοῦσιν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν*. Cic., *ad Att.*, viii. 9, 'vigilantia ac diligentia'; Verg., *Georg.*, iv. 158, 'Aliae victu invigilant.' In Prov. 8³⁴ *¶* has 'blessed is the man, ὃς . . . ἀγρυπνῶν ἐπ' ἔμαις θύραις καθ' ἡμέραν.'

ἀμέριμνος cannot mean 'will not long be troubled about finding her.' It surely has the sense in which it is used in 7²³, or nearly so: 'without care,' 'independent,' 'self-sufficing.'

16. There is no idea of 'circumvention' (Churton) in *περιέρχεται*. It is used as is *περιπατεῖ ζητῶν τίνα καταπιεῖν* in 1 Pet. 5⁸.

The only difficulty in the verse is connected with *ἐν πάσῃ ἐπινοίᾳ*. This has been variously interpreted. (1) 'If only they think of her she will meet them'; (2) 'she meets them with all attention'; which *¶* 'in omni providentia occurrit illis' seems to favour. But the idea

17. For the truest beginning of her is the desire for instruction ;

seems simple enough ; the parallel with line 2 can be preserved by explaining 'whatever plan a man has in his mind, Wisdom, if he be worthy of her, will set it right for him.' Grimm quotes Nannius, 'omni mentis intentioni sive cogitationi se offert, et quandocunque animus aliquid prudens meditatur, ibi statim sapientia occurrit.' Omitting the 'prudens,' which is anticipating the intervention of *σοφία*, we may take this as the sense of the passage. Wisdom meets a man, *ἐν τριβοῖς*, or, as the next line explains it, at every decisive moment of his life.

With the whole text we must necessarily compare Prov. i²⁰ *sqq.* 'Wisdom crieth aloud in the street ; she uttereth her voice in the broad places ; she crieth in the chief place of concourse ; at the entering in of the gates, in the city, she uttereth her words,' and the generally quoted passage of St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, ii. 41, 'Wherever thou turnest, he speaks to thee by some of the vestiges which he has impressed upon his works, that when thou fallest away from him in pursuit of outward objects, he may meet thee by the very forms of those objects that thou mayest find him everywhere and acknowledge him to be the life and bliss of the soul.'

17. It is possible to couple *ἀληθεστάτη* either with *ἀρχή* or with *ἐπιθυμία*. But common sense seems to point to the first as most likely. 'A genuine desire to be instructed' has no doubt much to be said for it ; but that the 'wish to be instructed' (not a very common quality) is the truest foundation of Wisdom is an idea which appeals more to us. The versions, except *S^P* (which renders 'the beginning of seeking her is truth and discipline'), *L*, and the Genevan, support this view ; and St. Augustine, *de Mor. Eccl.*, i. 32, quotes 'initium enim illius verissimum.' We find also *ἀρχὴ σοφίας* in Ps. 111¹⁰ (repeated in Prov. i⁷, 9¹⁰), 'The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.'

Here begins an imperfect sorites (vv. 17-20). The beginning of wisdom is desire of discipline ; desire (or care) of discipline is love of her ; love of her is observance of her laws ; to observe her laws means incorruption, and incorruption brings us nearer to God. By the rules of Logic the conclusion should be 'the beginning of wisdom brings us nearer to God' ; but instead we have in v. ²⁰ the irrelevant conclusion (confirmed by v. ²¹) that 'the desire of wisdom promoteth to a kingdom,' which is neither logically nor actually true. A clearer and better sorites is to be found in Rom. 5³⁻⁵, 'Let us rejoice in our tribulations ; knowing that tribulation worketh patience ; and patience, experience ; and experience, hope ; and hope maketh not ashamed' : and again in Rom. 8³⁰, *οὐς δὲ προώριτε τούτους καὶ ἐκάλεσε, καὶ οὐς ἐκάλεσε τούτους καὶ ἐδικαίωσεν, οὐς δὲ ἐδικαίωσε τούτους καὶ ἐδόξασε.* In all these instances the legitimate conclusion is missing ; indeed it can only be discovered by a common-sense treatment of the premises.

18. And care for instruction is love for her,
 And love for her is keeping of her laws,
 And adherence to the laws the assurance of immortality;

Gregg sets out the general argument of the sorites excellently, but he has to invent an original proposition, viz.: 'Desire for wisdom is the beginning of wisdom,' which should correspond to the conclusion, 'Desire for wisdom makes men kings'; but the original premise does not exist in the text.

As Farrar correctly remarks, the reasoning here is little more than verbal assertion, but the general thought is sound, though the Sorites ends in a non sequitur. The sense is that

'Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-control;
 These three alone lead men to sovereign power.'

18. 'Love,' or rather 'affectionate respect' and the keeping of the commands of the person so respected, are properly considered as inseparable. Cf. Exod. 20⁶, 'Them that love me and keep my commandments,' repeated Deut. 5¹⁰, 7⁹, and Matt. 19¹⁷, 'If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments'; John 14¹⁵, 'If ye love me keep my commandments.' There is, however, a difference between *νόμοι* and the word here used, *ἐντολαί* (in the Old Testament it is *προστάγματα*). The former, says Grimm, is only used once in the New Testament, Heb. 10¹⁶, and then in a quotation from Jer. 31³³. *νόμος*, however, occurs in a like sense in James 2⁸.

ἀφθαρσία, which Sh translates 'non-destruction,' is in this connection but one more proof of the utterly loose way in which the words for 'immortality' are used by writers of the time of 'Wisdom.' *ἀθανασία* is treated similarly. It may be attained by justice, 1¹⁵; by 'kinship unto wisdom,' 8¹⁷; here by adherence to law; and 15³, by the knowledge of God's power. Similarly the son of Sirach would seem to make 'immortality' dependent on (41¹³) a good name; (40¹⁹) children and the building of a city; (44¹⁰) deeds of righteousness and mercy. When Philo speaks of 'virtue' or 'philosophy' as leading to 'immortality,' the word is meaningless. *De opif. Mundi*, § 25, *τὸ φιλοσοφίας γένος, ὃφ' οὐ καίτοι θνητὸς ἀν ὁ ἀνθρωπος ἀπαθανατίζεται*; § 54, *θεοσέβειαν δι' ἣς ἀθανατίζεται ἡ ψυχή*. Cf. also *Legis Allegor.*, I. §§ 32, 33. To expect exact eschatological ideas from such writers is hopeless. Even in Eph. 6²⁴ ἡ χάρις μετὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαπώντων τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν . . . ἐν ἀφθαρσίᾳ, the word is very loosely used, and was translated by A.V. 'in sincerity.'

The Armenian version (Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 282) renders ἀγαπή 'mercy.'

As to *προσοχὴ νόμων*, the genitive is easily paralleled in New Testament Greek as in *προσενχὴ τοῦ θεοῦ* (Luke 6¹²). Sh translates 'understanding of the laws,' and so also Sp.

19. And immortality maketh to be near unto God ;
 20. So then the desire of wisdom leadeth to a kingdom.
 21. If ye then take pleasure in thrones and sceptres, ye despots
 of the nations,
 Honour wisdom, that ye may reign for evermore.

19. E. Pfleiderer (*Heraklit*) and other writers insist that this is an idea borrowed straight from the *Phaedo*, 63c. In that passage there is certainly something like an expressed hope of immortality. It runs as follows :—*νῦν δὲ εὐ̄ ἴστε, ὅτι παρ' ἄνδρας τε ἐλπίζω ἀφίξεσθαι ἀγαθούς, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἀν πάνυ δισχυρισάμην, ὅτι μέντοι παρὰ θεοὺς δεσπότας πάνυ ἀγαθούς ἥξειν, εὐ̄ ἴστε, ὅτι, εἴπερ τι ἀλλο τῶν τοιούτων. δισχυρισάμην ἀν καὶ τοῦτο.* In 69d the idea is more clearly stated, *ο κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει.* But the point to be noticed is that our author is the first among Jewish writers to express definitely the expectation of immortality with God for the righteous.

The Fathers (Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria), quoted at length by Deane, emphasise this point. They restate 'Wisdom's' faulty sorites, and end in the natural conclusion ; the observance of God's commandments brings us to immortality—nearness to God.

Quite unimportant is the suggestion of older commentators that the expression *έγγὺς θεοῦ* means 'servants of God' on the analogy of Esther 1¹⁴ (Ἑ) *οἱ ἀρχοντες Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων οἱ ἔγγὺς τοῦ βασιλεως.* Deissmann, *Biblical Studies*, Eng. trans., p. 107, thinks that an Alexandrian legal expression, found in the papyri, is here intended : 'he need not fear that his *ἀφθαρσία* will be disputed by another' : he has a legal guarantee of incorruption.

20. With this verse ends the sorites—a very peculiar one : in no stage (save one) of the ladder is the word used in the preceding stage employed. *ἐπιθυμία* in the first line is replaced by *φροντίς* in the second ; *τήρησις* in the third by *προσοχή* in the fourth ; *βεβαίωσις ἀφθαρσίας* in the fourth by the simple *ἀφθαρσία* in the fifth. But it is to be noted that Pseudo-Solomon succeeds in introducing seven terms (the mystic number ; cf. 7²²) into his argument, viz. *ἐπιθυμία, φροντίς, ἀγαπή, τήρησις, προσοχή, ἀφθαρσία, ἔγγὺς θεοῦ.*

The termination of the argument appears, as already remarked, to be irrelevant. Nor is the difficulty to be avoided by supposing that a heavenly 'kingdom' and not an earthly is meant. To this end Rom. 5¹⁷, *ἐν ζωῇ βασιλεύσοντιν διὰ τοῦ ἑνὸς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* ; 1 Cor. 4⁸, *χωρὶς ἡμῶν ἐβασιλεύσατε ; καὶ ὅφελόν γε ἐβασιλεύσατε, ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν συμβασιλεύσωμεν* ; 2 Tim. 2¹², *εἰ ὑπομένομεν, καὶ συμβασιλεύσομεν*, are quoted. But the next line (cf. also 8¹⁴) plainly refers to earthly rule, which would naturally be the idea uppermost in the mind of the Israelite.

21. As already pointed out, the reference to earthly rule here is

22. But what wisdom is, and how she had her beginning, I will declare,

And will not conceal from you mysteries;

But will trace her out from the beginning of creation,

And bring into clearness the knowledge of her,

And will not pass by the truth;

unmistakable, and we may compare Prov. 8¹⁶, 'By me (Wisdom) kings reign and princes decree justice. By me princes rule, and nobles, even all the judges of the earth.' Cornely propounds the extraordinary theory (repudiated by his editor Zorell) that all the expressions used in these verses of kings and princes are really figurative. The royal rulers apostrophised are simply faithful Jews, and *κράτησις* and *δυναστεία*, and the like expressions, will merely denote their superiority over their apostate fellow-countrymen.

'Reign for ever' may be either the ordinary Oriental exaggeration as seen in the salutation, 'O king, live for ever!' 1 Kings 1³¹, Neh. 2³, Dan. 2⁴, etc., or it may allude to the 'immortality' supposed to attend on just deeds and merciful actions (cf. notes on v. 18). In any case the expression is a loose and indefinite one.

¶ adds (what is reckoned as v. 23 in its editions) a singular appendix to this verse, viz. 'Diligite lumen sapientiae, omnes qui praeestis populis.' This is not quite, as Deane suggests, an alternative translation of the second line which has crept into the text: it is more likely a marginal gloss or summary of the whole verse which has found its way in. There is nothing in the versions to indicate or justify it.

22. The difficulties in regard to this verse are raised only by those who are determined to identify *σοφία* with the Logos in one form or another. To them, of course, the idea that she can have had 'a beginning' (*έγένετο*) is unreasonable; hence Bois (*Essai*, 388) would supply *ἐποίησεν* with the word, and translate, with reference to the supposed utterances of Solomon in the following chapters 'how I got her.' But her 'beginning' is duly described in Prov. 8²⁴, 'When there were no depths I was brought forth,' etc., and Job 28²⁶, 'When he made a decree for the rain and a way for the lightning of the thunder: then did he see it (Wisdom) and declare it.' Certainly Pseudo-Solomon does not fulfil his promise; he gives us no account of the origin of Wisdom; and perhaps Churton's paraphrase, 'how she came into existence, or began her work in man,' is the safest, though it is no translation. 'How she came up' (A.V.) is also indefinite. In Eccl. 1⁴, 'He created her and saw and numbered her, and poured her out upon all his works,' and 24⁹, 'He created me from the beginning before the world,' an origin of Wisdom is distinctly indicated. § expresses this, but seems to have little reference to the Greek. It runs thus: 'that she was before (all) creatures I

23. Neither verily will I company with pining envy,
For this shall have no fellowship with wisdom.

will investigate and will clearly propound the knowledge of her, nor will I pass by righteousness.' The Arabic follows the text, and translates 'from the beginning of her existence.'

It is possible also that in line 3 *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γενέσεως* may mean 'from the beginning of her nativity' (A.V.), though this would properly require the addition of *αὐτῆς*. Some would render (again with reference to the three succeeding 'Solomonic' chapters) 'from the beginning of *my* life.' But having regard to the contents of chapters 10 *sqq.*, it seems better to render 'from the beginning of creation.' This, however, strengthens the theory that the writer intended immediately to proceed to such a sketch of Wisdom's operations, and that the next three chapters are an interpolation either of the original writer or of some one else. The exact phrase *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κτίσεως* is found in Mark 10⁶, 13¹⁹, 2 Pet. 8⁴.

If we were not practically certain that the writer of 'Wisdom' was either a senior contemporary or an immediate predecessor of Philo, the second line of the text might be taken as a reflection on that writer and his school, if he had one. Philo, it is true, protests against the idea of esoteric doctrine, *De Vict. Offer.*, § 12, *Tί γὰρ εἰ καλὰ ταῦτα ἔστιν ὁ μύσται, καὶ συμφέροντα, συκλεισάμενοι ἑαυτούς ἐν σκότῳ βαθεῖ τρεῖς ἡ τέτταρας μόνους ὀφελεῖτε, κτλ.* but in *De Cherubim*, § 12, he plainly intimates that his doctrine is not for all: *Τελετὰς γὰρ ἀναδιδάσκομεν θείας τοὺς τελετῶν ἀξίους τῶν ἱερωτάτων μύστας κτλ.* It is possible that the writer refers to the heathen mysteries, for which, according to modern critics (E. Pfleiderer and Bois), he had a deep aversion. L, however, translates 'sacramenta Dei,' which is probably not far from the truth.

On *παροδεύσω* cf. note on 1⁸. The correct form 'praeteribo' is here given by L.

23. There is a rather feeble play on words in *παροδεύσω . . . συνοδεύσω*. The grammar is uncertain: for if *συνοδεύσω* be subjunctive, *οὐτέ μή* (not *μήν*) must be read, and a few MSS. have either this or *οὐδὲ μή*.

The reference to pining envy is not very clear. Siegfried translates it 'envy of the learned,' but who are the learned in question? Gfrörer, *Philo*, ii. 233, discovers a distinct allusion to men like Philo, Aristeas, and Aristobulus, who, he says, treated the doctrine of Wisdom as a mystery (cf. Letter of Aristeas, 260, 261). 'Pining envy,' therefore, is a reproach directed either against the Egyptians (?) or those Jews who prided themselves on the possession of the true interpretation of Scripture. Philo, he says, though pretending to make all plain, is really always posing as a hierophant. The passages quoted on v. 22 support this. There is a strong verbal correspondence between this line and Philo, *De Vict. Offer.* (l.c.), *φθόνος γὰρ ἀρετῆς διώκισται*, 'there is no room for so mean a vice as envy in the sphere

24. Now the multitude of the wise is the salvation of the world,
And a wise king the establishment of his people.

25. And so be ye instructed by my words, and ye shall be
benefited.

of virtue' (Farrar), and Philo also quotes (*Quod liber sit quisquis*, § 2) Plato's *Phaedrus*, *φθόνος ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται*.

For the description of Envy cf. Ovid, *Met.*, ii. 775 *sqq.*, 'Pallor in ore sedet: macies in corpore toto . . . videt ingratos intabescitque videndo successus hominum, etc.' This goes far to explain the epithet 'pinging' envy. Envy is personified, and depicted as suffering from the wasting sickness which consumes the jealous man.

οὐτός probably is *φθόνος*, though the *L* rendering 'talis homo' is not impossible. *κοινωνεῖν* with the dative means 'to keep company with,' 'to be in fellowship with,' and agrees with the whole metaphor, which is that of fellow-travellers walking along a road.

24. These two feeble verses (24, 25) are almost obviously inserted to connect the 'wise king' of chaps. 7-9 with the totally different matter of chaps. 6 and 10. When Bissell (p. 222), arguing for the unity of the book, says 'there is no one of the many separate sections into which it may be divided in which the way is not prepared for saying what is subsequently said,' he forgets that ancient 'editors' were not always so naïve as those of *Genesis*, and, moreover, overlooks the weakness of connecting verses like these two. The apologists are ingenious enough. 'I will do my best to increase the roll of wise men, for the more numerous they are the better it is for the world' (Deane); and so before we come to the promised Philosophy of History, three chapters on the nature of Wisdom are required. 'The unmeet withholding of the truth is an injury to humanity' (Farrar); and therefore seventy verses of mere rhetorical praise of Wisdom, without a word of definite explanation, are interposed.

σωτηρία is of course not used in the Christian sense of eternal redemption, but of 'the public weal' generally, as in *Prov. 11*¹⁴ (Gr) *σωτηρία ἡπάρχει ἐν πολλῇ βουλῇ*. (*L*, 'in the multitude of counsellors,' which is really more appropriate to our text).

For *εὐστάθεια* A.V. has 'upholding of the people,' Genev. 'stay of the people,' and *L* 'stabilimentum,' all of which express the meaning. R.V. 'tranquillity' is inadequate. The word is not uncommon; it occurs in 2 Macc. 14⁶, where R.V. translates also 'tranquillity,' 3 Macc. 7²⁶. Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 61, *οἷς δὸς κύριε ὑγείαν, εἰρήνην, ὄμονοιαν, εὐστάθειαν* ('stability'). The verb *εὐσταθέω* is also in use, and is classical.

For the general sentiment cf. the well-known passage in Plato, *Rep.*, v. 473c, 'unless philosophers become kings or kings philosophers, there will never be rest from evils in the cities.'

25. The use of *ωστε* in this sense is curious, but classical. Soph.,

7. 1. I indeed am also a mortal, like to all,
And offspring of one earthborn, first formed ;

Elect., 1172, θυητὸς δ' Ὀρέστης ὥστε μὴ λίαν στένε. Cf. 1 Cor. 4⁵ and 1 Pet. 4¹⁹.

Grimm points out at some length the apparent contradiction between these verses and what has gone before. Here it would seem that the conversion of heathen rulers to 'Wisdom,' and consequently to the religion of the God of Israel, is contemplated as a means of setting the world right. (So in 14¹³ the abolition of idols is regarded as sure to come.) But in 5¹⁶ *sqq.* we have a plain prophecy of the destruction of these heathen powers : there the kingdom of God is to be established not by conversion but by annihilation. It is likely that Pseudo-Solomon had no clear idea on the subject. He is a victim to the constant contradiction between particularism and universalism which hampered the Alexandrine philosophers. On the one hand, the Messianic kingdom was to be founded on conquest and ruin of the enemy ; on the other hand, the new birth of man as a result of the assimilation of 'wisdom' is looked forward to. The first view represents dogma ; the second sentiment.

7. 1. That the author in this and the two following chapters attempts to assume the part of King Solomon there can be no reasonable doubt, though the contrary has been recently maintained in a little book (otherwise excellent) on the *Authorship of Ecclesiastes* (cf. Wright, *Koheleth*, p. 60). That doubts should arise, however, is not surprising. If we leave out of account these three chapters, it is amazing how any man of 'Wisdom's' mental calibre could attribute to the cosmopolitan trader-king of Israel the sordid particularism which pervades the rest of the book ; if we consider these chapters we are struck with the totally different view of Solomon's character presented there and in Ecclesiastes (cf. especially 2⁸ R.V. and Wright, p. 64), who does not hesitate to allude to the king's luxury and polygamy, while 'Wisdom' is full of exhortations, hypocritical if they really come from Solomon, to temperance and sobriety, and denunciations of voluptuous vice. It is only fair to add that such passages only occur outside the three 'Solomonic' chapters, unless 9^{11,15} can be reckoned among them (cf. note on v. 30 below).

The connection with what precedes is not very obvious (the *μὲν* in the first line is probably answered by v. 7, but there is no *δέ* to correspond), but may consist in the fact that Solomon disclaims his royalty as affording him the peculiar privilege of wisdom. Any one can possess it (6²⁵, all can be educated in it), and no man can plead lowness of station as an excuse for not showing it. There may also be an allusion to the legendary supernatural powers with which Jewish tradition had endowed Solomon, and which he here disclaims.

γηγενῆς is a natural word to use of Adam as formed ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς (Gen. 2⁷, Eccl. 17¹, 1 Cor. 15⁴⁷), but the actual term, though

2. And in the womb of a mother was I formed as flesh,
 In ten months' space, compact with blood,
 By the seed of a man and the pleasure that accompanieth
 wedlock.

classical, does not occur in the New Testament, cf. Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 39, *τί γὰρ δύναται θυητός*; *ἢ τίς ἴσχὺς γηγενοῦς*;

πρωτόπλαστος is perhaps a genuine invention of Pseudo-Solomon. Why Farrar should doubt this does not appear. It occurs again in 10¹. Deane gives examples of its use by the Fathers; Clement of Alexandria, Athanasius, Irenaeus ('protoplatus' in the Latin). **L** has here 'qui prior factus est,' which is inadequate. **S^h** 'the son of one born of the earth, first created.'

2. Grimm, clinging to the theory that 'Wisdom' taught the pre-existence of souls, remarks that he does not tell us when the soul is joined to the *σάρξ*; whether at the moment of generation or at that of birth. Farrar, accepting all that Grimm says, nevertheless observes that the writer is rather a creationist than a traducianist; his views agree with those of Philo, who held that the pre-existent souls are fleshless and bloodless, and have no participation with earthly matter. For a very full philosophical account of the infusion of the soul into the embryo at the moment of conception cf. the quotations from the Rabbinical writings in Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, 226. The view there represented is frankly creationist and appears to imply the pre-existence of souls, but certainly not in the Platonic sense.

γλύφω is not a very usual word in the sense of 'mould,' 'fashion,' but it occurs in 13¹³, Eccl. 38²⁷, meaning 'carve' or 'engrave.' For 'to fashion,' as in Job 10⁸, Ps. 119⁷³, **G** uses another word—*πλάσσω*. A great number of passages are quoted to illustrate the common statement of the ancients that ten months was the period of gestation. One only is well known, Virg., *Ecl.*, iv. 61, 'Matri longa decem tulerunt fastidia menses.' The most interesting is from Philo, *Legis Allegor.*, i. § 4, where he tries to make out that seven months (his mystic number) are sufficient to ensure 'life' to the child. With this we compare Arist., *Hist. An.*, vii. 4, who says that in Egypt women being *εὐέκφοροι* (cf. Exod. 1¹⁰), produce children at eight months. It might seem that lunar months are meant, but Romulus (Ovid, *Fasti*, i. 33) is said to have divided the year into ten months, 'utero matris dum prodeat infans'; and these were not lunar months. Cf. Soltau, *Römische Chronologie*, 83-86, 246.

ἐν αἷματι is very generally taken of the menstrual blood, which was supposed to unite with the seed for the formation of the foetus by a kind of curdling process possibly alluded to in Job. 10¹⁰, 'Hast thou not poured me out as milk, and curdled me like cheese?' Why *ἡδονή* is mentioned is not clear, unless Gaab's idea is right, that this supplied the spiritual element in the new creature. This, of course, Grimm

3. And when I was born I drew in the common air,
 Yea, and fell upon my kindred earth,
 Wailing out my first cry like unto all :

rejects as inconsistent with his 'pre-existence of souls'; but he is right in saying that the writers of Eccles. 11⁵, 2 Macc. 7²², Ps. 139¹³⁻¹⁶ show more sense when they treat the whole thing as a mystery. He quotes an admirable sentence from Calmet, 'Quis jubet sacros auctores ex physicorum principiis loqui? Communae illi aetatis suae opiniones sequuntur.' *éν* with an instrumental meaning is possible in Greek, and is a common Hebraism.

3. The expression *σπάντινά δέρπα τὸν κοινόν* is found word for word in Menander, *Frag.*, vi. 6, ed. Brunck., and in Eccles. 3²⁰ (men and beasts) 'have all the same breath.'

'Fell upon (my kindred) earth' is a traditional expression derived from very early times. We have it in Hom., *Il.*, xix. 110 used as of 'all men on earth,' *ὅς κεν ἐπ' ἥματι τῷδε πέσῃ μετὰ ποστὶ γυναικῶν ἀνδρῶν*. The expression in Isa. 26¹⁸, 'Neither have the inhabitants of the earth fallen,' is conjecturally translated in accordance with the context: 'been born'; cf. also v. 19, 'The earth shall bring forth' (lit. cause to fall) 'the shades.' 'Cadere matre' or 'de matre' is so used in Latin, as in Val. Flacc., i. 355, Claudio in *Rufin.*, i. 92. The expression 'tollere infantem' for 'to recognise a child as one's own' belongs to the same early stage of civilisation. Deane aptly quotes Lucret. v. 224:

'nudus humi jacet, indigus omni
 Vitali auxilio, quom primum in luminis oras
 Nixibus ex alvo matris profudit.'

The meaning of *ὅμοιοπαθῆ* is much disputed. The rendering given is that of R.V., and agrees with *γηγενῆς* in v. 1. It occurs twice in the New Testament, Acts 14¹⁶, James 5¹⁷, but in both cases it means 'of like passions,' and gives us no help here. Luther rendered it 'omnium gestatricem,' which is not a translation of the Greek at all; Grimm would have it to mean 'aeque omnibus calcatam'; but how Horace's 'aequa tellus pauperi recluditur regumque pueris' (*Od.*, II. xviii. 32) supports him it is hard to see. The loose *S^p* has simply 'in the manner of all men'; the Arabic, 'which renewed or repeated my griefs.' But *L*, Castellio, A.V., Genev., and to a certain extent Acts 14¹⁶, all support the translation given above. Churton ingeniously paraphrases 'the earth *in compassion for my weakness* received me into her bosom.' *S^h* follows the Greek word, 'suffering the like.'

τοια is of course purely adverbial (a classical use), but it puzzled the transcribers, who thought it should be *ἴσην* to agree with *φωνήν*, and some omitted the word altogether (*¶*), while the Complut. read *ἡκα* 'I came,' and *L* has 'emisi,' which may refer to this reading.

4. In swaddling clothes was I reared and with cares.
5. For there is no king that had any other beginning of life;
6. And of all these is one entrance into life and a like departure.

4. *φροντίδες* might be well represented by the Latin 'fastidia': but that is used by Virgil of the troubles of gestation. *Λ* 'In involventis nutritus sum et curis magnis.' *§^v* is brief, but expresses the meaning: 'In swathing bands was I anxiously wrapped up.'

Parallelomania can hardly excel Gregg's suggestion (*Introd.*, liii.) that 'Lk. 2⁷ recalls Wisd. 7, where the homely detail of the royal child being wrapped in swaddling clothes is recorded.' He rightly adds that 'these similarities may be purely accidental.'

5. 'Αρχὴ γενέσεως might mean 'source of existence'; and Philo *de Mundi Opif.*, § 22, certainly so uses it when he says *τὸ σπέρμα τῶν ζώων γενέσεως ἀρχὴν εἶναι στυμβίζηκε*. *γένεσις* is used not only of actual birth, but of the life which follows it, as in Jas. 3⁶, *φλογίζουσα τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως* (where, however, *γένεσις* is usually translated 'nature'). But the next line seems to define the meaning here. 'The beginning and end of life are the same for all.'

We note that in 6²⁴ the same words are used in an entirely different sense—one of Pseudo-Solomon's peculiarities.

6. Farrar rightly describes this sentiment as a 'commonplace of moralists.' There is indeed little else in the whole of the three chapters. This passage, however, is widely illustrated from various sources. It is well and eloquently treated in Eccles. 40¹⁻⁷, 'A heavy yoke is upon the sons of Adam from the day of their coming forth of their mother's womb until the day for their burial in the mother of all things,' etc.; 'from him that weareth purple and a crown, even unto him that is clothed with a hempen frock.' Horace, *Od.*, I. iv. 13, has the well-known lines, 'Pallida mors aequo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas regumque turres'; but the most striking correspondence is found in Theodoret, *Orat.* ix. *de Providentia*: Οὐ μόνον δέ τὴν εἰς τὸν βίον εἰσόδον μέν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἔξοδον ἵσηρ ἔχομεν. So Job 1²¹, 'Naked came I out of my mother's womb, and naked shall I depart thither,' *i.e.* to the mother of all, as in Eccles. *l.c.* Again Job 21²³⁻²⁶ propounds the truth that though men die in various ways, early and late, yet 'they lie down alike in the dust, and the worm covereth them.' This is perhaps the most pessimistic passage in Wisdom and the nearest to Koheleth. Eccles. 3¹⁹⁻²⁰, 'All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again.'

There is in the three chapters no single note of the 'hope full of immortality' of 3⁴. The 'immortalité mnémonique' of 8¹¹ is a mere mockery of the real thing.

7. Wherefore I prayed, and understanding was granted me ;
I called, and the spirit of wisdom came unto me.
8. Her I preferred before sceptres and thrones,
And deemed riches as naught in comparison of her.
9. Nor did I count as equal with her a priceless jewel.
For all gold in her sight is as a little sand,
And as clay shall silver be accounted before her.

7. The meaning of *διὰ τοῦτο* seems to be that Solomon recognised his own weakness, king though he was, and so prayed for that wisdom which alone could make him a good ruler. This is fully emphasised in 9⁵⁻⁶ and in 8²¹. No doubt the writer had in his mind the vision of Solomon, 1 Kings 3⁶⁻¹⁵, and his prayer, 8¹²⁻⁵³.

It is, however, useless in the case of a vague writer like the author of 'Wisdom' to attempt to draw distinctions between *φρόνησις* and the *πνεῦμα σοφίας*. To him they are much the same, and Grimm's quotations to prove a difference between an objective 'Wisdom of God' and a subjective 'wisdom as communicated to a man,' are superfluous. That anything like the 'Holy Spirit' is meant is of course out of the question.

ἐπικαλεσάμην (without an object) requires some notice. The verb in its original sense (Lidd. and Sc.) *always* means 'to call upon a God.' Hence the omission of any object (as in Acts 7⁵⁹, ἐλιθοβόλουν *τὸν Στέφανον* ἐπικαλούμενον καὶ λέγοντα κτλ.) can be easily understood. The *locus classicus* in the New Testament for a prayer for 'wisdom' is found in James 1⁵, εἰ τις λείπεται σοφίας αἰτεῖτο παρὰ τοῦ διδόντος θεοῦ πάσιν.

8. We have here another commonplace of the 'sapiential books,' but the most exact parallels are to be found in respect of v. ⁹.

προκρίνειν τί τινος is a classical phrase ; but *ἐν συγκρίσει αὐτῆς* is a later usage, not found before Plutarch. *συγκρίνω τι πρός τι* is found in Aristotle, but *συγκρίνω τί τινι* only in Hellenistic Greek, as in v. ²⁹ and also in 15¹⁸, 1 Cor. 2¹³, 2 Cor. 10¹².

9. To this verse many real parallels are to be found. A.V. margin cites Prov. 3¹⁴⁻¹⁶ and Prov. 8^{10,11}, 'Receive my instruction and not silver ; and knowledge rather than choice gold ; for wisdom is better than rubies' ; 8¹⁹, 'My fruit is better than gold, yea than fine gold ; and my revenue than choice silver' ; Job 28¹⁸, 'The price of wisdom is above rubies,' and the verses before and after. Cf. also Prov. 16¹⁶, 'How much better is it to get wisdom than gold ! and to get understanding is rather to be chosen than silver.' It is possible also that there is an allusion to 2 Chron. 1¹⁵ (1 Kings 10²⁷), 'The king made silver and gold at Jerusalem as plenteous as stones,' and 1 Kings 10²¹, '(Silver) was nothing accounted of in the days of Solomon.'

ἀτίμητος λίθος, 'a priceless stone,' can hardly be misunderstood ;

10. Above health and comeliness did I cherish her,
And preferred to have her rather than light,
For that the radiance from her is quenchless.

11. But there came to me with her all good things together,
And riches uncountable in her hands :

the word occurs in 3 Macc. 3²³, *τὴν ἀτίμητον πολίτειαν*. **L** has 'pretiosum lapidem,' and **S^P** 'a stone of price.' The Arabic, however, has 'inestimable,' and an excellent parallel is found in Shakespeare, *Richard III.*, I. iv. 27, 'Inestimable stones, *unvalued* jewels.'

ἐν ὅψει αὐτῆς is generally rendered 'in respect of her,' but having regard to the personification of Wisdom as it appears in these chapters, it may be allowed to translate it literally 'in her sight,' as in Ps. 143², 'in thy sight shall no living man be justified,' where, however, the Greek is *ἐνώπιον σου*, and this or *ἐνάντιον* is almost invariably used by **G** to translate the perfectly literal **בְּעֵינִי** of the Hebrew. The few exceptions have *ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς σου*, but *ἐν ὅψει* seems never to be used. Even a Father (Methodius) in quoting this very passage substitutes *ἐνώπιον αὐτῆς* for the correct reading. **L** has 'in comparatione illius'; but 'in judicio illius' is certainly the sense in Deut. 4²⁶ and in numerous other instances. The Armenian (Margoliouth, p. 283) supports the Latin rendering.

10. There is a difference of opinion (unimportant) as to the meaning of *ἀντὶ φωτός*, which **L** and Arab. render 'pro luce,' 'as a substitute for light,' and so Grimm, A.V., Genev., and Arnald, who paraphrases neatly : 'I determined to have her for a light or guide.' But the meaning suggested by R.V. is better : 'I had rather lose light than wisdom, for the light of day wanes and perishes, but the light of wisdom never.' Ps. 119¹⁰⁵, 'Thy word is a lamp unto my feet and light unto my path,' rather favours the view of **L**.

ἀκοίμητον, 'never laid to rest' (**L** 'inextinguibile,' for which *ἀσβεστος*, Matt. 9¹², Mark 9⁴³ is the proper word). The idea of the eclipse of earthly light is a common one. Cf. Hood :

Wherever he may be, the stars must daily lose their light ;
The moon will veil her in the shade, the sun will set at night.
The sun may set, but constant love will shine when he's away,
So that dull night is never night and day is brighter day.

11. There is for once some force in the connecting particle **δέ**. 'Though I made light of earthly blessings in comparison of her, these came to me with her unasked.' Cf. 1 Kings 3¹³, 'I have also given thee that which thou hast not asked, both riches and honour.' Cf. Prov. 3¹⁸, 'In her left hand are riches and honour ; 8¹⁸, 'Riches and honour are with me ; yea, durable riches and righteousness ;

12. And I rejoiced in all because wisdom guideth them,
Yet I knew not that she was the mother of these things.

13. Frankly did I learn and ungrudgingly do I impart,
The riches of her I do not hide away;

Matt. 6²³, 'Seek ye first his kingdom and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.'

L renders *ἀναριθμητος πλοῦτος* by 'innumerabilis honestas,' and elsewhere translates *πλούσιος* 'honestus,' and *πλοῦτος* 'honestas.' Whence this singular Low-Latin rendering is derived it is impossible to say. It appears in one or two Fathers. We have 'honestas' in v. ¹³ and 8¹⁸, and 'honestare' in 10¹⁰.

With the whole passage cf. 2 Chron. 1¹², *τὴν σοφίαν καὶ τὴν σύνεσιν δίδωμι σοι, καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ χρήματα καὶ δόξαν δώσω σοι, ὡς οὐκ ἐγενήθη ὅμιος σοι ἐν τοῖς βασιλεῦσι τοῖς ἔμπροσθε σου, καὶ μετὰ σὲ οὐκ ἔσται οὐτως.*

12. For *γένεσιν* (Swete), **L**, Arm., and some good MSS. read *γενέτιν* which A.V. and Genev. translate. The word is not found elsewhere, but is regularly formed, and is certainly the 'lectio difficilior.'

The meaning of *ήγειται*, 'leads' or 'guides' them, is plain. Unless Wisdom directs the disposition of earthly goods and honours, they are a curse rather than a blessing. The **L** rendering 'quoniam antecedebat me ista sapientia' is very hard to explain, save on the supposition that the translator had not *αὐτῶν* in his text at all. The difference between the readings *ἐπὶ πάντων* and *ἐπὶ πάσιν* is entirely unimportant. Bois (*Essai*, 391) explains 'Wisdom walks before, and good things follow in her train.'

The last line is exceedingly mysterious. It seems only explicable by a reference to the vision of Solomon in 2 Chron. 1⁷⁻¹², in which he asks for wisdom without knowing that wisdom would bring him all other blessings. That the rule of Solomon was not altogether dictated by wisdom is apparent from the complaint of his subjects to Rehoboam in 1 Kings 12⁴.

13. This is very like a repetition of 6²³, and unless some polemical sense is implied, it is difficult to see what purpose the verse serves. It is possible that Philo may have had predecessors who, like him, dealt in mysteries and occult interpretations. For an unfavourable account of these later sophists and their pretensions cf. Drummond, *Philo*, i. 4-7, and Dähne, *Jüd.-Alev. Religions-Philosophie*, i. p. 9, etc.

'Ἄδολως is not very enlightening. A.V. 'diligently' is quite beside the mark. Genev. 'unfeignedly' is an accurate translation enough, as is **L**, 'Quam sine fictione didici.' **S^P** and Arab. have corresponding renderings; but none of them convey any meaning to the reader, any more than does Churton's paraphrase, 'with no mercenary motive.' Reuss, 'sans arrière-pensée,' i.e. without thought of the

14. For an unsailing treasure for mankind is she,
 Which they that use do foster friendship towards God,
 Being commended by the gifts that come from her training.

temporal advantages which Wisdom actually brought; but this affords no antithesis to ἀφθόνως.

Parallels are plentiful. Matt. 30⁸, 'Freely ye have received, freely give'; 1 Pet. 4¹⁰, 'Using hospitality one to another without murmuring, according as each hath received a gift, ministering it among yourselves as good stewards of the manifold grace of God.' A curious passage in Eccl. 20³⁰ (and 41¹¹) furnishes a kind of commentary on the verse. 'Wisdom that is hid and treasure that is out of sight, what profit is in them both?' Deane quotes two apt parallels from the Fathers: Euseb. on Ps. 33⁸, ἀδύλως ἔλαβον, ἀφθόνως μεταδίδομαι; and Justin Mart., *Apol.* i. 6, παντὶ βουλομένῳ μαθεῖν, ὡς ἐδιδάχθημεν, ἀφθόνως παραδίδοντες.

Bois (*Essai*, 391) suggests a variation of the ordinary rendering: not 'I communicate wisdom liberally,' but 'I communicate the fact that she brings all blessings' liberally.

14. Ἀνεκλιπής (for the classical ἀνεκλειπτος, as in Luke 12³³, 'A treasure in the heavens that faileth not') is only found once again, in 8¹⁸, and may be considered one of 'Wisdom's' original creations.

ὄν οἱ χρησάμενοι (accus. for dative) is entirely unclassical; (cf. Lidd. and Sc. s.v.) but it is found in 1 Cor. 7³¹, χρώμενοι τὸν κόσμον ὡς μὴ καταχρώμενοι. There, as here, some transcribers have naturally substituted the dative, some also turning χρησάμενοι into κτησάμενοι. In Acts 27¹⁷, βοηθείας has been turned into βοηθείαις; but in 2 Macc. 4¹⁰ there is no variation of reading in the MSS. Grimm's argument against κτησάμενοι, on the ground that it would be only human wisdom that mankind could 'possess,' does not seem very forcible, and he is entirely wrong in saying that *S^P* read χρησάμενοι.

لَه is 'to possess.' Arab. and ل, however, have 'used,' and the Armenian is said also to read this.

στέλλεσθαι φίλιαν is also, it would seem, a unique expression (the aorist ἐστέλλαντο is gnomic), but στέλλεσθαι, in the sense of 'prepare,' is classical. Cf. Lidd. and Sc. s.v. The 'friend of God' is the regular Oriental appellation of Abraham. Cf. James 2²³, φίλος θεοῦ ἐκλήθη, as from Isa. 41⁸, 'the seed of Abraham my friend,' and 2 Chron. 20⁷. In John 15¹⁴ Christ calls the disciples his 'friends.' Gen. 18^{17.18} contains no exact description of the patriarch as 'God's friend,' but is sufficiently strong to justify such description. Cf. Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 10¹ and 17².

Συσταθέντες presents no difficulty. It occurs in 1 Macc. 12⁴³, συνέστησεν αὐτὸν πᾶσι τοῖς φίλοις αὐτοῦ, as also in Rom. 3⁵, 5⁸ ('God commendeth his own love towards us'), and 2 Cor. 4²; but 'gifts that come from the training of wisdom' is a singularly vague expression, and

15. But to me may God grant to speak as I would,
 And to devise worthily of the things that have been given
 me ;
 For he too is the guide of wisdom,
 And the director of the wise.

16. For in his hand are both we and our words ;
 All sagacity also and knowledge of crafts.

seems to mean the good works that man may do under the influence of Wisdom, or, as Churton seems to take it, the imparting of those gifts liberally to others.

15. *Δορή* is undoubtedly the right reading, but there was probably once a variant, *δέδωκε*, found in Complut. and Ald., and translated by *L*, Arab., A.V., and Genev. A transcriber would think that Solomon need not pray for what he had already, for wisdom surely would include eloquence.

κατὰ γνώμην in classical usage may mean (1) according to his or my wish ; (2) in my or his opinion ; (3) according to his or my purpose ; but it does not mean 'with judgment' (R.V.), though possibly the writer thought it did. *S* also has 'with counsel.' *L* is indefinite. *S^b* 'according to will.'

The translation of *ἐνθυμηθῆναι* is also unjustified by classical usage. It would seem possible to construct it with the genitive and render 'to take heed duly to the gifts that have been granted me.' But though the Greek is bad the sense is good : 'not merely to conceive fine ideas (*L* *prae sumere*) but to be able to express them in worthy language.' *ἐνθυμηθῆναι* seems only to occur in an absolute sense once (in Hippocrates), and then to mean 'to be in a passion.'

But for *δεδομένων* (or *διδομένων*) *λεγομένων* is read by *ENNA* and has the support of all other versions except *L*. It can only mean 'what I promised or spoke of' (in v. ¹³), and in that case the meaning suggested for *ἐνθυμηθῆναι* ('remember,' 'take heed to') seems even more appropriate. *λεγόμενα* can hardly mean, as A.V. marg., 'things that are to be spoken of.'

οδηγὸς σοφίας is the guide 'of Wisdom' and not 'to Wisdom,' as A.V., Genev. *L* rightly has 'dux sapientiae,' but Arab. 'who leads to wisdom.' This is grammatically possible, but destroys the parallel with line 4.

16. This loose use of *ἐν χειρὶ αὐτοῦ* (cf. Isa. 40¹², 'who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand') should serve to prevent attempts to define the exact sense of the words in 3¹ and elsewhere.

With *λέγεις* cf. Exod. 4¹², 'I will be with thy mouth, and teach thee what thou shalt say.'

The second line seems to have little or no concern either with what goes before or what follows, and the commentators have been

17. For it was he that gave me an unerring knowledge of the things that be,

To know the ordering of the world and the working of the elements.

18. The beginning and end and middle of times,

The turn of the solstices and the changes of seasons,

exercised to devise a connection. *'Eργατεία*, a Byzantine word, would seem from its derivation from *έργατης*, 'a workman,' to mean 'handicraft,' and certainly cannot bear the meaning of 'works of God,' which Heydenreich (quoted by Grimm) would assign to it. The suggestion 'rerum gerundarum peritia,' which would include statesmanship, has more claim to attention, but in any case *φρόνησις* is here something much more special than 'understanding,' to which rendering R.V. of course adheres. There may be truth in Churton's suggestion that heaven-inspired artificers like Bezaleel are alluded to. In that case Farrar's rendering 'skill' for *φρόνησις* is adequate. Exod. 31³, *ἐνέπλησα αὐτὸν* (Bezaleel) *πνείμα θείον σοφίας καὶ συνέπειας καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ*.

The verse, says Grimm, is an inserted commonplace, and the γάρ in v. 17 connects not with it but with the preceding *σοφῶν διορθωτῆς*.

17. One would expect that *έμοι* would come first, as in v. 15, if the emphasis is on it, as the connection just indicated would require; 'he is the director of the wise, for here am I whom he instructed.'

σύστασις τοῦ κόσμου, the organisation of the world, appears in the *Timaeus*, 32c, in close connection with mention of the elements, *τῶν δὲ δῆ τετταρῶν ἐν ὅλον ἔκαστον εἰληφεν ἡ τοῦ κόσμου σύστασις*. ἐκ γὰρ πυρὸς παντὸς ὕδατος τε καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς συνέστησεν αὐτὸν ὁ συνιστάς. This seems to render it certain that *στοιχεῖα* here means the four elements, and not, as in a suggestion quoted by Dähne ii. 176, n. 107, 'the heavenly bodies' and their influence. The term might mean this, and S^r actually renders it so (جَمِيعَةُ الْأَنْوَافِ), as also (Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 288) the Ethiopic. Cf. Lidd. and Sc. s.v. ii. 5. After Plato the name *στοιχεῖα* for elements came into common use. Cf. 2 Pet. 3^{10.12}, *στοιχεῖα κανσούμπενα λυθήσεται*.

18. The first line seems so indefinite that it has given occasion for somewhat wild conjectures to fix its meaning. That 'beginning' can mean 'autumn,' 'end' summer, and 'middle' winter and spring (Grotius and Bauermeister, cited by Grimm) is incredible: to know the seasons is in the capacity even of beasts. A reference to 'the three divisions of the Greek month' is fantastic. A better suggestion is that of Heydenreich, that a knowledge of the periods of the world's history, possibly prophetic, is indicated. A general meaning is given by Deane, viz., 'a poetical circumlocution for the difference and

19. The cycles of years and the positions of the stars,
 20. The natures of animals and the tempers of beasts,
 The forces of spirits and the devices of men,
 The species of plants and the virtues of roots :

variety of the periods concerned in astronomical chronology,' and if this be interpreted (Farrar) to mean the knowledge requisite for constructing an astronomical calendar on sound principles, we probably have the true meaning. The possession of such powers has always been regarded with peculiar esteem among early civilisations.

τροπῶν ἀλλαγάς, the alternation or perhaps rather 'turn' (the exact period of the change) of the solstices, is quite a simple expression, *τροπαὶ* with or without *ἡλίου* being the regular word to denote midsummer and midwinter, though it is occasionally used for the movements of other heavenly bodies than the sun. But unfortunately the reading *τρόπων*, 'changes of manners' (an idea utterly foreign to the context), is found, and seems to have introduced general uncertainty into the passage. Grimm enumerates four renderings of *τροπῶν ἀλλαγάς*—(1) motions of the stars generally; (2) earthly effects produced by such; (3) turn of the solstices; (4) earthly effects produced by such. Furthermore, the Coptic (Margoliouth, *l.c.*, p. 288) translates 'airs' and *Σ^P* 'of things' generally. This latter and the Arabic 'conditions' may represent the reading *τρόπων*.

The use of *τροπαὶ* in Hellenistic Greek is rather uncertain. In Deut. 33¹⁴ we have *ἡλίου τροπαὶ*, but in Job 38³³, *τροπαὶ οἴρανοῦ*, and in James 1¹⁷, *τροπή* is of obscure meaning.

Similarly 'changes of seasons' for *μεταβολαὶ καιρῶν* is by no means a certain rendering. *καιρὸς* used absolutely in the sense of seasons is not classical. Its proper meaning is 'opportunities,' 'crises in human affairs,' and if that rendering be accepted it certainly favours the reading *τρόπων*, as does the Arab. 'vicissitudes of times.'

19. The translation 'circuits of years' is almost meaningless (A.V., R.V.), and to render in accordance with the classical usage, as in Eur., *Orest.*, 1661, *ἐνιαυτοῦ κύκλος*, 'the circling seasons'), is to repeat what has already been said. 'We must suppose that Pseudo-Solomon claims the knowledge of "cycles" lunar and solar, the intercalary method, the sacred and civil reckonings, etc.' (Deane).

Edersheim, *Hist. of the Jewish Nation*, p. 353, points out that for a considerable period mathematics, geometry, and astronomy were considered as the peculiar study of the Jews. And for their general intellectual superiority he cites Deut. 4^{5,6}, which, however, refers to legislation.

20. *φύσεις ζώων* is the general nature of living creatures, which might possibly include man. *θυμοὺς θηρίων* is the particular ways of beasts, and especially wild beasts; their disposition and (16⁵) their rages. 'Tempers' expresses both. *Λ* 'iras,' *Σ^b* 'rages,' *Σ^P* 'rage.'

'Wisdom' could find this in 1 Kings 4³³, 'he spake also of beasts, and of fowl, and of creeping things, and of fishes.' But still more in the book of Proverbs, which he would no doubt consider Solomon's own work, do we find constant allusions to the animal creation. Churton quotes in Prov. 1¹⁷, the simplicity of the bird ; the ant and roe in 6⁵⁻⁸ ; the ox in 7²² ; the swallow, horse, ass, and dog in 26², etc. ; the bird forsaking its nest, 27⁸ ; the lion and bear, 28¹⁻¹⁵ ; the leech, eagle, serpents, jerboas (properly rock badgers), locusts, spider (properly lizard), and ants in 30¹⁵⁻³¹. The statement of 1 Kings is practically repeated by Josephus, *Ant.*, VIII. ii. 5.

The translation of *πνευμάτων βίας* as 'forces of winds' (R.V., A.V., Genev., L, S^P, Arab.) is supported by a passage in Philo, *De Opif. Mundi*, § 19, where he says that it is possible for men, by observing the stars, to 'trace out' (not to control) *βίας πνευμάτων*. Yet this is almost certainly the wrong interpretation : when 'Wisdom' means the 'violence of winds,' he uses *βίας ἀνέμων* (4⁴), and some form of anti-thesis between *πνεύματα* and *ἀνθρώποι* is clearly required. We must translate 'spirits,' and the word *βία*, which generally means 'violence' (cf. *Prom. Vinct.*, Prol., where *bia* and *kratos*—violence and tyranny—are conjoined), seems to refer chiefly to evil spirits. It is useless to say that the belief in demons formed no part of the Alexandrian philosophy. The tradition was that Solomon's power extended over evil spirits especially, cf. Joseph., *Ant.*, VIII. ii. 5, 'God enabled him to learn that skill which expels demons . . . also he left behind him the manner of using exorcisms by which they drive away demons,' and in the Koran, *Sura xxi.*, evil spirits only are mentioned. It is pertinent to this passage to remark that in the Rabbinic theology angels when sent on missions to earth, take the form of *winds* ; when they stand before God, they are as fire. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, 167.

διαλογισμοί is of course not 'the thoughts of men's hearts' ; those are known to one only ; but their 'tricks,' their 'disputations' ; cf. the Judgment of Solomon in 1 Kings 3¹⁶ *sqq.* A like meaning of the word is found in Luke 9¹⁶, 'a dispute among them, which should be the greatest.' Phil. ii. 14, *χωρὶς γογγυσμῶν καὶ διαλογισμῶν*, so in 1 Tim. 2⁸, *χωρὶς ὀργῆς καὶ διαλογισμῶν*.

Διαφορὰς φυτῶν is certainly the species of plants. Grimm quotes Theophr., *Hist. Plant.*, VI. iv. 5 and VII. iv. 1.

δυνάμεις βιξῶν is a characteristic addition to the Scriptural statement in 1 Kings 4³³, 'he spake of trees, from the cedar tree in Lebanon even unto the hyssop that springeth out of the wall,' and is illustrated by the story in Josephus (*Ant.*, VIII. ii. 5) of the extraction of a devil through a man's nostrils by the aid of a root discovered by Solomon. One such root is actually described by the Jewish historian in *B. J.*, VII. vi. 3, as of the most wonderful power in driving away demons from sick persons. Its name is Baaras, and under ordinary circumstances it is certain death to touch it, etc.

21. And whatsoever is concealed and manifest I learned to know,
For Wisdom the contriver of all did teach me.

21. The enclitic *τε* is a very weak particle to act as a conjunction for two substantive clauses as here. It is questionable if a writer with an exact knowledge of Greek would have so used it; it is possible that 'Wisdom' really meant it to strengthen the *καὶ* which joins *κρυπτὰ* and *ἐμφανῆ*, but in 12⁸ he again uses it to join clauses. The rarity of *τε* in Hellenistic Greek is noteworthy. It occurs frequently enough in St. Paul's writings and those of St. Luke—the most polished Hellenists; thrice in St. Matthew and thrice in St. John, twice in St. James, once in St. Jude, and twice in the Apocalypse.

For *ἐμφανῆ* *L* gives the extraordinary rendering 'improvisa,' reading perhaps *ἀφανῆ*. This reading is actually found in Euseb. *Praep. Evan.*, XI. vii.; but there is another way of accounting for the *L* reading. Reusch (quoted by Cornely) conjectured that the original reading was 'in propositu,' which with the meaning of 'in prospectu,' or even 'in manifesto,' might really represent *ἐμφανῆ*. If the mistake was made it must have been very early, for S. Ambrose (*De Abrah.*, ii. 7) quotes the received text.

On the face of it, the claim to know all things secret and manifest seems an absurdity, and was laid hold of as such by the opponents of the use of the Apocrypha for religious purposes, during the German dispute on the subject in the early fifties of the last century.

But it is really only a repetition or expansion of what has already been said. The 'things manifest' are the operations of nature, the 'things concealed' are the 'forces of spirits and the devices of men.' No doubt Solomon did not possess these to the extent with which later Jewish tradition credited him, but the whole passage, the whole chapter indeed, expresses that tradition.

It is inadvisable, and probably does not express the writer's meaning, to translate *τεχνῖτης* by the word 'artificer,' which suggests the idea that Wisdom was the actual creator of things. That she should be, as an attribute of God, the contriver of natural order and of men's reasonings need not mean too much. It need not alter our interpretation when we find that God himself is called in 13¹ the *τεχνῖτης* of the world. Pseudo-Solomon is quite accustomed to use the same word loosely in different senses, as in the case of *ἐπισκοπή*, and the language of these three Solomonic chapters is so exaggerated that argument from the use of terms here is useless in reference to the other parts of the book. That in Prov. 8³⁰ Wisdom is called 'master-artist' (according to the correct version), and that Philo calls her the mother or nurse of the world (Dähne, i. 223, quoting *Quod deter. potiori insid.*, § 30), matters nothing. Philo's 'Wisdom' is the *Logos*. Our author's is not.

22. For there is in her a spirit of thought and of holiness,

Singly born yet manifold, subtile,
Mobile, lucid, unadulterate,
Clear, inviolable, loving goodness, acute,
Unhinderable, beneficent,

22. The above is a translation of the common text, as it may be called, accepted by Swete and Fritzsche, and based on the general consensus of the MSS. and the versions, *ἴστιν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεῦμα*. But very early variant, *ἴστιν γὰρ αὐτῇ πνεῦμα*, existed, as is proved by the quotations in Euseb., *Praep. Ev.*, vii. xii. 4 and xi. xiv. 4. It is also found in *Ἑλλ* and a few other MSS. of little value mentioned by Grimm.

A good deal depends on the reading here. If the variant is accepted we have something very like an identification of Wisdom with the Holy Spirit, which was favoured by the Fathers, who did not understand that this was to ascribe the doctrine of the Holy Ghost to an Alexandrian origin—a mistake of which full use has been made in modern times. It is likely that the variant was due to some supporters of this identification. The remarks of Reuss are brief and incisive: 'This last reading (*ἴστιν γὰρ αὐτῇ*) is evidently more favourable to the theory which considers Wisdom as a divine person or hypostasis, while the other implies a conception less advanced in this direction, and generally speaking less clear. It is precisely on account of this difference that we should prefer the received reading as the older.' This sums up the somewhat prolix note of Grimm who, however, raises a different point: 'The received reading also may be due to a Trinitarian copyist who wished to distinguish the third person of the Trinity from the second, the Son of God, who was identified with *σοφία*.' But this last statement assumes a good deal.

Drummond (*Philo*, i. 216) remarks that 'the distinction is one of words rather than of reality,' for a few lines further down (v. 2) 'wisdom' once more takes the place of the 'spirit' which is said to be 'in it.' The passage does not seem to justify this statement; an Bois' proofs (*Essai*, 234) that the Holy Spirit and Wisdom are the same are doubtful. When he says of this text that 'Wisdom is *πνεῦμα* or possesses a *πνεῦμα*', he ignores the whole point at issue. Gfrörer, ii. 222, also thinks that no difference is implied, and says the passage 'explains the whole of Philo' (223).

Unfortunately there exists a third reading also for line 1: *ἴστιν γι* *ἐν αὐτῇ*, which might mean 'She is in herself a spirit,' and so Bois translates it (*Essai*, 391); but this only introduces an alternative difficulty into a text already sufficiently difficult.

Noερόν is said to be a word borrowed from the philosophy of the Stoics, who used the somewhat incongruous phrase *πῦρ νοερόν*, and of their Supreme Being *τὸ περιέχον τὰ ὅλα νοερόν*. The term is, however, found in Plato and in Aristotle, and is considered Platonic by Burton, *Bampt. Lect.*, iii., n. 20.

23. Kind to man, certain, unerring, self-reliant,
 Universal in power, universal in purview,
 And pervading all spirits
 Of thought, of purity, of utmost subtilty.

23. The string of epithets which follows may also best be characterised in the words of Reuss. 'The commentators have remarked that they number twenty-one, and have discovered premeditation in this.' He is wrong in casting doubt upon the 'premeditation,' but right when he goes on to say, 'It is impossible to see anything here but a chance enumeration dictated by exuberant rhetoric; the epithets succeed one another without order, and, moreover, are partly synonymous.' 'We remark (1) that several of these epithets refer to intellectual faculties, while others concern moral virtues; (2) that the author enumerates at haphazard qualities which necessarily belong to the spirit considered as an emanation of divinity, and others which, though the product or effect of this spirit, are of a kind to be attached to humanity only, as is implied in the last phrase of the catalogue.' He sees in the list the confirmation of his remark previously made, that 'Wisdom in Jewish philosophy includes at once theoretic and practical elements.' For the 'classifications' to which he alludes we may refer to Grimm, p. 157, who discusses the efforts of Hasse and Baumgarten-Crusius to discover some order in this congeries of adjectives. It is impossible to say that the passage gives us any clear idea of the nature of Wisdom or of what the writer conceived her to be, and to write a detailed commentary on every epithet is the work of a lexicographer. The verses are a mere rhetorical exercise, very possibly based on the model of Cleanthes the Stoic quoted in Euseb., *P. E.*, XIII. iii. 44. *τάγαθὸν ἐρωτᾶς μ' οἵν τεστ' ἀκονε δῆ τεταγμένον, δίκαιον, δσιον, εὐσεβὲς, κρατοῦν ἑαντοῦ, χρήσιμον, καλοῦ δέον κτλ.* By the last obvious emendation for *καλὸν*, *δέον*, we bring the number of epithets to four times seven. A similar heaping together of adjectives is found in Philo, where 147 epithets are assigned to the Epicurean. That the number twenty-one is deliberately chosen can scarcely be doubted. Cf. on the mystic qualities of seven (and presumably of its multiples) Grimm's quotations, p. 157. The preservation of the exact number in the MSS. serves to correct the aberrations of the translators, who, confused by so many vague epithets, sometimes expanded one into two, so that the *S^P* has in place of 21 no less than 27, and the *L* 25 adjectives. The Arabic inserts two entirely unauthorised epithets between 'kind to man' and 'certain' in this verse, and so attains to the number of 23. The copyists were plainly influenced, some by a desire to maintain the sacred multiple of seven, some by the wish to make the number correspond with the letters of the Greek (or Hebrew) alphabet.

Of all these twenty-one, hardly any contain a definite idea or embody a philosophic truth. *Μονογένες* at first sight seems to

24. For Wisdom is more mobile than any motion,
Yea, she passeth and goeth through all things by reason
of her pureness.

provide material for discussion, but is presently explained away by *πολυμερές*. There is no reference to the genesis of wisdom. Drummond, i. 219, 'These are two contrasted terms, and must be considered in' relation to one another. The former expresses that unity which through the necessity of thought we ascribe to wisdom. We cannot rationally speak of two or more wisdoms, but only of one; and therefore, considered ontologically, it must be a single essence, 'only begotten,' not one of several similar emanations. Nevertheless if this unity it must be manifold, 'as its modes of action are various'—not, however, as Drummond assumes, in the various ordered processes of the natural world, but rather in the *διαλογισμοί* of men.

The last two lines seem almost without meaning, at least as they stand. That wisdom 'penetrates thoughtful minds' is a platitude after what has been already said. The versions endeavour to put some meaning into the phrase by referring the epithets to Wisdom herself. L has 'qui capiat omnes spiritus: intelligibilis, mundus, subtilis.' S' shortens the three epithets into two, 'clever and clear, still referring them to Wisdom. The Armenian (Margoliouth, p. 282) has 'is sufficient for all things.' These are not mistranslations but glosses—attempts to attach a meaning to an empty phrase. S' keeps to the order of the received text, but has twenty, or (taking in the last two lines of the verse) twenty-one or possibly twenty-three epithets.

24. The verse seems to be an explanation or expansion of the last sentence: Wisdom penetrates all souls prepared to receive her, because she penetrates all things. The expression *κινητικώτερον κινήσεως* (the neuter is grammatically correct, cf. Virgil's 'varium et mutabile semper femina') is clumsy but expressive. L has 'Omnibus mobilibus mobilior est sapientia.' S' is extraordinary: 'she is changed in all (kinds of) changes and (so) guided.'

The expression *δίηκει καὶ χωρεῖ* (L 'attigit ubique') seems to be a Stoic phrase. Grimm quotes the two words in conjunction from Plutarch and also from Athenagoras, *Suppl.* 6, Οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς δὲ ὑλης . . . φασι τὸ πνέυμα χωρεῖν τοῦ θεοῦ . . . δίηκει δὲ ὁ δὲ λόγος τοῦ κόσμου But the idea is a very common one in semiphilosophical writers who have no fear of pantheism before their eyes. Cleanthes, apud Tertullian, *Apol.*, xxi., is cited for 'permeator universitatis spiritus,' and Seneca, *Consol. ad Helv.*, viii., for 'divinus spiritus per omnia maxima ac minima, aequali contentione diffusus.' Farrar very appositely quotes lines from Wordsworth and Pope, the latter of whom, at any rate, would probably not be deterred by suspicions of unorthodoxy. Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, v. lvi. 5, gives the true Christian

25. For she is a vapour of the power of God,
 And an emanation of his all-governing glory, without
 alloy.
 For this cause no polluted thing stealeth into her.

26. For she is a reflection of eternal light,
 And a spotless mirror of the working of God,
 And an image of his goodness.

explication of such expressions. Other authorities for the Stoic formula are given in Drummond, *Philo*, i. 87, notes.

καθαρότης is wrongly translated by L 'munditiam'; for the idea is not of purity but of pureness, that is of 'sinceritas,' 'immateriality.' As immaterial, Wisdom can pass through all things where a material body could not. For this use of the word cf. Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. § 20, 'Ἄηρ μὲν οὖν καὶ οὐρανὸς αἱ καθαρώταται μοίραι τῆς τῶν ὀλων οὐσίας.

25. With this verse begins the puzzling account of Wisdom as an emanation. There seem to be three distinct metaphors employed—(1) the breath of God; (2) an exhalation, so to speak, of His person; (3) a ray of His brightness. Gfrörer, ii. 225, in a rather obscure passage, argues that *ἀτμός* and *ἀπόρροια* together make up the 'pleroma'; but *ἀπόρροια* has probably a distinct meaning of its own, not unlike that given to it by Empedocles and his school, who gave the name to the 'effluences' of objects by which they were assumed to impress themselves on the senses.

'*Ἄτμος* (for which the Armenian as quoted by Margoliouth, p. 285, and the Ethiopic must have read *ἀκτίς*—a reading not without its merits) finds some justification in Job 33⁴ (Elihu speaks), *πνεῦμα θεῖον τὸ ποίησαν με πνοή δὲ παντοκράτορος ή διδάσκοντά με*. Closer still is Eccl. 24³ (Wisdom speaks), 'I came out of the mouth of the most High and covered the earth like a mist.' For the latter idea (*όμιχλη*) compare Gen. 2⁶ (where, however, G translates *πηγή*) with Gen. I². See also Eccl. I⁹, 'poured her (Wisdom) out upon all his works.'

If, however, *ἀκτίς* could be read, *ἀπόρροια* might well mean an emanation in the form of light, for which sense Grimm quotes Marc. Aurel., ii. 4. Athenag., *Apol.*, p. 10. In that case the metaphor would be the same throughout, 'the ray; the beam; the reflection' (*ἀπαύγασμα*). S^h, 'a pure emanation of the thought of the ruler of all.'

παρεμπίπτειν is a curious word, or rather is used in a curious sense. A.V. translates it literally 'fall into her'; L more intelligibly 'in eam incurrit'; S^P and Arab. like A.V. But the meaning is rather 'creep into,' 'steal into unnoticed.' Aeschin., *De Falsa Leg.*, 51, 20, *παρεμπεσόντων εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν ήμῶν οὐκ ἐλευθέρων ἀνθρώπων*.

26. 'Απαύγασμα almost certainly means a 'reflection' and not a 'radiation.' The latter sense has already been expressed in the

preceding verse. The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, however, adopted this meaning in 1³, where ἀπάνυασμα is translated by R.V. 'the effulgence of His glory,' and correctly. The word occurs three times in Philo, twice with doubtful meaning, but once where it must mean 'reflection.' The passage is in *De Plantat.*, § 12. Philo is commenting on Exod. 15¹⁷, and says that the ἀγίασμα (by which he understands the whole world) is οὗτον ἀγίων ἀπάνυασμα, μίμημα ἀρχετύπου. It cannot here mean the radiance or effulgence of the saints.

The Fathers followed 'Hebrews' and interpreted this passage as referring to God the Son. So St. Augustine, *Serm.*, cxviii. 2, 'De Sapientia Patris, quod est Filius, dictum est, Candor est enim lucis aeternae. Quaeris Filium sine Patre. Da mihi lucem sine candore,' etc. This unhesitating identification of 'Wisdom' with the 'Son of God' it is that has given occasion for the theory that the whole doctrine regarding the second person of the Trinity is derived from the Alexandrian Logos idea.

It may be safely said that there is not a single word in 'Wisdom' to denote that the writer identified λόγος and σοφία, and yet half the arguments of the critics on this verse (e.g. Grimm, p. 163) depend on such a supposition. Bois (*Essai*, 234) argues for the identity. He adduces 9² as a proof that Logos and Sophia are the same. The words are, 'who madest all things by thy word, and by thy wisdom thou formedst man.' There is not the slightest indication here of a belief in the writer's mind that the 'word of God' was anything else than the spoken word of God. E.g. 'God said Let there be Light, and there was Light.' There is, indeed, in this passage no personification at all of either idea.

This is not the only difficulty raised by 'Wisdom's' metaphorical language. He so expresses himself that it might well seem that he identified God with material light. The writers of the Old Testament, though they represent God as surrounded by light (cf. Ps. 104², 'Who coverest thyself with light as with a garment') or in action like fire (Deut. 4²⁴, 'The Lord our God is like a consuming fire'), yet are careful, warned by the example of their neighbours, never to identify him with light or fire. In the New Testament we have the one instance of 1 John 1⁵ ('God is light'), but the language there is plainly as rhetorical as that of Wisdom. Philo is careful to speak of ἀσώματος αὐγῆ and of φῶς ψυχικόν (cf. Dähne, i. 272, and the notes there). Wisdom is not so cautious, but no doubt the vv. 29.³⁰ correct in part the materialistic idea here conveyed. 'Being compared with light, she is found to be before it,' etc. This does not prevent Pfeiderer (*Heraklit*, p. 301) from claiming φῶς αἰδίον as a distinctly Heraclitean idea.

It is possible that 'Wisdom' in his confused way, keeping to the idea of the mirror, means εἰκὼν to be the image in the mirror. The word is thus used in Plato, *Rep.*, III. 402 B, εἰκόνας γραμμάτων εἰς που ἦ ἐν ὑδαστιν ἦ ἐν κατόπτροις ἐμφαίνοντο οὐ πρότερον γνωστόμεθα κτλ.

27. But she being one can do all,

And abiding in herself maketh all things new,
And generation by generation passing into holy souls
Maketh them friends of God and prophets.

Though he never actually applies the word *ἀπαύγασμα* to the Logos, Philo in one passage gives us an explanation which may well serve to illustrate the metaphor: it is found in *De Somn.*, i. § 41, *κάθαπερ γάρ τὴν ἀνθήλιον αὐγὴν ὡς ἥλιον οἱ μὴ δυνάμενοι τὸν ἥλιον αὐτὸν ἴδειν ὄρωσι . . . οὕτως καὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰκόνα τὸν ἄγγελον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὡς αὐτὸν κατανοοῦσι.*

27. The A.V. has 'being *but* one she can do all things,' and so Siegfried. The R.V. leaves the point unsettled, as do the versions, *L*, *S^P* Arab., but plainly two senses can be given to the words: either (1) *in spite of* being only one she can do all; or (2) *by reason of* her self-containedness and unchangeableness. This latter seems to agree well with the second line. Assuming that Wisdom is another name for the Spirit of God, we have an exact parallel in 1 Cor. 12¹¹, *πάντα ταῦτα ἐνεργεῖ τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα*.

Similarly the next line *τὰ πάντα καινίζει* will then find a parallel in Ps. 104³⁰. *ἔξαποστελεῖς τὸ πνεῦμά σου καὶ κτισθήσονται, καὶ ἀνακανιεῖς τὸ προσῶπον τῆς γῆς.* What the precise meaning of the words in Wisdom is it is difficult to understand. The phrase seems a mere rhetorical enlargement. Taken, however, in conjunction with the next line, it may mean 'she renews the human race one generation after another, and in each influences holy souls.' The similar passages Heb. 6⁶ and Rev. 21⁵ give us no assistance here. Gfrörer's theory that the Platonic doctrine of 'ideas' (*Philo*, ii. 226), as the only really permanent things, is here indicated, is too ingenious. A passage of Anaxagoras (Arist., *Phys.*, viii. v. 10) quoted by Grimm, in which *νοῦς* is represented as at once *ἀπαθής* and *ἀμυγής*, illustrates our text better.

κατὰ γενεάς has been persistently misunderstood, except perhaps by Arab. The *S^P* has 'in every age,' and A.V. 'in all ages.' Genev. comes nearer to the sense of the Greek, 'according to the ages.' *L*, 'per nationes,' is peculiar. It would literally mean that Wisdom chose the best souls out of all (heathen) nations; but this is far too advanced an idea for the particularist Pseudo-Solomon. The idea of change from one generation to another is emphasised by the preposition in *μεταβάνοντα*.

For 'friends of God' cf. notes on v. ¹⁴. It is suggested, however, that 'Wisdom' had in his mind rather philosophic than Biblical ideas, and that ὁ μὲν σώφρων θεῶ φίλος· ὁμοίος γάρ (Plato, *Laws*, bk. iv. 716) suggested the idea to him as it may have done to Philo (*Frag. ap. Mangey*, ii. 652, from John of Damascus), πᾶς σοφὸς φίλος θεοῦ. Probably to both writers Jewish and heathen pronouncements were equally present.

28. For nothing doth God cherish save him that dwelleth with wisdom.

Ἐπροφήτης is an ambiguous term which has given rise to much controversy. Deane is right when he says that it means 'an interpreter of God's will, not necessarily one who foretells the future.' But he goes too far when he compares the English use of 'prophesying' for mere preaching. For the term 'prophet' always implied inspiration, in one form or another. Cf. Philo in Gfrörer, i. 57.

Farrar is no doubt wrong when he argues against Grimm that people like Wisdom would recognise 'ethnic inspiration.' That the greater Fathers did so is no proof that the Jews were capable of such large-mindedness. The best among them may have regarded the Greek poets and philosophers with respect, but for the most part their writings were considered as valuable just so far as they supported or could be made to support Hebrew views of religion. Thus 'the Sibyl' was used simply as a vehicle for something very like forgery.

From the words 'generation by generation' Grimm elicits the idea of a continuance of prophecy which he thinks is illustrated by Philo's own curious claim to inspiration (*De Cherub.*, §§ 7-10), and Josephus' account of the prophetic powers of John Hyrcanus (*Antt.*, XIII. x. 7) and of the Essenes (*B. J.*, II. viii. 12). But the latter statements are deprived of all worth by his lying story of his own prophetic powers (*B. J.*, III. viii. 9).

Bois proposes a most complicated rearrangement of the verses from 7²¹ onwards: thus 7^{21.29.30}, 8¹, 7²²⁻²⁸, 8² *sqq.* All such propositions proceed on the theory that Pseudo-Solomon is a continuous and philosophical thinker.

28. The meaning is, in such persons only are to be found the 'holy souls,' cf. v.²⁷.

The neuter οὐδέν or οὐθέν, instead of the masculine (which apparently no MS. of weight gives), perplexed the translators. Λ simply renders 'neminem.'

συνοικοῦντα, considering the recurrence of the metaphor, where it cannot be questioned, in 8² and 9¹⁶, may surely be understood here as of matrimonial cohabitation. Our own expression 'wedded to his books' and the like gives plenty of warrant for the idea. Such meaning is, however, questioned, because συνοικεῖν κακῷ, λύπῃ, φόβῳ are found; but these are obviously more extensions of the idea; cf. Tennyson's 'Sorrow, let me dwell with thee, no casual mistress, but a wife.'

Upon this metaphor of wedlock with wisdom, Dähne, ii. 170, n. 96, finds an argument for the Therapeutic authorship of Wisdom, the Egyptian ascetics being said in the *De Vita Contempl.*, § 8, to be eager to cohabit with Wisdom, though such union produces no mortal children. In reality the statement is rather an argument for the

29. For she is fairer than the sun,
 And above all order of the stars :
 Being compared with light, she is found superior ;

30. For to this doth night succeed,
 Whereas wickedness hath no power against wisdom ;

Christian origin of the tract, the language approaching that used in the Church of the 'Brides of Christ' and so forth.

29. This verse, as already mentioned, seems to be intended as a corrective to the ambiguity of v. ²⁶, where see notes.

It is possible that *ἀστρων θέσεις* means 'constellations,' as R.V. and Siegfried translate it. But this is embraced by the general term 'order of stars' which A.V., following Genev., adopts, and so L and Arab., while S^P, as usual, has an eccentric but possible interpretation, 'fixed stars.' The meaning of *ἀστέρων θέσεις* in v. ¹⁹ seems slightly different ; cf. notes there.

For *προτέρα* the 'elegant' reading *λαμπροτέρα* is found in one or two MSS., but is obviously a fanciful gloss.

30. The passage is paralleled by Soph., *Trach.* 30, *νὺξ εἰσάγει καὶ νὺξ ἀπωθεῖ διαδεδεγμένη* ; and the idea is a familiar one in poetry, as in a well-known English song—

'By yon bright moon above !'—'which can change like man's love,'
 'By the sun's brightest ray !'—'which night's clouds chase away,'
 and Hood's

'Wherever he may be, the stars must daily lose their light ;
 The moon must veil her in the shade, the sun will set at night.'

'Αντισχύειν with the genitive is not found elsewhere, nor indeed has it elsewhere the same sense as here, being used (in Dio Cassius) with the simple meaning of 'to repel by force.' We find, it is true, in Matt. 16¹⁸, *πύλαι ἄδου οὐ κατισχύσουσιν αὐτῆς*, and apparently on the strength of that passage Compl. reads (with a few MSS.) *οὐ κατισχύσει*.

The opposition of 'vice' and *σοφία* shows that 'Wisdom' is (as often) confusing Divine Wisdom with human, which is very nearly identical with virtue.

St. Bernard, quoted by Deane, joins this verse to the next chapter. It is preferable to join the first verse of the next chapter to this.

Such words in the mouth of Solomon seem out of place ; but Farrar offers an ingenious apology. 'The writer would have answered' (to such an objection) 'that Wisdom never enters into contact with vice, but withdraws from the soul, step by step, as evil enters into it,' Jer. 1^{3.6}. This explanation is certainly helped by the metaphor of day yielding to night.

8. 1. But in full might she reacheth from end to end,
And doth order all things properly.

2. Her I loved and diligently sought from my youth up,
And sought to take her as a bride for myself,
Yea, I became a lover of her beauty.

8. 1. This passage might well seem to round off the ideas of the previous verses. But here we have a sudden return from the conception of human wisdom to that of the divine. It is not the wisdom that repels vice which manages the world; that wisdom is concerned with the ordering of a man's own life. There can be no doubt as to the meaning of *ἀπὸ πέρατος εἰς πέρας*. It means 'the ends of the world,' and is so used (in the plural) twice by Philo (*De Mutat. Nom.*, § 3, and *Vita Mosis*, i. § 19 end). It is so translated in our own Anthem 'O sapientia' for December 16, 'Attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter.'

The idea expressed certainly comes very near to that of Philo's Logos or Sophia, and in a less confused writer the passage would be of great importance. Philo's words are (*De Migr. Abr.*, § 32), *συνέ-ζεσθαι τόδε τὸ πάνταν ἀράτοις δυνάμεστιν ἀπὸ γῆς ἐσχάτων ἄχρις οὐρανοῦ περάτων ὁ δημιοῦργος ἀπέτεινε.*

χρηστῶς is translated by A.V. 'sweetly,' and by R.V. 'graciously,' following the Fathers and all the versions and the Anthem above quoted. But in all these cases the object plainly is to get an effective antithesis between 'fortiter' and 'suaviter,' whereas the force of the word is really determined by *διοικεῖ*, which signifies 'household management' (Lidd. and Sc. s.v.), and was a favourite metaphor with the Stoics. One instance from *Diog. Laert.*, vii. § 133, may suffice. The problem is discussed *εἰ προνοίᾳ* (which properly means 'caution,' 'forethought') *διοικεῖται ὁ κόσμος*. The rendering is therefore (as margin of R.V.) 'unto good use,' 'skilfully,' almost, as we might say, 'with good husbandry,' and the reference in *διοικεῖν* is certainly to the matrimonial metaphor which follows, though the two senses of *σοφία* again become confused there.

2. It is impossible to doubt that love similar to that of husband and wife is here indicated. Apart from the other passages of similar import as 7²⁶, 8¹⁶, the verb used here, *φιλεῖν*, may be used of sexual affection. For the love of God to man or of man to God *ἀγαπᾶν* is generally used, cf. 7²⁸. Only of the love of God to Christ and to redeemed man is *φιλεῖν* used in John 5²⁰, 16²⁷, and so even of man's love for Christ, 1 Cor. 16²², *εἰ τις οὐ φιλεῖ τὸν κύριον, ἥτω ἀνάθεμα.*

We have a similar allusion to Wisdom as a wife in Eccl. 15² '(she shall) receive him as a wife married in her virginity,' and in Christian writers such language became too common. The climax was probably reached by Friedrich von Spee, who in his 'Trutz-Nachtigall' embodied hymns (to Christ) expressing such relation in the

3. She glorifieth her noble origin as being one that hath the converse of God,

Yea, and the Lord of all things cherished her;

most unguarded terms. So the word *έραστής* in line 3 is capable of the most sensuous meaning, which it actually seems to have in 15⁶. Budde, *Althebr. Lit.*, 279, thinks there is here an allusion to one of the many allegorical explanations of the 'Song,' viz. the wooing of Wisdom by Solomon, and Lincke (*Samaria u. s. Propheten*, 129) finds in this sexual description the new Eros, the god of Love for science), which he discovers in the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* of Plato. One passage in the *Phaedrus*, 250 D (quoted by Grimm), is striking. *φρόνησις οὐχ ὀράται δεινούς γάρ ἀν παρείχεν ἔρωτας, εἴ τι τοιούτον έαυτῆς ἐναργὲς εἰδώλον παρείχετο εἰς ὅψιν λόν.* Conybeare, in an excursus (p. 304) *On the Contemplative Life*, quotes Philo as believing that women could conceive διὰ τοῦ θεοῦ, and without human husband, and even recover their virginity by mystical union with God; but as Philo considers that the wives of the prophets were λόγῳ μὲν γυναῖκες, ἔργῳ δὲ ἀρεταῖ, his opinion is unimportant.

The 'beauty' of wisdom (or virtue) is an unobjectionable term, if it were not used in such a context. Xen., *Mem.*, II. i. 22, in the famous 'Choice of Heracles,' describes her as *εὐπρεπή τε ἰδεῖν, καὶ ἐλευθέριον φύσει, κεκοσμένην τὸ μὲν σῶμα καθαρότητι, τὰ δὲ ὅμματα αἰδοῖ, τὸ δὲ σχῆμα σωφροσύνῃ.*

Equally free from ambiguity is Prov. 7⁴, 'Say unto Wisdom thou art my sister, and call understanding thy kinswoman.' Pseudo-Solomon is, as usual, incautious.

3. This translation is given as that now commonly accepted. So R.V., A.V., Siegfried. Arab. is doubtful and L ambiguous, having 'generositatem *illius* glorificat' and not 'suam': possibly bad Latin only, and resting on the next words, 'omnium dominus dilexit illam.' S^p has 'there is joy and the glory of God in her partnership,' a rendering which Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 274, refers to a mistaken rendering of some lost Hebrew original, *תְּהִלָּה* meaning in new Hebrew 'joy,' and *תִּרְחָה* 'nobility.' Eccl. 24¹, 'Wisdom shall praise herself and shall glory in the midst of her people' supports this rendering. But Edersheim *ad loc.* thinks the sense there is, 'let Wisdom glorify herself'; the writer invites Wisdom to open her mouth and declare her excellence, and she responds.

This meaning is not satisfactory, and much is to be said for the translation suggested by Grotius, 'she glorifies the nobility of man,' that is, however noble a man may be, the possession of Wisdom increases his claim to respect. To object with Grimm that this is against Solomon's declaration of his natural equality with all men in 7¹⁻⁶ does not seem very forcible. 'Wisdom' overlooks such trifles; and, on the other hand, the explanation of the received interpretation—that she 'improves upon' her noble origin by continual converse with God,

4. For she is initiate into the knowledge of God,
And chooser of his works.

5. But if riches be a possession to be desired in life,
What thing is richer than wisdom that maketh all things
serviceable?

appears far-fetched. Very probably the writer uses δοξάζει in a forced sense, because he knows no better word.

συμβίωσιν is again an unfortunate term, as being almost appropriated to wedlock. The writer is careful to use not ἐφίλησεν but ἡγάπησεν in the next line, but how far such vague ideas could be carried we see from Philo *De Ebriet.*, § 8, ἐπιστήμη, ἡ συνών ὁ θεὸς οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἔσπειρε γένεσιν, which certainly seems reminiscent of Greek fable.

Of the second line §^P has a remarkable rendering, ‘because God is her father and the Lord of all loves her.’ Margoliouth, *loc. cit.*, justifies this as a double version of a double Hebrew text, אָבָה and אָהָבָה (‘her father,’ and ‘he loved her’).

4. This most mysterious passage has puzzled all translators. The above, which is the R.V., is probably near the correct rendering, but (1) μύστις is by some taken as μυσταγωγός, not the initiated but the initiator, and so L ‘doctrrix enim est disciplinae Dei.’ Arm. acc. to Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 285, must have read ἐραστής, and §^P has ‘She is the daughter of the secrets of God, and the daughter of all his counsels and the glory of all his works.’ (This ‘daughter,’ however, is a well-known periphrasis in phrases denoting character, quality, etc. Cf., for instances in Hebrew, Oxford *Heb. Lex.*, s.v. בָת, § 5.) Arab. reads, ‘The companion of the secret of the knowledge of God, and higher in dignity than all His works.’ What text the three can have had before them it is impossible to conceive.

We have then ἐπιστήμη θεοῦ, which Gfrörer, ii. 220, will have to mean the ‘knowledge of the being of God,’ *i.e.* she instructs men in the knowledge of God; but the next line shows plainly that it means ‘the knowledge which God possesses.’ Furthermore, he takes αἰρέτις as ‘disciple,’ comparing αἴρεσις in the sense of a ‘belief’ or ‘way of thought’ in Acts 24¹³⁻¹⁴. But this is not likely; the whole tone of the passage, whether we read αἰρέτις, or with some inferior authorities εὑρέτις, is distinctly in the direction of establishing Wisdom as a being apart from God. In a more systematic thinker it would be decisive: here it is very probably an unconsidered exaggeration, and we have the usual confusion of human wisdom in v.², and divine σοφία in this and the preceding verse.

5. The translation given leaves much to be desired. The real meaning of ἐργάζεσθαι seems to be to make money out of a thing: we might almost use the modern term ‘exploit.’ This is the rendering of the acute Nannius, and is accepted by Grimm and after him

6. And if understanding be regarded as a worker,
Who in all the world is a greater artist than she?

7. And if a man cherish righteousness,
Her labours are virtues;
For she teacheth temperance and prudence,
Justice and manliness,
Than which nought in life is more profitable to man.

by Farrar. We come down from the exalted 'wisdom' of v.⁴ to the merely human prudence which was after all the Jewish ideal. §^P is here a mere loose paraphrase, and Arab. keeps closely to the Greek, 'worketh all things.' But the worldly interpretation is supported by Prov. 8¹⁸, 'Riches and honour are with me. Yea, durable riches and righteousness.' So, too, Prov. 8¹², 'I wisdom have made subtilty my dwelling, and find out knowledge of witty inventions.' There is no disguising the fact that lucre is here indicated, as in the case of the 'virtuous' woman in Prov. 31^{10.12.13}, whose chief commendation is her gainful handiwork.

6. This translation is suggested with hesitation. It is that of the A.V., of Siegfried, and of the Arabic. §^P seems to take no account of the words *τῶν ὄντων*, which are generally rendered as R.V., 'who more than wisdom is an artificer of the things that are?' That *φρόνησις* is here used as equivalent to *σοφία* need not surprise us; but an alternative rendering is possible, 'if human wisdom is a worker, who more than *she* (i.e. the heavenly wisdom) is an artificer of the things that are?' Human wisdom can produce results, but only heavenly wisdom can call into being things permanent and self-existent (Gregg).

The conjecture *ἐράξεται* is useless; there is no such word. More is to be said for Schulthess's proposed reading *εἰ φρονήσεως ἐρᾶ τις*, and still more for Bauermeister's *εἰ φρόνησιν ἐργάξεται (τις)*, for this was what §^P read حَلَقَ مَنْصُوراً 'If a man desire to work cunningness.' But the rendering proposed 'If a man desire to seek wisdom eagerly,' is hardly supported by John 6²⁷, 'Labour not after the bread that perisheth,' where manual toil is indicated.

The difference between *τεχνῖτις* (Swete) and *τεχνίτης* (the received text) is unimportant.

Churton naturally refers for an illustration to Bezaleel: Exod. 31³, quoted on v.¹⁶.

Bois suggests an emendation *εἰ δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως ἔραται καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἀγαπᾶ τις, οἱ πόνοι ταύτης . . . ἀνθρώποις τίς αὐτῆς τῶν ὄντων μᾶλλον ἔστι τεχνίτης*; a conflation of vv. 6, 7.

7. The paucity of our author's vocabulary is shown by his repetition of *δικαιοσύνη* in the first line as the general goodness of a man's life:

8. But if also a man long for much experience,
 She knoweth the things of old and how to surmise of the
 things to come ;
 She understandeth the tricks of arguments and the answers
 of riddles ;
 Of signs and wonders she hath foreknowledge,
 And of the issues of seasons and times.

in the fourth in its distinctive sense, *i.e.* fairness as between man and man.

Nothing can be argued from this passage, which is a mere commonplace of the schools, as to Pseudo-Solomon's acquaintance with Greek philosophy. Platonists and Stoics alike used the formula of the four virtues, sometimes with slight variations, such as the substitution of *εὐσέβεια* for *φρόνησις* or *ἀνδρεία* (also written *ἀνδρία*, cf. Lidd. and Sc. *s.v.*). The formula is repeatedly dwelt upon in the Stoical writing 'On the Dominion of Reason,' otherwise known as *4 Maccabees*, the date of which is probably nearly that of Wisdom. In 1¹⁸ of that book we have *φρόνησις, δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη*; but the greatest of these is *φρόνησις*. In vv. 22.²³ we have a sort of commentary on the formula (with *εὐσέβεια* for *φρόνησις*), and there is a similar exposition in Cic., *De Fin.*, v. xxiii. § 67. St. Ambrose was, according to A. Lapide, the first to describe these as the 'cardinal' virtues; but the enumeration has been criticised as tautological and confused. Cf. Whewell, quoted by Farrar.

Grimm argues that Pseudo-Solomon could not have used the formula in its Platonic sense, which, he says, depended on the trichotomy of human nature which he nowhere recognised; but why it should also be declared that he could not have used it in the Stoic sense is not clear. On the contrary, he seems to have deliberately adopted the Stoic term *φρόνησις*, which they habitually used in place of *σοφία*.

The allegorical interpretation of the four rivers of Paradise as the four cardinal virtues in Philo, *Legis Alleg.*, i. § 19, is well known, but it throws no light upon the interpretation of 'Wisdom.' Cf., however Eccl. 24.^{25,26}.

8. The variant *εἰκάζει* in line 2 is probably the conjecture of a scribe who saw the absurdity of 'surmising' about the past. The translation given avoids the difficulty, but it is very likely that the writer, in his loose fashion, intended *εἰκάζειν* to govern both *ἀρχαῖ* and *μέλλοντα*. *πολυπειρία* likewise seems to be loosely used—wide knowledge (of the world) is probably the meaning which 'Wisdom could have attached to it, and so *¶* 'multitudinem sapientiae.' The versions (S^P and Arab.) both take the obvious sense of the passage 'she knows the past and divines the future'; but that is hardly the Greek.

9. I determined then to take her to live with me,
 Knowing that she will be to me a counsellor in prosperity,
 And a comfort in cares and grief.

στροφὰς λόγων is translated 'tricks,' in order to preserve the original force, which is that of the twistings and turnings of a wrestler. A parallel passage occurs in Eccl. 39²³ (of the wise man), 'he will enter in amidst the *στροφαὶ* of parables. He will seek out the hidden meaning of proverbs and be conversant in the *ἀνίγματα* of parables.' It seems probable, however, that the literal meaning of *λύσεις αἰνίγμάτων*—'solution of riddles'—is here the right one; for the propounding and solving of riddles has always been a favourite exercise of Oriental 'wisdom.' For the 'riddles' of the Old Testament cf. Jud. 14¹² (Samson's riddle), Ezek. 17² *sqq.* (the great eagle), and for Solomon's especial skill in such matters cf. 1 Kings 10¹. Farrar refers to a collection of 'Aenigmata Hebraica' by Bellermann (1798). The son of Sirach (cf. also 47¹⁷) does not refer to riddles so much as to parables.

The words 'foreknows signs and wonders' are peculiar, but explicable, as by Churton 'Wisdom also includes the careful observation of natural phenomena, by which men discover the approach of earthquakes' (we should rather say eclipses) and other 'signs and wonders.' But Grimm insists that a prophetic foreknowledge of signs and wonders is indicated; his reasons are not clear or cogent. We may take 'wonders' as having reached in Wisdom's time the meaning of 'remarkable natural phenomena'; signs are the indications by which, for example, so common a matter as the weather is foretold. Cf. Matt. 16², *τὸ μὲν πρόσωπον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ γινώσκετε διακρίνειν, τὰ δὲ σημεῖα τῶν καιρῶν οὐ δύνασθε.* Such a function of Wisdom is not a very exalted one, but it is very Hebraic. It is fortunate that the collocation of *σημεῖα καὶ τέρατα* occurs in the Old Testament: cf. Jer. 32²⁰, 'Who didst set signs and wonders in Egypt.' Otherwise it would undoubtedly have been argued that the New Testament writers (John 4⁴⁸; Acts 2¹⁹, 14³; Rom. 15¹⁹; 2 Cor. 12¹²) had copied 'Wisdom.'

Similarly *καιροὶ καὶ χρόνοι* has become a common phrase of Hellenistic writers, as Dan. (¶) 2²¹, and Acts 1⁷, 1 Thess. 5¹. It may be doubted whether Pseudo-Solomon meant to distinguish very closely between the words; but in classical writers they are plainly defined. Cf. Pseudo-Dem. *in Neaeram*, 1357, 2, etc. (quoted by Deane), where *χρόνος* is a long period; *καιρὸς* a specific conjuncture of events. So L 'tempora' and 'saecula.' A Lapide 'opportunitates et tempora.' The R.V. 'seasons and times' is meaningless, unless we take 'seasons' as we find it in the words 'seasonable' and 'unseasonable.' For a knowledge of the proper time for action is plainly implied. Siegfried's 'the developments of periods in times' is not very illuminating.

9. The idea of connection as with a wife is pursued. *ἀγάγεσθαι* is

10. Through her I shall have repute among the multitudes,
And honour with the elders, being young.

an ancient classical expression for 'to lead a bride home' (Lat. 'ducere uxorem'), and is as old as the time of Homer, *Od.*, vi. 159, and xiv. 211, ἡγαγόμην δὲ γυναῖκα (Lidd. and Sc., s.v. ἡγω). A little supported variant (Gr.) omits ἀγάγεσθαι, in which case we should have simply 'I chose her to live with me,' but this may well be the work of a transcriber who disliked the sexual idea.

σύμβοντος ἀγαθῶν is quite naturally translated (A.V., S^P, Arab. Genev.) 'a counsellor of good things.' Siegfried's 'luck-bringing counsellor' is neat, but hardly justified by the Greek, and R.V., 'one who would give me good thoughts for counsel,' is almost meaningless. While the marginal rendering, 'hold counsel with me for good things, is little better. The meaning is practically decided by the next line 'a comfort in cares and grief.' ἀγαθά is used as elsewhere in these chapters, e.g. 7¹¹, 'all worldly blessings came to me with her,' viz. riches and the like. The peculiar use of the genitive has its parallels in Hellenistic Greek; cf. Winer (ed. Moulton), § xxx. 2 (a); and σύμβοντος with the genitive denoting purpose occurs in 2 Chron. 22³, μῆτρη ἦν σύμβοντος τοῦ ἀμαρτάνειν. Παραίνεσις for παραμυθία, 'comfort, is peculiar; we may set it down to 'Wisdom's' imperfect knowledge of Greek, or else to some Hellenistic usage for which we have no other parallel. L has 'allocutio,' which seems to be merely the literal rendering of a translator who could not interpret the word; though 'alloqui,' with the sense of 'comforting,' is classical. Orelli on Hor. *Epd.*, xiii. 18, cites several examples. Both S^P and Arab. have 'one that would repel from me cares and grief,' for which there is no warrant whatever in the present Greek text.

10. The use of ὥχλος for 'public assembly' is rare, the word being generally used contemptuously as of a 'mob,' cf. note on 6²; but there is a close parallel in Xen., *Mem.*, III. vii. 5, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς ὥχλοις ἦ ἐταῖς ἴδιαις ὅμιλαις. The use of the word in this rare sense so struck the older commentators (L 'habebit claritatem ad turbas') that they sought to make ὥχλοι mean 'the Gentiles'; a meaning without parallel. We do have a reference in v. 14 to Solomon's influence among 'the nations' but there the usual term ἔθνη is employed.

The question of Solomon's age when he came to the throne is not a very profitable one. Josephus, *Ant.*, VIII. vii. 8, says he was fourteen; in his prayer at Gibeon (1 Kings 3⁷) he says, 'I am but little child'; and in 1 Chron. 22⁶ and 29¹ (the latter even when he received the homage of the people), David speaks of him as 'youth and tender.' In 1 Kings 11⁴, after a forty years' reign, he is described as an old man. More to the purpose is Eccles. 47¹⁴, 'How wise was thou made in thy youth, and filled like a river with understanding coupled with the sad and stern verses which follow.'

11. Acute shall I be found in judgment,
And in the sight of potentates I shall be admired.

12. They shall wait on me when I am silent,
And to me when I speak they shall attend,
And when I talk at large
They shall lay a hand upon their mouth.

13. Through her I shall have immortality,
And shall leave an eternal memorial to them that come
after me.

11. The reference in line 1 is possibly to the famous 'judgment of Solomon' in 1 Kings 3¹⁶ *sqq.*, but the idea of acute judgment is inseparable from that of the ideal Oriental kingdom, where, on the one hand, the prince is supreme judge, and, on the other hand, the courts of law teem with such chicanery that it requires a veritable Solomon to pronounce a fair decision.

δυνασταὶ seems to have no distinct reference either to Solomon's governors (cf. Joseph., *Ant.*, VIII. ii. 3) or to the foreign rulers with whom he came in contact. These are rather alluded to in 5¹⁴.

¶ has an addition to this verse : 'et facies principum mirabuntur me,' which is said to be an enlargement or paraphrase of the preceding lines. Certainly the versions show no trace of it.

12. §^P according to the translation in Walton's Polyglot would read 'more and more they lay their hand upon their mouth' : this is attractive, but probably incorrect ; it would mean that the translator took ἐπὶ πλεῖον (a curious expression) with the last line, but Δῆμος, δῆμος probably goes together, 'when I speak much,' or 'at length.'

With the whole passage compare Job 29⁷ *sqq.*, 'When I went forth to the gate unto the city, when I prepared my seat in the street, the young men saw me, and hid themselves ; and the aged rose up and stood ; the princes refrained talking, and laid their hand on their mouth ; the voice of the nobles was hushed, and their tongue clave to the roof of their mouth.'

For the expression 'to lay the hand on the mouth' as a token of reverence cf. further Job 21⁶, 'Mark me, and be astonished, and lay your hand upon your mouth,' and Eccl. 5¹², 'If thou hast understanding, answer thy neighbour, and if not, let thy hand be upon thy mouth.'

φθεγγομένω προσέξουσι (τὸν νοῦν) is a common expression ; cf. 13¹ and 14³⁰, as also Acts 8⁶, προσεῖχον οἱ ὄχλοι τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου, and 1 Tim. I⁴, but it may be noted that the Armenian has 'gaze upon,' and §^P also ւիւն.

13. Ἀθανασίαν, 'clearly of the subjective kind, *i.e.* undying fame, as

14. I shall govern peoples, and nations shall be subjected unto me.

15. Dreaded tyrants shall fear when they hear of me,
In assembly I shall appear good and in war courageous.

the context shows' (Gregg). To attempt to reduce Wisdom's idea of immortality to this posthumous reputation is absurd. When we speak of the immortal Shakespeare we have no eschatological meaning in our words, and whether there is any 'higher meaning' implied in v. ¹⁷, as Deane suggests, is questionable.

Nevertheless there seems to be a recurrence here to the old Jewish idea. 'The memory of his deeds, and his name perpetuated in his descendants, constituted the immortality that the early Hebrew looked for' (Gregg). Even in Greek the word 'immortality' is not found before Plato. The *ἀθάνατοι* of earlier Greek literature are the gods as opposed to mortals.

With *μνήμην ἀιώνιον*, cf. Ps. 112⁶: *εἰς μνημόσυνον αἰώνιον ἔσται δίκαιος*, 'the righteous shall be had in everlasting remembrance.'

In *Ἑ* (a palimpsest) there is found after *ἀθανασίαν* the beginning of a line *καὶ τιμὴν παρὰ*. Possibly *τοῖς ἐκγόνοις* is to be supplied, but the remainder is indecipherable.

14. *Λαοί* probably means the tribes who were actually under Solomon's sway. Its classical force is that of an orderly multitude (*populus*), and in *Ἑ* it is constantly used of Israel, e.g. Exod. 1²⁰, *ἐπλήθυνε ὁ λαὸς καὶ ἴσχυε σφόδρα*. *ἔθνη*, on the other hand ('nations'), must be the Gentiles over whom Solomon's influence extended. Let us observe the distinction. In Ps. 57¹⁰, which is appealed to as proving the words identical, it is quite possible that the difference also exists, 'will praise thee in Israel and also among the Gentiles.'

For the form of expression cf. Ps. 18⁴⁷, *ὁ θεὸς ὁ διδοὺς ἐκδικήσει ἐμοὶ καὶ ὑποτάξας λαοὺς ὑπ' ἐμέ*, nearly repeated in 144², and for the general idea Prov. 8¹⁵, 'By me kings reign, and princes decree justice.'

15. There is no occasion for the clumsy addition of R.V., 'Among my people I shall show myself a good ruler.' *ἄγαθός* is, it is true, difficult to translate by a single English word, but the sense is plain; it is that of Homer, *Il.*, iii. 179, *αὐτότερον βασιλεὺς τ' ἄγαθος, κράτερός αἰχμητής*. So Scott, *Lady of the Lake*, iii. 16, 'Sage counsel in cumbe Red hand in the foray.'

For this use of *πλῆθος* as the assembled people, cf. Xen., *Mem.*, i. i 42: *νόμοι εἰσὶν οὓς τὸ πλῆθος συνελθὸν καὶ δοκιμάσαν ἔγραψε*. So it is in Exod. 12⁶, where it answers to *לִבְרָה*, and Eccl. 6³¹, 7¹⁴, *ἐν πλήθει πρεσβυτέρων*. Deane remarks that 'this is an idea (viz. of a popular assembly) quite foreign to our author's notions.'

16. When I come home I shall rest with her;
 For intercourse with her hath no bitterness,
 Nor cohabitation with her vexation,
 But cheerfulness and joy.

17. Considering these things in myself,
 And pondering in mine heart
 That there is immortality in the kinship of wisdom,

As a parallel to line 1 we have Ps. 18⁴, 'As soon as they hear of me they shall obey me.' The addition of *φρικτοί* seems to prove that 'tyrants' is used in its modern (and later Greek) sense. Thus the comparison with 1 Kings 10²⁵ 'All kings of the earth (Ἑ) sought to Solomon to hear his wisdom' is not clear. §^h enforces the idea by rendering 'frightened tyrants.'

16. When I come home is plainly 'when I return harassed by the cares of the council or the campaign.' Grimm and Farrar gloss the passage by saying that 'Wisdom also procures for a man domestic peace,' but the allusions to actual conjugal affection are undeniable. Grimm himself quotes from Nicostratus (a middle comedian) in Stob. *Floril.*, lxx. 12, *τῇ γυναικὶ ἀνὴρ προσαναπάντεται*, and so A.V., 'I will repose myself with her.' Joseph., *Ant.*, xx. ii. 1 uses the word in the strongest sense. So *Ἄ* 'conquiescam cum illa.' §^p has 'I rest in her,' which has a different force, and Arab., strangely enough, 'I guide myself by her.' Plainly the translators did not like the comparison to an actual wife. So Gregg, 'the Greek word . . . has special reference to the intercourse of intimates, friend with friend, brother with brother, father with son.' It may be so used; but the natural meaning is that given.

συναναστροφή is a general word for intercourse, as in 3 Macc. ii. 33, 'intercourse and traffic' between faithful Jews and apostates.

It is held that this passage proves our author's acquaintance with the 'choice of Heracles' in Xen. *Mem.*, II. i. 32 *sgg.*; and it is certainly remarkable that so many expressions in these verses have their parallels in that book. But the apologue is ascribed to Prodicus the sophist, and was probably a commonplace of Greek moral philosophy.

17. The metaphor from conjugal love is pursued, though *συγγένεια* in classical Greek seems rather to denote blood relationship than matrimonial affinity. Why it should be said (Farrar) that *ἀθανασία* is here used in its loftier sense of *personal* immortality does not appear. Grimm remarks that it is as indefinite here as in v. ¹³. §^p has simply 'life.'

8. And in the love of her pure delight,
 And in the labours of her hands wealth unfailing,
 And understanding in common exercise in her company,
 And fair repute in the sharing of her talk,
 I went about to seek how I may take her to myself.

19. Now I was a child of fine parts,
 And to my lot fell a good soul,
 Or rather being good I entered into a body undefiled.

18. Purity is plainly the idea intended in *τέρψις ἀγαθή*, and the idea of mere sensual delight thus excluded; 'honestata,' A Lapide. Siegfried's 'angenehme Ergötzung' is quite beside the mark.

In line 2 recurs the practical idea of the value of the good (an-industrious) woman to her husband, Prov. 31¹⁰⁻³¹. **L** has 'honestata sine defecione,' which no version supports.

συγγυμνασία is a late and rare word, to which **L** probably gives it true force 'in certamine loquelae illius.' Some kind of dialectica disputation, of the kind which down to a hundred years ago was supposed to afford the best training for the intellect, is referred to 'wrestling in argument with her is a liberal education.' Whether the *σύν* implies 'community' or 'completeness' matters little. **S^h**, 'i equality of discipline of teaching.'

But *κοινωνία λόγων* is certainly not 'communication of her ideas' (Wahl and Gregg), it is the completion of the preceding line 'sharing in her discourses.'

The last line, 'I went about to seek,' etc., is not without significance in reference to the question of the separate doctrines of chaps. 7- (cf. Introd., § 9): here Solomon is going about to get wisdom; in 6 Wisdom is going about to find men.

19. On this famous passage almost volumes have been written. The versions vary; they did not understand that 'Wisdom' could be correcting himself by the *μᾶλλον δὲ*. Hence **L** has 'Et cum esset magis bonus veni ad corpus incoquinatum.' **S^P**, 'And on account of my goodness I came,' etc. The Arabic only has **ل**, 'but rather 'no, on the contrary.'

For the whole question cf. Additional Note A, where the subject is fully discussed. It is unfortunate that judgment is darkened by the obstinate belief of German writers (even Grimm) that the only reason why some critics cannot recognise the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls here is that they think it unorthodox. So, too, Drummond's *Philo*, i. 200, seems to be biased by his idea that 'Wisdom' only represents imperfect doctrines afterwards elaborated by Philo. T

these critics the $\mu\bar{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\bar{o}\nu$ δὲ means this: Pseudo-Solomon said carelessly that he 'got a good soul,' but then remembering that he believed in pre-existence, instead of erasing the preceding line, put in another to correct it.

Now the Stoical doctrine to which 'Wisdom' was chiefly, if not entirely, indebted, took no particular account of pre-existence. Its teaching is well set forth by Drummond, i. 112, 'The soul, being strictly a part of the universal Logos, was not an eternal individual entity which took up its abode in the temporary prisonhouse of the body, but first sprang into separate existence along with its corporeal dwelling. It derived its natural origin from parts of the souls of the parents, and grew by an orderly development, possessing prior to birth only a vegetative existence, but afterwards when it was chilled by the air and hardened, rising into animal life.' Cf. the authorities quoted in his notes.

To enter here upon the rival doctrines of Creationism and Traducianism would be beside the mark. We need only consider the rendering which, rejecting the idea of pre-existence, we can give to this passage. It may simply mean, as Mr. Deane puts it, 'I was by nature endowed with good qualities of body and soul, or rather, it was because my soul was good and pure that a corresponding body was given it, and thus the $\epsilon\bar{u}\phi\bar{u}\bar{\iota}\bar{a}$ was brought about.' So the writer in *Church Quart. Rev.*, April 1879, p. 90, 'That a body without blemish should be appointed for a soul that is good is no more an assertion of the transmigration of souls than the doctrine of the physiognomists of the connection between character and bodily form.' Pre-existence, however, does not necessarily imply transmigration. Cf. Blunt *ad loc.*

That the pre-existence of souls is contrary to all Christian theory is plain enough: it might imply something like transmigration, and it is true that various efforts were made by 'orthodox' commentators to explain the passage away. L, as above quoted, took $\mu\bar{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\bar{o}\nu$ with $\bar{\alpha}\gamma\bar{\alpha}\theta\bar{o}\bar{s}$, and meant that 'when the soul became better,' its body correspondingly became 'undefiled.' Another method was to take $\bar{\eta}\lambda\theta\bar{o}\bar{v}$ as a pluperfect, 'I had come' (which is not impossible). For a very full account of these various interpretations, see Bissell *ad loc.*

Gregg's comment is, 'he is true to Old Testament teaching in not asserting that the cause of man's frailty is to be found in his physical nature, or that the flesh is in itself sinful or the seat of sin,' for which he quotes Davidson, *Theology of Old Testament*, p. 192. 'His body is unstained; he starts life without prejudice.' But if this is the common lot of all men, why is Solomon made to say that he in particular 'came into a body undefiled'?

20. But knowing that I shall not otherwise acquire her unless
God give her,

And that this was a point of prudence, to know from
whom this favour should come,

I met the Lord and prayed of him,
And said with my whole heart :

9. 1. God of the fathers and Lord of mercy,
That didst make all things by thy word,

20. The idea that *ἐγκρατής* can mean ‘temperate,’ ‘in control of myself,’ though supported by *L. S^P* and the arguments of Grimm, has nothing to commend it. It is an attempt to force a Platonic idea on an un-Platonic writer, adopted indeed by St. Augustine (quoted by Deane), but out of all accord with the meaning of the passage. Arab. has the correct interpretation, and so A.V., Genev., ‘I could not enjoy her except God gave her’; R.V. (with the suggestion that ‘the Greek is defective,’ *i.e.* that *αὐτῆς* is omitted), and all the best modern critics. Even Farrar here deserts Grimm. Bois points out that Solomon in the great ‘prayer’ does not ask for continence: his paraphrase is, ‘I was a child of noble nature and all the rest; but I knew that I could not get Wisdom unless I prayed God for her; therefore I prayed for her.’ The omission of a genitive after *ἐγκρατής* is no doubt unusual, but is perfectly paralleled by Eccl. 6²⁷, *ἐγκρατής γενόμενος μὴ ἀφῆς αὐτήν* (15¹ has a genitive). *S^h* has distinctly ‘to be in possession of her.’

ἐνέτυχον is here literally translated: that it has also the subsidiary meaning of ‘to approach in prayer,’ ‘to plead with,’ is undoubtedly; as in 16²⁸, *πρὸς ἀνατολὴν φωτὸς ἐντυγχάνειν σοι*. Cf. Rom. 11², *ἐντυγχάνει τῷ θεῷ κατὰ τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ*, and Heb. 7²⁵. But having regard to 1 Kings 3⁵, ‘In Gibeon the Lord appeared to Solomon in a dream by night,’ etc., it seems better to keep to the original and pregnant meaning.

9. 1. This verse and the succeeding verse are quoted as proving the identity of *λόγος* and *σοφία*. There is nothing to justify such an idea. ‘Wisdom’ is alluding, cursorily and not of set purpose, to the statements in Gen. 1^{3,6,9}, etc., ‘God said, Let there be . . . and there was.’ ‘Wisdom’ has an idea of the ‘Word of God,’ but it is that of the Old Testament. Twenty passages could be quoted from that Old Testament in which the ‘Word of the Lord’ is personified far more distinctly than here, or anywhere in the book except in 18¹⁶, on which see notes. The ‘Word of the Lord’ is to all intents the mere ‘utterance’ of God, as it might be the ‘utterance’ of any mortal man except that by reason of its source it is more efficacious.

Hoennicke in Herzog (art. ‘Weisheit’) points out that 1*b* and 2*a* are not parallel; that they are progressive: the word formed the world wisdom invented man; yet orthodox writers like the one in Vigour

2. And through thy wisdom didst form man
To have rule over the creatures made by thee,
3. And rule the world in sanctity and righteousness,
And judge judgment in uprightness of heart;

oux, *Dict. de la Bible*, v. 1350, insist that *σοφία* and *λόγος* are here identical. Gregg's quotation of Ps. 33^{6,6} is very apt: *τοῦ ἐλέοντος κυρίου πλήρης ἡ γῆ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ κυρίου οἱ οὐρανοὶ ἐστερεώθησαν*. The whole idea is Hebraic and not Greek: so Grimm, quoting Eccl. 42¹⁵, 'In the words of the Lord are His works.' To say with Deane that *ἐν λόγῳ* 'adumbrates the personal word,' is to play into the hands of those who would derive all Christian doctrine from Alexandrian sources.

In line 1 a curious variant occurs: 'Lord of thy mercy.' It is adopted by Swete, supported by \mathfrak{G}^B and other good MSS., uncial and cursive, but among the versions by Arab. only. It is possible that *σου* was added by mistake from the end of line 2. For a parallel expression cf. 2 Cor. 1³, *ὅ πατὴρ τῶν οἰκτιρμῶν*. But if *σου* be added the expression ceases to be merely qualificative, and must be rendered 'controller of thy mercy'; which is an improbable meaning here. \mathfrak{G}^P has the plural 'mercies,' or rather 'pitifulnesses.' R.V. 'Lord who keepest thy mercy,' is absolutely indefensible.

Bois, considering that *πρωτόπλαστον*, *πατέρα κόσμου*, and *μόνον κτισθέντα* all amount to the same thing, but that *πατέρα κ.* may be due to Pseudo-Solomon's dislike of proper names, would read *κόσμου οὐ μόνον*, and then, as *καὶ . . . τε* is irregular for *τε . . . καὶ*, he would give an adversative sense to *τε* and translate 'Wisdom not only guarded the first man, and the fathers of the world, when once created, but also gave him power, etc.'

2. It is quite possible that the writer meant 'in thy wisdom.' To elevate 'wisdom' here into the position of a subordinate Creator is absurd. The author is writing 'currente calamo,' as is evident from the whole tone of the passage. His language is that of a sermon, not of a theological disquisition. *Ἐλέος*, *λόγος*, and *σοφία* are precisely in the same category. They are all attributes of God; of their separate existence from God there is no hint or indication.

There is a slight anacoluthon. The participle *ποίησας* in v. 1 should be followed by a participle and not an indicative verb here, and so a few MSS. read *καρασκευάσας*: an obvious correction of the scribes.

The reminiscence of Gen. 1²⁶, Ps. 8⁷, 'Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands' is obvious: Deane quotes also Hermas; *Vision III. iv. 1*, where the same word *δεσπόζειν τῆς κτίσεως πάσης* is used.

3. The verse is without special interest with regard to Wisdom's opinions. *δσιότης* as representing man's duty towards God, and

4. Give to me wisdom that sitteth by thy throne,
And reject me not from among thy servants.
5. For I am thy servant and the son of thine handmaid,
A man weak and shortlived
And inferior in understanding of judgment and of laws.

δικαιοσύνη as denoting his duty towards his fellowmen, constitute a well-known philosophic antithesis, which occurs in the prophecy of Zacharias, Luke 1⁷⁶, 'in holiness and righteousness before him all the days of our life.' *δικαιοσύνη* may very well include the duty of man towards dumb animals which is so often insisted upon in the Mosaic law. Cf. Deut. 22¹⁷, 25⁴, and many other passages.

'*Ἐν εὐθύνητι ψυχῆς* seems to refer to the same quality of mildness and justice of rule.

4. The rendering of R.V., 'that sitteth by thee on thy throne,' is absolutely unwarranted. *¶* has 'adsistricem sedium tuarum,' and *S^P* 'give me wisdom from thy throne.' The Arabic is vague, 'one of those who are ever (or often) with thee'; but the idea of an absolute *πάρεδρος τῷ θεῷ* is peculiar to Philo, who uses it of *δίκη*, *Vita Mosis*, ii. § 10. Previous examples of such expressions in the classics are clearly figurative only, e.g. Pindar, *Olymp.*, viii. 28, *Διὸς ἔριον πάρεδρος θέμις*; Soph., *Ant.* 451, *ἡ ξύνοικος τῶν κάτω θεῶν δίκη*. The idea, says Grimm, is Biblical (Prov. 8³⁰), Wisdom says *ἥμην παρ' αὐτῷ*, but the language heathen. Arnald quotes from Plutarch (without a reference) a passage which probably exactly expresses our author's meaning in this ambiguous sentence: (Justice) 'does not only sit like a queen at the right hand of Jupiter, when he is upon his throne; but she is in his bosom, and one with himself.'

'Thy throne' is in the plural—said to be the plural of 'dignity' or 'majesty.' It recurs in v.¹² and in 18¹⁵. In Ps. 122⁵ there is no real parallel, 'thrones of the house of David' is an ordinary plural.

ἐκ παιδῶν σου may be either 'children,' as A.V., or, as is more probable from the succeeding verse, 'servants'; so *S^P*, Arab., and probably *¶*, 'a pueris tuis.' In any case the meaning is that 'Solomon deprecates a fate which he knows must befall him if he seeks to dispense with divine aid' (Gregg). *S^h* always translates the word 'servants.'

5. The first line is identical with Ps. 116¹⁶, *ἐγὼ δοῦλος σὸς καὶ νίος τῆς παιδίσκης σου*, cf. 86¹⁶. There is no occasion to interpret *παιδίσκη* of 'the people of Israel'; it means simply the speaker's mother, cf. Luke 1³⁸, *ἰδοὺ ἡ δούλη κυρίου*. That 'son of thine handmaid' implies that he was born in the house and therefore more to be trusted than a purchased servant seems fanciful.

δλιγοχρόνιος is not, as Burmeister supposed, a word invented by the writer, but common enough in the classics (cf. Lidd. and Sc. s.v.). It

6. For though one be perfect among the sons of men,
 If the wisdom from thee be lacking, he shall be accounted
 for naught.

7. Thou didst prefer me to be king of thy people,
 And a judge of thy sons and daughters;

8. Thou badest me to build a temple on thy holy mount,
 And in the city of thy habitation a place of sacrifice,
 A copy of the holy tabernacle which thou preparedst from
 the beginning.

is either a general term like *ἀσθενῆς*, or refers to the shortness of life as preventing man from attaining to full knowledge of wisdom.

Ἐλάσσων is either used absolutely as in the translation given, and as R.V., Siegfried, Arab., §^P, or as a real comparative. So **L** ‘minor ad intellectum,’ A.V. ‘too young for the understanding.’ Genev. perhaps mistranslates **L** ‘less in the understanding.’ This seems hardly grammatical, and Grimm would render ‘inferior (to those who) are versed in understanding of judgment’; which is clumsy. The words are probably bad Greek. *Ἐλάσσων τῆς συνέσεως* would have been better.

6. *τέλειος* **L** ‘consummatus’ perfect in all other respects; *εὐφυῆς*. Origen in *Matth.*, tom. x. 19, quotes the passage, adding *ἐν πίστει* to *τέλειος*. A good parallel for the idea is found in *Matt.* 11¹¹, ‘Among them that are born of women there hath not risen a greater than John the Baptist: nevertheless he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he.’ Cf. also *1 Cor.* 3¹⁹, *ἡ σοφία τοῦ κόσμου τούτου μωρία παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἐστι*, cf. ch. 13¹⁻³. There is an emphasis on ‘the sons of men,’ whose judgment is purely temporal and external, as in the case of the sons of Jesse, *1 Sam.* 16⁷, ‘The Lord seeth not as man seeth; for man looketh on the outward appearance, but the Lord looketh on the heart.’

7. R.V. ‘didst choose me *before my brethren*,’ which is clumsy and unnecessary: ‘choose’ by itself gives the full classical force of the word; and so A.V., Siegfried, and all the versions. Nor is it advisable to read into the *πρό* the sense of ‘from everlasting,’ or to refer it to Nathan’s prophecy of the birth of Solomon, *2 Sam.* 7¹² *sqq.*

The expression ‘sons and daughters of God’ is so rare (cf. *Isa.* 4⁴ **G**, ‘sons and daughters of Zion’; and 43⁶, ‘bring my sons from far and my daughters from the ends of the earth’) that some special reference must be intended here; in all probability to the case of the two women in *1 Kings* 3¹⁶ *sqq.* That the expression is ‘due to the depressed condition of Eastern womanhood’ (Farrar) is a poor explanation.

8. There seems no occasion to suppose with Reuss and others that in the words ‘holy mount’ the writer has committed an anachronism.

Grimm propounds a dilemma ; Mount Moriah is either called 'holy' because the temple was to be built there, in which case we must imagine ourselves very early in Solomon's reign ; or because the temple was already built there, which would mean a period after his reign. But the mount was already hallowed by Abraham's sacrifice (Gen. 22¹⁴), and by the vision of the angel who appeared to David in the threshing-floor of Araunah there.

From line 2 of this chapter down to 10² the Syriac text is extant in a Palestinian version in the Bodleian Library published by Gwilliam. Such variants as it offers are noticed below. The fact that the division of chapters is noted in it would seem to prove that it is late. On the other hand, we find one or two archaic forms.

That there is a reference in line 3 to Exod. 25^{9,40}^a 26³⁰^b, where God shows Moses the 'pattern' (*τύπος*) of the tabernacle, is not to be doubted. The question is whether Pseudo-Solomon has not mixed up with this purely Jewish idea a vague reference to the 'archetypes of things' as they appear in the Platonic doctrine of ideas. On this Gfrörer, *Philo*, i. 228, insists, and he is followed by most modern commentators. His argument turns on the words *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, which he affirms must mean 'before the foundation of the world.' This is in itself questionable. But there are in the New Testament two allusions to the 'pattern in the mount.' Acts 7⁴⁴ is unimportant. Heb. 8⁵ repeats Exod. 25⁴⁰. But the preceding words are 'priests . . . who offer gifts.' Either, then, we have merely a direct allusion to the 'pattern' shewed to Moses (abstract or concrete), or a reference to the doctrine of ideas, or a mixture of both. But there remains another possibility. The Rabbis had invented a theory that (Kohler in *Jewish Encycl.*, art. 'Pre-existence') seven things had existed before the foundation of the world : the Torah, the Throne of Glory, the Sanctuary, the Patriarchs, Israel, the Messiah, and Repentance. Of these the sanctuary is assumed to have been pre-existent on the ground of Jer. 17¹², where it is said 'a glorious high throne from the beginning is the place of our sanctuary.' The word 'from the beginning' *מראשׁון* is wanting in our copies of *¶*, but 'Wisdom' may very well have found it there in the form *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* (*מראשׁון* is thus translated in Isa. 48¹⁶, *οὐκ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐν κρυφῇ λελάηκα*). If this be so, we have a simple explanation of the passage. Solomon copied the pre-existent sanctuary ; not, however, pre-existent according to any Platonic theory of ideas, but according to a fanciful Jewish fable. Grimm begs the question when he declares this inconsistent with the pure Alexandrian culture of Pseudo-Solomon. He thinks *ἄγια σκηνή* is 'heaven,' which the earthly sanctuary represents, just as the high priest's dress in 18²⁴ represents the whole world. *ἔτοιμάζω* is certainly used in Prov. 3¹⁹, 8²⁷, of the creation of the heavens by God, and *σκηνή* does denote a heavenly tabernacle in Heb. 8², 9¹¹, Rev. 13⁶, 15⁵. *S^{pal}* translates *μίμημα* not 'copy,' but 'likeness.'

^a *παράδειγμα*, 25⁹.

^b *εἶδος*, here.

9. And with thee is wisdom that knoweth thy works,
 And was present when thou madest the world,
 Yea, and knoweth what is acceptable in thine eyes,
 And what is right in thy commandments.

10. Send her forth out of the holy heavens,
 And despatch her from the throne of thy glory ;
 That abiding with me she may toil,
 And that I may know what is well pleasing before thee.

Gfrörer's assumption that *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* must mean 'from before the creation of the world,' seems too strong ; in Isa. *l.c.*, and also in 45²¹ it means 'from the beginning of Jewish history,' and no more.

The references of all arguments from the divine worship of Judaism back to the *tabernacle*, disregarding the temple, is characteristic also of the writer of Hebrews, who would consider both temple and kingdom as signs of spiritual declension. Westcott, *Hebrews*, p. 233 (note on 8⁵). He has also a note on *θυσιαστήριον* (p. 453), which seems to mean sometimes 'altar' only ; sometimes, as here, a 'place of sacrifice' generally. Of the dislike of pietists for the temple there may be a trace in Rev. 21²².

9. For the connection with v. ⁸ cf. Churton : 'the attribute of wisdom which was manifested in the creation of the world, was again declared in the ordering of the tabernacle, and the skill which was given to Bezaleel and the others who executed the work. This spirit of Wisdom is also given to lead us generally in the way of uprightness and the path of God's commandments.' This, of course, assumes that *σκηνή* is the tabernacle in the wilderness.

A.V. and Grimm supply *ἥν* with *μετὰ σοῦ*, which is grammatically questionable ; besides, Wisdom not only was, but is, the *πάρεδρος* of God, *παρούσα* implying help, like the Latin 'adesse alicui.' So *Ἄ* 'affuit.' For the sense again cf. Prov. 8²² *sqq.*, 3¹⁹.

εὐθές is the Alexandrian form of *εὐθύ*, which occurs in *Ἑ* only four times, while the masc. *εὐθύς* is commoner than *εὐθῆς*. The word is regularly used for 'that which was right in the sight of the Lord.'

10. *Ἐξαπόστειλον* may mean the sending forth of one to represent the sender, as an *ἀπόστολος*, while *πέμψον* often (though scarcely here) implies an escort, especially in the derivative *πομπή*. A.V. with the *Ἄ* omits *πέμψον* altogether.

For 'throne of thy glory' Grimm quotes the Song of the Three Children, v. ³², *θρόνος βασιλείας σον*, but the expression seems to need little illustration, any more than the use of 'the heavens' for the dwelling-place of God.

Line 3 is to be taken as one idea 'that she may assist me in my efforts to keep thy laws.' Arm., according to Margoliouth, p. 282, is said to translate this 'come and abide with me,' possibly misunderstanding *κοπιάσῃ*.

11. For she knoweth and understandeth all things,
 And shall guide me in mine actions prudently,
 And guard me with her good repute.

12. So shall my works be acceptable,
 And I shall judge thy people righteously,
 And shall be worthy of my father's throne.

13. For what man shall know the counsel of God,
 Or who shall think what the Lord willeth?

11. R.V. in line 2 has 'she shall guide me in (ways of) soberness': a quite unnecessary periphrasis. \S^{Pal} , 'For she knoweth every thing, and she comprehendeth and leadeth me (note the presents) purely in my works, and by her glory guardeth me.'  is probably right. It means first 'to eye' and then to guard a person.

$\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ in the last line is capable of several interpretations, the least likely of which is Vulg. 'in sua potentia,' A.V., 'in her power.' But $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ in this sense is only used of God (Rom. 6⁴, Christ was raised from the dead, $\delta\acute{a}\tau\eta\varsigma\delta\acute{o}\xi\eta\varsigma\tau\o\varsigma\pi\alpha\tau\o\varsigma$), in whose case glory and power may be taken as identical.

(2) We may render 'in her brightness,' which illuminates the path of life. So Reuss, 'L'erreur étant représentée comme l'effet d'une manque de lumière, l'éclat est l'image naturelle pour une bonne direction.'

(3) $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ may mean $\delta\acute{o}\gamma\mu\alpha$ (Lidd. and Sc.), and so 'through her counsel' is a possible rendering.

(4) Inasmuch as it is the guarding and not the guiding that is in question in line 3, the translation given above seems preferable, comparing 8³ for the 'high repute' of Wisdom. Solomon, having appropriated this quality as part of the dowry of his bride, will be raised in all men's esteem, and so protected by it. With this the Arabic  agrees. \S^{P} has  'glory,' which may possibly mean 'majesty,' as the Polyglot (Walton) translates it.

12. With this rather commonplace verse, in which even the voluminous \AA Lapide can find nothing to comment on save the possible degeneracy of sons of righteous fathers, the Prayer seems to end. What follows consists of moral reflections.

13. Grimm's translation, 'who will take to heart what God's will is?' is reasonable, but does not represent the Greek. The statement is really a strong one; 'no man without wisdom from on high can understand the will of God.' Cf. Isa. 55⁷, 'My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord.' But this passage is stronger; it really implies that necessity for immediate communication between God and man which is the very foundation

14. For the reasonings of mortals are timorous,
And our plans are ever like to fail :

15. For the corruptible body weigheth down the soul,
And the earthly tabernacle oppresseth the much-pondering
mind.

of mysticism, and if this had been a canonical book the verse would probably have been used to that end.

The actual words of the text are to be found represented in Isa. 40¹³, *τίς ἔγγων νοῦν κυρίου, καὶ τίς αὐτοῦ σύμβούλος ἔγεινετο*; repeated in Rom. 11³⁴ word for word, and with a variation in the first clause in 1 Cor. 2¹⁶. Both writers have drawn from the same source; but it must be noticed that in our author it is implied that by means of Wisdom man is enabled to understand God's will. In any case St. Paul is nearer to Isaiah than to Pseudo-Solomon.

14. We must here recognise again the slenderness of the writer's acquaintance with Greek. His meaning is represented by the translators: A.V. 'miserable,' Siegfried 'worthless.' This is what he means, but he can find no other word in his vocabulary to represent it but *δειλοί*; this he uses in the Homeric sense (*δειλοὶ βροτοί*) of 'weak,' 'wavering,' very much as a modern Hindoo might use Shakespeare's 'silly,' thinking that it still means 'feeble.' ('God's silly vassal' was the epithet administered to James I.) It is no wonder that R.V. (margin) suggests that the reading may be corrupt; but it is supported by all the versions. The word has the plain post-Homeric meaning of 'cowardly' in Matt. 8²⁶, *τί δειλοί ἔστε, δλιγόπιστοι*; and Rev. 21⁸. §^P in 17¹⁰ translates the word 'hard.'

For the general sense cf. Ps. 93¹¹. *κύριος γινώσκει τοὺς διαλογισμοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅτι εἰσὶ μάταιοι*, and the same passage quoted in 1 Cor. 3²⁰.

'*Ἐπίνοιαι* 'plans,' 'devices,' is translated by § 'providentiae,' a curious word, probably African; for the only examples of its use are quoted (by Deane) from Tertullian, Augustine, and Fulgentius. For 'our plans' §^P reads 'their plans.'

15. This passage, which is fully discussed in the Introduction and in Additional Notes A and C, is the only one which seems to prove actual knowledge of the text of Plato on the part of Pseudo-Solomon. To what is elsewhere said we may add that the whole tone of the previous verses is such as would lead us to expect the body to be described as a source of weakness; not as a source of sin. The passage of Plato which 'Wisdom' had undoubtedly read (or heard quoted) is in *Phaedo*, 81C: *ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε τοῦτο [τὸ σῶμα] οἰεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες καὶ ὀρατόν· ὅ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὀρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ ἀειδοῦς*

τε καὶ Ἀιδου κτλ. Philo's views are of no account here, and Gregg's remark on that point is excellent. 'He has avoided an error into which Philo fell: this passage presents a typical example of the distinction between Philo with his speculative bent, and Pseudo-Solomon with his inflexible religious purpose.' He gives the opposite passages from Philo.

It is useless to multiply quotations on the subject of the evil influence of the body from Stoical and semi-Stoical writers: the most important are collected by Deane *ad loc.*, and more still by Arnald. 'The spirit is willing but the flesh is weak' (or sometimes wicked) is the keynote of them all. The idea is as old as Pythagoras or his school, and for its origin cf. Charles' *Eschatology*, pp. 142-143.

Far more important is the teaching of the so-called Sibylline Oracles in this matter. To the third book of these compositions (which Charles, *op. cit.*, p. 176, dismisses too contemptuously) the date of 140-100 B.C. may be assigned, and, what is of interest for us, it is of Egyptian origin.

The most extreme views of Wisdom's condemnation of the body as altogether evil are based on this verse. So Payne-Smith (*Bampton Lect.*, 1869, p. 369) says that the author would have 'rejected with horror' the idea of the resurrection of the body, as being altogether an evil thing. St. Paul, he says, regarded the body as the 'temple of the Holy Ghost' (1 Cor. 6¹⁹), which is true enough; but he forgets such passages as Gal. 5¹⁷, 'The flesh lusteth against the spirit,' etc. If such views did not prevent St. Paul from believing in the resurrection of the body, why should they prevent Wisdom from holding the same view? Cf. *Church Quart. Rev.*, April 1879, p. 90. The fullest persuasion of the resurrection of the flesh is consistent with the doctrine that the soul is clogged and imprisoned by the body, and this, and no more, if so much, is here implied by 'Wisdom.'

πολυφρόντιδα Λ 'Terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem.' A.V. 'that museth upon many things.' The idea is that above indicated; the body does not tempt man into sin; it is not evil in itself; but it does hinder and clog the soul by its needs and its earthly relations when that soul would fain be 'hearkening what the inner spirit saith.' Cf. Hor., *Epist.*, II. ii. 76; after all the worries and the bodily discomforts of a crowded city, 'I nunc et versus tecum meditare canoros.' The idea is fully expressed by Churton *ad loc.* 'while the soul is thus burdened, our knowledge is partial and imperfect; we see God, but only through a glass, darkly.' Cf. 2 Esdr 4¹¹, 'How can that which is already worn out with the corrupted world understand incorruption?' He also quotes Hooker, 'The instruments being weakened wherewithal the soul doth work, it preferretl rest in ignorance before wearisome labour to know.' The R.V. rendering, 'full of cares,' is in this context absolutely meaningless; but the translation of *σκῆνος* as 'frame' is good. The word had almost lost its figurative sense and become a synonym of *σῶμα*.

16. Yea, hardly do we guess at things that are upon earth,
And find out with labour the things which be at hand,
But the things in heaven who hath searched out?

17. Now who did know thy counsel, except thou gavest wisdom,
And sentest thine holy spirit from on high?

The whole of the second line is wanting in \mathfrak{S}^P , both in Walton's Polyglot and in Lagarde's separate edition, but is found in \mathfrak{S}^h and in \mathfrak{S}^{Pal} , which translates 'for the body which is corruptible weigheth down upon the soul, and the earthly tabernacle which is from [the earth] upon the heart whose musing [is upon many things]'. If Stenning's filling up of the gaps is correct, which it almost certainly is, $\beta\rho\iota\theta\epsilon$ is not translated at all, and $\gamma\epsilon\hat{\omega}\delta\epsilon$ twice over. The end is also conjectural, but should be a rendering of $\pi\omega\lambda\phi\rho\omega\tau\iota\delta\alpha$.

16. The parallel with John 3¹², 'If I have told you earthly things and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you of heavenly things?' is obvious, but unprofitable. It proves nothing. More to the purpose, as representing possibly a contemporary line of thought, is 4 Esdr. 4²¹, 'They that dwell upon the earth may understand nothing but that which is upon the earth; and he above the heavens what is above the height of the heavens'; but the whole thought is commonplace and unsuggestive. Cf. Job 38^{31.32} as paraphrased by Churton, 'How little do we know of those heavenly bodies which we see above us! What astronomer can bind the sweet influences of the Pleiades, loose the bands of Orion, or guide Arcturus and his sons.'

Two variants are to be noted. \mathfrak{E}^N has for $\epsilon\nu\chi\epsilon\rho\sigma\iota\nu$ 'things close at hand' (\mathfrak{L} 'quae in prospectu sunt'), $\tau\alpha\epsilon\nu\pi\omega\sigma\iota\nu$ 'things immediately in our path'; and \mathfrak{L} , which has 'investigabit', seems to have read (with one or two MSS.) $\epsilon\xi\chi\nu\iota\alpha\sigma\epsilon$ instead of $\epsilon\xi\chi\nu\iota\alpha\sigma\epsilon$.

17. We have here, again, a passage which might well be taken as a text for mysticism (cf. v. ¹³ above). But more important is the apparent identification of Wisdom with the Holy Spirit, for which see the Introd., § 6. That 'Wisdom' had any idea of the 'Holy Ghost' in the Christian sense is of course most improbable: his $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha\hat{\alpha}\gamma\iota\omega\eta$ is an indefinite entity—if an entity at all.

'From on high' or 'from above' is the best translation available of $\hat{\alpha}\pi\hat{\omega}\hat{\iota}\psi\iota\sigma\tau\omega\eta$. The plural has no particular force: cf. Tennyson, 'of old sat Freedom on the heights'; so Job 22¹², $\delta\tau\alpha\hat{\iota}\psi\eta\lambda\alpha\hat{\nu}\iota\omega\eta$, and $\tau\alpha\hat{\epsilon}\pi\omega\tau\alpha\hat{\nu}\iota\omega\eta$, 'the heavenly parts,' in Eph. 1³, etc.

\mathfrak{S}^{Pal} , And thy counsel who [is able to know unless] thou hast given wisdom and hast sent the spirit of thy holiness from [on high]? This version, at all events, did not understand $\pi\nu\epsilon\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha\hat{\alpha}\gamma\iota\omega\eta$ technically of the Holy Ghost.

18. And thus were the paths of those upon the earth made straight,

And men were taught the things pleasing to thee,
And were saved by wisdom.

10. 1. She it was that protected the first formed father of the world throughout, created alone as he was,
And rescued him from his own transgression,

18. The utter feebleness of this verse indicates its true purpose ; it would seem to be an introduction to what follows—a link to connect the Solomonic chapters with the totally unconnected historical survey which succeeds. *ἐσώθησαν* is explained by this fact : we are now to trace the fortunes of those who, like Adam, Noah, Abraham, Jacob followed after wisdom and 'were saved' by her ; *i.e.* in accordance with the practical Jewish idea, attained earthly prosperity ; whereas Cain Esau, and so forth, despising wisdom, were ruined by their departure from her ways. There is no question of eternal salvation implied in *ἐσώθησαν*. It refers simply to earthly wellbeing. Cf. Eccl. 3¹.

S^{Pal}, 'And in this manner were set straight the paths of those who were upon the earth, and what is acceptable unto thee did the sons of man learn, and by *thy* wisdom they were saved.' *τῇ σοφίᾳ σου* is read by some good MSS. including *GN*.

One of *L*'s curious additions occurs here, 'Sanati sunt quicunque placuerunt tibi, Domine, a principio.' There is nothing in the versions (*S^P* has simply 'by Thy wisdom they lived') or in the MSS. to justify this addition, but early liturgies, as quoted by Deane from Gutberlet do seem to refer to such a reading, *e.g.* Lit. of St. Clement : *ὑπὲ πάντων ἀπὸ αἰώνος εὐαρεστησάντων σοι ἀγίων*. It would seem that the MS. used by the old Latin translator had *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* (on which see note on v. 8), which he rightly rendered, in accordance with the contents of chapter x., 'from the beginning of history,' whereas the compilers of the liturgies took it in the sense of 'from everlasting.'

'The subject of the second great division of the book,' says Farrar 'is ingeniously introduced by this last verse.' The connection is so ingenious, or rather artificial, that, as A Lapide tells us, 'some began chapter x. with this verse.' It is a mere link, possibly introduced by the writer himself; cf. Introd., § 9, 'On the Unity of the Book.'

10. 1. In this and the succeeding chapters we have perhaps the first attempt, at all events in Hebrew literature, at a philosophy of history. Isolated lessons of similar type, *e.g.* on the certain effects of idolatry upon a nation, are found in Judges 2¹⁻²³, 2 Kings 17⁷⁻²³ Neh. 9⁹⁻³¹, and such are the contents of Psalms 78, 80, 105, 106, 135, 136. Later we have Acts 7, Heb. 11, Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 9-10, and 17-19. Cf. also Eccl. 2¹⁰.

To point his moral the writer avails himself of extra-scriptural embellishments, but whether derived from oral tradition or from Apocryphic literature it is difficult to say. In a few cases we can detect the source of these additions, but probably some were due to the author's exuberant imagination. As part of this philosophy of history, the digression on the origin of idolatry comes naturally in, and is not, as Weber fancies, an extraneous addition.

That *σοφία* is only mentioned twice in these chapters (14^{2,5}) is certainly striking; still more remarkable is it that in 14² it is man's sagacity that is meant. This is an index of what follows; in the remainder of the book there is complete confusion or perhaps alternation between the praise of the divine wisdom which led the Israelites out of Egypt and the human 'understanding' which led them to avoid idolatry and its accompanying evils.

With regard to chap. 10 in particular, its apologetic character should be noticed (*Church Quart. Rev.*, April 1879, p. 93). It seems almost to be intended to meet the very objections afterwards put forward by Celsus (and controverted by Origen) against the Jewish scriptures. (a) Celsus caviled at the fratricidal fury of a Cain and an Esau as described by 'Moses.' *Pseudepigr.* (vv. 3,10) shows that this was the behaviour of those who had fallen away from wisdom, to their own ruin. (b) It was urged that the story of Noah was but a version of that of Deucalion, mangled by a Hebrew writer; but (c) most of all it was asserted that Moses had impiously described God as weak and impotent, for he could not even persuade the men whom he had created to obey him. This objection our author answers by what seems to be the earliest positive assertion that Adam was restored after his Fall.

The obvious sense of v. ¹ is that given by Churton. As long as Adam continued in his uprightness, Wisdom preserved him (if the διὰ in διεφύλαξεν is pressed it must refer also to his subsequent rescue). His fortunes are fully set forth in Eccl. 17^{1,13}. When he fell, through hearkening to the voice of his wife, Wisdom did not utterly forsake him, but led him forth from his sin by the way of repentance, and taught him to exercise the authority which the Creator had given him.

Although not clearly indicated in Genesis (or in the Book of Jubilees), a repentance and restoration of Adam has been generally inferred by Jews ('Life of Adam and Eve' in Kautzsch, *Pseudepigr.*, p. 509 *sqq.*) and Christians (full quotations in Deane). The legends on the subject are collected by Churton. That 'such a discussion, besides its irrelevancy, has no place in a pre-Christian work, the Incarnation being the indispensable presupposition for such a restoration' (Gregg), is a strong statement. (Cf. Fuchs in Kautzsch, *Pseudepigr.*, p. 510 *sqq.*, on the Jewish origin of 'Vita Adami.')

Difficulties have been raised with regard to (1) the sequence of

2. And gave him strength to rule over all things.

events as recorded in this verse. Dähne (*Religionsphil.*, ii. 168) will have it that *παράπτωμα ἰδίου* means his 'peculiar offence' (which is contrary to 'Wisdom's' general use of *ἰδίου* (cf. examples in Grimm, and notes on 19⁶), and refers it to the sin committed by Adam in becoming united, a pure spirit, to an earthly body. Yet he (note 92) 'would not clearly deduce from this passage the pre-existence of souls.' The idea seems fantastic, but is not entirely without support (cf. Blunt on 8²⁰) with regard to the possibility of the souls, all created at the foundation of the world, being obedient or disobedient before their entrance on mortal life.

(2) *μόνον* is variously interpreted. (a) That Adam was the one 'created' man, all after him being 'begotten,' is rejected by Grimm on the ground that such a restricted use of *κτίζειν* is a later ecclesiastical piece of pedantry. (b) So long as he was alone, without the temptress Eve, Wisdom guarded him. (c) Unprotected against dangers. For this Grimm cites John 8²⁹, ὁ πέμψας με μετ' ἐμοῦ ἐστιν· οὐκ ἀφῆκεν με μόνον and 16³². (d) Gfrörer, ii. 241, thinks it means the 'one-create,' the 'pattern-man,' with reference to the 'ideal man' of Philo. The versions translate simply and straightforwardly; they certainly do not support Dähne's rendering of *ἰδίου*. Bois' suggestion *οὐ μόνον*, 'not only preserved, but also,' would require *ἀλλὰ καὶ* (cf. v. 8) to follow it: this he vainly endeavours to extract from the irregular *καὶ . . . τε* (in place of *τε . . . καὶ*) which follows.

Some curious explanations of *ἐξειλάτο* (L 'eduxit') should be mentioned. Many MSS. of L seem to have read 'eduxit illum de limo terrae,' which was adopted by all the older commentators like Holcot. This is plainly a mere gloss to escape from a difficulty. St. Augustine (*Op. Imperf. c. Julianum*, vi. 30) actually thought that the deliverance of Adam from the bonds of hell at the descent of Christ was prophetically referred to; but he read of course 'a delicto suo.'

2. R.V. 'to get dominion over all things' is unnecessary if not absolutely wrong: for this authority over all living creatures was given by God (Gen. 1^{26,28}), and renewed after the fall (Gen. 9²). The versions support no such idea, but L has the curious rendering 'virtutem continendi omnia.' R.V. would almost seem to favour the Rabbinic idea that Adam was enabled to master the world by his huge size, strength, and knowledge, or, as Kleuker (ap. Grimm), 'by means of divine and angelic magic.'

We have here the last fragment of S^{Pal}: 'She [preserved] him who was formed [as a father] to the world, and who as a solitary one [was created], and delivered [him] from [his] sin of' . . . (a word corresponding to *ἰδίου* is wanting), 'and gave [him] power that [he should rule] over all things.'

3. But falling away from her an unrighteous one in his anger
Perished with his fratricidal rage.
4. Through whom when the earth was drowned, wisdom again
saved it,
Steering the just one in wood of little price.

3. On the omission of proper names throughout the book cf. note on 4¹⁰. \mathfrak{S}^p alone among the versions ventures to insert the names Cain, Noah, etc.

συναπώλετο is not easy to render. \mathfrak{S}^p has 'for the slaying of his brother, anger (? of God) destroyed him,' which cannot be reconciled with \mathfrak{E} . Four interpretations are possible: (1) as \mathfrak{L} , 'deperiit,' he perished utterly. (2) He perished *with Abel* by incurring spiritual death in inflicting natural death. So Philo, *Quod Det. Pot.*, § 14, 'Ανέστη Καΐν καὶ ἀπέκτεινεν ἑαυτὸν, ἀλλ ὡνχ ἔτερον. But it is doubtful if Prayer of Manasses v.¹³, 'Destroy me not together with my transgressions,' bears out this rendering. (3) Still less is Grimm's 'perished *through* his fratricidal rage' justifiable. (4) Arnald, adopting the Arabic rendering, 'together with fratricidal souls,' translates 'he perished together with persons of like murderous character,' cf. Gen. 9⁶. He is, however, inclined to Origen's view, viz. that all the wicked posterity of Cain are meant. \mathfrak{S}^h literally, 'with fury murderous of his brother.'

As to the end of Cain, traditions vary. (1) That he perished by the accidental fall of a house (Book of Jubilees, iv. 31) is an invention to reconcile the poetic justice of a violent death with God's promise in Gen. 4¹⁶ that he should not be 'slain'; (2) that he was the 'man' killed by Lamech by accident (mistaking him for a wild beast in its den) is also a fancy founded on the song in Gen. 4²³.

The omission of Enoch from these Hebrew worthies is tentatively referred by Grimm to a wish to exalt Solomon as the one representative of Israel's wisdom; 'Wisdom's' contemporaries, he says, were too much given to praise Enoch in that character. But surely the fact that Enoch has already been mentioned in 4¹⁰ is enough.

4. 'Through whom' is quite a new view of the origin of the flood as a punishment. The account in Gen. 6¹⁻⁴ connects the wickedness of the earth with the folly of the 'sons of God' in wedding the daughters of men, and the existence of the giants, but does not mention Cain. It is in Josephus (*Ant.*, I. ii. 2) that the wickedness of Cain's descendants is most insisted upon. That the point was not clear to ancient translators is plain from the fact that \mathfrak{S}^p entirely omits the words, and Arab. has 'on account of that.' The latter favours the reading δι' ὃ found in a few MSS. and defended by Grotius. Its meaning would be that this one transgression let loose sin upon the earth.

To translate *κατακλυζομένην* with R.V., 'when the earth was

5. She also, when the nations were confounded in a conspiracy of wickedness,

Found the just man and preserved him blameless unto God
Yea, and kept him firm against pity for a son.

drowning with a flood,' is at once cumbrous and meticulous. The earth was not only 'drowning' according to Gen. 7: it was actually overwhelmed: and it is not likely that 'Wisdom' would be very accurate in his distinction between *κατακλυζομένην* and *κατακλυσθεῖσαν*. None of the versions support such a distinction.

κυβερνᾶν is, it is pointed out, a favourite word of the Stoics in connection with *πρόνοια*.

δι' εὐτελοῦς ἔύλον is not used contemptuously, but is meant to indicate the small value of even the huge ark in comparison with the cause of righteousness which was by its means preserved. So Noah is called in 14⁶ the 'hope of the world.' A slightly different rendering would contrast the insignificance of the ark with the magnificence of the flood. But this is not the meaning of εὐτελοῦς. *Sh* 'contemptible,' which agrees well with the explanation of Cornely, viz. that the epithet is introduced to magnify the exceeding power of Divine Wisdom, which can make so poor a thing the vehicle of preservation in the midst of the Flood.

5. *συγχυθέντων* no doubt refers to the confusion of tongues, but in Wisdom's rhetorical fashion he expresses this so ambiguously that it might mean simply 'were joined in one welter of iniquity'; and so all the versions translate. *L* 'in consensu nequitiae cum se nationes contulissent.' *Sp* and Arab., 'were poured out into wickedness.' Gregg emphasises the contrast between *όμόνοια*, 'agreement' and 'confusion.' Some older writers even took *συγχυθέντων* as 'confederate in idolatry.' *Sh*, 'were confused.'

Εὗπερ is almost certainly to be replaced by *ἔγνω*, the reading of many MSS. and all the versions. So 2 Tim. 2¹⁹, "Ἐγνω κύριος τοὺς ὅντας αὐτοῦ. Cf. 1 Cor. 8³ and John 10¹⁴.

ἀμεμπτον θεῷ. So Gen. 17¹ (¶), *εὐαρέστει ἐνώπιον ἐμοῦ καὶ γίνοι ἀμεμπτος*. For the use with the dative cf. Acts 7²⁰, *ἀστείος τῷ θεῷ*. It is a more or less classical use. Winer, § xxxvi. 4a.

There can be little doubt that it is implied that Abraham was present at the building of the tower, but that this was suggested solely by the fact that his story begins soon after that of Babel, in Gen. 11, 12 (Grimm), is unlikely. It is more probable that there is some connection with the legend that Nimrod cast Abraham into a furnace because he renounced idolatry. (Jerome, *Quaest. Hebr. in Gen.* cited by Deane). The legend arose from the word 'Ur,' meaning 'fire' or 'light.' So *L* of Neh. 9⁷, *Eduxisti eum de igne Chaldaeorum*.

The use of *ἐπὶ* for 'against' with the dative is classical. (Lidd. and Sc., s.v. B. I. 2. d.), cf. Luke 12⁵³, *διαμερισθήσονται πατήρ ἐπὶ νιώ κανίδος ἐπὶ πατρί. κτλ.* It is remarked that *τηρεῖν* (preserve) is the effect

6. She, when the impious were perishing, saved the righteous man,
Escaping the falling fire of Pentapolis;

7. Of whose wickedness a waste land that smoketh is still appointed as a testimony,
And plants that bear fruit of bloom that never ripeneth;
A pillar of salt standing as a memorial of an unbelieving soul.

of *φυλάσσειν* (guard) : a fine-drawn distinction. The versions are remarkable. *S^P*, 'protected him powerfully (*iσχυρόν*) through (or in) the son of pity' (not as A Lapide, 'Abraham filium misericordiarum custodivit'). Arab. is nearly as *G*, but has 'in' for *ἐπί*. *S^H*, 'in the love that he had for his son.'

6. There seems no reason against a literal translation, which is quite intelligible, like Horace's 'fulmen caducum,' *Od.*, III. iv. 44. It is possible that the *κατὰ* in *καταβάσιον* may govern the genitive, but in the one similar instance, *καταβάτης σελήνης* (Lidd. and Sc., *s.v.*) it means not to descend on the moon, but to bring the moon down.

There is a family of words of the kind : *καταβάσιος*, *καταβάτης*, *καταβάτης*. Pseudo-Solomon is the only writer who uses *καταβάσιος*, which is probably to be credited rather to his ignorance than his originality.

The translation given avoids the obvious objection that the fire did not descend on all the five cities ; for Zoar, which (Gen. 14²) made one of them, was preserved. It seems, however, to have been usual to speak of five cities as destroyed (Jos., *B. J.*, IV. viii. 4), though Zoar is mentioned by the same author as still existing (*Ant.*, I. xi. 4), and is named in Isa. 15⁵, Jer. 48³⁴. Cf. Driver in Hastings' *D. B.*, *s.v.* 'Zoar.' Is it possible that Bela (Gen. 14^{2,8}) was really distinct from Zoar, and was one of the five said to be destroyed?

For *ἐξαπολλυμένων ἀσεβῶν ἐρρύσατο*, *L*, *S^H*, Arab., Arm., Aeth. have all 'saved from the unrighteous that were perishing' (or 'were destroyed', *S^H* and Arab.). It is evident that all read *ἐξ ἀπολλυμένων* as two words, but such rendering is contrary to the historic narrative. It was not the Sodomites from whom Lot was fleeing, but from the destruction which came upon them. Only *S^P* preserves the idea of a genitive absolute.

7. On Tischendorf's reading *οῖς ἐπὶ μαρτύριον*, instead of *ἥς ἐπὶ μαρτύριον*, Cornely remarks that no single Greek codex seems to have it, and that it probably crept into the text from the Sixtine edition of the Old Testament in Greek. But it is certainly supported by *L*, 'quibus in testimonium.' In the next verse *L* has for *ἐβλάβησαν*, 'lapsi sunt'; a plain mistake for 'laesi sunt.' The 'Sixtine edition' is that given

in Walton's Polyglot, the marginal variations being those of the Alexandrian MS. (¶^A).

ἀτέλεστιν ὄφαις can hardly mean 'at immature seasons' (À Lapide), and our rendering agrees with the legend of the Apples of Sodom, Jos., B. J., IV. viii. 4, (καρποὶ) οἱ χρόαν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἐδωδίμοις ὄφαις, δειγματένων δὲ χερσὶν εἰς καπνὸν ἀναλύονται καὶ τέφραν. In Deut. 32³² it is the 'wine' of Sodom and Gomorrha that is spoken of. If the words were ἀτελεῖ ὄφα, the rendering of A.V., R.V., Genev., 'fruit that cometh not to ripeness' would be certain, and it is what 'Wisdom' means. He argued, with his imperfect knowledge of Greek, that 'plants' being in the plural, 'blooms' must be so also. L, 'Incerto tempore fructus habentes arbores.' S^P has 'bear no fruit at all,' and Arab. 'produce imperfect fruit.' So also S^H, as if it were ἀτελέστοις. Solin. *Polyhistor.*, 38 (quoted by Grimm), speaks of the apple: 'habeat speciem licet maturitatis, mandi tamen non potest.' Tac., *Hist.*, v. 7, 'Atra et inania velut in cinerem vanescunt.'

The story of the still-smoking land is an exaggeration, but it was one which was prevalent till modern times. Cf. the Greek 'Acts of Pionius' quoted by Gregg, who remarks that 'smoke may have issued from the bituminous soil, as in the Lydian Catacecaumene, or the notion may be due to the dense mist which rises from the basin of the Dead Sea.' Cf. the descriptions of the site of Sodom in Deut. 29²³ (where 'burning' is expressly mentioned), Zeph. 2⁹, Isa. 13²⁰, Jer. 49¹⁸. Margoliouth considers that this vivid description goes to prove that the writer was a Palestinian Jew—and is answered by Freudenthal, *Jewish Quart. Rev.*, 1891, p. 752, who asks whether the descriptions in Tacitus (*Hist.*, v. 7), Tertull., *Apol.*, c. 40, and Clem. of Rome 1 Cor. 1¹¹, prove them to have been natives of Palestine. 'The account,' he says, 'is not that of a man who personally knew the locality, but consists of legendary exaggerations of the actual phenomena.'

It is probable that the legend of the apples is based on the peculiarity of some existing fruit. Robinson thought it was the *Asclepias gigantea*; Wilson and Hasselquist some form of *Solanum*; others the *Calotropis procera*. Chateaubriand (*Itinéraire*, i. 413), without giving it a name, speaks of a little apple answering in part to the description. Of this he says he gathered six specimens, and had still four in his possession.

ἀπιστονοῦσι assigns a peculiar reason for the looking back; disbelief in the destruction of the cities, and not mere longing for a lost home. Again, it may mean distrust in God's power to save.

The parallelism of this line with the first shows clearly that not merely a 'reminder' of unbelief is meant, but a concrete 'monument.' μνημεῖον can mean nothing else, and ἐστηκνία definitely fixes this signification. Siegfried, *Philo*, 24, seems rather to lean to a Philonic interpretation, and in his translation in Kautzsch he renders 'Erinnerungsmal,' which seems to favour the story that the pillar was really

8. For having passed wisdom by,

They were not only disabled from recognising the things
that were good,

But also left behind them for the world a memorial of their
folly,

So that they could not even shun detection in the nature
of their fault.

a monument erected to the woman by others (cf. Grimm, 199), while she herself was (Eichhorn) caught and destroyed by a stream of pitch. **L** has for *στήλη* 'figmentum salis,' and **S^P** 'the soul that believed not she (Wisdom) made a pillar of salt.' **S^H** translates *μνημεῖον* 'a grave.'

There is no real anacoluthon, *έστηκνα* continuing *καθέστηκε*. Siegfried strangely translates the former word 'hochragend.'

According to Driver in Hastings *D. B.*, iii. 152, Wisdom alludes to an appearance actually in existence. Such pillars are constantly in course of formation and destruction, owing to the perpetual decomposition and liquefaction of the perishable rock at the south end of the Dead Sea. Numerous authorities say that they have seen it. Jos., *Ant.*, i. xi. 4, Clem. Rom. and Irenæus are quoted by Kitto. Benjamin of Tudela says he had seen it, with exact particulars. So Maundrell (March 30). These are worth citing to prove that Pseudo-Solomon meant that an actual memorial, not a mere 'remembrance,' of Lot's wife existed, as much as did the waste land that smoketh and the plants bearing fruits that ripen untimely or that never come to ripeness.

8. On *παροδεύω*, cf. note on 11⁸.

This use of verbs like *βλάπτω* with the gen. of the infin. is quite classical. Winer, § xliv. 4b (note). Cf. Luke 24¹⁶, *οἱ ὄφθαλμοὶ ἐκρατοῦντο τοῦ μὴ ἐπιγνῶναι αὐτῶν*. For *βλάπτειν*, to 'hinder from,' with gen. cf. Lidd. and Sc., *s.v.*, i. 2. This is far better than the cumbrous and probably incorrect A.V.: 'They gat not only this hurt *that they knew not* the things which were good'; for this seems to imply the genitive of purpose. Siegfried is much the same: 'they injured themselves so that they knew not the good.' Grimm is equally ambiguous, 'They suffered damage *in such wise that* they knew not the good.' All these are evasions of the true construction, as is **L**, 'non tantum in hoc lapsi sunt, ut ignorarent bona.' **S^P** is strange. 'Wisdom they went beyond and returned not to her, not only that they *did not* right,' etc. The Arabic is even more erratic and deserves no notice.

Βίος may be 'human life,' but both here and in 14¹¹, *τοῦτο ἐγένετο τῷ βίῳ εἰς ἐνεδρον*, it may have the meaning of the world at large. So Sext. Empir. (in Lidd. and Sc.) uses *οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου* of the world as opposed to the philosophers; and in 4 Macc. 17¹⁴ we have *οἱ κόσμος καὶ οἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίοι ἐθεώρει*. **L** 'hominibus.'

9. But Wisdom delivered out of troubles them that served her.
 10. She did a righteous man, a fugitive from a brother's wrath,
 Guide in straight paths;
 Show to him God's kingdom and give him knowledge of holy
 things,
 Provide for him in his toils and bless with plenty his
 labours.

'So that' may be 'in order that,' but if we retain it, the interpretation seems clear. The nature of the memorial commemorated their sin. The burning crimes of Sodom were perpetuated in smoke; her vile and fruitless lusts in the 'hell-apples': for doubtless a less violent death was inflicted on the wife of Lot.

9. We now come to the examples of those that followed, instead of passing by, Wisdom. 'The word itself (*τοὺς θεραπεύσαντας*) recalls to one's mind the Therapeutæ, by whose teaching the author may have been influenced' (Deane). The inference is untenable. Cf. Introd. p. 45, and v. ¹⁶ below.

10. We note that *δίκαιος* and *ἄδικος* are applied only to the Hebrew worthies: for the heathen Sodomites and Egyptians the term *ἀτεβεῖς* is used.

'Straight paths' is probably literal and not metaphorical (Farrar). She took him straight to Mesopotamia, Gen. 28 ²⁰.

R.V. is right in translating 'God's kingdom,' and so avoiding the technical if uncertain meaning which attaches to the 'kingdom of God,' in the abstract. Here something concrete is meant. A Lapide, 'Regnum Dei vocat caelum in quo scalae innixus consistebat Deus,' but presently he adds 'ostendit illi regnum, id est regimen Dei,' which gives a different meaning. 'Holy things' is indefinite. 'A glimpse of heaven' (Farrar), 'mysteries' (Deane), 'the supernatural' (Grimm), which is most ambiguous. The rendering 'knowledge of the angels' (Gen. 28 ¹²) is also quoted by Grimm. In Prov. 9 ¹⁰, 30 ³, *συνέσις* and *γνῶσις ἀγίων* mean knowledge of the Holy (i.e. God). Cremer's idea, quoted by Bissell, that *βασιλεία* is really used here by anticipation in the full technical sense of New Testament language, will hardly be approved.

For *ἐν μάχθοις* Sh reads 'through his toils.'

ἐπλήθυνεν τοὺς πόνους αὐτοῦ has given some trouble. Either *πόνος* must mean the fruit of his labours as in 8⁷, or *ἐπλήθυνεν* signifies 'made to succeed,' 'prospered.' Neither is certain. *πόνοι* in 8⁷ means 'results' of labours in an abstract sense (viz. virtues) and not the concrete products; in Ecclus. 14 ¹⁵ it seems to have the latter meaning. Prov. 3⁹, 'Honour the Lord from thy just labours' is ambiguous. On the other hand, *ἐπλήθυνεν* cannot possibly, according to classical usage, have the meaning 'prosper,' but if we once depart from this

11. In the greed of them that oppressed him she stood by him,
And made him rich ;

12. She preserved him throughout from enemies,
And made him safe from liers in wait,
Yea, and a sore conflict she decided for him,
That he might know that piety is stronger than all.

(considering that 'Wisdom' is writing in a foreign tongue) there is no reason why the rendering given above should not meet the case. It is practically that of \mathbb{S}^P and Arabic. The only true meaning (classically) is 'multiplied his toils.' Gfrörer's idea, i. 230, that Wisdom meant it to mean 'bless' is adopted, with the addition of 'with plenty.'

It is to be noted that the multiplication of Jacob's blessings was due to a *σοφία* of very questionable character, scarcely to be classed even as *φρονησίς*.

11. \mathbb{L} 'in fraude circumvenientium illum affuit illi,' giving what is perhaps the more usual meaning 'to prevail against' by force or fraud. \mathbb{S}^P takes the word as meaning 'oppressors,' and Arab. has the strange version 'filled his lap with the wealth of those that had insulted him.' R.V. gives a cautious rendering, 'when men dealt hardly with him,' and apparently takes *κατισχύοντων* as an independent genitive absolute.

12. The first two lines appear to refer to Jewish legend. In the book of Jubilees, xxxvii., xxxviii., a long and circumstantial account is given of a war and decisive battle between the sons of Esau and those of Jacob. Esau is killed and his sons made to pay tribute (cf. also *Test. xii. Patr.*, Judah 4⁹). There is no mention of 'liers in wait,' however, and this must allude to some further apocryphal story. The anxiety of later Hebrew writers to blacken the character of Esau and Edom is easily understandable. Cf. Ps. 137⁷. Two other interpretations are mentioned by Cornely, (1) that the hostility of Laban and his pursuit of Jacob after his flight is meant, and this certainly agrees with the story of divine interposition in Gen. 31²⁴; (2) that the enmity of the Canaanites after the slaughter of the Shechemites (Gen. 34³⁰) is indicated. There is no reason why the writer should not have had all three cases in his mind.

It is possible that line 3 refers to these legendary conflicts, but it is generally assigned to the struggle of Jacob with the angel, and *εβάθευσεν* is translated 'gave him the victory.' It is most probable that this is correct, and that we have here a fresh instance of Pseudo-Solomon's ignorance of Greek. *Βραβεύω* cannot possibly have such a meaning, and accordingly R.V. translates 'she watched as judge,' which is not in accord with the context, which requires *victory*. Blunt translates 'appointed him a strong conflict.' Siegfried 'conducted the conflict for him (victoriously),' which is reading too much

13. She deserted not a righteous one that was sold,
 But delivered him from sin,
 Went down with him into a pit,
 And left him not in bonds,
 14. Until she brought him the sceptre of a kingdom
 And power over them that tyrannised over him;
 And proved them false that slandered him,
 And gave to him honour that should last for ever.

into the words, but agrees with **L** 'certamen dedit ut vinceret.' Th Arabic is similar. **S^P** gives the obvious version 'made him coi queror,' and this is no doubt correct, as also **S^h**. 'Wisdom' mistook th meaning of the word. The 'victory' of Jacob in the contest with th angel is not very distinctly stated in Genesis (cf., however, 32^{29b} but is emphasised in Hos. 12⁵).

Grimm's suggestion that line 4 means that piety is not onl stronger than men, but prevails with God, is hardly tenable. Th wrestling was not conceived generally as taking place with God hin self but with an angel. Cf. Hosea *l.c.* This 'angel' probably, in th earliest form of the story, represented a local god, possibly the spir of the river Jabbok, who resented his stream being crossed, and wh feared the dawn and refused to disclose his name. Then this loc and comparatively feeble god was transformed into Jehovah himsel Hence the ambiguous account in Gen. 32³⁰, including the saying ' have seen God face to face.'

13. **λάκκος** is the one word in this very simple passage which re quires discussion. It may mean 'dungeon' and is actually used of Joseph's dungeon in Gen. 40¹⁵, ἐνέβαλόν με εἰς τὸν λάκκον τοῦτον. Cf Exod. 12²⁹. It may also mean the pit into which Joseph was cast b his brethren—the natural meaning of **λάκκος**. **L** took it so, and trans lated ἐξ ἀμαρτίας 'a peccatoribus,' meaning his sinful brethren. Th version, if possible, would present no difficulty. Lines 1 and 2 are then general description of Joseph's case, and 3 and 4 a particular account of his successive troubles, first at the hands of his brethren and then in Egypt. **ἐξ ἀμαρτίας**, however, almost certainly refers to Potiphar's wife.

14. R.V. is probably right in translating 'a kingdom' and not 'the kingdom.' This difference, observed throughout, indicates th intentional indefiniteness (on whatever cause based) of 'Wisdom's language. **ἐξουσίαν αὐτῶν** for 'power over them' is supported b many classical instances.

σκῆπτρα for **σκῆπτρον** is poetical, but usual in classical Greek. Cf the use of **θυόνοι** in 9¹². There is no great exaggeration in the state ment. Cf. Gen. 41³⁹ *sqq.* Philo, as usual, goes further. *De Jos.*, § 2 εἰτ' αὐτὸν τῆς βασιλείας καθίστησι διάδοχον, μᾶλλον δ', εἰ χρὴ τὸ ἀληθὲς πείν, βασιλέα.

μωμᾶσθαι is no doubt the wrong word; it means properly to 'blame'

15. She delivered a holy people and a blameless seed from a nation of oppressors.

16. She entered into the soul of a servant of the Lord,
And stood up against dread kings in wonders and signs.

certainly not 'to accuse'; but Pseudo-Solomon knows no better. **¶** 'maculaverunt,' and R.V. 'mockingly accused him,' show the difficulty the word caused to the translators. Both Potiphar's wife and his own brethren are probably alluded to. 'Mockingly' is, as Gregg says, 'not in the Greek': but the revisers plainly connected it with **Μῶμος**, the personification of mockery.

δόξαν αἰώνιον. Churton: 'The everlasting honour of being a saviour and benefactor to Egypt and many people.' Gen. 50²⁰, 'To save much people alive.'

15. This is the first example of the unreasonable exaltation of Israel as 'a blameless folk' in 'Wisdom.' His motive is clear: he is addressing either apostate Jews or heathen rulers. In either case it will not serve his purpose to admit a single fault in Israel. Wisdom must always have been with the nation, or his argument fails. Of the many passages quoted by the commentators to prove the idolatry and rebelliousness of Israel, the most striking are those which refer to actual idolatry of the Hebrews while in Egypt. Cf. Josh. 24¹⁴, 'Put away the gods which your fathers served beyond the river and in Egypt.' Ezek. 20⁸, 'Neither did they forsake the idols of Egypt'; 23³, 'They committed whoredoms in Egypt.'

Deane's explanation of the extravagant **ἀμεμπτον** as 'an official characteristic,' as St. Paul calls all Christians 'holy,' is insufficient. St. Paul does not argue from his epithet, except by way of exhortation, Eph. 1⁴, 5²²; Col. 3¹². Pseudo-Solomon uses his unsparingly to prove that Providence was always on the side of the Jews.

It is strange that people who defended the 'Song' and 'Koheleth' as part of the true Scriptures should have attacked the canonicity of this book on such grounds as this and similar verses afford. Cf. Grimm's statements as to the 'Apokryphenfrage' *ad loc.* He points out that Exod. 19⁶, 'Ye shall be unto me a nation of priests and a holy people,' refers to the destiny of Israel rather than its actual conduct, and Hab. 1¹³ to its comparative righteousness as against the Chaldaeans. The fact remains that 'Wisdom' speaks of Israel as 'blameless.' A curious way out of the difficulty is suggested by Calmet, who renders 'who had never offended the Egyptians,' which certainly agrees with 19¹⁴. But the expression is probably general.

16. **Θεράπων κυρίον** is here Moses. In 18²¹ it means Aaron. It is hardly conceivable that such an expression, which alternates in **¶** with **δοῦλος θεοῦ**, should be taken as a proof of the connection of the writer with the Therapeutae (Noack).

Βασιλεῦσι may probably be translated generically 'royalties.' To

17. She rendered to the holy a reward of their toils ;
 She led them along a wondrous way,
 Yea and was to them for a covering by day
 And for a flame of stars by night.

interpret it of 'the king and his princes' is far-fetched. If the reading 'in the chambers of their kings' in Ps. 105³⁰ were certain, we should have an excellent parallel. But *G* reads there 'in the storehouse of their palaces,' or 'kingdoms.' To refer the expression to the other 'kings,' Sihon, Og, and the like (Ps. 136^{17.18}), is inadmissible : it is Moses only who is here spoken of. It is just possible that 'Wisdom' may allude to the legend of Moses' campaign for Pharaoh against the Ethiopians (Jos., *Ant.*, II. x. 2), but, considering the context, most unlikely. The versions translate literally except *S^P*, which has 'powers and kings.' A Lapidé is quaint : 'Pharaoh, who by reason of his power and pride was "instar multorum."'

17. Most early commentators understood the 'reward' as the 'jewels of silver and jewels of gold' which the Hebrews 'borrowed from their oppressors' (Exod. 12³⁵), but Grimm is probably right in referring it to their deliverance generally. The other interpretation is too worldly, though Gen. 15¹⁴, 'Afterward they shall come out with great substance,' seems to indicate it. That the conscience of Israel was not easy on this matter is clear from 'Jubilees,' xlvi. 18 : 'On the seventeenth day we bound him (Mastema) that he should not accuse the children of Israel on that day, in that they begged of the Egyptians vessels and clothes, vessels of gold and vessels of silver and vessels of brass, and that they plundered the Egyptians,' etc.

The 'wondrous way' might be paraphrased as 'a way full of miracles'; the sweetening of the waters of Marah; the bringing of water out of the rock; the manna; the quails; and so forth. Cornelius has another interpretation; he thinks that the wondrousness refers to the extraordinary and circuitous route by which the Israelites were led (Exod. 13¹⁷). This certainly implies the interposition of Wisdom more perhaps than the miracles.

The meaning of 'a covering by day' is clearly explained in Ecclesiastes 34¹⁶, *σκέπη ἀπὸ καυσῶνος καὶ σκέπη ἀπὸ μεσημβρίας*, combined with Ps. 104³⁹, *διεπέτασε νεφέλην εἰς σκέπην αὐτοῖς*. Reuss *ad loc.*, 'la nuée devait protéger la caravane contre l'ardeur du soleil.' That the clouds could so protect the whole vast body of emigrants is, however, a idea only appropriate to legend.

'Flame of the stars' need not be explained as that of the sun and moon. To any one who knows the burning light of the constellation in the Eastern sky the expression is sufficient in itself.

There is surely no indication here of the personification of Wisdom as the pillar of cloud and fire, as Siegfried (*Philo*, p. 24) would have it. The reality of the pillar is no more denied than is that of the Re-

18. She brought them through the Red Sea,
And led them through much water ;
19. But their enemies did she drown,
And cast them up out of the depths of the abyss.

Sea (in the next verse), which might just as well be accounted as symbolical. Drummond, *Philo*, i. 185 (following Gfrörer, ii. 207-9), goes too far also : 'Although it did not suit the author's plan to enter, like Philo, into a detailed exegesis, it is evident that the pillar of cloud and of fire is allegorised into Wisdom.' But his own quotations from Philo show the difference of view. In *Quis rer. div. heres*, § 42, Philo speaks of the cloud as 'gently dropping Wisdom on virtuous understandings,' and connects it with the Logos. In *Vita Mosis*, i. 29, he suggests that there was an invisible angel wrapt up in the cloud. Pseudo-Solomon's view is, on the contrary, a purely practical and concrete one. The pillar was a protection by day and a light by night. In any case there is a great difference between a 'manifestation' of Wisdom and an allegorical appearance of Wisdom. The strongest text which can be adduced for Gfrörer's theory is Eccl. 24⁴, 'my throne is in the pillar of cloud' ; but there the meaning is disputed.

18. R.V. 'brought them over the Red Sea' is obviously wrong. The Greek means 'through.' §^P and Arab. seem to have had some text which added 'terrible' to 'Red Sea' ; both translate it so.

19. A.V. and R.V. 'out of the bottom of the deep.' It is, however, possible to translate 'from the depth, the abyss' ; but a similar passage in Eccl. 24⁵ has *ἐν βάθει ἀβύσσων*, and the versions all support the ordinary rendering. *ἀβύσσος* seems to be always an adjective in classical and always a noun in Biblical Greek.

³*Ἀνέβρασεν*, 'she cast them up,' is a rare word, and might possibly answer to *Ἐ* 'eduxit,' referring not to the 'casting up' of the Egyptians but to the 'bringing up' of the Israelites out of the sea. This, however, is against the context, particularly the next verse. Nevertheless both §^P and Arab. support it, and early commentators from Luther onward did the same. But the use of the similar word *ἀποβράσσω* in Philo, *Vita Mosis*, iii. § 34, *πάντες οἱ νεκροὶ σωρῆδον ἀπεβράσθησαν εἰς τοὺς ἀντιπέραν αἰγαλούς*, seems to settle the meaning. The verbal resemblance between Pseudo-Solomon and Philo is somewhat striking. On the word *ἀναβράττω* Arnald remarks, 'The bodies rising in the act of drowning are . . . compared to bubbles rising in boiling water.' It is certainly a vivid expression.

The Jerusalem Targum contains an account of a contest between earth and sea, neither of which will hold the bodies of the Egyptians. Cf. the tradition in Jos., *Ant.*, II. xvi. 6, that the weapons of the Egyptians (apparently not their bodies) were washed ashore to provide the children of Israel with arms. The bodies, according to

20. Therefore did the righteous spoil the impious,
 And sang hymns, O Lord, to thy holy name ;
 And praised with one accord thy defending hand :

21. For wisdom opened the mouth of the dumb,
 And made the tongues of infants eloquent.

II. 1. She directed their acts aright by the hand of a hol prophet.

the Targum, had been finally swallowed by the earth, which is hardl in accordance with Exod. 14³⁰, 'Israel saw the Egyptians dead upo the seashore.'

20. 'Υπέρμαχος is generally translated as above ; but Grimm mentions another rendering, 'fighting bravely' or 'victoriously.' I 16¹⁷ it must have the meaning given, but the versions here eithe missed the force of the ὑπέρ altogether or took the view of Λ, whic has 'victicem manum.'

21. It is possible that we have here, as Farrar says, 'poetic general isations founded on the stammering tongue of Moses (Exod. 4¹ 6^{12,30}), but here ideally extended to all the Israelites.' It is also possible with A Lapide, to interpret the words of those who 'prius obseß a Pharaone prae metu videbantur muti et infantes elingues' but some tradition, otherwise unknown, seems to be alluded to Churton favours A Lapide's interpretation, citing Exod. 14¹⁰⁻¹⁴, fo the servile terror of the Israelites. Deane quotes a treatise falsel attributed to St. Augustine (*De Mirab. S. Script.*, xxi.) for a story of 'all, young and old, though they could not hear Moses leading the song, yet joining in it with one accord' (δροθυμαδόν, v. 20).

τρανός for 'eloquent' occurs also in Ξ of Isa. 35⁶, τρανὴ ἔστι γλώσσα μογιλάλων. Margoliouth (*Expositor*, 1900, i. 42) takes thi as a proof that Isaiah was acquainted with 'Wisdom' and not the reverse.

Coverdale and Genev., taking the aorists ἤνοιξεν and ἔθηκεν a frequentative, render 'openeth' and 'maketh.' If this could be accepted, the reference to Ps. 8², 'Out of the mouths of babes an sucklings,' would be sufficient to explain the passage. But 'Wisdom is here writing historically.'

II. 1. Grimm joins this verse to chapter 10, as being the last in which Wisdom is assumed as the nominative.

A very similar passage is found in Gen. 39²³, ὅσα αὐτὸς ἐποίει, κύριος εὐάδον ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν αὐτοῦ. To speak of the expression 'b the hand of' as anthropomorphic (as does Bois) is absurd. It is common Hebraism, repeated in the New Testament : Acts 7³⁵, σὺ χειρὶ ἀγγέλου. Gal. 3¹⁹, ἐν χειρὶ μεσίτου.

For Moses as a prophet cf. Deut. 34¹⁰, 'There hath not arisen

2. They travelled through a desert uninhabited,
And pitched tents in pathless places :
3. They resisted their foes and repulsed their enemies.
4. They thirsted and they called upon thee,
And water was given them out of a craggy rock,
And healing of thirst out of hard stone.
5. For by those things whereby their enemies were punished,
By these they in their need were holpen.

prophet since in Israel like unto Moses, whom the Lord knew face to face.' Cf. also Deut. 18¹⁸.

2. *ἀοίκητον*, 'uninhabited,' is to be taken literally. Gregg's idea that it means 'the desert had no established city-life' is far-fetched. 'Wisdom' is too general in his language for such refinements. The word *ἀοίκητος* is also used in Hos. 13⁵ of the desert, but only in \mathfrak{G} . Heb. is quite different.

3. The classical distinction between *πολέμιοι*, 'public foes,' and *ἐχθροί*, 'private enemies,' is well known. Wisdom, if he knew of the distinction, ignores it. The only real *ἐχθροί* of the Israelites were the Egyptians; but the word here includes Amalekites, Moabites, and Amorites.

4. This is, of course, a perversion of Scripture. In Exod. 17³, the people murmured against Moses and 'were almost ready to stone him.' There seems to be no tradition to support Pseudo-Solomon, who is simply exaggerating to prove the 'blamelessness' of the chosen race. The idea that *ἐπεκαλέσαντο* can be restricted to Moses and Aaron is out of the question.

ἀκρότομος is properly 'precipitous,' but such an epithet is meaningless here. A.V. and R.V. have 'flinty rock,' which is not a rendering of the Greek, but suits the context. 'Water out of flint' is a striking expression. 'Wisdom' seems to have had Deut. 8¹⁵ (\mathfrak{G}) before him. *τοῦ ἐξαγαγόντος σοι ἐκ πέτρας ἀκροτόμου πηγὴν ὕδατος*. There, as in Job 28⁹, Ps. 113 (114)⁸, the Hebrew word is actually שִׁיבְעָן, 'flint.'

5. The meaning is plain: water relieved the Israelites' thirst. Water turned into blood tormented the Egyptians. This is the first indication of the wearisome topic of 'retaliation' which is expanded in chapters 16-19. The Mosaic law of 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth' is plainly reflected here.

For *ἐκολάσθησαν* \mathfrak{S}^h has here, and throughout hereafter, the Syriac phrase 'received capital punishment.'

The extraordinary addition to this verse in \mathfrak{L} has no authority. The words are: 'per quae enim passi sunt inimici illorum a defectione potus sui et in eis quam abundarent filii Israel, laetati sunt, per haec

6, 7. Instead indeed of the fountain of an ever-flowing river
 Turbid with gory blood,
 For a rebuke of the decree for the murder of babes,
 Thou gavest them all unlooked for plentiful water,

quum illis deessent bene cum iis actum est.' This may be a margin gloss, copied into the text by an ignorant transcriber.

Gregg points out a certain resemblance between this contrast at that in 1 Pet. 3²⁰, where the drowning of the world by water is contrasted with the saving of the ark by the water which carried it on its waves. If we could suppose a reminiscence of 'Wisdom' in the author of 1 Pet., it would go far to explain the difficult word διεσώθησαν δι' ὑδατος in the latter.

6, 7. The language is at once diffuse and pregnant: that of the writer who is making the best he can of a foreign language. The idea of vengeance for the death of the children is found in the *Book of Jubilees*, but in a different form, xlviii. 14, 'All the people that he had led out to pursue Israel the Lord our God cast into the sea into the depths of the abyss, instead of the children of Israel. For this thing, that the Egyptians had cast their children into the river, he took vengeance on millions of them; and a thousand strong and brave men perished for one suckling that they had cast into the river, of the children of thy people.' Philo's explanation of the miracle (*Vita Mosis*, i. § 17) is that because the Egyptians had honoured water as 'the beginning of the whole creation,' it was used for their especial punishment.

The epithet 'ever flowing' is rightly explained as contrasted with the next line: the stream no longer flowed: it was choked with gore.

ταραχθέντος is, on the ground of reason, the best reading in line 6. It has good MS. support, and it avoids an anacoluthon. What the translators read it is impossible to say. L has 'pro fonte semper terni fluminis humanum sanguinem dedisti injustis, qui cum minu- rentur in traductione infantium occisorum dedisti illis abundante aquam insperate.' S^p does not seem to have read *ταραχθέντος* (or *ταραχθέντες* (the most usual variant) at all, but translates 'Instead of fountain was given to them a stream running with blood of red water for a rebuke on account of the children who had been slain by decree. And thou gavest to them water in the good life that faileth not.' The last words represent a mistranslation of *ἀνελπίστως*. Arab. seems to have read *ταραχθέντος*, but with the addition *ὑπ' αὐτῶν*, 'a river troubled by them with the blood of murdered infants.' S^b certainly read it. All these renderings are either mistranslations (L 'traductione' for *εἰς ἔλεγχον* is plainly so), or the translators had a text before them widely differing from our own.

Nevertheless *ταραχθέντες*, as Gregg points out, preserves the

8. Showing through their thirst at that time how thou didst punish their adversaries.

9. For when they were tried, though chastened only in mercy,
They understood how being judged in anger the impious were tormented :

balancing of clauses. The Egyptians are 'troubled' by the spoiling of the water ; the Israelites are blessed by a plentiful supply of it.

There are several traditions with regard to this story. One, quoted by Gregg, is to the effect that Pharaoh 'commanded to kill the first-born of the sons of Israel, that he might bathe himself in their blood,' which is, of course, not in accordance with Exod. 1²², 'Every son that is born ye shall cast into the river.' Another is that of Josephus (*Ant.*, II. xiv. 1), 'The water was not only of the colour of blood, but it brought upon those that ventured to drink of it great pains and bitter torment. Such was the river to the Egyptians ; but it was sweet and fit for drinking to the Hebrews.' The absurdly exaggerated account of Philo, 'the river was turned into blood from Ethiopia to the sea,' etc., is in his *Vita Mosis*, i. § 17. His overstatements are not entirely unlike those of 'Wisdom.'

8. Here again the versions are hopelessly at variance. **L** 'Quemadmodum tuos exaltares et adversarios illos necares' ; where 'tuos exaltares' is plainly an interpolation and 'necares' is far too strong for ἐκόλασας. **S^P** is clear but inaccurate. 'Therefore dost thou show that by thirst thou didst punish their adversaries.' Arab. takes ὅτε ἐπειράσθησαν in the next verse as part of this, and translates 'therefore didst thou punish the rebels (*ὑπεναντίους*, misunderstood) when they thirsted at a time when they were tempted.' The misconception is apparent.

The vindictive idea of these verses—that God only punished the Israelites a little to enable them to see how terrible such punishments, many times multiplied, must be to the Egyptians—is not in accord with Deut. 8³, 'And He humbled thee, and suffered thee to hunger, and fed thee with manna, which thou knewest not, neither did thy fathers know.'

9. A.V. inserts as a third line the last clause of v. 1⁴, 'thirsting in another manner than the just' : a most audacious and unsupported conjecture, approved by Arnald and Farrar on the ground of sense. The extraordinary variants of **S^P** here and in following verses do not seem to have been noticed. Here we have 'When they were tried and thou didst in mercy punish and direct them, they knew that in wrath the impious are scourged and torn.'

The ordinary statement of the Pentateuch is that the Israelites throughout 'tempted God' and were punished for it, but in Deut. 8² we have the view given here, 'The Lord thy God hath led thee these forty years in the wilderness to prove thee, to know what was in thine

10. For these as a father admonishing them thou didst prove,
 But those as a stern king condemning thou didst searc
 out.

11. Yea, and whether absent or present they were alike di
 tressed ;

heart,' etc. Cf. also v. ¹⁶ and also 8 ⁶, 'As a man chasteneth his son
so the Lord thy God chasteneth thee.'

The latter part of the verse is generally regarded as without warrant in Scripture ; but cf. Deut. 7 ¹⁵, 'He will put none of the evil diseases of Egypt, which thou knowest, upon thee, but will lay them upon all that hate thee.' So too 11 ²⁴, where 'the chastisement of the Lord your God' seems to refer to the plagues of Egypt. Farrar remarks that 'the writer may have founded his view on various passages of Scripture, but only by reading them apart from their context and with the blindness of Jewish prejudice.'

10. The R.V. is accepted as preserving the skilful antithesis ; but the sense is most likely given in Genev., 'Thou hast condemned the other as a righteous king when thou didst examine them.' If this be not the meaning, we must suppose that Pseudo-Solomon has used the word *ἐξετάζειν*, which cannot mean 'punish' (A.V.), in a wrong sense. He has just shown his ignorance by referring *τούτους* to the Israelites, whereas, according to all classical usage, it should mean 'the latter' and *ἐκείνους* 'the former.' So too *ἀπότομος βασιλεύς* is almost a grotesque expression.

¶ has (as Genev.) 'interrogans condemnasti.' §, 'These as father thou didst choose, comfort, and try, and those as a stern king thou didst slay and condemn.' Arab. translates the text literally.

Besides Deut. 8 ⁵, cf. 2 Sam. 7 ¹⁴, and Heb. 12 ⁶, 'Whom the Lord loveth he chasteneth, and scourgeth every son whom he receiveth' Grimm quotes an apposite passage from Plutarch, *De Superst.*, where the superstitious man mistakes *τὸ πατρικόν* of God for *τυραννικόν*.

Such doctrine is contrary not only to that of the New Testament, Acts 10 ³⁵, 'In every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is acceptable to him' (cf. 17 ²⁷), but also to that of the Old Testament, Ezek. 18 ²⁹, 'Yet saith the house of Israel, The way of the Lord is not equal. O house of Israel, are not my ways equal? are not your ways unequal? Therefore I will judge you, O house of Israel, every one according to his ways.' On the other hand, Mal. 1 ², 'I have loved Jacob, and hated Esau,' seems to reflect the very spirit of 'Wisdom' here. His fine sentiments at the end of the chapter only emphasise his inconsistency of thought and language.

11. R.V. supplies the words to make up what seems the real meaning : 'Whether they were far off (from the righteous) or near (them) they were alike distressed.' It is true that *παρόντες* can hardly

12. For a double grief gat hold upon them,
And a groaning over past remembrances.

bear this meaning, but the Greek of a writer who can use a combination like *kai . . . dè kai* is hardly worth investigation. The meaning seems to be, that while the Egyptians had the Israelites with them they were plagued; when they were rid of them they suffered from hearing 'the report that water which had been so hostile to themselves had befriended the escaping Israelites' (Gregg). This writer would apparently interpret the 'water' as that of the Red Sea; but the preceding verses refer to the thirst of the Israelites in the wilderness, quenched by a miracle: if this be so, we must, as in v.¹³, suppose that the Egyptians are conceived of as hearing of the miracles wrought in the desert. The difficulty is met by other interpretations. (a) Grimm would render *ἀπόντες* of the Egyptians drowned in the Red Sea; *παρόντες* of those who stayed at home and heard of the disaster. (b) The Egyptians, whether they held aloof from the Hebrews or mixed with them, were equally tormented with thirst: referring to the legend in Josephus, *Ant.*, II. xiv. 1, that the water became blood for the Egyptians only. (c) Whether they were in Pharaoh's presence or away from it. (d) Holtkot explains 'whether they came to water which they could not drink, or stayed away from it.' (e) Lastly, Reuss, following Hugo a Sancto Caro, says, 'il s'agit simplement de gens voisins des Israélites en Égypte et d'autres plus éloignés,' i.e. Canaanites and Amalekites, etc. *Σ*^P seems to favour this, 'Thou didst destroy the distant and the near'; but the next verse, with its reference to the memory of the past, supports the R.V. rendering.

ὅμοιῶς naturally goes with the two participles, and does not mean that the Egyptians were distressed (*ἐτρύχοντο*, a rare word in Biblical Greek) 'like the Israelites.'

12. An important variant occurs here: instead of *στρεναγμὸς μνημῶν τῶν παρελθοντῶν*, which implies a genitive of origin, good MSS. read *μνημῶν των παρελθοντων*, and so *¶* 'gemitus cum memoria praeteritorum': possibly also *Σ*^P, 'and a groaning of remembrances of those (things) that are past.' *Μνήμων* as the adjective 'memor' certainly seems preferable to the genitive *μνημῶν*.

Holding by his interpretation that *ἀπόντες* means those drowned in the Red Sea, Grimm can only refer the 'past remembrances' to the *παρόντες*, but with the rendering of R.V. the difficulty disappears: the Egyptians are plagued by the news from the desert, and also by the remembrance of their own folly and its punishment. Farrar: 'actual punishment, and subsequent remorse and envy.' Deane: 'The thought that their punishment brought deliverance to the Hebrews; secondly, the enforced recognition of the power of the Lord and the nothingness of their gods.' *À Lapide* gives even more varieties of interpretation.

13. For when they heard that by their own plagues
The others were being benefited, they had knowledge
the Lord.
14. For the castaway whom aforetime they rejected with scorn;
the exposure of infants
In the result of events they admired,
Having thirsted after another fashion than the just.

13. A.V. simply 'they had some feeling of the Lord'; Genev. 'they felt the Lord'; R.V. 'they felt *the presence of* the Lord.' If any word be supplied, 'the hand of the Lord' would be better. R.V. translates *εὐεργετημένους* 'had been benefited,' which, though well supported, is, as Deane says, 'the alteration of some scribe who did not understand the (continuous) force of the present participle.'

L and Arab. plainly take the Israelites as the subject: **L**, 'Cum enim audirent per sua tormenta bene secum agi, commemorati sunt Dominum, admirantes in finem exitus.' The last clause is a transfer from the next verse, but the rest must mean 'when they (the Israelites) understood that (even) in their punishments God dealt well with them (cf. verses 9,10), they remembered the Lord (*ἵστθοντο*).'
Arab. bears the same meaning, except that it translates the last clause 'they got pleasure from them (the *κολάσεις*) before the Lord.' The extraordinary **S^P** rendering is spoken of below.

Idiaw is taken by Grimm as 'their own peculiar punishments'; but it is doubtful if the word is ever so used in 'Wisdom.'

S^P's translation of these verses is so strange that mere paraphrase will not account for it. (Lagarde's edition corresponds to that of Walton Polyglot.) It runs as follows: 'For when they heard of their own deliverance, that when they (? the Israelites) were blessed, they knew not the Lord, nay, rather made mock of that which had happened to them, yet at the result of their fortunes they were amazed; and the cry was not as their intentions (οτι Απειπον), because in the there was no understanding.' Out of all this two points are clear: (1) that the translator could not understand v. 14, *tōn γὰρ ἐν ἐκθέσι πάλαι ρίφέντα ἀπειπον χλευάζοντες*, at all; and (2) that he had the idea that the ingratitude of the Israelites (according to the Mosaic view, but not that of 'Wisdom') was the point to be pressed. It may have had a different text before him, edited by some scribe who took that view. Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 273, argues in explanation of the Syriac translation of *οὐχ ὅμοια δικαοῖς διψήσαντες*, 'their cry was not like their thoughts,' that **הַמְּנוּז** might mean both: for as 'part. plur. masc.' of **הַמְּנַז**, it would be 'thirsting,' and as the substantive **מְנוּז** with the 3rd plur. masc. suffix it would mean 'their cry.'

14. R.V., contrary to all ordinary translations and to the sense (1) the Egyptians did not 'leave off mocking' at the time of the *ekθeru*

renders *ἀπείπον χλευάζοντες*, 'they left off mocking,' which is no doubt good Greek, and in classical writers would probably be correct, though even there (Lidd. and Sc., s.v.) the meaning 'to reject' is far more common. The margin of R.V., 'in hatred,' represents *ἐν ἐχθέσει*, an impossible word unless it represents *ἐν ἐχθεσι*, the rare Homeric plural of *ἐχθος*. Gregg argues for this reading that 'the exposure of Moses in his infancy is not germane to the topic in hand, nor has it any connection with the mocking of the Egyptians; on the other hand, "cast forth in hatred" refers plainly to Exod. 10¹¹⁻²⁸.' *L* is fairly clear, 'Quem enim in expositione prava deriserunt,' but must have read some other word for *πάλαι*. (*S*, as we have seen, gives no help.) Arab. rendering similarly as to *πάλαι*, has 'him who had been cast out among vile things,' but there follows, 'they fled from in despair,' which represents *ἀπείπον χλευάζοντες*. The *ἐκθεσις* is referred to again in 18⁶. *"Ἐκθεσις* is the technical term for the exposing of a child, Hdt. i. 116; Eur., *Ion*, 956. Cf. Acts 7^{19.21}.

Cornely, following Jansen, adopts the singular idea that God and not Moses is referred to. He argues that at no time was Moses despised; he was first brought up in Pharaoh's household, and on his return to Egypt was (Exod. 11³) 'very great in the land of Egypt,' etc. But surely the word *ριφέντα* is sufficient to confute any such explanation.

τὸν γὰρ ριφέντα, the accepted reading (instead of *δν*), produces something like an anacoluthon with the next line. Winer (Moulton), xviii. 1, will not admit that it may possibly be for the relative, but thinks *δν* a correction. If the R.V. translation of *ἀπείπον* be accepted, an *adversative* particle is demanded at the beginning of line 2.

ἐπι τέλει, which means 'at the end' and not 'for the success' (Wahl *ap.* Grimm), would naturally mean 'on the occasion of the triumphant exodus,' but if the next line be rightly placed here (see on v. 9) it confines the reference to the everlasting subject of the thirst of the Egyptians. How this should still be in existence at the end of the plagues it is difficult to conceive. It lasted (Exod. 7²⁵) seven days only. We must either suppose that, according to some Hebrew legend, the Egyptians knew all about the quenching of the Israelites' thirst in the desert (v. 13, *ὅτε γὰρ ἤκουσαν*), or that *διψάντες* is used in a pluperfect sense as it is translated above. Cf. Winer (Moulton), p. 343.

For *πάλαι* Arm., according to Margoliouth, has 'yesterday and the day before yesterday.' It is possible that the *L* 'in expositione *prava*' contains some explanation of this. Cornely seems to think it an early mistake for 'pridem,' which would literally bear some such meaning as Arm. gives, and this is rendered still more likely if, as his editor Zorell conjectures, some obscure abbreviation of 'pridem' was used.

15. But for the foolish reasonings of their unrighteousness,
 Led astray by which they worshipped senseless reptile
 and vile vermin,
 Thou sentest upon them a multitude of senseless beasts fo
 vengeance;

15. *Αντὶ* has its full force given it in R.V. 'in requital of.' Cf. Wine (Moulton), xlvi. *a*, and the well-known *λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν* in Matt. 20²⁸. But cf. especially Zeph. (G) 2¹⁰, *αὕτη αὐτοῖς ἀντὶ τῆς θύρεως αὐτῶν διότι ἀνείδισαν καὶ ἐμεγαλύθησαν ἐπὶ τὸν κύριον*.

The versions vary widely. L 'Pro cogitationibus autem insensati iniquitatis illorum quod quidam errantes colebant mutos serpentes e bestias supervacuas,' where 'quidam' seems to have no justification, and *ἄλογα* is translated 'speechless'; so also S^P   adding after 'Thou sentest upon them' the words 'to insult them.'

κνάδαλα seems to represent almost exactly our English 'vermin' as applied to foxes, stoats, and even to badgers. That the Egyptians worshipped reptiles is undoubtedly true: the Greek name of Crocodilopolis is sufficient to prove this: that they worshipped cats, which might be described as vermin, is also certain; but to prove our author's theory of punishment of like by like it would be necessary to prove that they had worshipped such beasts as were sent to plague them—lice, flies and locusts. Such proof is wanting. A more prejudiced account than that of Juvenal, *Sat.*, xv. 1-15, can hardly be imagined; but he mentions no worship of vermin. Pseudo-Solomon may have had in his mind the scarabaei, but it is hardly likely. His language seems merely rhetorical. That the Egyptians were attacked by serpents, which they certainly worshipped (cf. reff. in Grimm, p. 210), is implied in 17⁹, but has, of course, no scriptural authority, any more than (Jos. *Ant.*, II. xiv. 3) 'various sorts of pestilential creatures with their various properties.' On Egyptian idolatry cf. Euseb., *Praep. Evang.* iii. 2, 3; Aristid., *Apol.*, c. xii., who speaks at length on the subject and for the worship of the crocodile-god Sebek, Brugsch, *Egypt* i. 168.

The passage is often compared with Rom. 1²¹, *ἐματαιώθησαν ἐν τοῖς διαλογισμοῖς αὐτῶν καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος αὐτῶν καρδία*, but the resemblance seems to be verbal only—one of many.

For the Jewish view of Egyptian animal-worship cf. Orac. Sibyll. iii. proem. ii. 22 *sqq.* :—

"Ανθρωποι, τί μάτην ὑψούμενοι ἐκροιζοῖσθε;
 Αἰσχύνθητε γαλᾶς καὶ κνάδαλα θειοποιοῦντες . . .
 Εἰλίποδας κλέπτοντι θεοὶ συλῶσι τε χυτρας . . .
 Προσκυνέοντες ὄφεις, κύνας, αἴλούρους ἀνόητοι,
 Καὶ πετέεινα σέβεσθε καὶ ἐρπετα θήρια γαίης,
 Καὶ λίθινα ξόανα καὶ ἀγάλματα χειροποίητα.

16. That they might know that by what things a man sinneth, thereby he is punished.

16. The text and the versions present no difficulties. Only §^P, as usual, simplifies 'by these he is to be judged and rewarded.'

'Wisdom' returns partially to the favourite idea of Judaism—earthly retribution. From 12²³, διὰ τῶν ἰδίων ἐβασάνισας βδελυγμάτων, and 17⁹, where the κνώδαλα and ἐρπετά reappear, there can be no doubt that the meaning is not simply 'because they worshipped beasts they were punished by beasts,' but 'they were punished by the very beasts they adored,' and for this there is no manner of warrant in the Biblical account.

The general idea of retribution: 'whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap,' is a common one; cf. Matt. 7², ἐν φιλοτρόφῳ μετρεῖτε μετρηθῆσεται ψυχήν; but the infliction of punishment by the instrument of transgression is so bright an idea that, as Farrar says, 'the writer seems to feel something of the delight of a moral discoverer in dwelling on this characteristic of judgment.' Cf. verses 7,8 above, 12²³ already quoted, 16¹, διὰ τοῦτο δι' ὄμοιων ἐκολάσθησαν ἀξιώς, 17³, 18⁶. Yet it was no new notion: in the Old Testament we have the instance of David, whose adultery and murder are punished by adultery and murder. The cases of Adonibezek and Agag are on a different footing. Theirs are simply cases of the 'lex talionis'; an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. That of Absalom, cited loosely from 'the Rabbis' with four others by A. Lapide, is more to the point. He was proud of his hair: his hair caused his death. But others, as in the 'De Mortibus Persecutorum,' are mere examples of retribution. Gregg cites an excellent instance of true 'retaliation' from Ps. 7¹⁵, 'he is fallen into the ditch which he made.' Cf. 57⁶. Eccl. 27^{26,27}.

It is to the early Christian and mediæval visions of retribution in the next world that we must look for anything exactly corresponding to the idea of Pseudo-Solomon. A few examples are to be found in the Revelation of Peter, where, § 7, blasphemers are hung up 'by their tongues,' and § 9, women that had 'adorned themselves for adultery are hung up by the hair which they had adorned.' But the best is in the Acts of Thomas, quoted by James on the Rev. of Peter, p. 64. 'These souls that are hung by their tongues are slanderers, and uttered false and shameful words; and those that hung by their hair were bold-faced (? women) who went about bare-headed in the world: those hung by their hands were cheats, and never gave to the poor: those hung by their feet ran after pleasure, but did not visit the sick nor bury the dead.' In comparison with this exactitude of punishment, Dante's suggestions of torments fitting the crimes committed seem far-fetched, e.g. there is no particular connection between the leaden cloaks and the crime of hypocrisy.

Yet it can hardly be said that this is in any sense a scriptural doctrine. It finds its first definite expression in 2 Macc. 9⁶. Antiochus dies of

17. For thy hand, all powerful, and that created the world out of formless matter,

Lacked not means to send upon them a multitude of bears or bold lions,

a disease of the bowels, 'and that most justly ; for he had tormented other men's bowels with many and strange torments.' In 'Jubilees,' iv. 31, Cain is killed by a falling stone because he killed his brother with a stone. In *Test. xii. Patr.*, Gad, § 5, Gad is seized with a disease of the liver, and is plagued with it eleven months, because his liver made him hate Joseph for eleven months, until he was sold. The examples quoted from the Old Testament (Job 4⁸, Ps. 109¹⁷, Prov. 5²², Ezek. 35⁶, Obad. 1⁶) are one and all examples of an entirely different principle, viz., that 'as a man soweth, so shall he reap.'

17. The interest of the passage centres round the words ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὑλῆς, which, together with the references to πρόνοια, really constitute the whole proof of 'Wisdom's' adoption of Greek philosophy in any form. It is to be observed that the allusion is casual and not dogmatic. If it were the latter it would involve the assumption of a double original existence—God, and matter extraneous to God.

For a discussion of the whole point involved, cf. the last pages of Additional Note A ; to the statements there made we may add that some Christian fathers found nothing at which to take offence in this statement of 'Wisdom.' Justin Martyr, *Apol.*, i. 10, uses the same words without any explanation : πάντα . . . δημιουργῆσαι αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὑλῆς δι' ἀνθρώπους δεδιδάγμεθα. He no doubt thought he was simply representing the statement of Gen. 1², and it is possible that he was. But the question of dualism so raised was apparent to the acuter mind of St. Augustine, who has his own explanation (*De Gen. c. Manich.*, i. c. 5 *ad fin.*). 'Primo ergo materia facta est confusa et informis, unde omnia fierent, quae distincta et formata sunt, quod credo a Graecis chaos appellari. Sic enim et alio loco legimus dictum in laudibus Dei ; qui fecisti mundum de materia informi. Quod aliqui codices habent de materia invisa. Et ideo Deus rectissime creditur omnia de nihilo fecisse, quia etiamsi omnia formata de ista materia facta sunt, haec ipsa materia tamen de omnino nihilo facta est.' This is of course a plain statement of the doctrine of a double creation, which seems at all events preferable to the heedless admission of a dualistic principle, as by Philo.

On the ground of such implied dualism this passage was strongly attacked by the assailants of the Apocrypha in the German controversy of sixty years ago. Cornely, defending 'Wisdom,' argues that the single expression ἡ παντοδύναμός σου χείρ is sufficient to clear our author from any suspicion of dualism ; 'omnipotence,' he says, is never attributed to God by the Greek philosophers, in whose systems such dualism in one form or another constantly appears. He further quotes 1¹⁴ : 'He created *all things* that they might have being.'

18. Or new-created wild beasts, unknown before, full of rage,
 Yea, either blowing out a fire-breathing blast,
 Or mouthing out roarings of smoke,
 Or flashing dreadful sparks from their eyes,

The curious variant 'invisa' for 'informi,' quoted above and in many other places by St. Augustine, deserves notice. It was most likely introduced by a scribe who thought to make the passage correspond as closely as possible to Gen. 1², where Ε has ή δε γη ην δόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκευαστος.

The versions vary. ℒ gives as the rendering of οὐ γὰρ ἡπόρει, 'non enim impossibilis erat,' with the late-Latin meaning of 'unable' (cf. the rare use of 'potest' for 'it is possible'), and for ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὄλης, 'ex materia invisa,' doubtless, like St. Augustine, with a reference either to Ε, as quoted, or to some similar version. §^P is, as frequently, peculiar. 'For not defective in thee was power; that which created the worlds from ὄλη (the Syriac word is the same) unknown: for thou wast able to send upon them many wolves and the fury of lions.' The Arabic gives the ordinary version, except that it too has 'wolves' for 'bears.' This reading is easily explained. Ἀρκος is a rare form of ἄρκτος, and appearing in the shape of ΑΡΚΩΝ was either mistaken for, or regarded as a mistake for ΛΥΚΩΝ. For bears as agents of divine vengeance cf. 2 Kings 2²⁴.

With regard to χείρ, a point is noticed by Pearson *On the Creed*. In Isai. 48¹³ the Targum renders 'my hand' in the text by 'my (God's) word.' In the same way the παντοδύναμος χείρ of this verse is plainly equivalent to παντοδύναμος λόγος of 18¹⁵, showing that 'Wisdom' regarded the Δόγος simply as an exertion of God's power; not the Philonian Logos at all.

The translation of θρασεῖς λέοντας as 'fierce' lions is classically impossible. This use of the word can only be attributed to the writer's ignorance of Greek. 'Over-bold,' 'arrogant,' is the strongest meaning which can properly attach to θρασύς. ℒ and Arab. have 'bold lions,' and so Siegfried translates.

Grimm insists that it is not the strange or furious nature of the beasts that is emphasised, but the πλήθος, their immense number.

18. The texts are full of variants. The translation given is that of η νεοκτίστος θυμοῦ πλήρεις θῆρας ἀγνώστος, which is the text of A.V., R.V., Genev., ℒ. But there is a reading νεοκτίστον θυμοῦ, which would mean not that the beasts were of new creation, but that the rage inspired in them was so. θυμός may possibly mean 'poison,' as in Deut. 32³³, θυμὸς δρακόντων ὁ οἶνος αὐτῶν. Cf. Job 20¹⁶. §^P and Arab. are strange. §^P, 'or sparks of terrible lightnings, or anger of many beasts that were not known, or fire blown and devouring, or strength of smoke that smoketh, or strength of lightnings that glitter.' Arab. seems to have read θυμοῦ ἀγνώστον, and the rest of its rendering is a loose paraphrase. A Lapide translates the ℒ 'Novi

19. Of which not only the harmfulness could despatch them a once,

But even the very sight by terrifying them destroy them.

generis ira plenas ignotas bestias,' 'unknown beasts full of a new kind of rage,' which would answer to *νεοκτίστον θυμοῦ*.

Again in line 3 we have a variant *λικμωμένου* which was adopted by A.V., 'filthy scents of scattered smoke'; and the rendering of *λικμωμένους* as 'frothing forth' (lit. 'winnowing,' 'scattering like chaff') would certainly be questionable in any other writer. But Pseudo-Solomon probably did not know the real sense of the word. **L** favours the R.V., 'fumi odorem preferentes.'

Βρόμοντος is generally taken as 'stenches' (*Βρόμοντος*); but though this is effective rhetorically it has no classical authority. **S^P** plainly took it as 'roaring smoke,' and Arab. has no hint of 'stenches.' Hesychius is quoted for the interpretation *όσμη* by Grimm, who would read *Βρόμοντος*, as if *Βρόμοντος* was the result of taking *λικμωμένους* as passive. **S^h**, 'breathing out severity of smoke.'

The idea of fire-breathing beasts is ancient. Job 41¹⁹, 'out of his (Leviathan's) mouth go burning torches, and sparks of fire leap forth. . . . His breath kindleth coals and a flame goeth forth from his mouth.' We have then Jason's fire-breathing bulls of Colchis: Ovid, *Met.*, vii. 104, 'Ecce adamanteis Vulcanum naribus efflant aeripedes tauri tactaeque vaporibus herbae ardent,' and verse 114, 'fumificisque locum mugitibus implent.' The idea was appropriated for the 'dragons' of mediaeval folklore. With the epithet *πυρπνός* compare Dr. Johnson's brilliant invention 'ignivorous.' Even A. Lapide believed it would seem, in the existence of fire-breathing whales among the monsters of the northern seas. Grimm thinks that 'the writer drew the separate traits of this picture from the appearance of the crocodile emerging from the water'—the idea of 'noisome breath' might certainly be traced to this.

It should be noted that there is yet another reading in line 3, *λιχμωμένους* (**G^A**), which is certainly the 'difficilior lectio.' The word means the 'licking' of a serpent's tongue, and as *καπνός* undoubtedly means fiery vapour, it would be possible to translate 'licking cracklings (Lidd and Sc.) of fiery smoke.' In 'Wisdom' only would this be possible. In v. ²⁰ there seems to be no variant for *λικμηθέντες*.

19. R.V. is very loose, 'which had power not only to consume them by their violence, but to destroy them even by the terror of their sight.' 'Despatch them at once' is A.V., and seems to render *συνεκτρίψαι* well. The idea is that of utter and immediate destruction.

όψις might possibly mean (Farrar) the deadly fascination of their gaze, like that of the basilisk; but it is simpler to take it with **L** 'aspectus,' their terrible appearance. **S^P** is as ambiguous as the Greek.

20. Yea, and without these they might have fallen by a single breath,
 Being pursued by justice,
 And scattered by the breath of thy power ;
 But thou didst order all things by measure and number
 and weight.

20. There are no variants except in **L**, which has 'persecutionem passi ab ipsis factis suis.' **S^P** is merely paraphrastic, but gives the sense of the text. **S^H** omits 'thy power,' and in line 4 *σταθμῷ* ('weight').

A.V. translates *πνεύματι* in line 1 'blast,' having probably in mind Eccl. 39²⁸, 'There be winds (not 'spirits') which are created for vengeance.' Cf. also 2 Kings 19⁷ (of Sennacherib), *ἴδον ἐγώ δίδωμι ἐν αὐτῷ πνεῦμα*, and Job 4⁹, *ἀπὸ δὲ πνεύματος ὀργῆς αὐτοῦ ἀφανισθήσονται*. See the notes on 5²³.

The idea of the last line, clumsily expressed, is that God will not unnecessarily interfere with the regular course of nature. **S^P** plainly refers the clause to the Egyptians only ; 'Thou broughtest upon them all in due measure, order, and weight.' But the idea is a general one. 4 Esdr. 4, 'He hath weighed the world in the balance. By measure hath he measured the times, and by number hath he numbered the times, and he doth not move nor stir them, until the said measure be fulfilled.' Job 28²⁵, 'To make a weight for the wind ; yea, he meteth out the waters by measure.' Isa. 40¹², 'Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand, and meted out heaven with the span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in a measure, and weighed the mountains in scales and the hills in a balance.' Philo, *De Somniis*, ii. 29, is probably a reminiscence of that passage. Reuss, 'Dieu arrive à ses fins en usant de moyens limités et non excessifs.'

Even miracles are regarded by 'Wisdom' not as a derangement of the universe, but as a rearrangement of the harmony of it, 19⁶.

A different and more exact explanation of the last line is suggested by Cornely, who thinks it is intended to give the reason why God instead of sending fierce monsters against the Egyptians, or destroying them with a single breath, merely tormented them with vermin. The Egyptians had not slain the Israelites, but had made their lives miserable ; therefore their lives were also made miserable, though by a strange agency ; but they were not slain. The Canaanites, on the other hand, were murderers ; therefore they, according to 'Wisdom,' were exterminated. Cornely quotes Calmet *ad loc.*, 'poenas infers semper aequissimas atque criminum gravitati et peccantium conditioni pares,' and also St. Augustine, *c. Julian. opus imperf.*, ii. 37 : 'in mensura et numero et pondere omnia disponens neminem sinit mali aliquid perpeti, quod non meretur, quamvis non tantum, quantum massae debetur universae, singulus quisque patiatur.' And so the **L** of Isa. 28¹⁷, 'Ponam in pondere judicium et justitiam in mensura' : R.V., 'I will make judgment the line and righteousness

21. For to exercise great power is thine at all times,
And the might of thine arm who shall withstand?

22. For as a sway of the balances is the whole world before thee,
And as a drop of dew in the dawning that descendeth
upon the earth.

the plummet.' Gregg indicates a similar explanation, but does not follow it up.

21. **L**, 'Multum enim valere tibi soli supererat semper.' Deane suggests that the true reading is 'superat' (?), which is found in some MSS. Genev. follows **L**, and translates 'thou hast ever had great strength and might.' A.V. is unusually loose, 'Thou canst shew great strength at all times when thou wilt.' **S^P**, 'great things are at thy command at any time.'

Clem. Rom. 1 Cor. 27, *τίς ἀντιστήσεται τῷ κράτει τῆς ἴσχύος αὐτοῦ*; is generally cited as the first known patristic quotation of Wisdom. The verbal correspondence is striking, and combined with the preceding words *τίς ἐρεῖ αὐτῷ τί ἐποίησας*; it looks like a reminiscence of the text and of 12¹² also, but again the latter phrase is found word for word in Job 9¹². Cf. Isa. 45¹², and notes on chap. 12¹².

The connection denoted by 'for' at the beginning of the verse is not with the clause immediately preceding, 'Thou didst order all things,' etc., but rather with the whole of the verses¹⁷⁻²⁰. God had the power, 'for,' etc., but did not exercise it.

22. R.V. 'a grain in a balance.' A.V. 'a little grain of the balance,' with margin 'little weight.' Genev. has the sense 'as a small thing that the balance weigheth,' which is possibly what the writer meant, but he did not understand the exact meaning of *ρωπή*, and had in his mind three things; (1) the swaying of the balance; (2) the tiny grain that will turn the balance; (3) the infinitesimal smallness of the world as compared with God. **L** 'momentum staterae' is the literal and correct rendering of *ρωπή*. There is no classical authority for any sense of the word that cannot be represented by 'momentum.' The concrete meaning of a 'grain' seems unexampled. **G** of Isa. 40¹⁶ (which Pseudo-Solomon seems to have had before him) gives *ρωπή ζυγοῦ* as a translation of **מְזִינִים קְרָשָׁה**, 'the small dust of the balance'; and he doubtless copied it thence. But *ορή* cannot mean that. Grimm quoting that passage would interpret not 'something that *can* alter,' but 'that cannot alter the balance.'

Arab. has 'the swaying of the tongue of the balance.' **S^P** 'the winking of an eye.'

A Lapide suggests three possible interpretations which may have been in the author's mind: (1) the tiny momentum required to sway the balance represents the smallness of the world as compared with God; (2) the temporary nature of the disturbance represents

23. But thou hast mercy on all because thou hast power over all,
 And dost overlook the faults of men in order to their repentance.

24. For thou cherishest all things that are and abhorrest nothing which thou madest,
 For thou never wouldest have formed anything in hatred thereof.

its temporary existence; (3) the image is that of God holding 'the balances of the earth,' and this agrees best with line 3 of v. ²⁰.

Margoliouth, *l.c.*, in the *Expositor* thinks Isaiah copied 'Wisdom' and not 'Wisdom' Isaiah.

For the comparison to the morning dew, presently dried up by the sun, cf. Hosea 6⁴, 'Your goodness is as a morning cloud, and as the dew that goeth early away,' and 13³ (the same words).

23. A.V. and Genev. 'Because they should amend': and 'because' in the sense of 'in order that' is good Gloucestershire to this day. Cf. A.V. of Matt. 20³¹, 'Rebuked them because they should hold their peace.' \mathfrak{L} , 'propter poenitentiam' is weak. \mathfrak{S}^P misunderstands the Greek, 'takest away the sins of men when they repent.' Cf. the late Latin use of 'quia' for 'ut.'

We have here a totally different reason for the forbearance of God from that alleged in v. ²⁰. He now appears as 'lover of souls' which he has created, and this argument continues in chap. 12.

For the idea of God's power as conditioned by mercy, probably the earliest example in Hebrew literature is Ps. 62^{11.12}, 'Power belongeth unto God; also unto thee, Lord, belongeth mercy.' Cf. 101¹, 'I will sing of mercy and judgment'; Eccl. 2¹⁸, 'As his majesty is, so also is his mercy'; 18¹³, 'The mercy of the Lord is upon all flesh, reprobating and chastening and teaching, and bringing again as a shepherd doth his flock.' But the closest verbal parallel is with Acts 17³⁰, $\tauούς μὲν οὐν χρόνους τῆς ἀγνοίας ὑπεριδῶν ὁ θεὸς τὰ νῦν ἀπαγγέλλει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντας πανταχοῦ μετανοεῖν$. For the idea of God's long suffering in order to repentance, see Rom. 2⁴, $\tauὸ χρηστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ εἰς μετάνοιάν σε ἄγει$, 2 Pet. 3⁹, Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. 19, who might almost have had 'Wisdom' before him. 'Why,' he asks, 'did not God send bears and lions and leopards, or at least the Egyptians' own asps upon them to destroy them?' and he answers, $ὅτι τοὺς οἰκήτορας ὁ θεὸς νοιθετήσαι μᾶλλον ἐβούλετο ἢ διαφθεῖραι$. A Lapide quotes Fulgentius *Eph.* vii. ad Venantium. 'Deus . . . in quo est omnipotens misericordia et omnipotentia misericors.'

For the exact expression 'to wink at,' cf. Eccl. 28⁷, $\piάριδε ἀγνοιαν$ (where, however, a mistranslation is suspected), and the same phrase in 30¹¹.

24. \mathfrak{S}^P and Arab. give the sense: 'if thou hadst hated anything,

25. And how could aught have endured if thou hadst not willed it,

Or that which was not bidden by thee be preserved?

thou wouldest not have made it.' But **L** has 'nec enim aliquid odiens constitueristi aut fecisti'—an unauthorised addition.

It is absolutely impossible to reconcile such a statement with 12^{10.11.} 'Their nature by birth was evil and their wickedness inborn': 'whc shall accuse thee for the perishing of nations which thou didst make?' We have, in fact, as in other instances in this book, particularism struggling with a sound instinct as to the overruling mercy of God, as represented in our English collect, 'who hatest nothing that thou hast made, and dost forgive the sins of all them that are penitent,' which comes, with alterations, from the Sarum Missal. A Lapide presses the passage home: 'Apago ergo, Calvine, quodoces Deum reprobos creasse ad damnationem et gehennam'; and to reconcile the text with 12¹⁰ adds, 'Deus diligit omnes homines quia homines sunt; odit vero nonnullos quia peccatores sunt.'

That the love or goodness of God impelled him to the creation o the world is one of Philo's principles. The other passages quoted from him to this effect are not convincing, but in *De Cherub.*, 35 after some of his vague statements about creation out of matter, he says, *τῆς κατασκευῆς αἰτίαν τὴν ἀγαθότητα τοῦ δημιουργοῦ*. The word *κατασκευή* may be noted as implying rather 'formation,' 'giving shape to,' than 'creation,' but the distinction cannot be pressed in 'Wisdom, who uses *κτίζειν* and *κατασκευάζειν* indiscriminately. More to the point is Grimm's quotation from Theodoret *De Prov.*, 2, 'Αγαθὸς ὁ καὶ ἀγαθότητα ἔχων μέτρον πάντος μείζονα ἡθέλησε καὶ τοῖς μη οὐσι τείναι δωρήσασθαι. Grimm takes some pains to prove that this idea could not have been borrowed from Plato. The passage quoted to support such a view is *Tim.* 29E-30A, and the reader can judge for himself: it runs—*Δέγωμεν δὴ, δι' ἥντινα αἰτίαν γένεσιν καὶ τὸ πᾶν τόδι ὁ ἔννιστας ἔννέστησεν ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδέποτε φθόνος. τούτου δὲ ἔκτὸς ὁν πάντα ὅτι μάλιστα γένεσθαι ἐβούληθι παραπλήσια ἔαυτῷ . . . βούληθείς γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθὰ μὲν πάντα, φλαύροι δὲ μηδὲν εἶναι κατὰ δύναμιν, οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὄρατόν, παραλαβόν οὐκ ἱσυχίαν ἀγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως εἰς τάξιν αὐτὴν ἔγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας.* The resemblance of idea is certainly striking.

25. 'Called of thee' in line 2 is the rendering of all the versions English and ancient, except **S^P** 'unless thou didst command' (Arab 'summon' is nearly 'vocare'), and the phrase must be considered: Hebraism: for **אָרַק** is sometimes used in the sense of 'to call forth' in creation; and this explains passages like Isa. 41⁴, 'who hath wrought and done it, *calling* the generations from the beginning'; where **אָרַק** is used; as also in 48¹³, 'when I call unto them (the heavens) the:

26. But thou sparest all, for they are thine, O Sovereign Lord, lover of souls.

12. 1. For thine imperishable spirit is in all things.

stand up together.' So Rom. 4¹⁷, *θεοῦ τοῦ ζωοποιοῦντος τοὺς νεκροὺς καὶ καλοῦντος τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα*.

The purport of the verse is slightly different from the preceding one. Here the continued existence of created things is ascribed to God, and not merely their creation: in spite of sin and rebellion God preserves His creatures. Dähne, i. 226 n. (referring to the Philonian system), thinks that a perpetual exercise of creative powers is implied. 'Wisdom's' language is probably loose and without philosophic content.

26. \mathbb{S}^P simply omits *φιλόψυχε*. All other versions translate it thus. The expression is beautiful, but the Greek is bad; for the adjective means 'cowardly.' No instance can be quoted to support 'Wisdom's' meaning, except one cited by Grimm from Pachomius *ap. Acta S.S. Mai III*, p. 30B, where the adjective is said to be coupled with *οἰκτίρμων*.

The commonly quoted passage from Ezek. 18⁴, *πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ ἔμαι εἰσιν*, is not really applicable here: it means 'all souls are in my power, so that I can punish them if it be needful.' More to the purpose is John 17^{9,10}, *οὐ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὧν δέδωκάς μοι, ὅτι σοὶ εἰσιν, καὶ τὰ ἔμα πάντα σά ἔστιν καὶ τὰ σὰ ἔμά, καὶ δεδόξασμαι ἐν αὐτοῖς*.

12. 1. R.V. and A.V. have 'incorruptible' for *ἀφθαρτον*, which is inadequate. \mathbb{L} (missing the point altogether) 'O quam bonus et suavis est, Domine, spiritus tuus in omnibus!' \mathbb{S}^P and Arab. also seem to have read *ἀγαθός* for *ἀφθαρτος*. Farrar argues for 'incorruptible': 'Men may grieve that spirit and desecrate its temple but never wholly lose it.' This would equally apply to 'imperishable.' The Arabic, it should be noted, omits 'thy' spirit, and renders 'a good spirit is present in every thing.'

The question is whether Pseudo-Solomon is here thinking in Greek or in Hebrew. If the latter, then the 'spirit of God which moved upon the face of the waters' (Gen. 1²) is meant: the creative power of God (not Wisdom; for Wisdom has never the power of creating physical life assigned to her, Bruch, *Weisheitslehre*, 346). If Greek philosophy has the upper hand in our author's mind, then he is referring to the Stoic idea of the 'soul of the world'; but as this is with him the same as *πρόνοια*, 'God's providence,' the result is the same. God cannot wish evil to (1) the creation which his own spirit has effected, or (2) to the world which is directed by his own providence.

Between the two comes the idea, also a Hebrew one, of the actual breath of life being breathed into the body by God (Gen. 2⁷), who can recall it when he will. Ps. 104²⁹, 'Thou takest away their

2. Wherefore thou dost correct by little and little them that err
 And reminding them by the very things wherein they fa-
 dost chaste them,
 That being loosed from their wickedness they may tru-
 in thee, O Lord.

breath, they die and return to their dust'; Job 34¹⁴, 'If he gather unto himself his spirit and his breath, all flesh shall perish together' cf. 27³; Eccles. 12⁷, 'The spirit shall return unto God who gave it. For the whole question cf. Additional Note A 'On the Pre-existence of the Soul.' But the idea appears as late as Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. xx. οὐδὲ η πνοή ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστιν, καὶ ὅταν θέλει, ἀνελεῖ αὐτήν. Reuss thinks that this Hebraic conception is that of the writer here: it is possible

The passages in 'Wisdom' which seem to refer to the 'soul of the world' may be summed up here. 1⁷, 'The spirit of the Lord hath filled the world, and that which holdeth all things together hath knowledge of every voice'; 7²⁴, '(Wisdom) pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness'; 8¹, 'She reacheth from one end of the world to the other with full strength, and ordereth all things unto good use.'

ἐν πᾶσι may be either masculine or neuter. If the latter, we must suppose that the Greek idea was uppermost in the writer's mind. The adjective φιλόψυχος would seem to point to a reference to men rather than to things: but this would involve a fresh contradiction for the Canaanites are presently represented as naturally evil in nature. The disentanglement of Pseudo-Solomon's theological view is a hopeless task. Cf. Deane *ad loc.*

2. R.V. gives for ἐλέγχεις, 'convict,' which is not the sense 'convince' might represent the meaning. Other versions have 'chasten,' 'correct,' or the like; but L, S^P, and Arab. all translate *two* words. L 'admones et alloqueris,' S^P 'reprove and rebuke' Arab. 'rebuke and exhort': almost certainly some word has fallen out of the text. κατ' ὀλίγον would, in classical Greek, be κατὰ βραχίονα but there is no doubt as to its meaning. L 'in partibus' ('in degrees' in late Latin = partim), S^P 'gradually.' Arab. mistakes the word altogether.

Vatablus (ap. A. Lapide) would read δι' ὑποκρίσεως, 'by which': vi 'the spirit.' An exact parallel to this would be John 16⁸, ἐκεῖνος (the Comforter) ἐλέγξει τὸν κόσμον περὶ ἀμαρτίας καὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ περὶ κρίσεως.

Grimm's summary of this and the following verses is excellent. 'God punishes sinners gently that they may turn and believe in him: though he determined on account of their wickedness to drive out and destroy the Canaanites by the hand of Israel; yet as he own creatures he dealt so mercifully with them that he destroyed them not at once, but sent the hornets before his host to warn the

3, 4. For the ancient inhabitants of thy holy land,
Hating them for doing their most detestable works of
enchantments and unholy rites,

and give them time for repentance, though he knew their natural wickedness.' It is useless to try to reconcile such statements as that in v. 4, 'hating them because they practised, etc.,' with 11²⁴, 'Never wouldst thou have formed anything if thou didst hate it.'

No commentator has explained the application of line 2. It seems to be a repetition of the maxim enunciated in the case of the Egyptians, viz. that whereby we sin thereby we shall be punished.

πιστεύειν ἐπὶ τινα is not classical. We have the word used with the dative, and with the prepositions *εἰς*, *ἐν*, *πρός*, and even *παρά*, but never in good Greek with *ἐπὶ*. It seems likely that the meaning is slightly varied by this preposition: that the idea is not of believing in God (John 14¹, *πιστεύετε εἰς τὸν θεόν*, cf. 1 Pet. 1²¹), but rather of relying on him instead of on their idols and false gods. But the verb is found with *ἐπὶ* in Acts 9⁴², *ἐπίστευσαν πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τὸν κύριον*, 11¹⁷, 16¹³, 22¹⁰, yet only in one chapter of St. Paul's Epistles, Rom. 4^{6.24}. Cf., however, Winer (Moulton), § xxxi. 5, note (p. 267), who thinks that the construction with *ἐπὶ* denotes the strongest form of belief.

For the idea of the longsuffering of God in order to repentance, cf. Amos 4⁶⁻¹¹ and Heb. 12⁶⁻¹⁰.

3, 4. Versions are unanimous except the Arabic, which renders the last words 'inventions devoid of righteousness,' plainly not understanding the word *τελετάς*, which Sh translates 'sacrifices.'

The first instance of the use of 'Holy Land,' the common mediæval term for Palestine (cf. Adrichomius, *praef. ad Theatrum Terrae Sanctae*, quoted by Arnald), is found in Zech. 2¹², 'The Lord shall inherit Judah as his portion in the holy land.' So also 2 Macc. 1⁷, 'Jason and his company revolted from the holy land and the kingdom.' But the word never occurs elsewhere in the Old Testament or anywhere in the New Testament.

'Hating them' (*μισήσας*). The difficulty is not one confined to Old Testament theology. Grimm puts the point clearly. 'The moral earnestness which refuses to relegate the idea of God to a mere abstract speculation, must find an antagonism to man's sin in the divine consciousness, and expresses this by "anger" or "hatred," or in a milder form as "displeasure." So St. Paul, even in his inspired depiction of the love of God as revealed in the death of Christ, yet refers to the wrath of God.' Rom. 5⁹, 'Much more then, being justified by his blood, shall we be saved from the wrath of God through him.' So, too, Ps. 5⁶, 'The Lord abhorreth the blood-thirsty and deceitful man.'

φαρμακεῖῶν undoubtedly means 'enchantments.' L 'per medicamina' is not enough. There are allusions to such practices in Exod. 22¹⁸ and Levit. 18^{21.27}, but the most definite accusation of the

5. Merciless murderers of their children,

Yea and an entrail-devourers' banquet of human flesh a
of blood,

Canaanites is found in Deut. 18⁹⁻¹², 'Thou shalt not learn to do at the abominations of those nations. There shall not be found w
thee any one that maketh his son or his daughter to pass through fire, one that useth divination (cf. the case of Balaam and the 'wards of divination' in Num. 22⁷), one that practiseth augury, or enchanter, or a sorcerer, or a charmer, or a consulter with a famil spirit, or a wizard, or a necromancer. For whosoever doeth the things is an abomination unto the Lord: and because of the abominations the Lord thy God doth drive them out from before thee.'

τελεταὶ might possibly refer to the rites of Moloch, but the word has a technical meaning in *Ex*, viz. the consecrated prostitutes of both sexes connected with the Canaanitish worship. The Hebrew of these (masc. *ישִׁירָק*) is rendered in 1 Kings 15¹² by *τελεταὶ* (*ἀφεῖ τὰς τελετὰς ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς*). Cf. Hos. 4¹⁴, where fem. *κρεστῶτες* is translated *τῶν τετελεσμένων*, and the second rendering of Deut. 23¹⁷, *ἐσται τελεσφόρος (חַשְׁרָק) ἀπὸ θυγατέρων Ἰσραὴλ, καὶ οὐκ ἐσται τελισμενος (שְׁרָק) ἀπὸ νιῶν Ἰσραὴλ* (the first rendering has *πόρνη* . *πορνεύων*). Cf. Gen. 38²¹). The 'mysteries' of the Hellenic nations are not here spoken of. They are alluded to later on in 14²³.

5. For *φονέας*, the received text, R.V. read *φόνους*, which would a natural change for a transcriber to make in order to co-ordinate the term with *θοῖναν* in the next line; but there seems to be no M authority for it, and Fritzsche's *φονάς* with the same meaning is a mere conjecture. It is equally natural that in the next line, *σπλαγχνοφάγος* should be read (as in Compl.) to correspond to *φονέας*, inserting also *καὶ* after it. This latter is, however, unnecessary. It is possible to translate '(hating them) as pitiless slaughterers of their children and entrail-devourers—a banquet of human flesh and of blood.' 'comestores viscerum.' Arab. seems to have read *φόνους* at *σπλαγχνοφάγων*. *Σ*^P is a paraphrase.

The charge of cannibalism is a mere exaggeration; Ezek. 16 'Thou hast taken thy sons and thy daughters . . . and these hast thou sacrificed unto them to be devoured' is probably figurative only. The accusation of 'Thyestean banquets' was brought against the early Christians, and only a few years ago the Russian Jews were charged with such offences. But the charge of human sacrifices undoubtedly true; it is difficult to say when such practices ended. The positive examples from the Bible are found in Judges 11³⁹ (Jephthah's daughter), 2 Kings 3²⁷ (Mesha's sacrifice of his son). For collateral evidence cf. Abraham's intended offering of Isaac. So too Ps. 106 'They sacrificed their sons and their daughters unto demons . . . who

6. From the midst of their orgie,
And parents assassins of helpless souls
Thou didst determine to destroy by the hands of our
fathers ;

they sacrificed unto the idols of Canaan.' Micah 6⁷, 'Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?' The passages like 2 Kings 16³, 'made his son to pass through the fire' (of Ahab), cf. Lev. 18²¹; 2 Chron. 28³ may mean nothing more than the throwing of the children through the flames; a practice which is rumoured still to exist among the peasantry of Germany at the 'Midsummer Fires'—a genuine relic of heathendom. The case of Hiel the Bethelite (presumably one of the Canaanitish stock), who laid the foundation of the new Jericho in Abiram his first-born, and set up the gates thereof in his youngest son Segub, 1 Kings 16³⁴, is now explained on the ground of recent explorations (cf. Driver, *Schweich Lectures*, 67) as referring to the custom of burying a child, at first alive, later on after it had been slain, in the foundations of any new public building. It is noteworthy that this occurred in the reign of Ahab. For further evidence as to sacrifice of children cf. Jer. 19^{4,5}, Isa. 57⁵.

6. The difficulty of the passage lies in line 1. The general MS. reading is, it may be taken, *ἐκμεσονυμυστάθειασον*. Now if it were not for the unfortunate addition of *ou* at the end this would be quite explicable. The word *μυστάθης* is found in Hesychius, and just as Pseudo-Solomon has formed *εὐδράνεια* (13¹⁹) from the grammarians' word *εὐδρανίς*, so here he has formed *μυστάθεια*. Unfortunately some copyist discovered in the last syllables of a word he had never seen before a resemblance to the more familiar *θιάσον*, and moulded the ending on the supposition that that word was meant. We read therefore *ἐκ μέσον μυστάθειας*, leaving the *ou* out of the question. The explanation of Hesychius for *μυστάθης* is *εἰδός τι καὶ φρατρία μαντίων*, which plainly refers rather to a noun than to an adjective, but otherwise gives the meaning required for this passage.

The common reading *ἐκ μέσον μύστας θιάσον* may be right (A.V. 'priests out of the midst of their idolatrous crew'), but any conjecture which does not include the word *μέσον* (as *ἐκμυσοῦς μύστας θιάσον* (R.V.), where *ἐκμυσῆς* is an invented word meaning 'abominable,' or Grimm's *ἐκ μύσον μύστας θιάσον*, 'initiated in orgies from sheer beastliness' is excluded by the fact that every ancient version contains the word 'midst' in some form or other. *L* has 'de medio sacramenti divini tui,' which is meaningless, but shows that the suffix *ou* or *σου* in the MSS. is very ancient. *S^P* 'they performed in the midst lawless mysteries' (not 'sacramenta' as Walton and Grimm; the word regularly means mysteries: *نَجْنَوْنَ*). Arab. 'When they

7. That the land which with thee is most precious of all
Might receive a worthy inhabitance of God's children.
8. But these also as being men thou didst spare,
And sentest wasps as forerunners of thine host,
To destroy them by little and little;

had removed from their midst knowledge of divine rites.'

לְפָנָי יְהוָה מִשְׁמָרָה מִלְּפָנָי where לְפָנָי has an explanatory note attached, but seems to be a well-known word equivalent to μυστάθεια.

αἴματος (*θοῖναν*, v. 5) of course incurs the special wrath of the J to whom the consumption of blood was expressly forbidden, Gen. Lev. 17¹⁰.

αὐθέντας is murderers with their own hand. L has 'auctores,' which is evidently a mistake. Some word like 'necis' has dropped out. Arab. understood the word as meaning 'suicides,' which is a possible meaning (cf. Lidd. and Sc.) but not appropriate here.

For similar denunciations of the Canaanites for idolatry, murder, Kohler (*Jew. Encycl.*, art. 'Book of Wisdom') refers to O Sibyll, i. 150, 178, iii. 36-40, 761-764; but the reference to original inhabitants does not seem very clear. The passages mixed up with invectives against the modern settlers in the land; hated Samaritans.

7. A.V. has in margin 'new inhabitance.' R.V. keeps to 'colony' L 'ut dignam perciperent (?) subject) peregrinationem puerorum I Genev. 'might be a meet dwelling for the children of God,' which no doubt is the sense, but ἀποικία is the wrong word and has puzzled the translators. S^P has 'Thou didst desire to destroy them by hand of parents (not 'our' parents) that the servants of God might attain a quiet home, the land which thou gavest with honour and glory.' Arab. 'that the beloved of God might receive a worthy habitation.' Note that most of the versions seem to take 'servants of God' as the subject of the verb. So probably L. A Lapide explains the plural as 'terrae et regiones,' which is hardly admissible.

ἀποικία is not the right word: it means a regular colony sent forth from a motherland, and Egypt could hardly be considered the motherland. Grimm's conjecture, ἐποικίαν, has no authority and would be a λέγει, which, perhaps, is rather in its favour.

God's motive in driving out the Canaanites here appears different from that alleged in the earlier verses. The object stated here is simply to clear the country for the Israelites.

8. R.V. translates σφῆκας 'hornets,' adopting the traditional rendering of הַעֲרָצָה in Exod. 23²⁸, Deut. 7²⁰; but the proper word

9. Not being unable to make the impious subject to the righteous in battle,

Or with dread beasts or with one stern word to root them out.

hornet seems to be ἀνθήνη (Arist., *H. A.*, ix. 41, or v. 20). **L** has 'vespas,' **S^P** Ἀνθένη, which seems to mean 'bees,' and A.V. 'wasps.'

There seems no reason to suppose that the 'hornets' were figurative — a mere expression for various plagues which attacked the Amorites. Philo certainly took the literal meaning (speaking of Messianic victories), *De Praem. et Poenis*, § 16, ἐνίοις τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἀναξίοις ἔσεσθαι ἥττης ἀνθρώπων, οἷς σμήνη σφηκῶν ἀντιτάξειν ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ αἰσχύστῳ προπολεμοῦντα τῶν ὁσίων. Such creatures were and are still sufficient when in swarms to inflict terrible harm. Cf. the references in Farrar and A Lapide, who cites Plin., *N. H.*, xi. 21, 'auctores sunt ter novenis punctis interfici hominem,' and adds that nine hornets can kill a horse. They were especially prevalent in certain places. πυργος as the name of a place in Josh. 15³³ may mean 'hornet-town,' and Σφήκεια or 'Waspland' is given as an ancient name of Cyprus.

For the metaphorical interpretation there may be cited St. Aug. *Qu. in Exod.*, 92, 93 (ap. Deane), 'aculei timoris intelligendi sunt fortasse quibus agitabantur memoratae gentis ut cederent filiis Israel.' **T** II. on Exod. 23²⁸ has 'hornets,' but the Persian translation printed by Walton renders 'destruction,' as also in Deut. 7²⁰. A mysterious passage in Deut. 1⁴⁴, 'the Amorites . . . chased you as bees do' may refer to the matter. If so, it points to a literal interpretation of the 'hornets.' A Lapide quotes a most apposite instance of the use of bees to repel an attack, from Portuguese history. Even more to the point is the citation in Cornely of Aelian, *Hist. Anim.*, ii. 28, who tells a story of the people of Phaselus in Pamphylia being driven from their city by swarms of wasps. Cornely's statement that this plague is nowhere mentioned in Scripture is marvellous in the face of Deut. 7²⁰ and Josh. 24¹². His reference to the tsetse-fly is apt. Gregg remarks that the 'metaphorical interpretations rely on the use of the simile of bees in Deut. 1⁴⁴, and in Ex. 23²⁷, "the terror." The latter, however, is possibly explained by the next verse as actually meaning "the hornet."

9. There is no important variation in the text or in the versions except **S^P**, which has 'But this was not because the impious are (or were) harder than the just that they should slay them, or with fierce beasts or with the slaughter of a word of the mouth be destroyed.' What the translator meant is doubtful.

ἐν παρατάξει, 'in pitched battle,' implies that they were not conquered so much in war as by the plagues spoken of. On the other hand, the hornets would seem to come under the heading of dreadful 'beasts'; but no doubt larger creatures are meant. Cf. 2 Kings

10. But executing judgment upon them by little and little thou
gavest them a place of repentance,

Not being ignorant that their generation was evil,
And their wickedness inborn,

And that their way of thinking could never change for ever

17²⁵ (of the Samaritans), 'They feared not the Lord; therefore the Lord sent lions among them, which slew some of them.' Lev. 26: 'I will send the beast of the field among you, which shall rob you your children, and destroy your cattle, and make you few in number.' Also Deut. 32²⁴, where, besides beasts, 'the poison of crawling things of the dust' is referred to, as in Jer. 8¹⁷.

ὑψ' ἐν is a most extraordinary phrase, for which no classical or Hellenistic example is quoted. The nearest justification for it is found in Aristotle's use of ὑπό with the accusative as meaning 'coming under a category.' Grimm's 'during one moment' is untenable, as πρὸς μίαν ροπήν in 18²⁹ is quite irrelevant. It is probably a slang expression which Pseudo-Solomon had picked up, but L and Ara understood it. The first has 'simul,' the second 'in a single moment.'

A Lapeide refers, in passing, to the double meaning of בְּרֵב Hebrew—'a word' and 'a pestilence,' but thinks it unimportant. The latter meaning would certainly co-ordinate the two forms of judgment in line 2, but it lacks all authority, unless indeed the vague paraphrase of S^P above quoted, containing 'slaughter' and 'word' is really a double translation.

10. A.V. is justified in translating κρίνων as more than mere 'judging'; cf. 1 Cor. 11³¹, 'When we are punished (not "judged" R.V.) we are chastened of the Lord,' that we may not be condemned with the world. Here κρίνω is distinguished from κατακρίνω, but Soph., *Trach.*, 724, τὴν δ' ἐλπίδ' οὐ χρὴ τῆς τύχης κρίνειν παρός, and Demosth., *de Falsa Leg.*, § 232, the meaning seems the same. C v. 22.

κατὰ βραχύ as before in v. 8. L 'partibus judicans,' as in v. 2 f. κατ' ὀλίγον. The Latin expression is peculiar and does not represent 'partim,' as Deane thinks, but rather 'piecemeal,' a use for which there seems to be no classical authority whatever, and which is not found in Ducange.

The reason given for the gradual expulsion of the Canaanites Exod. 23²⁸ is widely different, 'I will not drive them out from before thee in one year; lest the land become desolate and the beast of the field multiply against thee.' Judg. 2^{21.22} gives yet another reason, also will not henceforth drive out any from before them of the nation which Joshua left when he died; that by them I may prove Israel whether they will keep the way of the Lord to walk therein as their fathers did keep it, or not.'

'A place of repentance.' τόπος in this sense ('opportunity') is not classical Greek. The one passage quoted to support it from Thuc.

II. For it was a seed accursed from the beginning :

Nor being afraid of any man didst thou grant them impunity for the things wherein they sinned.

vi. 54, *ἐν τόπῳ τινι ἀφανεῖ* means 'in some dark corner' or the like. The term seems to have been transferred bodily from the Latin. Cf. Livy, xxiv. 26, 'locus poenitendis'; xliv. 10, 'poenitentiae relinquens locum.' In Hellenistic Greek the usage is frequent. Heb. 12¹⁷, *μέτρανοις γὰρ τόπου οὐχ εὑρεν*. Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 7, *ἐν γενέᾳ καὶ γενέᾳ μέτρανοις τόπου ἔδωκεν δὲ Δεσπότης τοῖς βουλομένοις ἐπιστραφῆναι ἐπ' αὐτὸν*. Eccl. 38¹², 'Give place to the physician' is not quite the same use, nor is 19¹⁷, 'give place to (*i.e.* make room for) the law of the most high.' But Rom. 12¹⁹, *δότε τόπου τῇ ὁργῇ*, and Eph. 4²⁷, *μηδὲ δίδοτε τόπου τῷ διαβόλῳ*, correspond more closely.

γένεσις Siegfried translates 'origin,' with reference to v. 11. The word is, as we have seen, capable of many explanations. R.V. 'nature by birth,' L 'natio eorum,' S^P 'origin,' Arab. 'their nature,' which is probably nearest the mark. The absurdity of God's giving 'a place for repentance' to people of inborn iniquity and accursed nature is too obvious to require comment. 'Wisdom's' natural theory of the Freewill of Man is in conflict with his conviction that all nations except the Jews are naturally evil. When he is philosophical he takes the former view; when he is historical, the latter. *Ἐμφύτος* in the next verse implies a strong expression of the doctrine of original sin, if taken as meaning 'inborn.' In James 1²¹, however, it has a different sense, viz. 'implanted,' which will not serve here. Farrar's remark that 'to talk here of the doctrine of original sin is an anachronism' is erroneous. Even a passage like Eccl. 1¹⁴, 'to fear the Lord . . . was created together with the faithful in the womb,' shows that such ideas were current long before. The Rabbinic theory of the descent of the Jews from Adam and the Spirit of God, and that of the heathen from the evil one and the spirit of impurity, is later no doubt (cf. Grimm *ad loc.*), but the idea of the curse upon Canaan (see next verse) contains the germs of the theory. It is of course absolutely at variance with 1¹⁶, 'Ungodly men called death unto them.' Churton's comment is remarkable, 'there may have been mercy even in the command to Joshua to exterminate the race, including infants and sucklings (Deut. 2³⁴, 20¹⁶), for if they had survived they would have corrupted themselves and others.'

λογισμός is variously rendered. L and A.V. 'cogitation,' Genev. 'thought,' R.V. 'manner of thought,' and so, roughly speaking, S^P and Arab. Margoliouth thinks it a translation of נַצְּרִי ' (evil) desire,' cf. 1³, *σκολιοὶ γὰρ λογισμοὶ χωρίζουσιν ἀπὸ θεοῦ*. So Gen. 8²¹, *ἔγκειται ἡ διάνοια τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπιμελῶς ἐπὶ τὰ πονηρὰ ἐκ νεότητος αὐτοῦ*.

II. A.V. 'grant them pardon' is inaccurate. R.V. 'leave them unpunished' is better. L 'veniam dabus'; but S^P, which may be

12. For who shall say 'What didst thou?'

Or who shall oppose thy judgment?

And who shall arraign thee for the perished nations whom thou didst make?

Or who shall come to stand before thee as a champion of unrighteous men?

translated (as also Arab.) 'grant them a reprieve,' is nearest to the sense, though not to the Greek. The two parts of the verse have no coherence, and the latter is rightly treated by Grimm as belonging to the subject of vv. 12-18.

The curse of Canaan in Gen. 9²⁵⁻²⁷ is no doubt referred to. 'Curse be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren etc. Canaan, it is to be noticed, is (Gen. 10⁶) the *son* of Ham, who was the original culprit (Jos., *Ant.*, I. vi. 3). There is nothing in the curse as to moral degradation, which is what Pseudo-Solomon is here insisting on. Grimm, in whose time the echoes of the great dispute over the Apocrypha in Germany had hardly died away, thinks that any attempt to argue from this passage that 'some souls are created bad,' proceeds from mere 'hatred of the Apocrypha.' He points out (on too familiar lines) that God's foreknowledge (*οὐκ ἀγνοῶν*) is different from predestination. Cf. 19¹, 'Unto the ungodly there came indignation without mercy; for their future also God foreknew. The theory of Farrar and Gregg, *ad loc.*, that room was left for individual amendment, as in the case of Rahab (Josh. 2; Heb. 11³¹, 'By faith Rahab the harlot perished not with them that were disobedient'; James 2²⁵, 'Was not also Rahab the harlot justified by works?') does not improve matters: if one could be saved a could be saved. We are dealing with the tentative utterances of a unscientific theologian, and there is no more to be said. We have similar contradiction in Exod. 34⁷, 'Keeping mercy for thousand: forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children,' etc.

Εὐλαβούμενός τινα, 'for fear of any one,' is quite classical. The word occurs in 17⁸ in the form *εὐλάβεια*, where it has the very strong sense of 'craven fear.' Throughout this passage there prevails a anthropomorphic idea of God, to be discovered more in the sense than in the actual words.

12. **L** alters the order of the last two lines. **S^P** has, in line 3, 'Who shall plead for the children of the nations when thou hast destroyed them?' Arab., 'Who out of all the nations destroyed which thou didst create, can complain of thee?' *ἐποίησας* is a very weak word for 'to create,' and exhibits the real poverty of our author's Greek vocabulary. Arnald, not without reason, renders 'who shall call the to account for the things which thou hast done against the nations'

13. For neither is there any God but thee

Who carest for all, to show that thou judgest not unrighteously :

and so Siegfried ; but Ps. 86⁹ has the same phrase, *πάντα τὰ ἔθνη σοι ἐποίησας*. *S^h* (omitting *σοι*) renders 'or who shall come for a trial of prosecution against wicked men ?'

The two first lines are taken direct from *G* of Job 9^{12.19}, *τίς ἐρεῖ ἀντὸν τί ἐποίησας* and *τίς κρίματι αὐτοῦ ἀντιστήσεται*; There is not the slightest reason to suppose that Rom. 9²⁰, 'Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God,' etc., is taken from this passage, but Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 27 which seems (Gregg) to be a conflation of this line and of 11²¹, 'The might of thine arm who shall withstand?' certainly is. Such questions are common. Eccles. 8⁴, 'The king's word hath power ; and who may say unto him, What doest thou?' Dan. 4³⁵, 'None can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?' Cf. Additional Note C.

κατάστασις (possibly 'thy bar') and *ἔκδικος* seem to be forensic terms. *L* 'in conspectu tuo,' and A.V. margin 'in thy presence' are too weak ; but they are followed by *S^P* and Arab. Holkot, quoted by A Lapide, discovers in this and v.¹¹ the four reasons why justice is at times too lenient—(1) fear of reversal of decision by a superior court (*εὐλαβούμενός τινα*) ; (2) fear of appeal : line 2 ; (3) fear of 'visitation' by superiors, line 3 : 'arraignment' ; (4) fear of actual rebellion against a legal decision : line 4. The division is not logical, but it is ingenious.

13. We have here two distinct interpretations, represented by the 'carest' of Genev. and the 'careth' of A.V. and R.V. With the former the meaning is, 'Thou hast the care of all things as no other god has ; thou art no god of one little nation or one little province ; thou art the God of all the earth, and that should show that thou art impartial in thy judgment, not favouring one nation more than another.' So A Lapide, 'Deum a nemine posse reprehendi vel injustitiae accusari . . . eo quod ipse omnium habeat curam ac provide omnium sit pater et provisor aequa ac justissimus judex et vindicta.' *S^P*, 'there is no other God but thee and thou carest for all, and hast shown that thou hast judged nought amiss.'

A slight variant of this rendering is adopted by Deane, 'thou who carest for all in order to show thine impartiality.' He cites 6⁷, 'Neither will he reverence greatness, because it is he that made both small and great, and alike he taketh thought for all' ; and 1 Pet. 5⁷, 'Casting all your care upon him because he careth for you.'

The other rendering depends on the attaching of $\ddot{\omega}$ *μελεῖ περὶ πάντων* not to *σοῦ* but to *θεός*. We then have the rendering of A.V. and R.V., 'There is no god beside thee who careth for all the world, so that thou shouldst have to prove to him thy just dealing.' *L* is

14. Neither is there king or tyrant that shall be able to confront thee concerning those whom thou hast punished.

15. But being just thou disposest all things justly,
Deeming it inconsistent with thy power
To condemn him who deserveth not to be punished.

uncertain, ‘non est aliis Deus quam tu, cui cura est de omnibus ut ostendas quoniam non injuste judicas judicium.’ Arab. favours this rendering, and Deut. 32³⁹ is cited to support it: ‘See now that I, even I, am he, and there is no god with me; I kill, and I make alive; I have wounded and I heal; and there is none that can deliver out of my hand.’ Siegfried renders this meaning best: ‘there is beside thee no God whose business it should be to care for all, so that thou wouldest have to prove that thou hast not judged unjustly’; but it is doubtful if *ἴνα δειξῆς* would bear that meaning, and, as Deane remarks, it is difficult to see where A.V. gets ‘*to whom thou mightest shew*.’ So R.V. ‘*that thou mightest shew unto him*,’ for which there is not the slightest warrant in the Greek.

14. The alternative reading *ἀπώλεσας* for *ἐκόλασας* probably comes from *ἀπολωλότων* in v. ¹². So *L* has ‘perdidisti’; it, however, translates *κολάζειν* in v. ²⁷ by ‘exterminate,’ so that nothing can be gathered from this rendering. Arab. has distinctly ‘punished.’ *S^h* ‘destroyed.’

There is probably no more difference between ‘kings’ and ‘tyrants’ here than between St. Paul’s ‘principalities’ and ‘powers,’ but in classical Greek *τύραννος* is the upstart in contradistinction to the hereditary king.

The versions, except the Arab., which has ‘dare to raise his eyes against thee,’ completely neglect the force of the strong word *ἀντοφθαλμῆσαι*. (*L* has ‘in conspectu tuo inquirent.’) It is hardly classical, not occurring before Polybius, but is well attested in later Greek. ὁ *ἀντοφθαλμῶν* *ἡδοναῖς* is quoted from the Compl. of Eccl. 19⁵, but does not appear in the ordinary texts. In Acts 27¹⁵ it means ‘to face the wind.’ In Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 34, a lazy workman ‘cannot look his employer in the face.’ Barn., v. ¹⁰, *οὐκ ἴσχύονσιν εἰς τὰς ἀκτῖνας αὐτοῦ (ἡλίου) ἀντοφθαλμῆσαι*.

For the last few words Siegfried has the extraordinary rendering ‘concerning the punishments which thou hast inflicted,’ which is supported by *S^P* ‘in that which thou didst justly decree,’ but does not represent the Greek.

15. R.V. ‘alien from thy power’ represents the Greek *ἀλλότριον* but not the sense. A.V. ‘not agreeable with thy power.’ *L* ‘exterum aestimas a tua virtute.’ *S^P* takes *ἀλλότριον* as masculine, ‘a stranger,’ and translates ‘Thou disposest all things fitly even in a matter where it behoved to exact punishment proportioned to thy power from strangers.’ Arab. follows the text.

16. For thy might is the origin of justice
 And that thou art lord of all maketh thee to spare all.

17. For thou displayest thy power when disbelieved as to the
 fulness of thy might,
 And in case of them that know thou dost convict their
 rashness.

Here, as in many other places (cf. Farrar's quotations), 'Wisdom' seems to have had Seneca's tragedies in mind. *Oed.*, 705, 'Qui sceptro (?) duro saevus imperio regit, timet timentes, metus in auctorem reddit.' Cf. *Jos.*, *Ant.*, IV. viii. 14, *τοῦ θεοῦ ἵσχυς ἐστι τὸ δίκαιον*.

The passage, especially line 3, was of some importance in the Predestinarian controversies. A Lapide argues at length against Calvin on the text with many quotations from Fathers and Councils.

Philo's view of God's dealings even with the hated Egyptians is given in *Vita Mosis*, i. 24, *οὗτε γὰρ ἐρημῶσαι τὴν χώραν προηρεῖτο ὁ θεὸς ἀλλὰ νοιθετῆσαι μόνον*. So in general, *Legis Alleg.*, iii. 34, *οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀμαρτάνοντιν εὐθὺς ἐπέξεισιν ὁ θεὸς ἀλλὰ δίδωσι χρόνον εἰς μετάνοιαν*.

The latter part of the verse is almost an exact anticipation of the simple maxim of Matt. 7¹, 'Judge not, lest ye be judged,' expanded in 18³³, 'Shouldest thou not also have had mercy on thy fellowservant, even as I had mercy on thee?' etc., and James 2¹³, 'Judgment is without mercy to him that hath showed no mercy.' Eccl. 28²⁴.

16. R.V. 'maketh thee to forbear all,' which is ambiguous and consistent with the acceptance of *πάντων* as neuter. A.V. 'to be gracious unto all.' L takes the word literally 'spare,' and there is no reason to depart from this meaning. S^P seems simply to have missed the last three words. Arab. has شفق, which means 'spare,' but in the sense of 'be niggardly.'

ἀρχή is variously rendered 'beginning' (R.V., A.V., L), 'principle' (Grimm and Siegfried), 'foundation' (Deane), but all may be summed up under the Latin 'principium.' The unfortunate L rendering of *ἵσχυς* by 'virtus' led early commentators, unacquainted with Greek, to believe that God's 'mercy' was meant, and an entirely false exegesis was the result. Farrar sums up the real meaning well: 'man's injustice is partly due to his feebleness and selfishness, and God being omnipotent has none of that bias to do wrong which springs from weakness.' So Reuss, 'Man's power is limited, and he loves to make others feel it. . . . God, because his power is unlimited, does not suffer in the opinion of wise men for using it in moderation.'

17. Both R.V. and A.V. are very paraphrastic. But the difficulty of the passage lies in *ἐν τοῖς εἰδόσι*. The change from this to *οὐκ εἰδόσι* would be natural to nine transcribers out of ten, and so L, Arm. have 'qui nesciunt.' But some MSS. of L have 'qui sciunt.' St. Augustine

18. But thou being master of might judgest with fairness;
 And with much leniency dost govern us :
 For power is at thy command when thou wilt.

quotes it so, and \mathbb{S}^p and Arab. show no signs of the negative. Rejecting it, we have a perfectly good rendering ; 'in the case of those who know and yet will not practically acknowledge thy rule,' i.e. the runagates of the first few chapters. This is better than 'conceited wise men,' which is, however, possible. Bois' conjecture $\epsilon\nu\deltaoia\zeta\sigma\iota$, 'for them that doubt,' is adopted by Siegfried : it has in its favour that the word is rare, and therefore likely to have been changed ; but it seems unnecessary. For a curious rendering of $\tau\omega\iota\epsilon\iota\theta\sigma\iota\tau\omega\theta\sigma\iota$, 'them that are acquainted with rebelliousness,' cf. A Lapide.

For the common rendering cf. Rom. 1²¹, 'Because that, knowing God, they glorified him not as God, neither gave thanks ; but became vain in their reasonings, and their senseless heart was darkened.'

The first line is translated by \mathbb{L} 'Virtutem ostendis tu qui non crederis esse in virtute consummatus,' where 'qui' seems to be for 'quippe qui' or 'quum' : 'Thou shewest power when thou art not believed to be complete in power.' Arab. plainly read $\alpha\pi\iota\sigma\tau\omega\mu\epsilon\omega\iota$ and took it for a middle, 'who believe not in the fulness of thy power.' \mathbb{S}^p 'Thou didst show thy powers and they believed not, but only in thy completed (not as Walton 'last') powers ; those whom thou knewest thou rebukest sorely.' The first line is not without sense, and such renderings tempt one to believe with Dr. Margoliouth that the Syriac translator had another text (Hebrew or otherwise) before him than that which we possess in the Greek.

18. \mathbb{L} 'Dominator virtutis,' which does not, however, imply that the translator took $\delta\epsilon\sigma\pi\omega\zeta\omega\iota$ as a substantive. \mathbb{S}^p and Arab. both take it as a verb. St. Augustine ($\alpha\beta.$ Deane) has 'Dominus virtutum,' which certainly gives a wrong idea of the meaning. Grimm quotes Luther and others as translating 'Gewaltiger Herrscher,' but the meaning is not 'measureless' might but moderation of that might, as in the next line.

$\epsilon\nu\epsilon\pi\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\zeta$, \mathbb{L} 'cum tranquillitate,' which is quite inadequate, as is R.V. 'gentleness.' A.V. 'equity' is better. \mathbb{S}^p has 'with mildness.' The whole conception is that of 'moderation' of boundless power. Cf. Song of the Three Children, 18, $\pi\omega\iota\sigma\omega\mu\epsilon\theta\iota\eta\mu\omega\iota\kappa\alpha\tau\omega\tau\eta\epsilon\pi\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\omega\sigma\iota\sigma\omega\iota$ $\sigma\omega\iota$ $\kappa\alpha\tau\omega\tau\omega\pi\lambda\eta\theta\omega\tau\omega\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\omega\iota\sigma\omega\iota$. Baruch, 2²⁷, has nearly the same phrase. The meaning is plain in Acts 24⁴, $\sigma\omega\pi\tau\omega\mu\omega\iota\tau\eta\sigma\iota\eta\epsilon\pi\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\omega\sigma\iota\sigma\omega\iota$: not 'clemency' as R.V., but Roman 'fairness.' Phil. 4⁶, $\tau\omega\epsilon\pi\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota\eta\mu\omega\iota\gamma\omega\sigma\theta\eta\theta\omega\pi\alpha\sigma\iota\mu\theta\omega\pi\iota\sigma\iota\sigma\omega\iota$, where A.V. 'moderation' gives the proper meaning. R.V. 'forbearance.' In 2 Cor. 10¹ the word is used certainly with a different meaning. It is coupled with $\pi\omega\alpha\tau\eta\iota\sigma$ and means 'gentleness.'

19. Now by such works didst thou teach thy people
 That the righteous man must needs be humane ;
 And madest thy sons to be of good hope
 That thou grantest for sins repentance.

19. 'From what follows it is clear that the writer is anxious to attribute to God's higher designs the occurrences narrated in the Pentateuch and in Joshua, which might well give offence to the ordinary feelings of humanity' (Grimm).

A.V. is probably right in connecting ὅτι διδοῖς (Swete for δίδωσ, the more usual form, διδοῖς being Homeric) closely with εὐελπίδας. No version, however, except Arab., so takes it. R.V. 'because thou givest repentance *when men have sinned*' which is not a translation of the Greek ἐπὶ ἀμαρτήμασιν. **L** 'quoniam judicans das locum in peccatis poenitentiae.' **S^E** 'grantest penitence *for sins*.' Arab. 'in sins.'

Much is to be said for Grätz's view (iii. note 3, 629) that Ps.-Sol. here deliberately sets himself to combat the Gentile idea of the Jews as 'hostes humani generis.' Of this idea we have many proofs. 3 Macc. 7⁴, δοῦλοι ἔχουσιν οὐτοι πρὸς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη δυσμένειαν. Tac. *Hist.*, v. 5, 'apud ipsos fides obstinata, misericordia in promptu, sed adversus omnes alias hostile odium.' Juv., xiv. 103, 'Non monstrare vias eadem nisi sacra colenti, quaesitum ad fontem solos deducere verpos.' Cf. Mayor's collection of testimonies in his note *ad loc.* This furious hatred of the Jews only appeared after their final rebellion and the fall of Jerusalem. But in the New Testament we have Acts 10²⁸, 'It is an unlawful thing for a man that is a Jew to keep company, or come unto one that is of another nation'; 1 Thess. 2¹⁵, 'They please not God, and are contrary to all men.' Cf. Esther 3⁸. δίκαιος may be taken then in the sense of 'a strict observer of the ceremonial law' as opposed to φιλάνθρωπος.

There is here a near approach to Christian teaching. The word φιλάνθρωπος does not indeed occur in the New Testament, but in 1 John 4²⁰ we have a fair exposition of the idea. 'If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar . . . and this commandment have we from him, That he who loveth God love his brother also.' But Farrar is right in saying that, in the words 'thy sons' the writer 'falls back into the self-satisfied prejudice which made the Jews speak as if all mankind were created for their sake': 'Egypt and Canaan are brought upon the scene only to provide object-lessons for Israel' (Gregg).

The expressions of Philo on this point are worthy of note. *De Abraham.*, § 37, τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς φύσεως ἐστιν εὐσεβῆ τε εἶναι καὶ φιλάνθρωπον. *De Profugis*, § 6, γνωρίσθητε οὖν πρότερον τῇ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἀρέτῃ, ἵνα καὶ τῇ πρὸς θεὸν συσταθῆτε.

20. For if on the enemies of thy servants and on them that were due to death

Thou didst execute judgment with so much carefulness and supplication,
Giving them times and place to change from their wickedness;

21. With how much circumspection didst thou judge thy sons,
To whose fathers thou gavest oaths and covenants of good promises?

20. **L** omits *καὶ δεήσεως*, not understanding it; and so A.V., probably following Compl. But Genev. has it ‘requesting unto them.’ The rendering given above may appear remarkable, but it represents the received text, and is supported by the paraphrases of **S^P** and Arab. ‘when they supplicated thee.’ These are no doubt wrong, but they represent the reading *δεήσεως*. Ample justification for the idea of ‘supplication’ of God to humanity is found in Isa. 65², ‘I have spread out my hands all the day unto a rebellious people’; Prov. 1²⁴, ‘I have called and ye refused; I have stretched out my hand and no man regarded.’ Cf. Rom. 10²¹, which repeats the passage of Isaiah. Grimm’s explanation of the passage is practically this,

The objection to this is that God would not supplicate to the Canaanites; but with ‘Wisdom’ all things are possible. R.V. translates the variant *διέσεως* (**G^N**) ‘indulgence,’ which is the obvious correction of a scribe who, like **L**, could not understand *δεήσεως*.

A third reading is *διέσωσας* (some MSS. of **L** have ‘et liberasti’), which is said to be the reading of Arm., but this is altogether at variance with the sense of the passage: ‘Thou didst execute judgment on them with so much deliberation and didst preserve them throughout’ is nonsense.

The passage is undoubtedly difficult. Accepting *δεήσεως* as the reading, Wahl and others compare Hebrew *הַנְּחָת* which may mean either ‘mercy’ or ‘supplication for mercy.’ For the first meaning cf. Jos. 11²⁰, Ezra 9⁸. If we could accept this the text might be made to mean ‘heedfulness’ (R.V.) and answer to supplication.’

For *χρόνους καὶ τόπουν* ‘times and opportunity,’ **G^A** reads *χρόνον καὶ τόπον*, an obvious change, which Grimm would adopt on the ground of the verbal assonance of which Pseudo-Solomon is fond. **L** has ‘tempus.’ Arab. ‘times and natural inclination.’ **S^H** ‘times and place by means of which to change.’

21. The stress is laid on *ἀκριβείας*, which in accordance with the argument cannot mean ‘sharpness’ or ‘exactness’ but rather carefulness’ (R.V.) or ‘diligentia’ (**L**), the idea being rather that of sparing than of exacting the full penalty of the law. The slow but continued

22. Us therefore chastening, thou dost scourge our enemies ten thousandfold,
 That when we judge we may carefully ponder on thy goodness,
 But when we are judged may look for pity.

23. Wherefore also them that lived in foolishness of life, wicked men,
 Thou didst torment through their own abominations.

judgment of Israel by the oppressions of neighbouring nations, described in Judges, may be meant.

For 'oaths' cf. Gen. 22¹⁶, δὶ ἐμαντοῦ ὄμοσα λέγει ὁ κύριος, and 24⁷, 26³, etc. For 'covenant' the word used by  is διαθήκη. Συνθήκη is unusual, and does not occur in the New Testament.

The genitive of remote relation, 'covenants of good promises,' has many parallels both in classical and Hellenistic Greek. Winer (Moulton), § xxx. 2b (β), p. 235.

22. There is no variant of importance.  has for the unusual word ἐν μυριότητι, 'multipliciter.'  'with ten thousand plagues.' Arab. 'manifold.' There is no reason for the A.V. and R.V. addition 'a thousand' or 'ten thousand times' more; for the idea is that Israel is not 'scourged' at all but 'chastened.' Deane is right in his distinction, 'chastening' as children . . . 'thou scourgest' as slaves. It is true that in Prov. 3¹² the two words are applied to the same form of chastisement; but 'Wisdom' has his own way of applying terms. He probably had in mind rather Ps. 31¹⁰, πολλὰί αἱ μάστιγες τοῦ ἀμαρτωλοῦ, τὸν δε ἐλπίζοντα ἐπὶ κύριον ἔλεος κυκλώσει. Unless the two words are recognised as forming a strong contrast, the passage loses all its force.

For παιδεύω cf. Deut. 8⁵, 'Thou shalt consider in thine heart that as a man chasteneth his son so the Lord thy God chasteneth thee.'

μυριότητι seems to be a ἀπαξ λεγ., and commentators suggest various substitutes given by Grimm, e.g. ἐν μακρότητι (Nannius) for 'in long-suffering,' and ἐν μακροθυμίᾳ (Nachtigal) with the same meaning. Both are utterly opposed to the plain meaning of the passage.

Grimm's citation of 2 Macc. 6¹⁴ is most apposite: 'For in the case of other nations the sovereign Lord doth with long-suffering forbear, until that he punish them when they have attained unto the full measure of their sins; but not so judged he as touching us, that he may not take vengeance on us afterwards when we be come unto the height of our sins,' and so in v. 12, 'these punishments were not for the destruction but for the chastening of our race.' The meaning is that God punished his chosen *at the time* for their smallest transgressions, and there an end; but allowed the heathen to go on heaping up wrath in order to their final destruction.

23. Wisdom returns to his old theory that the Egyptians worshipped

24. For they went astray even farther than the ways of error,
 Taking as gods those which among the beasts of ou
 enemies are despised,
 Deceived like silly children.

the very insects by which they were plagued, and $\ddot{\theta}\epsilon\nu$, 'wherefore, takes up the idea of v. 22^a, 'thou scourgest our enemies.' Some have thought that the Canaanites are still in question, and that the fish god Dagon of the Philistines, and Baalzebub 'the lord of flies' worshipped by the Ekronites (2 Kings 1^{2,16}), are referred to. But there is no mention of plagues inflicted on the Canaanites through such creatures, unless we take the 'horns' as 'flies.'

$\ddot{\alpha}\delta\kappa\omega s$ seems to be an afterthought of the writer, tacked on at the end of the line, to designate particularly the Egyptians, whom he considers as especially 'unrighteous,' because they wronged their guests who had done them no harm (19¹⁴). A transcriber would no understand this, and we have consequently the variant $\ddot{\alpha}\delta\kappa\omega s$ accepted by \mathfrak{L} , 'insensate et injuste vixerunt.' \mathfrak{S}^p is questionable Arab. has the adjective. Grimm, who adopts the adverb, cites also Arm. in its favour.

$\beta\delta\epsilon\lambda\gamma\mu\pi\alpha$ is not translated by \mathfrak{L} . \mathfrak{S}^p has 'filthiness.' It is the word employed by \mathfrak{E} (without much reference to the Hebrew) to designate heathen idols. Sometimes it represents תֹּועֲבֹת , שָׁקֶן , and in Jer. 11¹⁵ מוֹמָה .

24. This is Grimm's translation of line 1, 'Longius aberraverunt quam erroris viae ferebant, ipsas erroris vias egressi sunt,' i.e. their error was simply incredible. This, however, is not the sense given by the versions. Only R.V. has in margin 'even beyond the ways of error. So Deane, A. Lapide, and writers cited by the latter. It may be questioned if the comparative denotes more than it does in 3¹⁴, $\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\sigma\theta\eta\mu\eta\rho\epsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma$. In that case the rendering of A.V. and R.V., 'they went very far astray in the paths of error,' will be correct.

Line 2 has given some trouble, chiefly because all the versions translate $\epsilon\chi\theta\rho\omega\nu$ 'their enemies.' That the Egyptians should worship things which *their* enemies (e.g. the Israelites) despised was no great proof of folly. The translation given is that of Freudenthal (*J. Q. R. ubi supra*). 'Our enemies' are the Gentiles. The Egyptians worshipped beasts which even Gentiles like themselves generally despised—not merely things which were (like swine) abhorrent to the Jew Margoliouth would treat $\tau\hat{\omega}\nu\ \epsilon\chi\theta\rho\omega\nu\ \zeta\hat{\phi}\alpha$ as a bad translation of the Hebrew 'wild beasts,' \mathfrak{L} has 'supervacua' for $\ddot{\alpha}\tau\mu\alpha$, and \mathfrak{S}^p translates 'they trusted in the beasts and reproach (?hendiadys) of their enemies.' Siegfried renders strangely 'beasts which were more contemptible than those (otherwise) most hated.' Bois would refer $\epsilon\chi\theta\rho\omega\nu$ to the beasts, who are called $\epsilon\chi\theta\omega\sigma\tau\alpha$ in 15¹⁷, and translates 'they worship filthy beasts and even among filthy beasts the mos

25. Therefore, as to children without reason,
 Thou didst send thy judgment as a mockery :

26. But they that be not brought to a right mind by mockeries
 of correction
 Shall experience a judgment worthy of God.

dishonoured.' This interpretation had already been indicated by Arnald, who paraphrases: 'they held for gods despicable and mischievous beasts,' and quotes from Calmet, 'les animaux les plus viles, les plus méprisables, *et les plus ennemis de l'homme*.' We must undoubtedly take account here of the difficulty which Pseudo-Solomon finds in expressing himself lucidly in Greek.

$\delta\kappa\eta\nu$ for 'after the manner of' is one of Pseudo-Solomon's classical reminiscences. It is not found elsewhere in Biblical Greek. \mathbb{L} has for $\psi\epsilon\nu\sigma\theta\acute{e}\nu\tau\epsilon$ simply 'viventes,' and \mathbb{S}^P 'they stupidly refused (or evaded) the punishment of children.'

The charge of worshipping frogs, crocodiles, serpents, etc., is one constantly brought against the Egyptians. Cf. II¹⁶ and the whole of the early part of Juvenal's *Sat.* xvi. Letter of Aristeas, § 138 (Αἰγύπτιοι) οἵτινες ἐπὶ θύρια καὶ τῶν ἔρπετῶν τὰ πλεῖστα καὶ κνωδάλων τὴν ἀπέρεισιν πεποίηται, καὶ ταῦτα προσκυνοῦσι κτλ : § 144, μυῶν καὶ γαλῆς ἢ τῶν τοιούτων χάριν περιεργίαν ποιούμενος ἐνομοθέτει ταῦτα Μωϋσῆς (Lev. II²⁹). On the subject of forbidden meats, etc., §§ 134-166 of the Letter are most valuable. Philo, *de Decal.*, § 16, charges the Egyptians with worshipping 'fishes either whole or even parts of fishes.'

25. The earlier plagues, it should be noted, were of a lighter nature, and might be considered as a gentle rebuke of idolatry—*e.g.* the frogs; the later ones grew more and more terrible, till they culminated in the death of the first-born. In Exod. 10², \mathbb{G} reads, $\ddot{\sigma}\sigma\alpha \acute{e}μπ\acute{e}παιχα τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις$.

Churton quotes from the Targums (Jerus., i., ii.) on Gen. 21⁹ a story that the child Ishmael was cast out for childish idolatry. It does not seem to be stated that he *made* idols.

26. It is best to take this, with Grimm, as a general statement and not one confined to the Egyptians. The latter explanation would necessitate the understanding of $\pi\epsilon\iota\pi\acute{a}\sigma\sigma\sigma\iota\pi\acute{a}\nu$ as $\acute{e}μ\acute{e}λλον \pi\epsilon\iota\pi\acute{a}\acute{e}\nu$, which is awkward. The use of $\mu\eta$ with $\nu\omega\theta\acute{e}\tau\acute{e}\theta\acute{e}\nu\tau\epsilon$ points to a general maxim, and there is no reason to press the past tense of the latter word. \mathbb{L} simply turns the second line into the past tense: 'dignum Dei judicium experti sunt.' \mathbb{S}^P seems to take it as general and Arab. also. A Lapide adds point to the general application by citing also the example of the Canaanites who were plagued with wasps or hornets.

For $\pi\alpha\gamma\pi\acute{a}\iota\sigma\iota\pi\acute{a}\nu$ $\acute{e}\pi\pi\mu\acute{e}\sigma\epsilon\omega\sigma$ \mathbb{L} has 'ludibriis et increpationibus,' which may be a hendiadys. A parallel is Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. 38,

27. For through the sufferings wherat they were indignant,
(Being punished by means of those very creatures whom
they esteemed gods),

Knowing him whom before they refused to know, they
recognised the true God :

Wherefore final condemnation came upon them.

13. 1. For vain indeed are all men by nature in whom was
ignorance of God,

And who could not from the good things that are seen
know him that is,

Nor giving heed to his works recognised the workman.

where speaking of the smiting of the rock he says, *τὰ παράδοξα ταῦτα καὶ παράλογα θεοῦ πάγνιά ἔστιν, ἀπιδὼν εἰς τὰ τῷ ὅντι μεγάλα καὶ σπουδῆς ἀξία.*

27. Churton gives the sense. ‘The vexation which they felt at these petty chastisements which befell them through their gods constrained them to acknowledge the true God whom they once denied.’ Grimm and Siegfried take line 2 as an amplification of line 1; but it is probable that *ἐπί* is used in a slightly different sense in the two lines. *L* endeavouring to be literal is unintelligible. *S^P* omits all the difficult parts of the verse. Arab. is nearly as above. The difficulty mainly arises from taking *ἐπί* in precisely the same sense in the two first lines.

Farrar’s rendering is remarkable: ‘it was the punishment *inflicted on their animal-gods* which made them most indignant amid their sufferings, and yet it was that very punishment which forced on them the conviction of the true God.’ On *Θεὸν ἐπέγνωσαν ἀληθῆ* Cornely remarks that ‘speculativa cognitio Dei non sufficit’; and it is possible that the Egyptians in their sufferings just so far recognised the power of their punisher that they were willing to include him in their pantheon. We may refer to the experience of many missionaries, who find a similar disposition in their heathen converts, and also to the partial recognition of Christ (as inferior to the Prophet) by Mohammedans.

The last line seems to refer to the final catastrophe: the death of the first-born and the destruction of Pharaoh’s host in the Red Sea.

13. 1. The ordinary rules of the Greek language will not permit us to supply ‘were’ with *μάταιοι*, though Grimm and R.V. do so, professing to be justified by the following *παρῆν*. But it would be difficult to find examples of such a use. A.V. has ‘are,’ and *L*, *S^P*, Arab. are as indefinite as the Greek.

The argument seems fairly plain, and follows naturally from the end of chap. 12, ‘All men must be fools who can look upon the works of

God and not recognise God in them,' but unnecessary difficulties seem to have been raised about *τὸν ὄντα*. We have surely here the ἔγώ εἰμι ὁ ὄντα of Exod. 3¹⁴, and in the face of such a text it seems absurd in the case of a Jewish writer to propose to supply ἀγαθὸν from ἀγαθῶν, so as to give the meaning 'him that is good' (Grimm). Nothing could well be weaker. The only question is whether we should understand 'him that is' as 'the one-existent,' or as suggested by Drummond, *Philo*, i. 187, 'the one true God' as opposed to the idols. The former is much more likely. Cf. Philo, *de Decalogo*, § 13, *τὸν ὄντα ὄντως ἡ οὐκ ἐιδότες ἀδιδάκτῳ τῇ φύσει ἡ οὐ σπουδάζοντες μάταιον ἀπονοίᾳ τοσαύτῃ κέχρηνται*. The passage is useful in showing us that μάταιοι φύσει (L omits φύσει) means not (Deane) 'by intellectual nature vain,' but as we say 'born fools,' unteachable or untaught. Dähne (i. 124, n. 21), remarking on the constant use of ὁ ὄντα or τὸ ὄντα in Philo, suggests that the E translation of Exod. 3¹⁴ is already coloured by Alexandrian theology. He holds also that Wisdom in this passage represents God as the Alexandrians did, as 'unknowable,' on which see Drummond, i. 197 *sqq.*

μάταιοι, as we see, is inadequately translated by 'vain,' but it is repeatedly used of the folly of idolaters; in 2 Kings 17¹⁵, ἐματαιώθησαν means 'went a fooling after idols,' and cf. Rom. 1²¹, Eph. 4¹⁷ (ματαιότης).

ἐκ τῶν ὄρωμένων (L 'de his quae videntur bona') finds its best comment in Rom. 1²⁰, 'For the invisible things of him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even his everlasting power and divinity; that they may be without excuse.'

ἐπέγνωσαν may have, as Farrar thinks, a particular meaning: 'they did not further recognise': did not look up through Nature to God.

The importance of the phrase *τὸν ὄντα* is, however, from a philosophical point of view considerable. Philo, appropriating the term from Exod. 3¹⁴, uses it (cf. references in Dähne, i. 124) to further his polemic against anthropomorphism, alleging that it implies that God is absolutely without (human) qualities; a pure existence. This view can hardly be attributed to Ps.-Sol., who attributes to God pity and patience (11²³, 12¹⁹, 15¹ *sqq.*) and a desire to improve the sinner 11²⁵. The remark that he can safely exercise such pity and patience because he need be afraid of none (11²³, 12¹⁴⁻¹⁶) is inconsistent with the idea of the absolute and unqualifiable, and the particularism ascribed to God equally so. The passages which might be taken to have a Philonic meaning are few: the principal one is 7²⁶ (one of the Solomonic chapters be it noted), where God is the φῶς αἰδίον, and Wisdom, here for a moment depicted as the manager of the world (cf. 7²⁷), a mere emanation from him.

For the description of God as *τεχνίτης* various passages of Philo are quoted by Grimm, but they do not seem important. The term is found in Epictet., *Dissert.*, I. vi. 7 (Grimm), *τεχνίτου τινὸς πάντως τὸ*

2. But either fire, or wind, or swift air,
Or the cycle of the stars, or rushing water,
Or the lights of heaven they deemed to be gods, rulers of
the world.

ἔργον οὐχὶ δ' εἰκῆ κατεσκευασμένον, and Heb. 11¹⁰ (of the artificer of the heavenly Jerusalem).

2. The text presents no difficulty. **L** translates $\phiωστήρας οὐρανοῦ$ by 'sun and moon,' and **S^P** has for $\piρυτάνεις κόσμου$ 'or the fixed order of the world.'

Philo, *de Decal.*, § 12, is here of interest. ἐκτεθεώκαστι γὰρ οἱ μὲν τὰς τέτταρας ἀρχάς, γῆν καὶ ὄδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ οἱ δὲ ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πλανῆτας καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας . . . and he goes on to say that they call the earth Demeter, Pluto, Persephone; the sea Poseidon; the air Hera (he might have added Zeus); the fire Hephaestus; the sun Apollo, the moon Artemis, and the morning star Aphrodite.

E. Pfleiderer (*Heraklit*, 302), followed by Bois, thinks that Greek philosophy is also referred to (cf. Additional Note D), and assigns to various schools the various elements referred to. It is noteworthy that Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoicks retained ('from patriotism,' says Pfleiderer) one relic of ancient mythology. They professed to believe that the stars were subordinate influences in the direction of the universe. Cf. 1 Cor. 8⁵, *εἴπερ εἰσὶ λεγόμενοι θεοὶ εἴτε ἐν οὐρανῷ εἴτε ἐπὶ γῆς . . . ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν εἰς Θεὸς ὁ πατήρ*. Many quotations from the Fathers are given by A. Lapide and Grimm; one from Aug., *de Civ.*, iv. 11, is very like that from Philo. He assigns the 'aether' to Jupiter; the 'aer' to Juno.

With regard to separate objects of worship, the Magian adoration of fire is well known ; to the Persians Hdt., i. 131, assigns worship of all the powers of nature. For the Chaldaean 'astronomy,' and γενεθλιαλογική cf. Philo, *de Migrat. Abr.*, § 32, where he attributes to the Chaldees something very like a belief in the 'anima mundi' (Dähne i. 378).

πνεῦμα from the context plainly means 'wind' and not 'spirit' and the Egyptians are said to have worshipped the winds as the cause of the annual inundation of the Nile. Besides the general and vague idea of Aeolus as the ruler of the winds, we have the distinct statement of Seneca, *Nat. Quaest.*, v. xvii. 5, that Augustus vowed and built a temple to one of the winds (? Circius) as a god. The nearest approach to such a conception in the Old Testament is Ps. 104⁴ 'Who maketh winds his messengers,' and 148⁸. Cf. note on 7²⁰.

For *φωστήρας οὐρανοῦ* cf. Gen. 1¹⁶, *τοὺς δύο φωστήρας τοὺς μεγάλους*, and the curious passage Job 31²⁶ *sqq.*, 'If I beheld the sun when it shined, or the moon walking in brightness; and my heart hath been secretly enticed, and my hand hath kissed my mouth . . .

3. Yet if they delighting in their beauty supposed these things
· to be gods,

Let them perceive how much the master of these things is
superior;

For it was the originator of beauty that created them.

should have lied to God that is above.' Eccl. 43⁷ gives us some idea of the reason why primitive worship is always directed not only to the healing and beneficent sun, but to the moon also. For the general worship of the heavenly bodies which attracted the Israelites themselves cf. Deut. 4¹⁰, 17³; 2 Kings 17¹⁶, 21³; Jer. 7¹⁸, 8², 19¹³, 44¹⁶; Zeph. 1⁵; Ezek. 8¹⁶; and art. 'Star' in Hastings' *D. B.*, iv. 612. See Budde, *Rel. of Israel*, p. 162.

πρυτάνεις for 'rulers' is an affected word, borrowed from classical Greek. The verb *πρυτανεύω* occurs in Philo, *de Monarchia*, i. § 1, ἐνὸς τοῦ πάντων πατέρος . . . πρυτανεύοντος κατὰ δίκην καὶ νόμον ἔκαστον τῶν γεγονότων. Arm., according to Margoliouth, translates *πρυτάνεις* 'satellites of the world,' which seems meaningless.

In these first nine verses of chap. 13 we have the description of a form of idolatry which the writer plainly considers almost excusable ('halb freundlich, halb polemisch' says Pfeiderer). The fault of the followers of such doctrines was that they did not recognise God in his works; but they were very far above the worshippers of graven images and of cats and dogs.

3. **¶** has for *βελτίων* 'speciosior,' endeavouring to preserve a comparison with *κάλλους* in the next line. Arab. is as usual literally true to the Greek, except that it translates *γενεσιάρχης* ('originator') by an abstract 'the origin.' §^p puts the whole into the second person plural: 'If ye think that they be gods,' etc. R.V. is explanatory, but not literal, for this and the following verse: 'If it was through delight in their beauty that they took them to be gods (v. 4), . . . but if it was through astonishment at their power and influence, let them understand,' etc.

τούτων is naturally dependent on *δεσπότης*—the lord of these things is surely superior to the things themselves; but **¶** translates it here and in v. 4, 'quanto *his* dominator eorum speciosior est.' The word *γενεσιάρχης* seems to be an invention of the writer, but it occurs afterwards in Euseb. *de Laud. Constant.* (quoted by Deane).

The disregard of the beauties of the world, attributed very commonly both to the Jew and to the ancient Roman if not to the Greek, seems to be greatly exaggerated. Farrar's note goes far (with his quotations) to dispel this idea; but Churton's lengthy commentary sets forth the truth. Of the beauty of the starry heavens (Ps. 19) the Hebrews at least were cognisant: nor can we say in the face of such passages as Ps. 104 and Job 39, and many allusions in the Song of Solomon, that they were blind to the minor beauties of nature.

4. But if it was through awe at their power and effect,
 Let them reckon from them how much more powerful :
 he that ordered them ;

5. For from the greatness of beauty and of creation
 Analogously the creator of them is recognised.

The Romans also are especially blamed for blindness to natural beauty. It is enough to quote Catullus xxxi. 'Peninsularum Sirmio.

Gfrörer, ii. 212, thinks that this passage shows distinct Hellenic influence ; Blunt *ad loc.* speaks of Ben-Sira as 'half Greek,' but there is no reason to ascribe his beautiful words (Eccl. 43⁹ and 11) regarding the stars and the rainbow to such external modes of thought. A Lapide and Grimm cite many appreciations of natural beauty from Greek writers and from the Fathers. Cf. especially Plato, *ap.* Cyril *adv. Julian.*, iii. p. 97 (Grimm), *ἀπὸ τοῦ κάλλους τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπὶ τὸν κάλλος ἀναφοιτῆσαι δέησας*, and Boeth. iii. *Metrum* ix. ; 'pulcrum pulcerrimus ipse Mundum mente gerens similius imaginans.' The Stoic argument for the government of the world by Providence on the ground of its admirable order is well known from Cicero's *Quaest. Tusc.*, I. chap. xxviii.

The best commentary, from the Christian point of view, on this text is found in Rom. 1¹⁹ *sqq.* quoted on v. 1.

4. Except R.V. and Arab. ('activity' as above) all the versions use some word corresponding to the Latin 'virtus,' by which L actually translates δύναμις.

νοεῖν is in Hellenistic Greek the current word for the apprehension of the divine element in nature. Grimm quotes Aristot. *de Mondo* c. I, ἡ ψυχὴ . . . λαβοῦσα ἡγέμονα τὸν νοῦν . . . θειῶψ ψυχῆς ὅμματι τὰ θεῖα καταλαβοῦσα. But the actual word is found in Rom. 1²⁰, τὰ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθοράται. Heb. 11² πίστει νοούμενα κατηγράπται τὸν αἰώνας ρήματι Θεοῦ. There are various quotations from Philo to illustrate this use of the word.

The notes on the preceding verse apply to a great extent to this also. The creator of beauty must be himself superior in that quality. The creator of things powerful must be more powerful than they.

5. There can be no doubt as to what the author meant to say, viz. 'from the greatness and beauty of creation,' but he has not said it though Deane accepts the inferior reading ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ καλλονῆς κτισμάτων. L undoubtedly read the received text, 'a magnitude in species et creatureae.' S^P and Arab. had also a text before them which they did not understand ; and though Deane cites quotations of ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ καλλονῆς from Eusebius and Athanasius, those Fathers probably corrected the text for themselves. Genev. takes the received text ; A.V. the easier reading ; R.V. has 'even of created things' which is ingenious but unnecessary. Churton pleads for 'proportion

6. But yet for these there is small blame ;

For they too peradventure err,

Seeking God and having the will to find him.

ably,' 'His wisdom and power appear so much the greater as we obtain a larger survey of His works' : a very modern idea.

For ἀναλόγως the only sufficient word is the modern one. L 'cognoscibiliter,' which is meaningless. A.V. 'proportionably,' which is very near the mark ; for the idea is that of arguing from the less (the creature) to the greater (the creator). R.V. margin 'correspondently' is not good. The word does not occur in Biblical Greek, but in Rom. 12⁶ we have ἀναλογία, 'having gifts according to the grace that was given to us ; if prophecy (let us prophesy) according to the proportion of faith, etc.' Sh has for ἀναλόγως لـ مـ كـ مـ لـ, probably not understanding the word. Cornely quotes from St. Jerome (*ad Damas. ep. xxi. 10*) an ingenious rendering, 'consequenter,' which taken literally really answers to R.V. margin 'correspondently.' γενεσιοῦργος is also an unusual word, not found in G or the New Testament.

The argument is that of Job 37-41 ; but it was a familiar one to heathen writers. A Lapide quotes Pythagoras (?), Plato, Xenophon, and Hermes Trismegistus. Gregg points out that such reasoning only proves the power and beauty of the Creator : 'His possession of the higher moral qualities, righteousness and love, must be revealed.' Yet Rom. 1²⁰ goes hardly further than the heathen view, though v. ²¹ 'when they knew God (as great and beautiful) they glorified him not as God (*i.e.* as the Father and lover and protector of all) neither were thankful' seems to correct this. Nor does Ps. 19¹⁻⁵ go very far, whereas Ps. 91⁵⁻⁷ at least implies the protecting power of the Creator.

Θεωρεῖται A.V. 'is seen.' R.V. clumsily 'does man form the image of their first maker' : which is to read into 'Wisdom' more than ever he meant to say. A certain technical meaning (of the eye of the soul rather than of the eye of the body) seems, however, to have attached to this word. Grimm quotes Arist. *de Mundo*, c. 6, ἀθεώρητος ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων θεωρεῖται (ό θεός). Farrar's interpretation, 'mental, spiritual, and adoring vision,' is perhaps too finely drawn ; but cf. Lidd. and Sc. *s.v.*, i. 2c.

Among Pseudo-Solomon's contemporaries the Sibylline oracles, perhaps alone, show appreciation of the beauties of nature, *lib. iii. Proem. ii. 3.*

'Αλλὰ θεὸς μόνος εἴς πανυπέρτατος, ὃς πεποίηκεν
Οὐρανὸν ἡέλιον τε καὶ ἀστέρας ἡδὲ σελήνην.
Καρπόφορον γαίην τε καὶ ὑδατος οἰδματα πόντου
Οὕρεα θ' ὑλήντα καὶ δέναα (?) χεύματα πηγῶν.

which is not unlike a chorus of Sophocles.

6. 'Ἐπὶ τούτοις might well mean in classical Greek 'on these conditions,' 'granting all this,' viz. that they were misled by the power

7. For being conversant with his works they do search diligently,
And believe their sight, that the things seen are beautiful.

and beauty of the creature. But *ἀντοὶ* in the next line proves that the writer meant 'in case of these men,' a use which can scarcely be paralleled in Biblical Greek. The instances in Winer (Moulton), § 48, c. 491, Robinson, *Lex.*, 391, hardly cover this case. But so *Ἐ* 'in his,' *Ἐ* 'on these.' Arab. inserts a 'not': 'no small blame'; not understanding the argument. A.V. has 'for this,' which is possible were it not for the next line.

To sum up: there are two theories—(1) Grimm refers *ἀντοὶ* to the Jews, who, seeking for God in the wrong way, may go astray; (2) Bois (with Deane) takes it of idolaters; 'they deserve little reproach, for it was perhaps in seeking for God that they went astray.' He is no doubt right in translating *τάχα* 'perhaps,' and in saying that Grimm's interpretation (*the seekers after God*) needs the article; and he gets a good meaning out of v.⁸, which, however, he wrongly compares with 8^{19.20}. Pseudo-Solomon, he says, after making some excuse for the heathen, turns round and declares, 'No, I went too far: they are not deserving of apology.' Even the oldest commentators said that *τάχα* (which occurs, always with the meaning of 'perhaps' in 14¹⁹, Rom. 5⁷, Philem. 1⁵), could not be referred to *πλανῶνται* alone. There is no doubt as to their wandering from the way; what is doubtful is whether they were not really seeking God, but seeking him in the wrong way. Cf. notes on 14¹⁹.

In either case there is a virtual contradiction of 6¹³; for we are there told that any one who seeks wisdom can find her.

Θέλοντες is a weak word for 'desiring,' and Deane's translation adopted above meets the case. Possibly Pseudo-Solomon used it instead of *βουλόμενοι* for rhythmic reasons; Acts 17²⁷ is more forcible, *ζητεῖν τὸν θεὸν, εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειν αὐτὸν καὶ εὑροιεν.*

The idea is exactly repeated in Philo, *de Decal.*, § 14, *ὅσοι μὲν ἥλιον καὶ σελήνης . . . ὡς θεῶν πρόπολοι τε καὶ θεραπευταί, διαμαρτάνοντι μὲν . . . ἥπτον δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ἀδικοῦσι τῶν ξύλα καὶ λίθους ἄργυρόν τε καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ τὰς παραπλησίους ὄλας μορφωσάντων ὡς φίλον ἔκαστοις.* An alternative rendering (Grimm) is: 'for even those may err (i.e. the followers of "Wisdom" among the Israelites) that seek God and wish to find him': but *ἀντοὶ* must, according to all the rules of Greek construction, refer to *τούτοις*, and what follows is a criticism of the *τούτοις*—not of Jewish seekers after wisdom.

The whole thought of the passage reminds us strongly of the further words of St. Paul in Acts 17^{29.30}, 'being then the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and device of man. The times of ignorance then God overlooked; but now he commandeth men that they should all everywhere repent.'

7. *Ἐ* has the sense: 'persuasum habent quoniam bona sunt quaę

8. But again even they are not to be pardoned.

9. For if they had power to know so much

As to be able to form theories about the world,
How found they not the Lord of these things sooner?

videntur'; and Arab. 'were content to perceive that visible things are (or were) beautiful.' **S^P** as usual amplifies, but preserves the meaning. *ἀναστρεφόμενοι* is exactly Lat. 'versati (inter)', and A.V. is too literal in translating 'conversant in his works.' **L** apparently omits *τῇ ὄψει*. R.V. is as usual cumbrous without being clear. 'Yield themselves up to sight because' is not a translation of *πειθονται τῇ ὄψει ὅτι* at all.

The idea is precisely that already illustrated from Rom. 1¹⁹⁻²². Men (the Stoics, perhaps, are particularly meant) deduced rightly enough from his works the power of God: his goodness they did not apprehend. Heb. 11³, which is generally quoted, does not seem much to the point, except that the words *τὰ βλεπόμενα* (*text. rec.*) occur there.

The reference may be to the Greek natural philosophers, or to the Chaldaean star-gazers, or possibly (Gregg) simply to 'practical men, who try to find light upon their life, but by their very externality are liable to be victims of sense-impressions.' The general truth is illustrated by the present-day attitude of the professors of the minuter sciences towards God and his universe. A Lapide quotes Trismegistus, *Dial.* v. : 'Cave, cave, O fili mi Tati, ne unquam artificium prives artifice.'

8. **L** 'nec his debet ignosci.' R.V. 'excused' may be compared with *ἀναπολόγητοι* in the parallel passage, Rom. 1²⁰, but it is not sufficient here. A.V. 'pardoned' is right. 'Excuse' has already been found for them in v. ⁶. Complete justification must be denied them. Cf. Churton, *ad loc.*

πάλιν has more than the English sense of 'again': it means rather 'I must go back on what I have admitted.' Lidd. and Sc. *s.v.*, i. 2. The best instance in New Testament Greek is 1 John 2⁸, *ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ παλαιά ἐστιν ὁ λόγος ὃν ἡκούσατε. πάλιν ἐντολὴν καινὴν γράφω ὑμῖν.* Cf. Robinson, *Lex. s.v.*, p. 610a.

9. **L** again has the sense: 'aestimare seculum'; for *αἰών* is the 'world in time' not the 'world in space' (*κόσμος*), and **S^P** **τοῦ** may mean the same. There is no English word for this (R.V. has 'the course of things'). Possibly **מִלְעָד** in Eccl. 3¹¹ (R.V. margin 'eternity') has this force. It certainly has in late Hebrew. For the metaphorical use of the word as 'the evil world' we have many examples in the New Testament, especially Gal. 1⁴, *αἰών πονηρός*; 2 Cor. 4⁴, *ὁ θεὸς τοῦ αἰώνος τούτου* (*i.e.* the devil).

στοχάσασθαι also (A.V. 'aim at the world,' Genev. 'discern the world') can hardly be rendered by one English word. German

10. For miserable are they and on dead things are their hopes fixed,

Which called the works of men's hands gods,
Gold and silver, a device of art,
And likenesses of animals,
Or useless stone, work of an ancient hand.

'ausforschen.' \S^h 'To judge what shall be in the comprehensibility of the world,' but the word used also means 'astronomical observations.'

If, however, Pseudo-Solomon is still referring to inquirers into natural phenomena, like Thales, Anaxagoras, etc., he has again used the wrong word, possibly for the sake of variety. So in 2 Esdr. 6⁵¹ we have 'propter nos creasti seculum,' which is absurd, but probably a translation of *alῶνα*, misused as here. Cf. v. ⁵⁹ of same chapter. *Sc̄tōrōn* seems to imply that the writer thought more of the material universe (*κόσμος*) than the 'course of the world's history.' Cf. Tertull. *Spectac.*, viii., 'Totum seculum Satanus et angelī ejus repleverunt.'

For the sense of the passage cf. Churton's paraphrase: 'If their powers of mind sufficed them for forming a judgment on the constitution of the world, how was it that the knowledge which they gained did not quicken (*τάχιον*) their apprehension of Him who is the Lord of the universe?'

10. From this verse to 14⁸ we have the famous diatribe against idolatry (of men's handiwork) which has been considered by some (Introd., § 'On the Unity of the Book') as a separate book in itself. It is, however, the logical consequence of the description of 'excusable' nature-worship in vv. 1⁸. These worshippers of graven images and of beasts are inexcusable, and the argument would be incomplete without them. There are similar invectives in many parts of the Old Testament, with occasional strong verbal coincidences with Wisdom Deut. 4²⁸, Isaiah 44⁹⁻²⁰, Jer. 10³⁻¹⁵, Ps. 115⁴⁻⁸, 135¹⁵⁻¹⁸. But the longest and most detailed is in the Epistle of Jer. (Baruch, 6). Cf. Letter of Aristeas, §§ 134-137.

A curious passage on the two idolatries is found in the Slavonic Apocal. Abrahami (in Bonwetsch, *Studien*, i. 1-70), especially pp. 12-20. Terah is an idolater. The head of one of his idols, Marumath comes off in Abraham's hands (cf. 1 Sam. 5⁴), and Terah makes a new body for it. He makes more idols and sends Abraham out to sell them. They fall off the ass and are broken. After many like adventures Abraham (ch. 7) addresses his father thus. He enumerates the elements, and says he cannot think them or the sun, moon, and stars to be God. 'But hear this, my father Terah, that I declare to thee the God who hath made all; but he is the true God, who hath made the heavens purple and the sun golden and the moon shining and with her the stars, and hath dried the earth in the midst of many waters, and hath sought me out in the confusion of my thoughts. God then reveals himself in a voice from heaven.'

Philo (Drummond, i. 285-287; ii. 2, 71) takes a much more favourable view of Chaldaean science than Wisdom would have done, and actually accepts Terah as symbolising self-knowledge.

The traditional translation is given with the greatest hesitation, for *ἐν νεκροῖς* cannot mean in any ordinary Greek either (A.V., R.V.) 'in dead things,' or (Grimm) 'auf Todten.' The only possible parallel for such a use (and a poor one) is Heb. 6¹, ἔργῳ νεκρά. Cf. 9¹⁴. It means 'among the dead men,' and so Genev. 'among the dead.' **L** 'inter mortuos.' So **S^P**. Only Arab. has 'in mortal things.' It is impossible to lay down rules for 'Wisdom's' Greek, and in 15¹⁷ he seems to use *νεκρόν* for 'a dead thing.' But here he is surely thinking (for a moment) of the form of idolatry described in 14¹⁵ (the worship of the dead departed). He instantly turns to the 'likenesses of animals'; but that is his way. A Lapide suggests an alternative 'Adeo sunt desperati ut quasi in numero damnatorum qui omnem spem salutis abjecerunt esse videantur,' i.e. their hopes of a future life are 'down among the dead men'; in Sheol. They are eternally condemned. So Calmet quoted by Arnald: 'ils sont comme des gens réduits au tombeau, sans secours, sans espérance.' Ep. Jer. (Baruch, 6⁷¹), ὡσαντὸς καὶ νεκρῷ ἐρριμένῳ ἐν σκότει ἀφομοίωνται οἱ θεοὶ αὐτῶν ξυλινοὶ gives also a slightly different sense.

'Gold and silver, the work of man's hands,' is a phrase continually repeated in the passages against idolatry referred to above.

ἔμμελέτημα τέχνης is a most extraordinary phrase. Cf., however, *χαράγματι τέχνης καὶ ἐνθυμήσεως ἀνθρώπου* (Acts 17²⁹), R.V. 'graven by art and the device of man.' A.V. has here 'to show art in.' R.V. 'wrought with careful art.' **L** 'artis inventionem.' **S^P** 'a trained work.' Arab. is periphrastic.

ἀπεικάσματα ξώων brings the author back to the hated Egyptians. Most likely the reference is to the Egyptian images with human form and animals' heads, Milton's 'brutish gods of Nile.'

λίθον ἄχρηστον probably has a deeper sense than mere cheap or worthless stone. It is remarkable that highly civilised nations have adored objects entirely devoid of artistic merit—sometimes even of shape. The hideous 'Diana of the Ephesians' was bad enough; but the actual worship of stones (probably meteorites), sometimes, it is true, roughly shaped (*χειρὸς ἔργον ἀρχαῖας*), by the Greek nations, is almost incredible. Perhaps the *ἀρχαῖον βρέτας* of Athena at Athens was little better. No doubt sometimes it was boundary stones or pillars (consecrated) that were reverenced. But for a full discussion of Greek stone-worship cf. Ramsay in Hastings *D. B.*, v. 110 *sqq.*; for Egypt, Wiedemann, *ibid.*, 189; and for Israel, Kautzsch, *ibid.*, 616. **L** 'lapis inutilis.' **S^P** 'stone of contempt.'

Farrar remarks that 'in the Church of Rome the miracle-working Madonnas were rarely, if ever, fine works of art, but usually brown and ugly Byzantine pictures.' So the famous black Madonna of Einsiedeln. The Christian apologists, like Arnobius (cf. Tholuck in

11. Yea, and if some woodcutting mechanic, having sawn down
a handy tree,
Hath skilfully stripped away all the bark of it,
And fashioning it in comely wise,
Hath contrived a vessel fit for the service of life,

12. While spending the refuse of his handiwork to dress his food
he was filled;

13. But taking the refuse of these which served to no use,
A crooked piece of wood and full of knots,
He took and polished it to occupy his spare time,
And fashioned it with the carefulness his leisure allowed,
Gave it the likeness of the image of a man,

Grimm), when images became usual in churches, were compelled to draw a refined distinction between the heathen and the orthodox use of them.

11. In the long passage vv. ¹¹⁻¹⁸ there is scarcely an original idea. All is derived from Isa. 44 ⁹⁻²⁰, Jer. 10 ³⁻⁶, and Baruch (*Ep. Jer.*) 6.

In any case the apodosis of *εἰ δὲ καὶ τις* is only to be found at the end of v. ¹³: ‘he giveth it the likeness of the image of a man; with the appendix of vv. ¹⁴⁻¹⁶: but A.V., strangely neglecting the ‘if’ altogether, constructs a sentence which can only end with v. ¹⁷, ‘Then maketh he prayer,’ etc.

Εὐκίνητον (L ‘lignum rectum,’ Arab. ‘a fine-growing tree,’ S^P ‘a tree which was pleasantly moved,’ with the curious addition ‘or wood from the forest’: apparently a marginal note or indication of change of subject) is probably ‘manageable’: possibly Pseudo-Solomon was not quite certain of its force himself. A Lapide cites variants *εὐτηκτοί* (‘easily melted or worked’), *εὐτυκτοί*, and *εὐτεκτοί* (the last a non-existent word, which would, however, roughly represent L ‘rectum’). All seem to be conjectures.

Χρήσιμον εἰς ὑπηρεσίαν ζωῆς is probably intended as a contrast to *ἀχρηστοί* in v. ¹⁰. But L ‘in conversationem vitae’ is quite inexplicable, especially as in 15 ⁷ *ὑπηρεσία* is rightly rendered. Gregg quotes *Ep ad Diogn.* ii., ‘Is not one idol bronze, no better than the vessels forged for our use; is not another earthenware, not a whit more comely than that which is supplied for the most dishonourable service (*ὑπηρεσία*)?’ Baruch, 6 ³⁹, ‘It is better to be a vessel in a house profitable for that whereof the owner shall have need, than such false gods.’

12. *ἀποβλήματα* is the ‘chips.’ L, ‘reliquiis,’ favours the variant *ὑπολείμματα*. The sarcasm of the passage is increased by the fact that before he makes his idol the man calmly sits down to his dinner. Isa. 44 ²⁶, *κρέας ὀπτήσας ἔφαγε καὶ ἐνεπλήσθη*. L omits *ἐνεπλήσθη* here

13. The variants are numerous. *συνέσεως* was the received text

14. Or to some paltry animal made it like,

Smearing it with vermillion and reddening its surface
with rouge,

And smearing over every blemish that is in it,

for ἀνέστεως in line 4, and so **L** and Arab., which omits ἀργιάς in line 3. For this also ἐργασίας is read: a plain misunderstanding of the bitter sarcasm. **S^P** is extraordinary: 'What is rejected from it is no good for anything. And he fashioneth from his heart what is devoted to abomination. It was a hard tree planted by waters and set up, taking which he formed it by his careful toil (ἐμπειρίᾳ συνέστεως): and on the day it was cut he drew it and made it like the human form.'

ἢξ αὐτῶν must mean 'the refuse of the chips'; an absurd exaggeration, which Grimm explains by saying that a knotty piece of wood would not burn well. 'No possible reason can be assigned why the artisan should purposely choose the most refuse and amorphous fragments to make into idols' (Farrar). But cf. note on λίθον ἄχρηστον in v. ¹⁰, and Hor. *Sat.* I. viii. 1, 'inutile lignum,' etc. **S^H** renders ὄζοις συμπεφυκός, 'branching out in boughs.' Arab. 'twisted in boughs.' **S^P** is hopelessly astray.

ἐπιμελεῖα ἀργιάς and ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀνέστεως both seem contradictory expressions. But ἐπιμέλεια may mean little more than 'studium' (Xen. *Cyr.* I. vi. 16), and so Grimm, 'Beschäftigung in seiner Musse.' It is always difficult to say if Pseudo-Solomon uses words in their strict Greek signification. Deane takes ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀνέστεως in a quite different sense: 'with such skill as carelessness gives'; heightening the sarcasm. Cf. Bauermeister, *ap.* Grimm, and Propert. IV. ii. 59 (of a Vertumnus), 'Stipes acernus eram *properanti* falce dolatus.'

For passages from heathen writers expressing contempt for idols cf. Grimm: especially two quotations from Seneca preserved by St. Augustine and Lactantius. A similar text in Philo, *Vit. Contempl.*, § 1, might be regarded, however, as a proof of the Christian origin of that book.

14. **L** omits εὐτελεῖ, and A.V. and R.V. in the next line (unaccountably) χροάν, which **L** translates 'colorem illius.' **S^P** has for line 3, 'decked it with all the beauty that is found on earth.'

For 'vermillion' used in painting images (not with any idea of making them lifelike, but ceremonially) see Plin. *H. N.* xxxiii. 36 and xxxv. 45 (of the statue of Jupiter being coloured red on *festal days*). Grimm cites Pausanias for the rouging of 'Dionysus and the Bacchantes, Hermes, and Pan.' For the last-named cf. Virg. *Ecl.* x. 26, 'minio rubentem,' and for Priapus ('ruber Priapus') Ovid. *Fast.* i. 415. It is likely that so archaic a custom was relegated in time from the city-gods to the rustic deities only. In Tibullus, II. i. 55, the *worshipper* of Bacchus ('Agricola minio suffusus, Bacche, rubente') paints himself red.

15. And making for it a room worthy of it,
 Set it in a wall making it fast with iron,
 16. He took thought for it therefore that it might not fall,
 Knowing that it is powerless to help itself,
 For indeed it is an image and hath need of help.

κηλῖδα is probably not 'spot' (A.V.) or 'stain' (R.V.) but 'blemish' (cf. Lidd. and Sc. *s.v.*), and so Arab. 'fills up every hollow and chin in it' *with mud*.

15. *Σ*^ρ 'made it fast with nails.'

οἰκημα is plainly a niche only; not the 'little shrine' of Tibul I. x. 19: 'Stabat in exigua ligneus aede deus.' It would need n fastening there.

The parallels are remarkable. Isa. 41¹⁹, 'He fastened it with nails that it should not be moved'; 40¹⁹, 'Casteth for it silver chains to hold it up; Jer. 10⁴, 'They fasten it with nails and with hammer that it move not.' Farrar notes that 'during the siege of Tyre by Alexander, the Tyrians bound their image of Melcarth to the altar by chains of gold,' probably, however, to prevent him deserting them bodily. Cf. Joseph. *B. J.*, vi. v. 3, 'Let us depart hence,' and Livy v. 21, for the desertion of Veii by its gods. So at the time of the capture of Babylon by the Persians in B.C. 538 the Chaldaean king had the images of the gods brought up from many cities to protect the capital. But the city fell, and the first care of the conqueror Cyrus was to restore the outraged gods to their homes. Cf. Budde *Religion of Israel*, p. 183, and the inscriptions there quoted.

16. Pseudo-Solomon takes *μὲν οὖν* not in its common sense of 'however,' but in its rarer meaning of a strengthened form of *οὖν*. The construction given in R.V., 'While then he taketh thought,' etc., no doubt makes the sentence run better (with an apodosis beginning with line 2 of the next verse), but it is not the Greek, which is a categorical statement, as in A.V.

We have again a close reference to Baruch 6²⁷, 'If they fall to the ground at any time they cannot rise up again of themselves.' So Isa 46⁷, 'They bear him upon the shoulder, they carry him, and set him in his place, and he standeth; from his place he shall not remove etc. And this bearing of the idol is insisted upon in Baruch 6^{4,26}, and especially 6⁶⁸, 'The beasts are better than they; for they can get under a covert and help themselves.' But *S^h* translates *έαντρῳ*, 't him,' i.e. the carpenter.

To the fall of an idol much superstitious fear was attached, e.g. c Dagon, 1 Sam. 5³ *sqq.* So the Artemis of Ephesus, which was mere stump, had artificial arms added to it supported by golden rod to prevent its falling. Similar superstition is found among ourselves with regard to the fall of portraits from a wall.

17. Yet praying to it about his goods and his marriage and his children,
He hath no shame in addressing the lifeless thing ;

18. Yea and for health he calleth upon that which is weak,
And for life beseecheth the dead thing,
And for aid supplicateth that which is utterly helpless,
And for a journey that which cannot even walk,

17. **L**, **S^P**, and Arab. all make line 1 a substantive sentence and rather attach line 2 to what follows. **L** translates *προσευχόμενος* 'inquirit.'

γάμοι, like Lat. 'nuptiae,' is the usual expression for marriage. Cf. Lidd. and Sc. *s.v.* Grimm's suggestion 'marriage in his family' is superfluous. It does not even imply (*ibid.*) 'marriage relationships.' The parallel with Isa. 44¹⁷, 'Deliver me, for thou art my god,' and with Jer. 2²⁶⁻²⁸, is not a close one.

These little household idols (it is difficult to understand what nations Ps.-Sol. can be speaking of) were represented by the Lares and Penates of the Romans, and also possibly by the mysterious 'teraphim' of early Israel, for which cf. Welch in Hastings *D. B.*, iv. 718, and Kautzsch, *ibid.*, v. 617, 642. Charles (*Eschat.*, 22) thinks there was such a family image at every Israelite's door, on the ground of Exod. 21⁶.

18. *ἀσθενές*, etc. **L**, **S^P**, and Arab. have the masculine throughout and this reading is found in lines 2, 3 in some MSS. and retained by Tischendorf. Possibly these were altered to correspond to lines 1, 4. Cf. note on *ἐν νεκροῖς*, v. ¹⁰.

περὶ ὑγείας for *ὑγείας* gives a late but not unusual form. Baruch 6^{36,37}, 'They can save no man from death . . . they cannot restore a blind man to his sight.'

περὶ ἐπικουρίας, if it means 'help' generally, is like Isa. 46⁷, 'One shall cry unto him, yet can he not answer, nor save him out of his trouble.' Jer. 14²². In this case *ἀπειρότατον* has the unusual sense of 'helpless' (**L** 'inutilem'), for which *ἀπορώτατον* was conjectured. If 'help' means assistance in the artificer's work, then the word *ἀπειρός* has its usual meaning. R.V. 'which hath least experience.' But such 'help' seems to be confined to v. ¹⁹.

βάσει need not be 'contemptuous' for 'feet' (Grimm). *ποδῶν βάσις* occurs in Eur. *Hec.* 837, cf. Baruch 6²⁶, 'Having no feet, they are borne upon shoulders,' and Ps. 115⁷, where they have feet but cannot walk. For ridicule of such motionless gods, cf. 1 Kings 18²⁷. 'Either he is musing, or he is gone aside, or he is on a journey,' etc.

For a similar oxymoron cf. 2 Cor. 6^{9,10}, *ώς ἀγνοούμενοι καὶ ἐπιγινωσκόμενοι*, *ώς ἀποθνήσκοντες καὶ ἴδον ἔζωμεν . . . ώς μηδὲν ἔχοντες καὶ πάντα κατέχοντες*.

19. Yea and for gain and for trade and for success in his handi-work

He beseecheth capacity of that which with its hands is most incapable.

14. 1. Again one preparing to sail and to traverse the furious waves,

Calleth upon a piece of wood more rotten than the vessel that carrieth him;

2. For this the desire of gain devised

And a workman built it by wisdom;

19. Only Arab. represents the Greek as we have it. **L** for $\chi\epsilon\iota\mu\hat{\omega}\nu$ $\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\chi\iota\alpha\mathfrak{s}$ has 'de omnium rerum eventu.' **S^P**, 'for the business of the gain of the work of his hands' for the whole line. For $\epsilon\pi\gamma\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha$ A.V. and R.V. both have 'getting,' R.V. with margin 'handywork,' which is possible, but seems to be already represented by the succeeding words. $\dot{\alpha}\delta\rho\alpha\eta\mathfrak{s}$ for 'feeble' is Greek, if late, but $\epsilon\dot{\nu}\delta\rho\alpha\eta\mathfrak{e}\iota\alpha$ seems to be formed from it by Pseudo-Solomon.

L again translates 'qui in *omnibus* est inutilis,' and it is suggested that in both lines 'omnium' and 'omnibus' are mistakes of a scribe for 'manuum' and 'manibus.'

14. 1. There is no variation in the versions. **S^P** expands $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\iota\beta\omega\hat{\alpha}\tau\alpha\mathfrak{i}$ into 'prays and beseeches to be a help to him,' and Arab. $\sigma\alpha\theta\hat{\rho}\omega\tau\epsilon\mathfrak{e}\rho\mathfrak{o}\nu$ into 'more fragile and weak.'

The custom of attaching images to the prow or stern of vessels is no doubt represented by the 'figureheads' until lately in use. In Acts 28¹¹ the sign of the ship was the Dioscuri, who were generally regarded as protectors of voyagers. So in Hor. *Od.* I. iii. 2, 'Fratres Helenae, lucida sidera' are invoked to protect a ship. Cyril of Alexandria on Acts says it was especially an Alexandrian custom to have *pictures* of the twins to right and left of the ship's prow. But possibly Deane is right when he refers rather to the Phoenician Pataeci, little gods, $\tau\mathfrak{o}\nu\mathfrak{s}\mathfrak{o}\iota\Phi\omega\mathfrak{n}\mathfrak{i}\mathfrak{k}\mathfrak{e}\mathfrak{s}$ $\epsilon\mathfrak{n}\tau\mathfrak{h}\mathfrak{s}\mathfrak{t}\mathfrak{i}\pi\mathfrak{r}\mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{r}\mathfrak{h}\mathfrak{e}\mathfrak{s}\mathfrak{t}\mathfrak{i}\tau\mathfrak{h}\mathfrak{r}\mathfrak{e}\mathfrak{w}\mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{n}\mathfrak{p}\mathfrak{e}\mathfrak{r}\mathfrak{i}\mathfrak{a}\mathfrak{g}\mathfrak{u}\mathfrak{o}\mathfrak{n}\mathfrak{s}\mathfrak{t}\mathfrak{i}$, Hdt. iii. 37.

Of the invoking of the gods in a storm there are many instances. The most familiar is that in Jonah 1⁶, 'the mariners were afraid, and cried every man unto his god'; for a modern parallel we have the famous scene in Erasmus *Colloqu.* 'Naufragium,' where especially Our Lady of Walsingham, St. James of Compostella, and the great St. Christopher of Notre Dame, are invoked.

The gist of line 2 is undoubtedly that while the wood for the ship is none too strong to protect life, the idol is actually made out of *refuse* wood, 13¹³. The next verse only weakens this vivid contrast.

2. The reading adopted is $\tau\epsilon\chi\nu\iota\eta\mathfrak{s}\sigma\omega\mathfrak{f}\mathfrak{i}\mathfrak{a}$, the variants being $\tau\epsilon\chi\nu\iota\eta\mathfrak{s}\sigma\omega\mathfrak{f}\mathfrak{i}\mathfrak{s}$

3. But 'tis thy providence, O Father, that guideth ;
 For thou hast given a way even in the sea,
 And in the waves a safe path,

σοφία (R.V. ‘an artificer, *even* wisdom, built it’) and *τεχνίτης σοφία*, *Σ^h*, which may well have been accommodated to 7²², *πάντων τεχνίτης ἐδίδαξέν με σοφία*, but is supported by Clem. Alex., *Strom.*, vi. 11 (Migne, ii. 313), *τὸ πρὸς τοῦ Σολομῶντος εἰρημένον· περὶ γὰρ νεώς κατεσκευῆς διαλαβὼν, ἀντικρύς φησιν· τεχνίτης δὲ σοφία κατεσκευάσεν. ή δὲ σὴ, πάτερ, διακυβερνᾶ πρόνοια.* *Σ^P*, ‘artifex sapientia fabricavit sua.’ *Σ^P* and Arab. are unanimous for the lection adopted. It is urged that the divine wisdom must be here referred to (which either of the other readings would imply), and indeed without such reference the verse is terribly weak.

But (1) Ps.-Sol. seems to have forgotten by this time all about his half-deified Wisdom of ch. 7-9, even if those chapters were in existence when he wrote this, and (2) how could a ship sailing under the patronage of a heathen idol be built under direction of God’s wisdom? It is true that God guides the ship (v. 3), for the Lord is loving unto every man, and his mercy is over all his works ; but that is a different thing from saying that his wisdom helped in the building of the idolater’s ship ‘for the sake of gain.’

Taking *σοφία* then as human wisdom, we have the following explanation : (a) the ship is more carefully constructed than the idol, for on its strength depends the success of the commercial venture, while the idol is a thing *εὐτελές*, ‘cheap’ ; (b) the man who built the ship was a craftsman, as opposed to the mere woodcutter who, after his dinner, hacks refuse wood into an idol.

3. *Σ^P* has for *διακυβερνᾶ* ‘didst create all things.’ *Σ^L* and Arab. are sufficiently literal. R.V., keeping to the fixed principle of the New Testament revisers, translates *ἔδωκας* ‘gavest,’ which would almost imply that the ‘way’ no longer exists. It is, of course, possible that ‘gavest’ refers to the Red Sea.

πρόνοια has been hastily assumed to indicate Platonism on the part of the author, or by some his leaning to Stoic doctrine, and Pfeiderer (*Heraklit*, p. 294) points out that *κυβερνᾶν* is a favourite Stoic expression also. It does occur in the ‘Stoical’ 3 Macc. 6², *παντοκράτωρ θεός, τὴν πᾶσαν διακυβερνῶν ἐν οἰκτίρμοις κτίσιν*, but it is also found in Plato. Now the Stoic *πρόνοια* was very little more than the ‘anima mundi,’ *κοινὸς λόγος* or *εἰμαρμένη*. The Platonic *πρόνοια*, or rather the Socratic, as represented by the teleological argument in Xen. *Mem.*, I. iv. 2, is really the providence of God, like Wisdom’s. We find this even in Hdt., iii. 108, *τοῦ θείου ή προνοίη*.

We need not suppose that Ps.-Sol. gained his idea of providence (though he may have borrowed the word) from either school. Drummond, *Philo*, i. 190 *sqq.*, shows that it is a natural consequence of his

4. Showing that thou art able to save from all,
So that even without art a man may put to sea.
5. But thou willest that the works of thy wisdom should not
be idle ;
Therefore do men entrust their lives to even the slenderest
timber,
And crossing the surge on a raft are come safely through.

theological system, such as it is. He does not consider God as merely δῶν, apart from all interference in human affairs, as Philo (now and then) seems to do (cf. notes on 13¹), but as a loving father (the very word is used here) who, 'if he had hated anything would not have made it.' It is true that his innate particularism strives against this view, but from this side of his doctrine the idea of a divine providence directing all things naturally flows, and this is completed by his view of the final judgment (chap. 3). Pseudo-Solomon may (Bois) have identified πρόνοια with his σοφία. More likely he confused them.

The word *πρόωνια*, in the sense of divine providence, is found again in 17², and several times in Maccabees, but never in the New Testament, and in Christian literature not before Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 24⁵ ἡ μεγαλείότης τῆς προνοίας τοῦ δεσπότου. Philo wrote three books on the subject, but his views, as set forth by Drummond, ii. 55 *sqq.*, are hazy and even self-contradictory. Cf. Dähne, i. 384 (n. 511).

4. In line 2 **L** omits *īva*, and so do several MSS. (including **GNCA**) followed by Genev. and A.V.; but Arab. has it. It was probably omitted because the construction was not understood. (For *īva* in the sense of 'so that' cf. Winer (Moulton), § liii. p. 577.) What **S^P** read it is impossible to say: the Syriac means 'to show that thou canst keep alive and save from everything; that with intention (? *προνοίᾳ*) everything is done.' It is quite possible, as A.V., to translate without *īva*: 'yea, even though a man went to sea without art' (Genev. 'without meanes').

An interesting variant of **L** is 'sine rate' for 'sine arte'; plainly a corruption, but accepted by Coverdale (quoted by Farrar) 'without shippe,' which must refer to the Red Sea passage; but, as Gregg says, Pseudo-Solomon 'suggests nothing so paradoxical as that God could carry men *on* the sea without vessels.' Yet commentators, including Luther and Houbigant, apparently attached to the marvellous 'sine rate', explained $\ddot{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\tau\acute{e}xvns$ 'without a work of art,' *i.e.* a ship. One explanation of $\ddot{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\tau\acute{e}xvns$ refers it to the inexperienced Noah (Bissell). $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{e}\beta\acute{a}vneiv$ for 'embark,' used absolutely, is quite classical; but neither in Acts 21^{2,8}, nor 27² is it really absolute.

5. The only important variant is, as usual, in §^P, 'Thou dost will and didst make all things; and thy wisdom ceaseth not from works,' plainly an utter misunderstanding of the Greek.

6. For in the beginning also, when the haughty giants perished,
 The hope of the world, escaping on a raft,
 Left behind for the age a seed of generation, steered by thy
 hand.

The idea is almost fantastic, especially if, as Arab., we attach the first line to v.⁴. There can be little doubt that the meaning is that God will have the works of wisdom (here very nearly 'Nature') distributed for the good of mankind. Providence is exercised merely in order that mankind may be supplied with comforts only attainable by over-sea commerce. So Reuss, adding 'un écrivain Alexandrin qui profitait chaque jour des commodités de la vie que lui procurait le commerce maritime de sa ville ne pouvait pas raisonner autrement.'

By attaching line 1 to what follows we get a less remarkable sentiment: 'it is only carrying out the will of God that his creatures should be made useful when men entrust their lives,' etc.

διεσώθησαν, which is ambiguously translated above, is an ambiguous word. It is generally called a 'gnomic aorist,' a convenient phrase, but the tense is very likely affected by the reversion to history in the next line. A Lapide is possibly right, 'liberati sunt ab hisce periculis et in dies liberantur.'

Quotations as to the dangers of early voyagers (in Grimm, Farrar, Gregg) are mostly hackneyed, like Hor. *Odes*, I. iii. 9 seq.: 'Illi robur et æs triplex,' etc. Less known is one from Seneca (whose *plays* constantly contain parallels to Wisdom, noticed even by Holkot. Cf. Grimm's quotations on 22.11, etc., and note that Menzel does not cite the tragedies at all in his list of correspondences). The passage is in the *Medea*, 301 *sqq.*, 'Audax nimium qui freta primus rate tam fragili perfida rupit . . . dubioque secans aequora cursu potuit tenui fidere ligno inter vitae mortisque vias nimium gracili limite ducto.'

6. 'Αρχῆς is not actually found in the sense of 'in the beginning,' but there is the analogy of *νυκτός*, *χειμῶνος*, etc. The reason why A.V., R.V., Arab. translate 'of old time,' seems to be that what occurred was long after the creation. S^P, 'For from the beginning there perished and passed away chosen giants; and they whose hope was that they should be strengthened in the world, fled away and left no seed of generation for ever.' Arab. is also confused and misunderstands ἐπί τοῦ κόσμου. Siegfried translates *ἀρχῆς* 'in primeval time,' which seems to hit the meaning exactly. Cf. Winer (Moulton), § xxx. 11, p. 258, for the genitive.

ἐπὶ σχεδίας καταφύγονται, not as R.V. 'taking refuge on a raft,' which would be εἰς σχεδίαν. *σχεδία* is used of any clumsy vessel not built in accordance with the shipwright's art. It is, of course, properly 'a raft.' For καταφύγειν, meaning 'escape' (A.V.), cf. Hdt. vi. 75.

For τῷ αἰώνι (A.V. 'to all ages') cf. 13⁹. Grimm thinks it means less here, viz. 'humanity' nearly as above. Burton (*Bampt. Lect.*)

7. For blessed is the wood whereby cometh righteousness.

argues that this idea might give rise to the Gnostic doctrine of aeons. Brucker, *Hist. Phil.*, ii. 696, recognises here the 'anima mundi' (!).

σπέρμα γενέσεως Ἡ 'semen nativitatis' seed of a (new) generation of men. Cf. Philo, *Vita Mosis*, ii. § 61. Νομισθεὶς . . . δευτέρας γενέσεως ἀνθρώπων αὐτὸς ἀρχὴ γένεσθαι, and *De Migr. Abr.*, § 22.

For the giants cf. 3 Macc. 2⁴, 'Thou didst destroy in former times those who did wrong, among whom were giants trusting in their strength and boldness, bringing upon them a measureless flood.' See Ecclus. 16⁷, Baruch. 3²⁶⁻²⁸. Jewish legend chiefly gathered round Og, who was said (1) to have escaped the flood because it only reached to his ankles; (2) to have fled to Palestine, where there was no deluge; (3) to have sat on the ladder beside the ark, and to have been fed by Noah on condition that he would serve him and his children. For the authorities for these legends cf. Lauterbach in the *Jewish Encycl.*, s.v. 'Og.' That one giant survived to beget the Rephaim lies at the root of these traditions.

7. Λ 'Benedictum est.' There is no reason with R.V. to take εὐλόγηται 'hath been blessed'; the effect of the perfect endures to the present, and corresponds to ἐπικατάρατον in v.⁸, Winer (Moulton), § xl. 4a, p. 340. §^P prefixes to the verse, 'this is thy providence which thou didst create,' and translates δι' οὐ γίνεται δικαιοσύνη, 'from which the righteous is discerned.'

Blunt explains well, 'Blessed is the ark whereby a righteous seed was preserved in the person of Noah, the "Preacher of righteousness," 2 Pet. 2⁵.'

The passage is curiously worded. Some would even refer it to Aaron's rod; but the use of *ξύλον*, which became a common word for the cross of Christ, induced the Fathers (a long list is given by À Lapide) to see here a prophecy of the crucifixion. For *ξύλον* in this sense cf. 1 Pet. 2²⁴, Gal. 3¹³, Acts 5³⁰, 10³⁹, 13²⁹. Grimm cites also Acts 16²⁴, where *ξύλον* means 'the stocks.' In modern times Grätz, *Geschichte*, iii. 630, claimed that this was a Christian interpolation: if so, it must have included an alteration of v.⁸, for *εὐλόγηται* corresponds most accurately to *ἐπικαράπατον*. Pseudo-Solomon probably only used *ξύλον* in order to point a contrast with *χειροποίητον* (*ξύλον*) in the next verse. He wanted a neuter word. Farrar notes that the Fathers had before them the interpolated *ἐβασιλευσεν* (*ἀπὸ τοῦ ξύλου*) found in the Veronese Psalterium (Swete, R.), but *prima manu* only.

Strange interpretations of δικαιοσύνη have been suggested. One mentioned by Arnald would refer it to the execution of justice on offenders by means of the gallows, citing Deut. 21²². Cf. the English Homily against Idolatry, part 1: 'He praiseth the tree whereof the gibbet is made, as happy in comparison to the tree that an image or idol is made of, even by these very words; happy is the tree where-through righteousness cometh (meaning the gibbet); but cursed is the

8. But that which is made with hands is accursed, both it and he that made it;

He because he made it, and the perishable thing because it was called God:

9. For equally hateful to God are the impious and his impiety;

idol that is made with hands.' Even more far-fetched is an idea quoted by A. Lapide, which would discover an allusion to the 'legitimate' profits of trading by sea. Both neglect the context.

8. This is practically the rendering of A.V., and certainly gives the meaning. Pseudo-Solomon either carelessly omits a second *ōti*, or thinks that the force of the first can run on to the second member of the sentence. So Bauermeister *ap.* Grimm.

With *χειροποίητον* we may probably understand *ξύλον* (cf. preceding chapter). It is objected that the ark was just as much made by hands as the idol, but *χειροποίητον* had acquired almost a technical meaning for idols. It is used in the neuter plural for such in Levit. 26¹; and in Isa. 31⁷ actually has the epithets 'silver' and 'gold' attached to it. L. quite naturally supplies 'idolum.' Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 265, takes up the argument that the ark also was 'made by hand,' and is answered by Freudenthal, *J. Q. R.*, iii. 722 *sqq.*

For *φθαρτόν* cf. Rom. 1²³, *ἥλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν ὁμοιώματι εἰκόνος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πετεινῶν καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ ἐρπετῶν.*

9. The point is accentuated by the latter verses of the chapter, which derive all manner of wickedness from idolatry. Cf. Hos. 9¹⁰, 'They became abominable like that which they loved.' *ἀσέβεια* is almost concrete: 'his ungodly work.'

A curious point is raised by Bissell, *ad loc.* (quoting Cremer, *Lxx.*, s.v. *ἀσέβεω*). It is said that the passage is contrary to 11²⁴: 'Thou lovest all things that are, and abhorrest none of the things which thou didst make.' The point is apparently that it should be not the downright ignorant idolatry of the heathen that is punished by God, but the 'erring from the right way' of those better instructed (*ἀμαρτάνειν*). Hence Wisdom's view is described as 'unscriptural.' Deane quotes Deut. 27¹⁵, 'Cursed be the man that maketh any graven or molten image' (which, however, refers to Israelites who set such things up in secret), and Ex. 23⁷, *οὐ δικαιώσεις τὸν ἀσέβη ἔνεκεν δώρων*. Certainly it is against idolatrous Hebrews that God's wrath is most fiercely denounced, and here it is heathen that are referred to. But the author is no theologian. It is the 'crimes' of the Canaanites that are punished (12³ *sqq.*), but they are also described as *ἀσέβεις*, 12⁹.

10. For that which is made shall be punished with him that made it.

11. For this cause shall there be a visitation of the idols of the Gentiles also,

For as God's creatures they became an abomination,
And stumbling blocks for the souls of men,
And a snare for the feet of the foolish.

10. There seems no reason to depart from the rendering of A.V. and **L**, and to translate with R.V., 'the deed shall be punished together with him that committed it,' which is tautological, the one involving the other. The perishing of the idols themselves is described in Isa. 2¹⁸⁻²¹, and Margoliouth quotes the Midrash on Gen. 47¹², 'As the worshipper is punished, so is the thing which he worships.' So in old English law, when it was possible, some form of vengeance was exacted from the *corpus delicti* as well as from the murderer, Farrar's instance of the beating of their idols by the heathen is not to the point, but the condemnation of the instruments of murder by Athenian courts is.

On this passage Margoliouth (*op. cit.*, p. 263 *sqq.*) finds one of his arguments to prove that Pseudo-Solomon wrote in Hebrew. He says it is absurd to condemn a thing simply as 'made by hand' (cf. notes on v. 8), but not if it is 'worshipped.' **רָבָע** and **רָבָעָה**, he thinks, may have been wrongly translated 'doer' and 'done,' when they meant really 'worshipper' and 'worshipped,' **רָבָע** bearing both meanings. His quotation from the Chaldee of Daniel, where **רָבָע** is used of the image which Nebuchadnezzar *made*, rather militates against his case.

τὸ πραχθέν for 'that which is made' is hardly justifiable. The passages quoted by Freudenthal from Xen., *Cyr.*, V. v. 35, *ἐὰν φάίνηται τὰ ὑπ’ ἔμοῦ πεπραγμένα ἐπὶ τῷ σῷ ἀγαθῷ πεποιημένα*, and from Demosthenes, refer rather to moral action than to manual performance; the most striking is Arist., *Poet.* 1448b 1, *τὸ ποιεῖν αὐτοῖς μὲν δρᾶν, Ἀθηναίοις δὲ πράττειν προσαγορεύειν*. But a parallel to this **πραχθέν** would be hard to find. We must assign it to 'Wisdom's' ignorance of the finer distinctions of Greek.

11. The ambiguity of **ἐπισκοπή** ('visitation' or 'protection') accounts for **L**'s 'non erit respectus,' probably not founded on any Greek reading, but a mere interpretation. **S^P** and Arab. have no negative.

R.V. text is wrong: 'among the idols': its margin 'upon the idols' is right. So Grimm, 'an den Götzenbildern,' **S^P** **بِالْمَنْدَبِ**, Arab.

عن صنام. It is true that **ἐπισκοπεῖν** **ἐν** is not found, **ἐπὶ**, **πρὸς**, **περὶ** being used; but for the manifold forces of **ἐν** in Biblical Greek cf. Winer (Moulton), § xlviii. pp. 480-488, and especially Exod. 12¹², **ἐν**

12. For the devising of idols is the beginning of fornication,
And the invention of them the corruption of life.

13. For they were not from the beginning, nor shall they abide
for ever;

πᾶσι τοῖς θεοῖς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ποιήσω δίκην. See also Jer. 10¹⁵ (of idols), *ἐν καιρῷ ἐπισκοπῆς αὐτῶν ἀπολοῦνται*, which was probably in the writer's mind.

ἐν κτίσματι θεοῦ. Being part of God's creation, and therefore intended for the *good* of mankind (v. ¹⁴), they have been perverted to its destruction. R.V. 'though formed of things which God created' is cumbrous and unnecessary.

βδέλυγμα is as strong a word as the author could find to express disgust. 'An abomination' not merely in the sight of God (Gregg), but, as the next line shows, a horrible cause of ruin to men. *βδέλυγμα* seems to be used in turn in *Γ* for every opprobrious term applied to idols in the Old Testament. Idols tempt men to revolt from God (v. ¹²), and then to crime (v. ²¹). Cf. Eccl. 17²¹.

παγίς is a general word for 'snare,' but *L* translates 'mousetrap.' The language is copied direct from the Old Testament. Josh. 23¹³, *ἐσονται ὑμῖν εἰς παγίδας καὶ εἰς σκάνδαλα.* Cf. Ps. 69²³, 106³⁶.

12. *S^P* did not understand *εὐρέσεις* for 'invention,' and omits it. A.V. quite unnecessarily inserts 'spiritual' fornication, meaning idolatry, which is often so metaphorically spoken of in the Old Testament. Ex. 34^{15,16}, Deut. 31¹⁶, but especially Ezek. chaps. 16 and 23 (Oholah and Oholibah). The idea seems based on that of a legitimate union between God and his people, of which all violation is adultery. But the reference here is to heathen, to whom this would not apply, and, as A Lapide says, 'quis nescit idola allicere ad idolatriam?'

So in Hos. 4 we have a vivid representation of actual lewdness caused by the worship of idols; and cf. the case of Moab and Midian in Num. 25. Pseudo-Solomon never speaks elsewhere of idolatry under this metaphorical veil, but he does refer to actual debauchery connected with idol-worship (v. ²⁷ and cf. Pfleiderer, *op. cit.*, on his supposed invectives against the Mysteries). So 2 Pet. 1⁴, 'The corruption that is in the world by lust'; 2¹⁹, 'bondservants of corruption.' The traditional character of the Greek gods was, of course, a further incentive to looseness of life, while some semi-Oriental cults actually demanded it. Of this our author could not be ignorant.

For *εὐρέσεις* (Swete) *εὐρεσίς* ('facilius lectio') is generally read; but *εὐρέσεις* is distinctly less intelligible, and it was probably that which puzzled the Syriac translator.

13. All versions, with A.V., R.V., etc., translate 'they were not,' referring back as far as v. ⁸ (Farrar) to get *χειροποίητα* as a subject. *εἰδῶλα* is nearer to hand; but it is quite possible to take 'it' (the system of idolatry) as the nominative. So Siegfried, 'it was neither

14. For through the empty imagining of man they entered into
 · the world,
 And therefore was an abrupt end decreed for them.

so from the beginning nor will it be so in future.' But *αὐτῶν* in the next verse shows that a plural is indicated.

Whatever doubts may exist as to the meaning of *αἰών* elsewhere, there can be no doubt that it here signifies 'eternity.' Siegfried's 'in der Zukunft' is totally inadequate. In Latin, Hor., *Od.*, IV. xiv. 2, 'tuas . . . virtutes in aevum aeternet' certainly means 'for ever,' and Plin., *N. H.*, xxxv. ii. 2, 'prorogare figuras in aevum' is also quoted.

Prophecies of the fall of idolatry are frequent enough in the Old Testament. Isa. 2¹⁸, 'the idols shall utterly pass away'; Zech. 13², 'I will cut off the names of the idols out of the land, and they shall no more be remembered.' Ezek. 30¹³, Micah 12¹³. Cf. Baruch 6⁵¹, 'it shall be manifest to all nations and kings that they are no gods.' Similarly for *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* we have Deut. 32¹⁷, 'New gods that came newly up, whom your fathers feared not.'

Grimm thinks that Pseudo-Solomon included two great ideas in this text: first, that Monotheism was the original religion of man; second, that the Mosaic law was destined to spread over all the earth.

14. *κενοδοξία* no doubt is in classical Greek 'vainglory' (as A.V., R.V.), but scarcely here, where it surely means 'empty fancy.' It must be classed with *φιλόψυχος* as a word which Pseudo-Solomon wrongly resolved into its original elements. §^P, however, favours the rendering 'vainglory' with its 'greatness of belly,' **لَبْسَةٌ**. The word is found in 4 Macc. in both senses. In 5¹⁰ as 'false imagining,' *κενοδοξῶν περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔτι κάμον καταφρονεῖς*; but in 2¹⁵, 8¹⁸, as in Phil. 2³, it means vainglory. § has 'supervacuitas,' which is more or less right, but takes it as a nominative, apparently changing the verb into the singular, as does §^P. Arab. is unusually strange: 'for mankind concealed the vanity which had come into the world, and when on that account their end was short, devised idols.' With this agrees remarkably a conjecture of Nannius; who would read *διὰ τὸ σύντομον αὐτῶν* (i.e. *ἀνθρώπων*) *τέλος ἐπενοήθη* (sc. *τὰ εἰδῶλα*), and explains 'ob brevitatem humanae vitae imagines esse inventas, ut quos in vita superstites habere non poterant, in monumentis effigiatos retinerent'; which certainly agrees with what follows. Arab., moreover, is, though paraphrastic, seldom quite astray from the received text. Lastly, *ἐπενοήθη* properly means 'devised,' as in v. 12, *ἐπίνοια* (R.V. rather awkwardly translates it so), and the emendation brings the two words into exactly the same sense, 'invention of idols.'

15. For a father afflicted with untimely grief,

Having made an image of a child quickly reft away,
Now honoured as a god him which was then a dead human
being,
And enjoined on his dependents mysteries and initia-
tions.

15. §^p is unintelligible, bearing little or no relation to the Greek. Arab. connects (not unreasonably) *ταχέως* with *ποιήσας*, 'hastily making an image.' It also inserts 'in sin' before 'enjoined.'

'Wisdom' suggests two entirely different origins for idolatry—(1) the worship of deceased offspring; and (2) the pride of princes. These he endeavours to connect by v. ¹⁶ line 1; when once the ungodly custom of idolatry had become usual and legal, it was a short step to the deification of kings.

The first theory approaches to that of Euhemerus, who believed that the Greek gods were deified men. Cf. Cic., *de Nat. Deorum*, i. § 119, 'Ab Euhemero autem et mortes et sepulturae demonstrantur deorum,' to which he subjoins some remarks as to the mysteries (cf. line 4 above). So, too, Aristeas, *¶Eph.*, § 135, *ἀγάλματα ποιήσαντες ἐκ λίθων καὶ ξύλων, εἰκόνας φασὶν εἶναι τῶν ἔξευρόντων τι πρὸς τὸ ζῆν αὐτοῖς χρήσιμον.* Lactant, *Instt.*, i. 8: 'Illos igitur quos imperiti et insipientes tanquam deos et nuncupant et adorant, nemo est tam inconsideratus, qui non intelligat fuisse mortales. Quomodo ergo, inquiet aliquis, dii crediti sunt? Nimirum quia reges maximi ac potentissimi fuerint.' Cyprian in tract. *Quod Idola Dii non sunt* (ed. Paris, 1634), 287b: 'Deos non esse quos vulgus colit, hinc notum est. Reges olim fuerunt, qui ob regalem memoriam coli apud suos postmodum etiam in morte coeperunt, etc.' Cf. Aug., *De Civ. Dei*, ii. 15. But Pseudo-Solomon seems to have got the wrong idea. Authentic instances of the worship of deceased children are few; such as they are they are collected by A. Lapide, and have been copied from him by succeeding editors. On the other hand, ancestor-worship certainly formed part of many ancient religions, and possibly of that of Israel also. Cf. Charles, *Eschatology*, pp. 19-30; Welch, in Hastings' *D. B.*, iv. 718; and Kautzsch, *Ibid.*, v. 614-616. But the subject is too extensive for discussion here.

In *μυστήρια καὶ τελετάς* the writer seems to wander away from the more domestic worship of the dead child to the deification of dead men celebrated by mysteries. Cf. Cic., *l.c.* particularly. This hatred of the mysteries and their abominations, on which E. Pfeiderer lays such stress, is traceable also in 12⁶.

ὑποχειρίοις also is hardly appropriate to a merely domestic sphere.

16. Then in time, being enforced, the impious custom was kept
as a law,
And by the commands of despots graven images were
worshipped;

17. Whom men not being able to honour in their presence,
through distance of dwelling,
Counterfeiting their features far away,
Made a visible image of the honoured king,
To flatter by their zeal the absent as present.

16. *κρατυνθέν* is rendered by **L** ‘convalescente iniqua consuetudine,’ ‘gathering strength,’ which is possibly right. R.V. ‘grown strong.’ **S^P** makes *ἀσεβές* an independent subject, and apparently takes *ἔφυλάχθη* for an active governing *νόμος*. (The Syriac translator of these chapters seems not to have known Greek at all.) **L** inserts ‘hic error’ before ‘custoditus est,’ probably a mere explanation.

Gregg remarks that there is no connection between the voluntary worship thus far described and the dictated worship of v. 17. But surely this verse shows Pseudo-Solomon imperceptibly gliding from one to the other. It is possible that he here refers to Nebuchadnezzar and his great image, which may have been an image of himself. Other instances of monarchs enjoining idolatry, as idolatry, on their subjects, before the time of ‘Wisdom,’ would be hard to find. Such things belong to the later times of persecution. But if we accept Caligula’s reign as the date of Wisdom (Introd.), there can be little doubt that that emperor’s command to erect a statue of himself in the temple of Jerusalem is referred to. Joseph., *Ant.*, XVIII. viii. 2 *sqq.* He withdrew the order, but in other countries he succeeded. The Ptolemies generally seem to have ordered divine honours to be paid to their predecessors, not to themselves.

17. For *τὴν πόρρωθεν ὄψιν* **L** has ‘e longinquo figura eorum allata,’ which is founded on the supposed force of *πόρρωθεν*, ‘from a distance’; but this force was lost in later Greek, and the word may mean simply *πόρρω*. Luke 17¹², *οἱ ἔστησαν πόρρωθεν*, Jer. 23²³, *θεὸς ἐγγίζων ἐγώ εἰμι, καὶ οὐχὶ θεὸς πόρρωθεν*. Isa. 33¹³ is not so strong, *ἀκούσονται οἱ πόρρωθεν ἀ ἐποίησα*. Robinson, *s. v.*, cites Hdn., II. vi. 20, *ἔστωτες πόρρωθεν*. Grimm’s supposition of a pregnant construction is needless, and unlike ‘Wisdom’s’ simple grammar. **S^P** has ‘made an image of them who dwelt afar off,’ and inserts ‘by their offspring’ after ‘by zeal.’ Neither variation deserves further notice. Cf. note on v. 16.

ἐμφανῆ is not ‘express’ (A.V., **S^P**) or ‘public,’ but simply ‘visible’ (R.V.).

διὰ σπουδῆς is read for *διὰ τῆς σπουδῆς* by MSS. of repute. It would probably mean ‘in their zeal.’ Cf. Winer (Moulton), § xlvi. p. 474.

18. But to the exaggeration of worship

The ambition of the artist urged even them that knew nought of the matter.

19. For he, wishing peradventure to please a man in power,
Forced by his art the likeness into a fairer form ;

For the Greek deification of living men, cf. Ramsay in Hastings *D. B.*, v. 154, who cites the case of Lysander, Agesilaos, and the Roman emperors. Augustus had actually to protest against his own divine honours. The development of such an idea is traced by Westcott, *Epp. of St. John*, 268 *sqq.*, who points out how it was encouraged by the old Italian belief in the 'genius' of a household and in its 'household gods.' It was, he says, a mixture of unbelief and of slavish Eastern adulation which produced emperor-worship. For Augustus's refusal to be worshipped except in conjunction with the goddess Roma, cf. Sueton., *Aug.*, 52. The temple of Cæsar in Joseph. *B. J.*, I. xxi. 7, must be understood to be of this character.

18. The stress is on the action of the artist, as in A.V., 'the singular diligence of the artificer did help to set forward the ignorant to more superstition' not as in R.V., which makes the ignorant the main actors. **L** has for *φιλοτιμία* 'eximia diligentia,' as A.V. **S^P** has for *εἰς ἐπίτασιν τῆς θρησκείας*, 'to serve him who is like unto himself,' taking *ἀγνοοῦντες* as a singular; and for *φιλοτιμία*, 'the art of the artist.' Cf. the strange Arab. 'So at last they diverted the honour paid to the workmen to his work.'

Taken by itself, this verse means (Gregg) 'the workman desiring to secure favour, produced so excellent a statue that he captivated the hearts of a people ever ready to deify any surpassing human excellence.' The people knew nothing about the original of the statue, but they worshipped it for its beauty. So the Segestans of Sicily actually worshipped as a hero Philip the pirate, their enemy, because he was so handsome (Hdt., v. 47). But there is nothing in this to justify R.V.'s translation, 'them that knew *him* (i.e. the prince) not.' *ἀγνοοῦντες* means those who knew nothing of the matter, except that they saw a beautiful statue.

θρησκεία means the outward observances of religion, 'cultus,' or as **L** 'cultura.' Cf. James I^{26,27} on the difference between sound and unsound *θρησκεία*, there translated 'religion.' Farrar quotes Milton's 'Gay religions full of pomp and gold': he might have added the continental term 'religious' in the sense of a person under vows. In Col. 2¹⁸ *θρησκεία τῶν ἀγγέλων* is 'superstition,' as here.

19. *Tάχα*, omitted by **L** and **S^P**, is retained in Arab., which translates as A.V., R.V. 'perchance.' Grimm and Siegfried 'quickly,' and so **S^H**, but, as quickness of work would certainly hinder elaboration, it is explained to mean 'as soon as' he undertook the statue he began to

20. But the multitude, allured by the grace of the workmanship,
Now counted as an object of worship him that was lately
honoured as a man.

make it a thing of beauty. *Táxa* is in the wrong place: it should be before *βουλόμενος*.

Now many good MSS. read *τῷ κρατοῦντι*, and *ταχατωκρατοῦντι* may possibly be a corruption of *τῷ κατακρατοῦντι*. *κατακρατεῖν* is not a familiar word in Hellenistic Greek, and, like many of Wisdom's words, it is a great deal too strong for the purpose for which it is used. Hence *L*'s strange translation 'assumpsit,' and probably also a scribe's simplification of the passage. The change had, however, been made before the time of Athanasius (*ap.* Deane), who, quoting from memory, writes *ἴσως* for *τάχα*.

ἴξεβιάσατο τῇ τέχνῃ is rendered by *S^P* 'did violence to his art,' the meaning, of course, being that he used all the efforts of his art. Deane quotes Plut., *Timol.*, 36, *τὰ Διονυσίου ζωγραφήματα τῶν κολοφωνίων, ἵσχὺν ἔχοντα καὶ τόνον, ἐκβεβιασμένοις καὶ καταπόνοις ἔοικε.*

ὅμοιότης R.V. 'to force the likeness toward a greater beauty.' If this be correct, the meaning is that artists flattered their originals as at the present day. But it has also been rendered 'portrait,' just as our 'likeness' has assumed a concrete meaning in colloquial English.

20. The versions vary little, except that *L* translates *σέβασμα* 'deum' (as A.V.). *S^P* is right with *τὸν ἕρμον* 'an object of veneration,' but translates *ἔφελκόμενον* 'running.' So two good MSS. read *ἴξερχόμενον*. Arab. translates *τὸ εὐχαρι τῆς ἐργασίας*, 'their inconsiderate delight in beauty,' probably misunderstanding *εὐχαρι*, and connecting it with *χαίρω*.

σέβασμα is a late word found in 15¹⁷, Acts 17²³. In 2 Thess. 2⁴ it appears rather as contrasted with the term 'God': *ὑπεραιρόμενος ἐπὶ πάντα λεγόμενον θεὸν ή σέβασμα*. Some notion of contempt attaches to it, as in Bel and the Dragon, 27. *ἴδετε τὰ σεβάσματα ὑμῶν.*

A striking passage is found in Philo, *De Monarchia*, i. 3, in which he condemns the pictorial arts in the true Jewish spirit as winning men to idolatry, *οὐ μην ἀλλὰ καὶ πλαστικὴν καὶ ζωγραφίαν συνεργούντις ἀπάτης προσέλαθον κτλ.* General expressions such as 13³, *οἱ τοῦ κάλλους γενεσιάρχης*, which are appealed to to prove 'Wisdom's' Greek appreciation of the beauty of nature, are of no account as against passages like this illustrated by Philo. Another similar passage of the latter (*De Gigant.*, § 13) narrates how Moses 'expelled painting and sculpture from his state, because counterfeiting the nature of truth they devise deceits and sophisms through the eyes for souls easily deluded.'

21. And this became a trap for man's life,
 That men, in slavery either to calamity or to tyrannical
 power,
 Invested stones and stocks with the incommunicable
 name.

22. So then to err concerning the knowledge of God sufficed
 them not,
 But living in the midst of a great war caused by ignorance,
 They call such great evils peace.

21. "Οτι implies probably the explanation of ἐνεδρον, and is so taken by \mathfrak{S}^P but not by \mathfrak{L} 'quoniam,' or Arab. 'because.' For $\beta\iota\varphi$ \mathfrak{L} has quite correctly 'vitae humanae': we might almost say 'humanity.' $\sigma\mu\phi\rho\alpha$ was not understood. \mathfrak{L} has 'affectui,' which means rather an evil state of the body or mind than a calamity. Margoliouth quotes the Coptic and Armenian as translating $\sigma\mu\phi\rho\alpha$ $\tau\omega\alpha\pi\iota\kappa\gamma$, and \mathfrak{S}^P has 'urged by beauty (which may be meant by \mathfrak{L}) and power.' The reference is clearly to v.¹⁵ (the case of the bereaved father).

ἐνεδρον is properly 'an ambush,' cf. Acts 23¹⁶, of the lying in wait of the Jews for St. Paul.

ἀκοινώνητον ὄνομα is not, as might be supposed, the secret name 'Yahweh,' but 'the name which should never be shared with others,' or the attributes of God assigned to other beings. Deut. 6⁴, κύριος ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν κύριος εἰς ἐστί, and cf.^{14,15}. Athan., *Contra Gentes*, 17 (Migne, i. 36), ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀκοινώνητον, ὡς εἴπεν ἡ γραφὴ, προσηγορίαν, καὶ τιμὴν τοῖς οὐκ οὖσι θεοῖς ἐσπούδαξον ἀναθεῖναι. Philo, *De Ebriet.*, § 28, οἷς οὐκ ἐξήρκεσεν ἡλίους καὶ σελήνης . . . εἰκόνας διαπλάσασθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἥδη καὶ ἀλόγοις ζῷοις καὶ φυτοῖς τῆς τῶν ἀφθάρτων τιμῆς μετέδοσαν. The sin of the heathen consisted in giving the name of the One God to many gods. Cf. Isa. 42⁸, 'I am the Lord: that is my name: and my glory will I not give to another, neither my praise to graven images.'

22. A.V. cautiously renders 'war of ignorance,' which Farrar interprets as above. R.V. without any justification inserts 'ignorance of him.' The ignorance indicated is of a different ktnd. \mathfrak{L} has 'in magno viventes inscientiae bello,' Arab. 'living in their stupidity.' \mathfrak{S}^P , 'ye waged war to give a name, which was not (given) in reason, to evil.' If we suppose that the name given is 'peace,' this rendering affords some sense. Other interpretations of μεγάλῳ πολέμῳ are (1) rebellion against the true God as denoted by idolatry, (2) referring to 5²⁰: the war which the sinner must wage against all creation armed to take vengeance upon him.

\mathfrak{S}^h strangely reads for περὶ (τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ γνῶσιν) 'after,' $\mathfrak{z}\Delta\omega$, and renders the next line 'living greatly in ignorance of wars.'

ἄγνοια does not seem to mean even 'religious ignorance,' but sheer blind ignorance of their own miserable condition: they were living in

23. For either enacting rites of childmurder or secret mysteries,
Or frenzied revels of strange ordinances,

war and thought it peace. 'God delivered them over to a reprobate mind,' *εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν*, Rom. 1²⁸, and they did not know their own misery. Jer. 6¹⁴, 'Peace, peace; where there is no peace,' as in 8¹¹, and Ezek. 13¹⁰, refer to a slightly different matter, though the words are the same. So also Tac., *Agric.* xxx., 'solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.' More to the purpose is Philo, *de Conf. Linguarum*, § 12, *πάντα γάρ ὅσα ἐν πολέμῳ δράται κατ' εἰρήνην συλάσιν, ἀρπάζουσιν, ἀνδραποδίζονται, λεηλατοῦσι, πορθοῦσιν, ιβρίζονται, αἰκίζονται, φθείρουσιν, αἰσχύνονται, δολοφονοῦσιν. ἀντικρυς, ἦν ὁσι δυνατώτεροι κτείνονται. . . ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαύτα τῆς ἀδομένης καὶ θαυμαζομένης περιμάχητα κειμῆλια.*

E. Pfeiderer (*Heraklit*, p. 316) uses the passage to enforce his theory that Wisdom held Heraclitus's doctrine of antithesis, and quotes from Her., *Fr.* 36 (which he believes Pseudo-Solomon wrote), the words *οὐ θεὸς . . . πόλεμος εἰρήνη*. The *εἰρήνη* in question he takes to have been a cant term of the 'mystery-mongers'; and so Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 290, thinks it had some technical meaning in connection with religious observances.

23. Τελετάς is generally omitted in the versions: (S^P and Arab.) it is indicated in the L 'filios suos sacrificantes.' S^P transforms the whole sentence into an address to idolaters, and prefixes ('Ye served them) and slew your children, and celebrated occult mysteries and went mad in devising of other worldly adornments' (? *κάμους* taken for *κόσμους*). Arab. fairly represents the text. Line 2 L translates 'aut insaniae plenas vigilias habentes,' which is inexplicable. S^H, 'revels of madness.'

'Ἐξάλλων, 'strange,' is now the received text, and τὰ ἔξαλλα, 'strange varieties,' is quoted from Plutarch; the word is found in 3 Macc. 4⁴. So ἐπὶ ταῖς ἔξαλλοις τιμωρίαις, 2 Sam. 6¹⁴; ἐνδεδυκὼς στολὴν ἔξαλλον, Est. 3⁸. In these cases the word is plainly an adjective, but here the reading ἔξ ἄλλων θεσμῶν, 'derived from other (i.e. foreign) sources' has much to be said for it. Mysteries derived from foreign lands were always unpopular, as the Phrygian rites in Greece, and the Bacchanalia at Rome. Grimm takes ἔξ ἄλλων as 'according to other uses than the *τελεταί* and *μυστήρια* named,' which seems weak.

τεκνοφόνους can only refer to the rites of Moloch, which had ceased long before Wisdom's time. That they were practised at Carthage till the second century A.D., as stated by Deane, seems hardly credible. He cites Gutberlet and Smith *D. B.*, but the passage of St. Augustine (*De Civ. Dei*, vii. 19) referred to in the latter plainly relates to times long gone by.

For the mysteries, Greek and Phrygian, cf. Ramsay in Hastings' *D. B.*, v. 124 *sqq.*, and especially his remark with regard to the 'purity'

24. They keep neither their lives nor their marriages pure,
But one either lying in wait for another slayeth him or
grieveth him by adultery.

25. And all things are a welter of blood and murder, theft and
fraud,
Corruption, faithlessness, tumult, perjury,

of the worshippers that 'the best ancient pagan conception of purity was consistent with habitual disregard of some of the elementary moral rules of the Christian and of the Hebrew religion.' Hence the fierce Jewish hatred of them.

24. *Λοχῶν* *L* translates 'per invidiam' (insidiam?). *S^P* is merely paraphrastic (rendering *νοθεύων* 'corrupts by fornication,' not 'adultery') as far as the end of the verse, where it adds 'and his own companion corrupteth him,' a not inept termination, but without MS. authority. Arab. puzzled by *νοθεύων*, has 'or flattering him (? θωπεύων) terrified him by things full of grief.'

Note that A.V. translates in the past tense throughout, as Genev. *νοθεύων* is the difficulty. It is found once, in Philo, *de Jos.*, § 9, *νοθεύων* *αὐτοῦ γάμον*, and *Quod Deus immut.*, § 22, *ξενίας ἀλόντες νοθεύονται*, but never absolutely as here. We must either supply 'his offspring' as 'bastardising his children,' or suppose that Pseudo-Solomon has again mistaken the force of a Greek word, and thought it meant 'by cuckolding him.' *S^h* simply 'counterfeiting.'

For the whole passage we have the well-known testimonies of St. Paul, Rom. i²⁴⁻³², Gal. 5¹⁹⁻²¹, I Tim. i⁹⁻¹⁰. Less familiar are Barnab. xx. (enumeration of sins), and the summary in Clem. Rom. (?) 2 Cor. i⁶, 'Our whole life was nothing else but death.' Grimm, p. 249, enumerates some of the modern works on the subject of Greek and Roman morality down to his own time (1860). Since then various exhaustive treatises have been published.

25. Lit. 'blood and murder, etc., keep all things in confusion.' A.V. adopting the reading *πάντας* (for which Bois pleads as in 15¹⁴, 13¹, urging that even if *πάντα* be read it must be nom. sing.) has 'there reigned in all men without exception (margin, "confusedly") blood and murder,' etc. Genev. 'so were all mixed together, blood and slaughter, etc.' *L* and *S^P*, 'all things were mingled, blood, etc.' Arab. 'in all their actions was mingled blood.' These three may possibly have taken *ἔχει* for 'stands,' 'all things stand in confusion.' *πάντας*, of course, would not imply that all heathen were murderers.

Arab. has for *τάραχος* (*v.l. ταραχή*) 'ingratitude,' which is more appropriate to the context, but has no MS. authority.

With these denunciations E. Pfeiderer compares the forged epistle of Heraclitus No. vii. (Bywater, pp. 75, ll. 6-15, and 76, 10-16), which certainly shows strong resemblances to our author, and argues that

26. Rabbling of good men, forgetfulness of favours,
 Pollution of souls, confusion of sex,
 Disorder in marriage, adultery and debauchery.

he wrote the epistle. The words are *ταῦτα γελάσω ὄρῶν . . . γυναῖκα φαρμάκεως ἐπειλημμένην τοῦ τέκνου ἡ μειράκια τῆς οὐσίας ἐκβεβρωμένα ἡ πολίτην γαμετῆς ἀφηρημένον ἡ κόρην βίᾳ διαπαρθενευθεῖσαν ἐν παννυχίσιν ἡ ἔταιραν οὕπω γυναικά καὶ γυναικῶν ἔχονταν ἥδη πάθη ἡ διὰ ἀσελγείαν νεανισκον ἔνα πόλεως ἐραστὴν ὅλης ἡ τὰς τῶν ἔλαιών φθορὰς ἐν μύροις* (Wisd. 2⁷) and so forth. At least several correspondences will be noted.

No better is the account of the Bacchanalia in Liv. xxxix. 8, summarised by Farrar, 'the pretence of mystic rites was mixed up with the infamous designs of secret societies, in which not only stupra but also venena intestinaeque caedes played a large part, while amid the roar of drums and timbrels detection was rendered difficult.'

26. *θόρυβος* is joined with *ἀγαθῶν* by A.V., L, Arab. R.V. omits it except in margin. S^P is hopelessly paraphrastic, prefixing (?) for *θόρυβος*) 'all which bring confusion on them that do them, so that they forget benefits, etc.' But *ἀγαθῶν* may be neuter, in which case it may mean either 'harrying of goods,' i.e. 'insecurity of property' or 'upsetting of all good.' Arab. seems to take the first. S^H seems to omit the line altogether. *θόρυβος ἀγαθῶν* is certainly a peculiar expression, which could scarcely occur in any good Greek writer, and is best rendered by the Scottish 'rabbling.' Arnald objects that it must mean a tumult raised by the good, as in Mark 14², *θόρυβος τοῦ λαοῦ*, and would join *ἀγαθῶν χάριτος ἀμνηστίᾳ*, 'forgetfulness of good men's favours.' But *θόρυβος* standing by itself would be but a repetition of *τάραχος*, and would, moreover, spoil the succession of substantive and genitive which follows. L has a similarly ambiguous wording, 'tumultus bonorum Dei immemoratio' (which Arnald would punctuate 'tumultus : bonorum Dei immemoratio), probably, as Deane suggests, from mistaking 'doni' for *dñi* (domini).

μιασμός for *μίανσις* occurs in Plutarch and in Biblical Greek, 2 Pet. 2¹⁰, *τοὺς δύπλω σαρκὸς ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ μιασμοῦ πορευομένους*. Cf. Plato *Phaedo*, 81b *μεμιασμένη ψυχὴ καὶ ἀκάθαρτος*, and *Rep.* 621 c.

γενέσεως ἐναλλαγή is no doubt meant to signify confusion of sex, but Pseudo-Solomon has used the wrong word. It should be *γένους* (Lidd. and Sc. s.v. IV.). This puzzled the translators, and L has 'nativitatis immutatio,' which like Arab. 'changing of birth,' seems to refer to supposititious children. There can be no doubt as to the meaning. Rom. 1²⁸, *αἴ τε γὰρ θήλειαι αὐτῶν μετήλλαξαν τὴν φυσικὴν χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν παρὰ φύσιν, κτλ.* Coverdale rendered it 'changing of birth,' meaning, no doubt, like other old commentators, the uncertainty of legitimacy which results from adulterous connections. Selden thought it might refer to the assumption of feminine costume

27. For the worship of the nameless gods
Is the beginning and cause and end of every evil.

and manners by abandoned men. Arnald cites Julius Firmicus to the effect that the priests of the Assyrian Astarte must not officiate, 'nisi effeminent vultum, et virilem sexum ornatu muliebri dedecorum,' c. 4. Cf. also Deut. 22⁶. The line, it may be noted, is a perfect iambic. Imperfect ones are found in 15⁴ *sqq.*

γάμων ἀταξία. **L** 'nuptiarum inconstancia' followed by 'inordinatio moechiae et impudicitiae,' which seems to mean that an alternative rendering of *ἀταξία* had crept into the text from the margin. All manner of irregular unions are no doubt included, and there is no reason, with Grimm, to exclude marriage of near kin or adultery, and confine the term to divorce. This was prevalent in Roman society, but Pseudo-Solomon is not speaking of Roman society. The marriage of the Egyptian kings with their sisters was more likely to be in his mind. A Lapide writes, 'quum scilicet infidelis uxorem repudiat, et aliam aliamque pro lubitu ducit aut uxores suas aliis viris concedunt, uti fecit Cato.' But in the days of the Empire it was the women who were the chief offenders in this way.

27. For *ἀνωνύμων εἰδώλων* **L** has 'infandorum idolorum,' and so Arab. **S^P** attaches the end of v. ²⁶ to this, and translates 'by the intercourse of their idols, damned (or damnable) names' (احنف).

τούτο. All evidently take *ἀνωνύμων* in the sense of 'infandorum,' 'unspeakable,' but the word can hardly mean this. It means either 'unnamed' or 'nameless.' (**S^h** 'vile of name.') If the former, the R.V. margin references are correct. If the latter, the meaning may be 'having no real existence' (*ἄψυχα εἰδώλα* in v. ²⁹). 1 Cor. 8⁴, *οὐδὲν εἰδώλον ἐν κόσμῳ*, Gal. 4⁸, *ἐδουλεύσατε τοῖς φύσει μὴ οὖσι θεοῖς*, or possibly 'nameless' in the sense of 'inglorious' (Lidd. and Sc. *s.v.*), for which Grimm quotes Job 30⁸, 'men of no name,' where, however, cf. **G**. But 'nameless idols' may possibly refer to the Jewish custom of substituting terms of contempt for the names given to idols by their worshippers, *e.g.*, the well-known substitution of 'Bosheth' for 'Baal' in proper names, and of 'Beelzebub' for 'Beelzebul.' To the prohibition of mentioning idols by name, which was the cause of this custom, the marginal references of R.V. apply. They are Exod. 23¹³, 'make no mention of the name of other gods, neither let it be heard out of thy mouth'; Ps. 16⁴, 'their drink-offerings of blood will I not offer, nor take their name upon my lips'; Hos. 2¹⁷, 'I will take away the names of the Baals out of her mouth, and they shall no more be mentioned by their name.' Gregg, however, supports the second view: 'the name of anything was the symbol of its existence: hence *nameless idols* means idols which represent no real gods.' Cornely inclines to the first, which he thinks **L** favours.

28. For either they take pleasure in madness, or prophesy false things,
Or live unrighteously, or easily forswear themselves.

29. For, believing in lifeless idols,
Though they swear falsely they look not to be punished.

Pfeiderer insists (*Heraklit*, p. 314) that 'unspeakable' orgies are referred to, or if gods be really intended, then the 'phallus and like symbols.' Cf. Heracl. *Fragn.*, 127.

Jowett on Romans, p. 70, attributes the immorality of idolatry (1) To the fact that it belonged to an age 'prior to morality,' when even decency did not exist. This is, of course, not Wisdom's view; he holds that the original belief was in God; that idolatry was a corruption of that belief. (2) To the fact that idolatry regards this world alone; morality depends on a belief in another world. Here, of course, Wisdom would agree. Cf. chap. 2 throughout.

28. **L** represents the Greek text, only inserting 'certe' before 'vaticinantur,' but both **S^P** and Arab. translate *μεμήνασιν* strangely: the first 'are defiled' (? *μαίνω*), the second 'are punished.' Arab. also has for *ἐπιορκοῦσι ταχέως*, 'if they commit wrong, they do it hastily.' The verse is not so vague as commentators suppose. The first line refers to the mysteries; the second to general looseness of life apart from these.

Εὐφραινόμενοι μεμήνασιν, A.V. 'they are mad when they be merry,' R.V. 'make merry unto madness.' The meaning is really given in one line of Catullus, lxiii. 18 (of Atys after his mad self-mutilation), 'Hilarate herae citatis erroribus animum.' So 1 Sam. 19²⁴, 'He stripped off his clothes and he also prophesied before Samuel and lay down naked all that day and all that night.' For the wild orgies of the Phrygian mysteries at least (which were despised by the Greeks), cf. Catullus *loc. cit.*

29. Arm. (Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 285) has for *ἀδικηθῆναι*, 'vengeance' (Syr. **لَعْنَة**), and this is adopted. The Greek for this, however, would be *ἐκδικηθῆναι*. **L** 'noceri,' and Arab. 'suffer not themselves to be wronged.' For *ἀδικηθῆναι* in the sense of 'to be harmed,' without any notion of justice, are quoted Rev. 2¹¹, ὁ νικῶν οὐ μὴ ἀδικηθῇ ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου τοῦ δευτέρου, 6⁶, τὸ ἔλαιον καὶ τὸν οἶνον μὴ ἀδικήσῃς, 7^{2,3}, 9^{4,10,19}, 11⁵, but all are insufficient to support a passage where *ἀδικεῖν* should mean not transgression of justice but execution of justice. **S^H** has 'to be injured.'

Bois would take *ἀδικηθῆναι* with *εἰδωλα*: 'think not that their idols are wronged by their perjury'; but this is to give an unusual sense to *προσδέχονται*. He adds that a future infinitive would be

30. For justice will pursue them on both counts,
 That they thought wrongly of God, giving allegiance to
 idols,
 And swore unrighteously in fraud contemning holiness.

expected, which is true of ordinary, but hardly of Wisdom's, Greek. For in Hellenistic language an aorist infinitive is constantly used with verbs of hoping, instead of the future infinitive. Cf. Cornely, p. 504.

Martial (*Ep. xi. xciv. 7, 8*, 'Ecce negas jurasque mihi per templum Tonantis; non credo, jura, verpe, per Anchialum') implies that the Jew considered an oath by an idol as of no account. On the other hand, while ordinary gods were at times regarded with scant respect, there were certain ancient deities whom a perjurer would fear to swear by, *e.g.* the Cabiri. *Juv. iii. 144*, *Jures licet et Samothracum et nostrorum aras contemnere fulmina pauper creditur*. Arist., *Pax*, 277, 'Ἄλλ' εἴ τις ὑμῶν ἐν Σαμοθράκῃ τυγχάνει μεμνημένος νῦν ἐστιν εὑξασθαι καλὸν ἀποστραφῆναι τοῦ μετίόντος τῷ ποδέ (cf. v. ³⁰, μετελεύσεται). And vengeance was supposed to overtake perjury among the heathen. Cf. the examples quoted by *À Lapide* on v. ³¹, and Hooker, *Ecc. Pol.*, v. i. 3, 'Fearful tokens of divine vengeance have been known to overtake the mockers of religion, even when they blasphemed false gods; and this was taken for a proof that those gods had power to reward those who sought them, and to plague those who feared them not. In this they erred; for it was not the power of those by whom they swore, but the vengeance of their sin (cf. v. ³¹) that punished the offenders.'

30. The common text is here received with the greatest hesitation. *LB* has 'Ultraque ergo illis evenient digne,' and so *S^P*, 'Two things will happen to them justly,' and also Arm. (Margoliouth, p. 284). Only Arab. supports the received text. *τὰ δίκαια* is translated 'just doom' (R.V.), but there seems to be no instance, classical or Biblical, of such a use. On the other hand, it may be urged that *μετελεύσεται* cannot mean 'evenient,' and that the two things are plainly those described in lines 2, 3. Otherwise the versions present no important variations. For *μετελεύσεται τὰ δίκαια* cf. Eur. *Orest*, 423, *ώς ταχὺ μετῆλθον σ' αἴμα ματέρος θεαί*, where the construction of *αἴμα ματέρος* is precisely that of *ἀμφότερα* here. *1 Tim. 5²⁴*, *τινῶν ἀνθρώπων αἱ ἀμαρτίαι πρόδηλοι εἰσι, προάγουσαι εἰς κρίσιν* 'τισὶ δὲ καὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσιν.

Two distinct sins are enumerated; the failure to recognise God in his creation (13¹ *sqq.*), and the habit of perjury consequent on contempt for their own idols. For the first cf. Rom. 1²¹, *γνόντες τὸν Θεόν, οὐχ ὡς Θεόν ἐδόξασαν κτλ.* For the second the case of Zedekiah, *Ezek. 17¹⁸*, 'As I live, surely mine oath that he hath despised, and my covenant that he hath broken, I will even bring it upon his own head.'

31. For not the power of them that were sworn by
 But the punishment of them that sin
 Pursueth ever the transgression of unrighteous men.

15. 1. But thou, our God, art helpful and true,
 Longsuffering, and in mercy governing all things.

2. For even if we sin we are thine, knowing thy might,
 But we shall not sin, knowing that we are reckoned thine.

'The writer's argument is that even if idols cause no fear, every man ought to carry a fear within him; punishment awaits the man who has stifled that sacred instinct' (Gregg). Grimm quotes from Grotius an unplaced passage of St. Augustine, 'Non te audit lapis loquentem sed punit Deus fallentem.'

31. *Παράβασιν* *L* strangely translates 'praevaricationem' ('collusion'). *S^P* did not understand the awkward *όμνυμένων* and has, 'this strength of punishment was not on account of the oath, but, etc.' For *ἐπεξέρχεται* *L* has the weak word 'perambulat.'

For *όμνυμένων* cf. Ovid, *Heroid.* ii. 23, 'At tu lentus abes, nec te jurata reducunt numina.' Arist., *Nubes*, 1242, *καὶ Ζεὺς γελοῖος ὀμνύμενος τοῖς εἰδόσιν*, this last quotation giving a curious illustration of Greek ideas of the gods. Cf. *Nub.*, 399, *εἴπερ βάλλει τοὺς ἐπιόρκους πῶς οὐχὶ Σίμων* 'ἐνέπρησεν.'

15. 1. A.V. unaccountably omits 'our' God, on which the whole force of the contrast with chapter 14 depends. All the versions have it. There is no variant except that *S^P* translates the last words 'nourisher of all,' either omitting *ἔλεει* or rendering it by 'very good.'

In *χρηστός* the idea of 'usefulness,' in accordance with its derivation, seems to deserve emphasis in opposition to the helplessness of the gods of 14²⁹⁻³¹, and the epithet seems designedly added to the formal description in Exod. 34⁶, Num. 14¹⁸, *ὁ θεὸς οἰκτίρμων καὶ ἐλεήμων, μακρόθυμος καὶ πολυέλεος καὶ ἀληθινός.* The idea of *χρηστὸς* in Luke 6³⁵, *χρηστός ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀχαριστοὺς καὶ πονηρούς*, Eph. 4³², *γίνεσθε εἰς ἀλλήλους χρηστοί*, is certainly that of helpfulness, affording comfort and succour. Yet *L*, *S^P*, *S^H*, and Arab. all have some word suggesting mere 'kindliness.'

2. The feebleness of the sentence seems to have instigated the translators to introduce variations. Only Arab. represents the text as it stands. *L* 'Si non peccaverimus scimus quoniam apud te sumus computati.' St. Augustine (*ap.* Deane) has 'tui sumus deputati,' with, however, much the same meaning.

It is difficult to read any force into the passage beyond the assertion that while the heathen are punished, God's people are always his, however sinful. Farrar remarks on the baldly Oriental character of the sentiment, 'It might seem to imply that might is right and that fear

3. For to know thee is perfect righteousness,
And to know thy power is the root of immortality.

4. For us neither the insidious device of men led astray,
Nor the unfruitful toil of painters of shadows,
A form smeared with variegated colours;

is the basis of obedience,' but the next verse (in which line 1 answers to line 2 of this, and line 2 to line 1 of this) shows that the writer meant that God's omnipotence was a pledge of his absolute righteousness.

The idea which **L** and Arab. seek to convey is that of 1 John 2², 'If any man sin we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous,' etc.

λελογίσμεθα is well explained by Bauermeister (*ap.* Grimm), 'because we are thy flock from whom thou demandest that we sin not, therefore we will strive for a perfect life.'

3. Only Arab. follows the text. Vulg. has for *κράτος σου* 'justitiam et virtutem tuam.' **S^P** 'Thy truth.'

R.V. translates *ἐπίστασθαι*, 'be acquainted with,' to make a distinction between the word and *εἰδέναι*. Gregg is right in saying that 'no distinction can be safely pressed.'

ὅλοκληρος is not uncommon in Biblical Greek, sometimes with a concrete meaning. 1 Thess. 5²³, *ὅλοκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχή καὶ τὸ σῶμα*, but in James 1⁴, as here, it has a moral sense, *ἴνα γὰρ τέλειοι καὶ ὅλοκληροι*. In 1 Macc. 4³⁷ we have *λίθους ὅλοκλήρους*, but in 4 Macc. 15¹⁴, *τὴν εὐσέβειαν ὅλοκληρον*.

There are curious resemblances between this verse and Eccl. 1²⁰, *ρίζα σοφίας φοβεῖσθαι τὸν κύριον* (cf. 1 Tim. 6¹⁰) and 1¹³ (for *ἀθανασία*) *τῷ φοβουμένῳ τὸν κύριον εὖ ἔσται ἐπ' ἐσχάτων, καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ τελευτῆς αὐτοῦ εὐρήσει χάριν*. It will hardly be argued that Wisdom here means by *ἀθανασία* the figurative immortality of 8¹³, or that acquired by leaving behind an honoured name, etc.

With line 1 compare John 17³, *αὕτη ἔστιν ἡ αἰώνιος ζωή, ἵνα γνώσκωσι σε τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεόν κτλ.* In both writers 'it is assumed (Farrar) that this knowledge of God carries with it the desire for and effort after holiness.' Cf. Jer. 9²⁴, 'Let him that glorieth glory in this, that he knoweth me . . . saith the Lord.'

The 'root' has possibly an ulterior meaning in reference to v. 2. However much the Israelites may sin, they yet have the 'root of immortality' among them.

4. Why R.V. should turn *ἐπιλάνησεν* into a passive, and A.V. should transpose lines 2 and 3, is not apparent. The Complutensian reads *σκιὰ γραφῶν* for *σκιαγράφων*, and so **L** 'umbra picturæ.' **S^P** strangely puts 'you' for *ἡμᾶς*, and translates the third line 'empty sights and changeable forms' (misunderstanding *διηλλαγμένοις*). Arab. only

5. The sight of which for a fool resulteth in desire,

And he lusteth for the unbreathing form of a dead image.

varies as to *σκιαγράφων* ('ornamentation'). *S^h* has word for word, 'painters of shadows.'

κακότεχνος (*ψυχή*) occurs in 1⁴ with cognate meaning, and Pfleiderer, p. 304, quotes from Heracl., *Fr.* 17, *πολυμαθίη κακοτεχνίη*, applied to Pythagoras.

σκιαγράφων came to be used generally for painters, but here the whole tone of the passage is that of studied contempt as evinced by *σπιλωθέν*, 'daubed,' and Pseudo-Solomon probably uses the word as an opprobrious one.

σπιλωθέν, *L* 'sculpta,' which Gutberlet ingeniously supposed to be owing to a false derivation from *σπιλάς*, a rock. Jas. 3⁶ has ἡ *σπιλοῦσα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα* ('defiling'), and Jude 23 *τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς σαρκὸς ἐσπιλωμένον χιτῶνα*. A Lapide spoils the effect of the word by quoting 'maculae' from Seneca in the sense of 'patches of colour.'

There is no occasion to refer the 'colours' of line 3 to the painting of images, which was generally of the coarsest kind (cf. note on 13¹⁴). *σκιαγράφων* is inconsistent with this, and there is no reason to suppose that the Jewish hatred of images did not, like the Mohammedan, extend to wall-pictures and the like, which were familiar to the dwellers in Egypt. Philo, quoted above, expressly mentions *ζωγραφία* as one of the arts excluded by Moses as a lying device to seduce men (*De Gigant.*, § 13, etc.).

Pseudo-Solomon's claim that the Israelites had not been led astray by idols is of course absurd. They were always falling away to idolatry till the Captivity, which seems to have cured them effectually.

5. R.V. 'leadeth fools into lust' is simply not the Greek, nor is A.V. 'enticeth fools to lust.' The margin 'turneth (?) into a reproach (reading ὄνειδος) to the foolish' is better. *ἔρχομαι εἰς* is good classical Greek for 'grow into,' cf. Hdt. i. 120, *ἐς ἀσθενὲς ἔρχεσθαι*, 'to come to an impotent conclusion.' Phil. 1¹², *τὰ κατ' ἐμὲ εἰς προκοπὴν τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἐλήλυθεν* ('resulted in the advancement of the Gospel').

Swete reads ἄφροσιν, and ὄνειδος for ὄρεξιν, against *L*, Arab., and *ENAC*. *S^r* is cited by Grimm also; but except that it uses the word 'fools' it affords no help, completely misunderstanding the Greek. Arab. translates ἄπνουν, 'that does not walk.' For the singular ἄφρονι ποθεῖ in the next line seems decisive.

ὄρεξις and ποθεῖ are probably meant to be taken literally. The legend of Pygmalion's statue, recounted in charming form by Ovid, *Met.*, x. 243 *sqq.*, is quoted in a very vile shape from Arnob., *Adv. Nat.*, vi. 22, by Grimm. See Sandys's comment on Ovid, *Metam.*, xv., and Pliny, *H. N.*, xxxvi. c. 5. The remark of Lesêtre is worth quoting: 'pour nous, si chrétiens que nous sommes, les peintures et les sculptures qui portent le réalisme jusqu'à la réalité, n'ont rien perdu de leur danger, et la réserve en pareille matière ne saurait excéder.'

6. Lovers of evil things and worthy of such hopes
 Are they that do and they that lust and they that worship.

7. For a potter, moulding soft clay painfully,
 Formeth each several thing for our service ;
 But from the same clay he formed for himself
 Both the vessels which serve for clean purposes
 And their opposites, all alike ;
 But which shall be the use of each of the two
 The potter is judge.

6. A.V., which transposes the lines, has 'are worthy of such things to trust upon,' which is probably the meaning. *έλπις*, then, is the object of trust. Cf. 1 Tim. 1¹, Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τῆς ἐλπίδος ἡμῶν. Their hopes are placed on things that are *ἄψυχα*, 14²⁹, and powerless to help. See 13¹⁰, ἐν νεκροῖς αἱ ἐλπίδες αὐτῶν.

Ἄ has for *έλπιδων* 'qui spem habeant in talibus.' Ḡ^P has for *έρασται*, 'operarii,' clearly reading *δέρασται*, as did also the Armenian (*teste* Margoliouth). On the other hand, it translates *δρῶντες* 'who fight for them,' which is inexplicable.

δρῶντες must mean 'they that make them.' Even in 'Wisdom' such a use is extreme, but the versions support it. Ἄ 'qui faciunt illos,' Arab. 'who fashion them.' Cf. the curious passage of Arist., *Poet.* 1448b, quoted on 14¹⁰, where *πράσσω* is also used for 'to manufacture.' *δράω* does not occur in New Testament Greek at all.

7. *έπιμοχθον* is unsatisfactory. It is recognised by Ἄ, Ḡ^P, and Arab. But it is a very rare word, and its position here does not suggest an adverbial use. Deane quotes Gutberlet for the rendering 'working troublesome earth soft,' which is a skilful evasion of a difficulty. If the Armenian (Margoliouth) 'on the wheel' had the slightest MS. authority it would be received, as representing *ἐπὶ τροχόν*, a far superior reading, which may have been corrupted by *κακόμοχθος* in next verse.

A.V. is unusually loose and paraphrastic. The versions are at one in referring the word 'clean' not to *ἔργα* but to the vessels themselves. Ἄ 'quae munda sunt in usum vasa,' to which Ḡ^P adds 'for their use,' which is inexplicable. Arab. paraphrases *πάνθ ὄμοίως* by 'like them as to workmanship.'

Metaphors from the potter's work are common in many languages, e.g. Hor., *A. P.* 21, Plato, *Gorg.*, 514e but for our purpose comparisons in Biblical Greek are more to the purpose. Rom. 9²¹ has been supposed to show acquaintance with the Book of Wisdom (cf. Additional Note C). But the Old Testament sources of both are evident. These are probably Isa. 45⁹, 'Shall the clay say to him that fashioneth it, What makest thou?' 64⁸, 'We are the clay, and thou our potter'; Jer. 18⁴, 'When the vessel that he made of the

8. And with misdirected toil he formeth a vain god out of the same clay,

Who being but a little before born of the earth,

After a little while goeth whence he was taken,

Having been required to return the loan of his soul.

clay was marred in the hands of the potter ; he made it again another vessel, as it seemed good to the potter to make it.' Eccl. 38^{29,30}. In Test. xii. Patriarch. *Naphthali*, c. ii., there is a very striking comparison of the action of God in creation to that of the potter.

We have finished with the wooden or painted idol and come now to the image made of earth, of a kind very familiar in Egypt. Such are referred to by Propert. IV. i. 5 as representing an early stage of worship. The attack from this point onward is rather on the idol-maker than (as in chap. 13) on the idol, and Grimm argues that whereas the maker of the wooden god at least believed in it as his god, the maker of the clay thing is a mere mercenary. (So little images are at the present day manufactured in England to be sold as antiquities on the top of the Pyramids.) He cites v. ¹², 'One must get gain whence one can, though it be by evil.' For the baseness of the man's life v. ¹⁰, 'his life of less honour than clay.' For his levity v. ⁸, vanity v. ⁹, greed v. ¹². These points added together certainly seem to point to a conception of the maker of earthen images different from that of the carpenter of 13¹¹.

In line 6 we have a variety of reading. Swete prefers *τούτων δὲ ἔτερου*. Fritzsche reads *ἔκατέρων*, which is the reading here translated ; and the old received text had *ἔκατέρου*. The meaning is much the same in all three cases. The versions simply evade the point ; e.g. *L* has 'Horum vasorum quis sit usus judex est figulus.'

8. *Κακόμοχθος* is a *ἀπαξ λεγ.* *L* 'cum labore vano.' *S^P* 'with wicked toil,' and so Arab. A.V. has 'employing his labours lewdly.' R.V. 'labouring to an evil end.' In any case the word seems to denote wickedness : unbelief in the very gods he was making. *S^H* tacks it on to v. ⁷, 'and evil is his toil.'

ὅς from its position would seem to refer to *πηλοῦ*, and it is possible so to connect it, translating line 4 'the loan of *its* life being required of *it* again,' but it is better to take it of the man formed out of the clay. *S^P* refers it to *θεόν*, and renders 'a god whom a little before he reclaimed from the earth.'

The meaning is clear enough. 'God made man out of clay : the clay turns round and makes a god' (Gregg). For the idea of life as a loan cf. the famous passage of Lucretius, iii. 971, 'Vitaque mancipio nulli datur, omnibus usu,' and (as quoted by Grimm) Plutarch, *Consol. ad Apoll.*, c. 10 (*τὸ ξῆν*) *εὐκόλως καταβλητέον καὶ ἀστενάκτως, ὅταν ὁ δανείσας ἀπαίτη*. Ambrose, *De bono mortis*, 10, 'Repetitur anima non

9. But his anxiety is not that he is like to fail in power,
 Nor that he hath a life soon ended,
 But he contendeth with goldsmiths and melters of silver,
 And imitateth modellers of brass,
 And thinketh it glory that he fashioneth counterfeits.

interimitur.' In Luke 12²⁰ we have τὴν ψυχὴν σου ἀπαιτοῦσιν ἀπὸ σοῦ. In Xen., *Apol.*, § 17, ἀπαιτεῖσθαι εὐεργεσίαν as here. On the lending of the soul to the body cf. Additional Note A. The passage in Eccles. 12⁷, 'the spirit shall return unto God who gave it,' which is naturally quoted, is probably not the word of Koheleth at all but of his final editor.

The passage is of some importance (cf. Gfrörer, *Philo*, ii. p. 243) as proving that Pseudo-Solomon believed that the souls even of wicked men returned to God, and did not suffer annihilation. At least that is his opinion here. Unfortunately what he says in one place cannot be used to check what he says in another.

9. μέλλει κάμνειν, **L** 'laboraturus est,' and so A.V., **S^P**, and Arab. (the remainder of **S^P** is hopeless nonsense, but we gather that it translates κίβδηλα 'unclean,' as does, according to Margoliouth, the Armenian also, *op. cit.*, pp. 284, 289). Farrar suggests 'to die,' but (1) this is already provided for in line 2; (2) κάμνειν does not mean 'to die.' καμόντες and κεκμηκότες (cf. 4¹⁶) are used for 'the dead,' in the sense of 'functi laboribus,' those whose work is done: but the finite verb apparently never. It is impossible to translate **L** by 'grow sick and weary' (Gregg). R.V. and Grimm adopt the rendering given above.

ἀντερείδεται, 'offers resistance to,' is one of Pseudo-Solomon's exaggerative words. Churton's paraphrase, 'instead of seeing in his own works the type of his own mortality, he strives to disguise their frailty by a counterfeit of gold, silver, or brass' seems far-fetched. The idea seems to be simply that the man, when he ought to be considering his latter end, is entirely taken up with earthly (and hopeless) rivalry.

κίβδηλα (which Arab. seems to render 'abomination') **L** translates 'res supervacuas.' But the preceding lines seem to explain that counterfeits of valuable images are meant. These were sometimes of earthenware, with a glazed exterior, but such an image 'underwent a somewhat more complicated process than when cut out of stone and simply covered with a vitrified coating; this last could, therefore, be sold at a low price; it offered all the brilliancy of the former, and its weight alone betrayed its inferiority' (Wilkinson, *Anc. Egypt*, ii. 148). Blunt, *ad loc.*, points out that Pseudo-Solomon's contempt here is levelled not so much at the idolatrous use of the ware, as at its brittle nature; a mere counterfeit of marble or brass. Such a point of view explains κίβδηλα, and the commentators' misapprehension of the word. They could not understand Wisdom's invective against mere 'imitations.'

10. His heart is ashes, and his hope more worthless than earth,
And his life of less account than clay.

11. Because he discerned not him that made him,
And that inspired him with his creative soul,
Yea, and breathed into him the spirit of life;

10. *Σποδὸς ἡ καρδία αὐτοῦ* seems to be a real mistranslation (from the *Gr.*) of Isaiah 44²⁰, 'He feedeth on ashes: a deceived heart hath turned him aside,' etc., the word 'heart' being erroneously included in the first member of the sentence. It is of course necessary, considering that parts at least of *Gr.* represent a text earlier than the Massoretic, to be cautious in assuming a mistranslation (cf. Swete, *Introd.*, 434 *sqq.*); but here there seems to be an undoubted blunder. Nevertheless, Ezek. 11¹⁹ (repeated 36²⁶) seems to favour the *Gr.* version, 'I will take the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them a heart of flesh.'

εὐτελεστέρα γῆς *W* translates 'terra supervacua,' where the adjective cannot be explained as a comparative with the ablative. *S^P* condenses the whole verse into 'His heart is ashes, his hope earth, his life vile mud'; which is a good specimen of his way of dealing with the text.

For the 'hopelessness' of heathenism cf. 3¹⁸, 2²², Eph. 2¹², 1 Thess. 4¹³ (*μὴ ἔχοντες ἐλπίδα*). The point is emphasised here by the introduction of *γῆς*, the clay in which the man works.

11. 'Discerned not' seems the best rendering of *ἡγνόσης*, on the analogy of Dem., *Falsa Leg.*, § 231, *τὴν πόλιν ἀγνοεῖν*. 'Ignore' would be a preferable meaning, but the word is hardly capable of it. Cf., however, 1 Cor. 1²¹, where it seems to mean wilful ignorance. *ἐνεργοῦσαν* seems to have distinct reference to the power which enabled the man to produce his works of art, and is therefore translated 'creative.'

It might seem merely significant of Pseudo-Solomon's ignorance of the commonest distinctions of Greek metaphysics that he here, as in 16¹⁴ ('the spirit that is gone forth he turneth not again, neither giveth release to the soul that Hades hath received'), uses *πνεῦμα* and *ψυχή* promiscuously, and in this very chapter twice uses *πνεῦμα* for what we should call 'the soul'; but if Mr. Porter (Additional Note A) is right, his Jewish philosophy would lead him to make no distinction. Mr. Porter's comment (p. 225) on this verse is substantially as follows: The last two lines are certainly quite identical in meaning: the verbs are synonymous; the descriptive attributes are not distinctive, and between the nouns themselves the author seems in this connection to have made no clear discrimination. The *πνοὴ* *ζῶσ* which, according to Gen. 2⁷, God breathed into man, and the *ψυχὴ* *ζῶσα* which man became, are not here kept apart. The *ψυχὴ* or *πνεῦμα* of man is what God breathes into him, and is first of all

12. But reckoned our existence to be a sport,
 And life a gainful fair-time ;
 For, quoth he, one must get wealth whencesoever it be,
 even out of evil.

vitality, life itself. At death man returns to the earth from which he was taken, $\tauὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαιτηθεὶς χρέος$ (15⁸). The $\psi\chi\eta$ then does not fully belong to man. The earth is his native element. The $\psi\chi\eta$ is a loan from God, and at death the loan is paid. The man returns to earth and his soul is taken back by God. This is obviously Jewish thought and nothing else. It agrees with 8¹⁹, but not with 8²⁰; that is, man is not a soul that enters a body, but a body formed of earth growing in the womb (7¹ *sqq.*), to which a soul is allotted or lent. So in 15¹⁰ man is one who has 'borrowed his spirit,' $\tauὸ πνεῦμα δεδανεισ-μένος$. In the poetic language of the Magnificat (Luke 1^{46.47}), $\pi\nu\epsilon\mu\alpha$ and $\psi\chi\eta$ are conjoined. Gfröer's remarks on the passage (*Philo*, ii. 241) seem perfectly justified. He cannot reconcile it with the idea of the pre-existence of souls. 'Revealed religion and philosophy,' he says, 'stand here, as in Philo, in conflict. In order to prejudice neither side, the author allowed both doctrines to stand side by side.' At any rate, the 'breathing in' of the soul by God is widely different from any Platonic theory of pre-existence. For $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\omega\sigma\alpha\tau$, which \mathfrak{L} translates 'quod operatur,' \mathfrak{S}^p has 'perfect' and Arab. 'intelligent.'

Cornely protests against the idea of trichotomy being here taught; as does Gregg, who writes, referring to Davidson, *Theol. of Old Testament*, p. 186, 'the analysis is rhetorical and not to be taken literally. With regard to "soul" and "spirit," the Jews viewed the immaterial part of man in various lights: soul was not for them distinct from spirit, but the same thing under different aspects. "Spirit" connotes energy, power, especially vital power; and man's inner nature in such aspects as exhibiting power, energy, life . . . is spoken of as "spirit." The soul, on the other hand, is the seat of the sensibilities.' He goes on to say, 'For the later and not strictly Jewish doctrine of the tripartite nature of man see Lightfoot, *Notes on Eph. of St. Paul*, p. 88.'

12. $\epsilon\lambda\omega\gamma\sigma\alpha\tau$ for $\epsilon\lambda\omega\gamma\sigma\alpha\tau$ is supported by all the versions, \mathfrak{L} avoiding the difficult word $\pi\alpha\eta\gamma\mu\sigma\mu\sigma\sigma\sigma$ by 'conversationem vitae compositam ad lucrum.' \mathfrak{S}^p has 'buying and the wares of a merchant,' and for line 3, 'all his traffic consisteth in evil.' Arab. is still vaguer: ('They think) our life destined for booty,' and entirely misunderstands line 3, taking $\delta\epsilon\tau$ for 'to be in poverty.'

The idea of life as a 'fair' was Pythagorean, cf. Cic., *Tusc.*, v. iii. § 9, 'Pythagoram autem respondisse similem sibi videri vitam hominum et mercatum eum qui haberetur maximo ludorum apparatu totius Graciae celebritate . . . item nos quasi in mercatus quandam celebritatem ex urbe aliqua sic in hanc vitam ex alia vita et natura profectos alios gloriae servire, alios pecuniae,' etc. The statement

13. For this man above all others knoweth that he sinneth,
 Fabricating of earthly material brittle vessels and graven
 images.

14. But most foolish of all, and sorry fellows, even beyond the
 foolish soul of a babe,
 Are the enemies of thy people that oppress them.

is repeated in Diog. Laert., VIII. i. 6, and Iamblichus' *Life of Pythagoras*, § 58 (Grimm).

Cf. James 4¹³, 'To-day or to-morrow we will go into this city, and spend a year there and trade, and get gain,' etc., and the magnificent description of the traffic of Tyre in Ezek. 27.

There is no discrepancy between ἐλογίσαντο (if it be read) and φησίν, for the latter seems used like Old English 'quotha,' *i.e.* 'as the saying goes.' Cf. Winer (Moulton), § lviii. p. 655, and the authorities there quoted, and especially 2 Cor. 10¹⁰, *Ai μὲν ἐπιστολαί, φησί, βαρεῖαι*, which is exactly the same as here—a plural implied.

For the sentiment of line 4 cf. Hor., *Ep.* I. i. 65, 'rem facias, rem; si possis, recte; si non quocumque modo (οὕτεν δή) rem.' Juv., *Sat.*, xiv. 204, 'Lucri bonus est odor ex re qualibet,' and the well-known anecdote of Vespasian and the non-odorous coin. On the other hand, Soph., *Ant.*, 312, οὐκ ἔξ ἀπαντος δεῖ τὸ κερδαίνεν φιλεῖν.

13. Both σκεύη (mere pottery—used contemptuously) and γλυπτά seem to refer to the idols. It might, however, mean that the potter makes pots and gods out of the same clay, cf. v. 7. §^P omits σκεύη altogether, and adds to the line 'and serves them.' 'Brittle,' which Arab. expands into 'soon to be broken up,' is represented in A.V. by 'brickle,' an old form found in Spenser, quoted by Farrar.

We have now a complete list of idols of different forms; wooden (13¹¹ *sqq.*), stone (13¹⁰, 14²¹), painted (15⁴), made of clay (15⁷ *sqq.*), molten (15⁹), graven (15¹³).

14. The rendering given represents πάντων (¶^{AC}) ἀφρούεστατοι (common text). The only thing to be said for Fritzsche's πάντες ἀφρούεστεροι is that it is 'difficilior lectio,' and not likely to be substituted for the other. All versions seem to have read πάντες; as to a following comparative or superlative they give no hint (§^P seems to join παρὰ ψυχὴν νηπίων with the next line), but all render καταδυναστεύσαντας with A.V., Siegfried, etc., as a present. That Pseudo-Solomon uses the aorist participle does not matter; cf. Goodwin 'Greek Moods,' §§ 24 and 35 (3). If, however, πάντες be read, the past use is more probable, and the word will then refer to all the nations who had ever oppressed Israel. But with πάντων and the present the allusion may well be to the hated Jewish apostates like Tiberius Alexander, who, according to Jewish ideas, opposed their fellow-countrymen (cf. Introd., p. 18). To these the charge of idolatry

15. Because they accounted even all the idols of the Gentiles gods,

In whom is no use of eyes for seeing,
Nor nostrils for the drawing in of air,
Nor ears to hear,
Nor fingers of their hands for feeling,
Yea, and their feet are slow for walking.

would be especially appropriate, for in this they really sinned against the light, and knew from the Psalms (cf. notes on v. ¹⁶) what manner of creatures they were worshipping. With v. ¹⁸, of course, an undoubted reference to Egypt begins.

Reading probably *παρὰ ψυχὴν νηπίον* **L** has 'supra modum animae superbi,' which is plainly corrupt, and Gutberlet's conjecture that it was originally 'supra animam pueri' seems probable. It may have been written 'supra modum animae pueri,' then 'supra pueri modum animae,' then 'supra pueri' was corrupted into 'superbi,' and as this gave no sense, a copyist restored 'supra' and relegated 'superbi,' without seeing that it contained 'pueri,' to the end of the line. Reuss translates 'plus pitoyables qu'une intelligence d'enfant.'

That the writer 'forgets he is writing as Solomon,' in whose time no enemies oppressed Israel, is obvious, but this does not apply if (as R.V.) we accept the past tense 'who oppressed them.' For this sense *ἔλογίσαντο* in the next line is evidence.

15. *'Ἔλογίσαντο* **L** 'reputaverunt' and **S^P** and Arab. have also the preterite tense, which Walton translates as present. Only **S^P** deviates from the text, making it as like as possible to the Psalms here imitated, *sc.* 115 ⁴⁷, 135 ¹⁵⁻¹⁷. Thus he translates *συνολκήν ἀέρος* simply 'smell the air,' and *οὐτε δημάτων χρῆσις εἰς ὥρασιν*, 'nor do their eyes see anything.'

συνολκήν, found only in late medical writers, is one of Pseudo-Solomon's peculiar adaptations. It simply means 'drawing together.' **S^H** 'breathing of air.'

'Breath' for *ἀέρος*, and 'helpless' for *ἀργοί* (R.V., Deane, Siegfried) both seem to read too much into the Greek. A.V. 'slow,' is better for *ἀργοί*, cf. Tit. i ¹². **S^H** 'vain.'

With regard to the general tolerance of Greeks and Romans for foreign cults, see Farrar's note, and Ramsay in Hastings' *D. B.*, v. 151-153. Striking passages as to the indignation of the better minds of Rome at such invasions are found, as in Lucan, viii. 831: 'Nos in templo tuam Romana accepimus Isin, semideosque canes et sistra jubentia luctus.' The Egyptians did not actually receive the 'other gods' into their own pantheon, Hdt. ii. 79, *πατρίοισι δὲ χρεώμενοι νόμοισι, ἄλλον οὐδένα ἐπικτέωνται*, but they recognised such gods as having power in their own territories, cf. notes on 19³.

16. For a man made them,

And one that had borrowed his soul formed them ;
For no man is able to form a god like unto himself ;

17. But, being mortal, he maketh a dead thing with lawless
hands ;

For he is better than the things which he worshippeth,
Forasmuch as he did live, but they never did.

16. *Δεδανεισμένος* contains the same idea as v.⁸, *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαρτηθεὶς χρέος*. Reuss 'qui vit d'un souffle d'emprunt,' which, however, restricts the meaning of *πνεῦμα* too much. *S^P* 'the spirit of an evil man formed them.' Though the idea is obscure, it seems to be that even though a man's spirit be borrowed, yet he cannot borrow it for one of his images ; he cannot even make an idol like a man, *i.e.* alive ; much less like God himself. *S^P* has 'and a spirit of fraud formed them,' which Margoliouth defends as the translation of a Hebrew original, on the ground that *חִי* (passive part. of *חִיוּ*) means 'borrowed,' and *חִי* (substantive) means 'fraud.'

Swete reads *αὐτῷ*, which can hardly mean 'like a man' (Grimm and *S^P*), but must refer to God himself, and is quite intelligible and more forcible than the reading adopted, which has, however, the authority of *L* and Arab. *S^h* must have read *αὐτῶν* (with 253), and something else for *δμοιον*, for it renders 'no man of them that is like to them is able to form a god.' Yet *δμοιον* has no variants, though the rest of the line is full of them. Cf. Fritzsche's note.

17. *Θνητός* is probably the wrong word. Pseudo-Solomon means to imply not that the man is doomed to die, but that being alive he makes a dead idol. As it stands, we can only explain, 'He being but mortal and so inferior, makes a thing inferior even to himself—'a dead thing'; a very feeble sentiment.

ἀνθ' ὧν almost exactly corresponds to the English 'forasmuch as,' and is the reading of *ΕΝ*, preferred by Fritzsche. It is certainly the more difficult reading, and is (apparently) that of *L* 'Cum enim,' *S^P* and Arab. At all events they cannot have read *ῶν* (Swete) preceded by *ἀντὸν* in the line before, which is supposed to have been corrupted into *ἀνθ'*. The meaning of *ῶν* must be 'of which things he alone had life, but they never.'

For *ἀνθ' ὧν* cf. Winer (Moulton), p. 456. It is classical, and also appears in Luke 1²⁰, *ἀνθ' ὧν οὐκ ἐπιστευσας τοῖς λόγοις μου*, 19⁴⁴, 'Forasmuch as thou knewest not the time of thy visitation'; Acts 12²³, 'Because he gave not the glory to God,' 2 Thess. 2¹⁰, and in the Old Testament repeatedly, expressing various Hebrew combinations, Gen. 22¹⁸, etc.

In the last line *S^P* has 'he can live but they cannot.' Grimm quotes Lactant., *Instt.*, II. ii. 13, 'Melior est qui fecit quam illa quae facta

18. Yea, and they do worship the most hateful beasts ;
For being compared in brutishness they are worse than
the others.

sunt,' and Philo, *De Decal.*, § 14, gives a rather different reason for the superiority. The workman is superior to his work in being older, and in a sense the father of it ; and in respect of power, 'for the thing that makes is of greater honour than the thing made,' a most inane idea, and far inferior to that of 'Wisdom.' For κρείττων γὰρ ἔστιν Cornely quotes Seneca *ap.* Lactant., *Instt.*, ii. 13, 14, 'Simulacra deorum venerantur, illis supplicant genu posito, illa adorant, illis stipem jacunt, victimas caedunt ; et quum haec tantopere suspiciant, fabros qui illa fecere, contemnunt.' What follows appears to be merely the *sense* of Seneca : 'Quid inter se tam contrarium, quam statuarium despicer, (Sen., *Ep.* 88¹⁸) statuam adorare, et eum ne in convictum quidem admittere, qui tibi deos faciat. Quam ergo vim, quam potestatem habere possunt, quum ipse qui illa fecit non habeat ? (Cf. v. ¹⁶, line 3.) Sed ne haec quidem dare hic potuit quae habebat : videre, audire, loqui, movere. Quisquamne igitur tam ineptus est, ut putet aliquid esse in simulacro dei, in quo ne hominis quidem quidquam est praeter umbram ?'

18. *Exθιστα* (L 'miserrima'), S^P and Armenian (Margoliouth) render 'foul.' Arab. 'monsters which they mock at.'

'*Avoia*' (received text *āvoa* for *āvoa*, 'senseless,' and L 'insensata enim comparata his, illis sunt deteriora,' which is obscure if not meaningless) forms the difficulty of the passage. There is not the slightest ground for translating it 'in ignorance,' viz. of the Egyptians, as Deane, 'In respect of folly in the worshippers they (beasts) are worse than the idols.' He adds 'it is more foolish to worship a beast than an image, because the latter may be taken as the representative of the deity, but beasts are in the author's view worshipped in themselves.' Bois, p. 407, attacks this translation, and also (with great reason) that of Bissell, 'being compared in respect of stupidity some animals are worse than others,' which is a mixture of the interpretation given above and that of A.V., 'some are worse than others,' reading *ēvia*, a mere conjecture of Junius. Churton agrees with Deane. S^H has 'in senselessness.' Cornely, adopting the reading *āvoa*, suggests the translation 'for brute animals compared to these others (*i.e.* the idols) are inferior to those others.' This he explains thus : in the case of idols at least some deity is represented, whose image is honoured because it represents him ; but brute beasts represent nothing, and if worshipped at all, must be worshipped for beasts as they are : which is precisely that extremity of folly which our author inveighs against.

Grimm conjectures *āvīa* 'in offensiveness,' but the rendering given has much the same force. It is objected by Deane that the animals worshipped by the Egyptians were not the most stupid : but we may

19. Nor are they by any chance fair, so as, in respect of the appearance of beasts, to be desired,

But they have escaped both the praise of God and his blessing.

16. 1. Therefore were they deservedly punished by the like animals,

And by a multitude of vermin were tormented.

be content with Milton's 'brutish gods of Nile.' Cf. notes on 12²⁴, and Siegfried *ad loc.*, who points out that Pseudo-Solomon is not thinking of the serpent, which would not suit his purpose, but of the really brutish creatures, the crocodile and the ἔρπετά καὶ κνώδαλα of II¹⁵.

In Rom. I²³ ἡλλαξαν τὴν δόξαν τοῦ ἀφθάρτου θεοῦ ἐν δόμοιώματι εἰκόνος φθαρτοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πετεινῶν καὶ τετραπόδων καὶ ἔρπετῶν, Grätz (*Gesch.*, iii. 445) sees a proof that St. Paul was, either directly or indirectly, quoting the Book of Wisdom.

19. The first line is very obscure in A.V. and R.V. 'As seen beside (other) creatures' for ἐν ὅψει ζῷων does not seem correct. Grimm apparently takes it 'considering that they are but beasts.' Siegfried offers a paraphrase 'they are not beautiful, to be pleased with them, as may well happen in the contemplation of beasts.' This is practically the meaning indicated above: some beasts are really attractive in appearance (ὅψει) though they are but beasts: the Egyptian objects of worship are not even that.

ὅσον ἐπιποθῆσαι is a perfectly good classical construction (it may be broken up into ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὥστε), cf. Lidd. and Sc. s.v. i. 8. But it does not seem to occur in Hellenistic Greek. Hence the versions are all hopeless. **L** is a fair specimen, 'nec aspectu aliquis ex his animalibus bona potest conspicere.'

The last line is obscure. It may be that Pseudo-Solomon thought, in accordance possibly with legend, that the reptiles were exempted from God's blessing and approval. Or perhaps Churton is right, 'through man's misuse of them they are severed from the approval and blessing originally bestowed on them by the Creator,' Gen. I^{21,25}.

16. 1. The analysis of this and the succeeding chapters is not easy, owing to their flow of rhetorical and at times inconsequent language. Grimm (translated by Farrar) is too minute. Gregg divides as follows into five sections, each containing a comparison of the fortunes of the Israelites and the Egyptians from different points of view.

A. 16¹⁻¹⁴. The Egyptian animal-worshippers were punished by an animal; they worshipped vermin; they were tormented by vermin: whereas the reptiles which attacked the Israelites in the wilderness were merely sent for their discipline and instruction.

2. Instead of which punishment, blessing thine own people,
 For the eagerness of their appetite an unaccustomed
 dainty
 Thou didst prepare, yea, quail-food ;

B. 16¹⁵⁻²⁹. Fire and water, heat and cold, fought against the Egyptians ; whereas they benefited Israel.

C. 17¹⁻⁴. Darkness tormented the Egyptians ; whereas the pillar of cloud and fire led the Hebrews.

D. 18⁵⁻²⁶. Contrast in respect of death—(1) the Egyptians who had killed the male children of the Hebrews lost their first-born ; (2) having drowned Israel's children in the Nile, they were themselves drowned in the Red Sea ; (3) the rescue of one child turned to the destruction of his would-be murderers. But these three points are confusedly stated and interwoven.

E. 19¹⁻²¹. The contrast between Egypt and Israel at the crossing of the Red Sea.

There can be no doubt as to the meaning : the Egyptians were punished on the principle of like by like (11¹⁶, 12^{23.27}), by animals resembling those they worshipped. R.V. tries to get the whole of this explanation into a single line of translation, viz. : 'For this cause were *these men* worthily punished through *creatures like those which they worship*' ; all the words in italics being supplied. \mathfrak{L} seems to have read $\delta\alpha\tau\alpha\tau\alpha$ 'on account of these animals,' for it translates 'Propter haec et per his similia' ; Arab. 'things like their gods,' which is correct. \mathfrak{S}^P is a mere paraphrase.

For the doctrine here laid down cf. notes on 11¹⁶, and add Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. § 17, where the scheme of retaliation of God on the Egyptians is elaborately worked out. The arrangement is such that it seems as if Philo and our author were drawing from a common source of teaching. The Rabbis naturally reduced the idea of retribution to an exact system. Cf. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, 244. The adulteress is to be punished in her loins. Samson was punished in his eyes because he had lusted with his eyes. Absalom by his hair because he had been sinfully proud of his hair. But even in this exact system it is hard to see why e.g. lechery should be punished by dropsy.

2. $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\tau\eta\sigma\alpha$, which is now generally read, is the participle. $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\tau\eta\sigma\alpha$, the indicative, which is retained by Tischendorf, would produce an anacoluthon. Yet it was certainly read by \mathfrak{L} 'bene dis-
 posuisti populum tuum,' by \mathfrak{S}^P 'didst show much kindness to thy people,' and Arab. But all probably read $\omega\tilde{\iota}s$ for $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}s$ in line 2, which again produces a difficulty, $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\mu\iota\alpha\delta\beta\epsilon\zeta\epsilon\omega\tilde{\iota}s$ having to be taken as in opposition with $\xi\epsilon\nu\eta\gamma\epsilon\sigma\iota\iota\omega\tilde{\iota}s$. \mathfrak{L} evades this by translating 'quibus dedisti concupiscentiam delectamenti sui ($\delta\beta\epsilon\zeta\epsilon\omega\tilde{\iota}s$, as we might say 'their heart's desire') novum saporem.' \mathfrak{S}^h must have read $\omega\tilde{\iota}s\epsilon\tilde{\iota}s$ $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\mu\iota\alpha\delta\beta\epsilon\zeta\epsilon\omega\tilde{\iota}s$. The variant $\omega\tilde{\iota}s\epsilon\tilde{\iota}s$ is found.

3. That those, desiring food,

Might, for the hideousness of the things sent among them,
Loathe even their necessary appetite;

But these, being in want for a brief space,
Might partake even of a rare dainty.

εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ὅρέξεως is translated by A.V. 'to stir up their appetite.' On the contrary, the quails were sent to appease their rebellious appetite for flesh. Exod. 16⁸, 'The Lord shall give you in the evening flesh to eat, and in the morning bread to the full; for that the Lord heareth your murmurings.' So Numb. 11, 'While the flesh was yet between their teeth, before it was chewed, the anger of the Lord was kindled against the people, and the Lord smote the people with a very great plague' (possibly a disease occasioned by the strange food), and the result was the 'graves of lust,' Kibroth-Hattaavah. But this is only the first of many perversions of direct Scripture statements, which henceforward occur frequently. Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. § 37, seems to take the same view of the episode of the quails which Pseudo-Solomon does.

ὅρτυγομήτρα is rendered by Hesychius *ὅρτυξ ἵπερμεγέθης*, and though Tristram (*Nat. Hist. of the Bible*, p. 230) rightly dismisses the theory that it was a crane or white stork, as suggested by Dean Stanley, it may very well have been the king-quail (Germ. 'Wachtelkönig'), a bird of larger size and darker colour than the common *ὅρτυξ*. St. Augustine, *Quaest. in Ex.*, 62 (quoted by Deane), says distinctly that the 'coturnix' and the 'ortygometra' are different birds though similar.

3. *Ἐκεῖνοι* is, of course, the Egyptians; from this point onward the writer pictures himself as with the Israelites; the Egyptians are the people on the other side of the Red Sea. The meaning is that the loathsome appearance of the creatures (Exod. 8³, 'Frogs which shall go up and come into thine house . . . and into thine ovens and into thy kneading troughs') took away their natural (*ἀναγκαῖαν*) appetite.

εἰδέχθειαν Fritzsche and Tischend. took for the Vatican text, but that MS. is now said to read *δειχθεῖσαν*, which is received by Swete, and was certainly read by L, 'propter ea quae illis ostensa et missa sunt.' Arab. and S^P are quoted by Grimm as supporting this reading: the former omits the word altogether, and the latter's paraphrase has no apparent connection with the Greek at all. *εἰδέχθεια*, though it occurs afterwards in Byzantine Greek (cf. Deane *ad loc.*), was probably formed by Pseudo-Solomon from the not unusual word *εἰδεχθῆς*, as he formed *εὐδράνεια* in 13¹⁹. It is at all events the only reading which gives a reasonable sense, and is adopted by R.V. (as A.V.). Siegfried objects that the Egyptians were not supposed to eat the insects; a remark which shows some ignorance of the human appetite and its hindrances: 'a hair in the soup' is a well-known German proverb for a cause of disgust or failure.

4. For it was needful that inexorable want should come upon those that tyrannised,
But for these merely for it to be shewn how their enemies were tormented.

5. For when upon them came the terrible fury of beasts,
And they were perishing by the bites of writhing serpents,
Thy wrath endured not to the end ;

6. But for admonition they were for a brief space dismayed,
Having a token of preservation to put them in mind of the commandment of thy law ;

For ἀποστρέφωνται with the accusative cf. Matt. 5⁴² and 2 Tim. 1¹⁵, ἀπεστράφησάν με πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ.

With this verse begins the tautology which disfigures the last chapters of Wisdom. ἐκολάσθησαν — κολάσεως. ἐπιθυμίαν — ἐπιθυμοῦντες. ὀρέξεως — ὄρεξιν. ξένην γεῦσιν — ξένης γεύσεως. τροφὴν — τροφῆν. ἐνδεεῖς — ἐνδειαν. ἐπελθεῖν — ἐπῆλθεν. δειχθεῖσαν(?) — δειχθῆναι and so forth.

4. For ἐνδειαν **L** has 'sine excusatione interitum,' and Arab. 'torment'; only **S^P** has 'poverty and hunger.' For τυραννοῦσι Arab. 'wicked rebels.' **S^P** 'on account of their impurity and cruelty.'

'La chose,' says Reuss, 'est positivement travestie.' God only made the Hebrews suffer hunger to show them how the Egyptians had suffered on account of the frogs. 'Εβασανίζοντο, 'were being tormented,' would imply that the hunger of the Israelites in the wilderness was contemporaneous with the hunger of their enemies. 'The author is here at his worst and lowest point of crude particularism' (Farrar). The translation is clumsy, but so is the Greek.

5. For σκολίων (properly 'crooked,' a word borrowed from Isa. 27¹, ἐπὶ τὸν δράκοντα ὄφιν σκολίων, referring to Leviathan), **L** has 'perversorum,' possibly with the same meaning. **S^P** and Arab. omit the word, but both seem to have read some adjective like δεινοῖς with δῆγμασι.

For θηρίων applied to serpents cf. Acts 28⁴, 'the venomous beast,' and for σκολίων Virg. *Aen.* ii. 204, 'Immensis orbibus angues.' Here, as elsewhere (11¹⁸), θυμός might conceivably mean 'poison,' but the supposition is unnecessary.

μεχρὶ τέλους has almost a technical meaning, 19¹, τοῖς ἀσεβέστι μεχρὶ τέλους ἀνελεήμων θυμὸς ἐπέστη, cf. 1 Thess. 2¹⁶, ἐφθασε δὲ ἐπὶ αὐτοὺς ἡ ὀργὴ εἰς τέλος. For the sense cf. ch. 18²⁰, οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺ ἔμεινεν ἡ ὀργὴ.

6. Σύμβολον σωτηρίας is undoubtedly the brazen serpent, but 'a token of preservation' is a curious expression, and no doubt led to the variant σύμβουλον (referring to Moses ?) in **ἙΚΑ**. It is noteworthy

7. For he that turned towards it was not saved by that which was beheld,
But through thee, the preserver of all.

that in Philo, *Agric.*, § 22, another serpent (that of Eve) is called σύμβονλος ἀνθρώπου. The words in Numb. 21⁹ are 'if a serpent had bitten any man, when he looked unto the serpent of brass, he lived.' This is expanded by Justin Martyr, *Apol.*, i. 60, into 'Moses said to the people ἐὰν προσβλέπητε τῷ τύπῳ τούτῳ καὶ πιστεύητε, ἐν αὐτῷ σωθήσεσθε.' Our Lord's use of this typical view of the serpent is well known from John 3¹⁴. Gregg gives a different sense: 'the brazen serpent was all the while in reserve, ready to check the invasion as soon as its lesson had been taught.' Grimm persists in the theory, inherited from writers like Gfrörer and Dähne, who would find traces of Philo's philosophy everywhere, that Pseudo-Solomon regarded the serpent as merely figurative. How Philo did treat this actual case we know: he reasoned away the serpent altogether into σωφροσύνη (*Legis Alleg.*, ii. 20) and καρτερία (*De Agric.*, § 22). The difference is obvious.

S^P not understanding the expression, has 'that those who were alive might remember the command.'

εἰς ἀνάμνησιν is best referred to the whole story; both punishment and remedy were to remind them of their complete dependence on God. If it be taken of the serpent only, then we may consider that serpent, as did the Egyptians, to be the symbol of life and health, or (as Deane) 'to have represented the old serpent deprived of his poison, and as it were hung up as a token of victory.' But this last seems too much in accordance with Christian symbolism. The 'old serpent' belongs to the Apocalypse.

7. The idea is a perfectly natural one; there was no virtue in the brazen serpent as a brazen serpent, but in what it represented and was the σύμβολον of; the life-giving power of God. This has always been the argument of the defenders of images for religious purposes; and if human nature were not prone to attach its adoration to the seen rather than to the unseen it might be valid. But it is to the point that this very serpent, or more likely an imitation of it, had to be destroyed in the reign of Hezekiah because it had become an object of idolatry, 2 Kings 18⁴. This explanation, however, is very different from 'allegorizing.' It is in effect the sacramental doctrine of the Christian Church. Yet Gfrörer, *Philo*, ii. 208, claims it as allegory; for 'in the Bible there is no mention that the serpent was a symbol, and that it was God, and not looking at the serpent, that saved men.'

ἐπιστραφεῖς is taken by S^P in the moral and not in the physical sense. 'He that repented was saved, not because he saw power (θεωρούμενον) but by thee, etc.' 'Conversus est' is the rendering of L and Arab.

Deane quotes Τ^{ΙΟΝ.} on Numb. 21⁶ (here nearly the same as Τ^{ΙΕΡ.}) but imperfectly. The whole passage runs: 'Lo, the serpent con-

8. And hereby also thou didst persuade our enemies
 That thou art he that saveth from every evil.

9. For them the bites of locusts and flies did slay,
 Nor was healing found for their life,
 For they deserved to be punished by such ;

cerning whom I decreed from the first days of the world that his food should be dust, and he hath not murmured against me ; but my people murmured for their food. Now then shall come the serpents who did not murmur for their food and shall bite my people who did murmur for their food.'

Bois insists (p. 226 n.) that this is the only place in Wisdom which speaks of God's direct interference in the world ; and even here he would translate διὰ 'for the sake of' and not 'through,' on the ground of classical usage.

8. *Kai* is probably of force in line 1. 'Not only in the passage of the Red Sea but in other miracles.' The whole passage presupposes that the Egyptians were aware of what was happening in the wilderness. It could, indeed, hardly be otherwise ; they must have known something of how a multitude of folk were faring in a country certainly not more than two hundred miles from their own borders. Some communication is alluded to in Exod. 32¹², 'Wherefore should the Egyptians speak, saying For evil did he bring them forth,' etc. Numb. 14¹³, 'Moses said unto the Lord, Then the Egyptians shall hear it . . . and they will tell it to the inhabitants of this land.' Deut. 9²⁸, 'Lest the land whence thou broughtest us out say, Because the Lord was not able to bring them into the land which he promised unto them, *and because he hated them*, he hath brought them out to slay them in the wilderness.' The words of 'Wisdom' might have been written in direct confutation of this assumption. God brought Israel out to save, not to destroy them, and so far from hating them it is he that saveth them from every evil.

9. *οὐς μὲν*, answered by *τοὺς δὲ νιούς σον* in v. ¹⁰ is a most unwarrantable extension of the ordinary construction, *ὅς μὲν . . . ὅς δέ*, which occurs in the New Testament, 1 Cor. 11²¹, *ὅς μὲν πεινᾷ, ὅς δέ μεθύει*, Matt. 21³⁵, etc. Various forms of the antithesis are quoted in Winer (Moulton), § xviii. p. 130, but nothing like the answering of a relative by a noun as here. *Sh* renders simply 'these.'

It is nowhere stated in Scripture that the bite of the locusts and flies caused death ; the former devastated the trees and herbage (Exod. 10¹⁶) but that is all. The only allusion to deadly effects is in Exod. 10¹⁷, where Pharaoh calls the locusts 'this death.' In the face of this silence it is useless to quote the instance of the mortal bite of the tsetse fly and the like, as we know them now. Later writers, of course, exaggerated. Jos., *Ant.*, II. xiv. 3, assures us that the lice

10. Whereas thy sons not even the teeth of poison-darting dragons overcame,
But thy mercy came forth to meet them and healed them.

11. For to put them in mind of thine oracles were they stung,
And were quickly delivered,
Lest falling into deep forgetfulness,
They should become bereft of thy beneficence.

actually killed men, as did various 'pestilential creatures,' not otherwise particularised. Philo's account of the *κυνόμυia* in *Vita Mosis*, i. § 23, is terrifying, but he never says that it causes death. In § 19 he describes the flies as getting into men's bodies through the nostrils and ears, but here, again, he never speaks of them as deadly. It is a mere exaggeration.

10. *שָׁרַג* has an extraordinary and interesting interpretation; 'Thy sons rode upon the teeth and heads of dragons.' Margoliouth, p. 273, in pursuance of his theory that this is a translation of the Hebrew, points out that *שָׁרַג* means both 'head' and 'poison,' and that it was easy to mistake *אָשָׁשׁ*, 'cast,' for *אָשָׁר*, 'sit upon.' This is, perhaps, the strongest point he adduces anywhere for his opinion.

'Αντιπαρῆλθε is translated by R.V. (no doubt in remembrance of its use in Luke 10³¹ for 'passed by on the other side') 'passed by where they were and healed them.' *Λ* and Arab. have it correctly 'adveniens' and 'meeting them'; *i.e.* coming to their help.

The Egyptians were killed by the mere bite of insects: venom-spitting serpents (the word is used by Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. 35, *τῶν ἐρπετῶν τὰ ιοβόλα*, and *Agric.*, § 22) were powerless against Israel.

11. *ἐνεκεντρίζοντο* is a mistake for *ἐνεκεντροῦντο*. *ἐγκεντρίζω* (Theophr., *Hist. Plant.*, *ap.* Lidd. and Sc.) means 'to graft' and nothing else. Cf. Rom. 11¹⁷, *ἀγριέλαιος ὁ ἐνεκεντρίσθης ἐν αὐτοῖς*.

λόγια (the diminutive is supposed to refer to the brevity of the sentences, as in the recently discovered *λόγια Ἰησοῦ*) is used of the 'oracles' of Sinai in Acts 8³⁸, *ὅς ἐδέξατο λόγια ζῶντα δοῦναι ἡμῖν*.

ἀπερίστατοι is here adopted in line 4 for *ἀπερίσπαστοι*, which can only mean 'not drawn hither and thither,' and is without significance here. R.V. endeavours to make sense of it by translating 'unable to be roused by thy beneficence,' but this seems impossible. 'Careless of thy beneficence' is equally so. A.V. with Grotius takes 'falling into forgetfulness' as a parenthesis, and translates 'that (not falling into deep forgetfulness) they might be continually mindful of thy goodness.' Margoliouth, 'never drawn from,' which still seems a translation of *ἀπερίσπαστοι*, and Siegfried's 'Ganz abgezogen würden von deiner Wohlthat' is probably the same. *Σ* 'they might not be tempted of (? away from) thy beneficence.'

12. For it was neither herb nor emollient that cured them,
 But thy word, O Lord, that healeth all things.

13. For thou hast authority over life and death,
 And leadest down to the gates of Hades and bringest up
 again.

The other reading gives a good sense in accordance with 'falling into deep forgetfulness.' It is given in the margin of R.V., is read by the MS. 23 (Marco-Venetian of the eighth century; *uncial* and not cursive), and one good cursive, 253. It was undoubtedly found by Arab., 'be separated from the memory of thy benefits,' and probably by **L**, 'ne . . . non possent tuo uti adjutorio,' which certainly is not the accepted reading. To meet this rendering Jansenius (if A Lapide is right) invented a new word *ἀνυπερίσπαστοι*, which he somehow connected with *ὑπερασπίζω*, and translated 'not covered with thy shield.'

Is it possible that *ἀνυπερασπιστοί* is the original reading? Such a compound would be quite in the vein of Pseudo-Solomon, and the rarity of the word would lead to its corruption.

12. Arab. has a curious rendering for *βοτάνη*, 'seller of herbs.' For *μάλαγμα* cf. Isa. 1⁶. It seems to correspond exactly to the Old English 'triacle' (treacle) for an emollient, as in Chaucer's 'Crist which that is to every harm triacle.'

It cannot be too strongly affirmed that the 'word' of God here is not the Philonian Logos. Cf. Toy in *Enc. Bibl.*, 5340. 'Word' is simply the utterance of the will of God. Grimm points out that exactly the same functions are attributed to God himself, v. ⁷, *τὸν πάντων σωτῆρα*, to *ἔλεός*, v. ¹⁰, and to *τὸ δῆμά σου*, v. ²⁶, and cf. Ps. 107 ²⁰, *ἀπέστειλεν τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ καὶ λάσατο αὐτούς*. 'The Logos here means exactly what is meant by the Logos there (in Ps. 107). It is unlikely that it contains even all that is to be found in the Logos of ch. 18¹⁵ . . . 'God's "word" is merely a periphrasis for God in active relation with men' (Gregg).

A curious passage is quoted from Philo, *De Sacrif. Abelis et Caini*, § 19, 'Men do not trust God the Saviour thoroughly, but first have recourse to *τὰς ἐν γενέσει βοηθείας, λαρποὺς, βοτάνας, φαρμάκων συνθέσεις, δίαιταν ἡκριβωμένην*.' Philo seems to have added to his other eccentricities that of a faith-healer. Very differently speaks Ben-Sira in the famous praise of physicians, 38¹⁻⁸.

13. Is there any question of the Resurrection here? If we take *εἰς* as 'to the gates of hell' as do all the versions, then the meaning is that of Ps. 9¹⁴, ὁ *ὑψῶν με ἐκ τῶν πυλῶν τοῦ θανάτου* and 107¹⁸, *ἥγγισαν ἔως τῶν πυλῶν τοῦ θανάτου*, i.e. to be near to death but not to die. The Israelites were near death when they were bitten by serpents, but God rescued them. Cf. 3 Macc. 5⁵¹, *οἰκτεῖραι αὐτοὺς ἥδη πρὸς πύλαις ἄδον καθεστῶτας*.

14. But a man slayeth in his wickedness,

Yet the spirit that is gone forth he turneth not again,
Nor doth he release the soul that is captured.

15. But thy hand it is impossible to escape.

On the other hand, it is urged (1) that *eis* should mean 'into' and not 'towards'; cf. Isa. 38¹⁰, where 'go into the gates of the grave' means 'die.' (2) That the expression is coupled with others which mean actual death, 1 Sam. 2⁶, 'the Lord killeth and maketh alive; he bringeth down to the grave and bringeth up,' while 'to kill and to make alive' is a common attribute of God, Deut. 32³⁹, 2 Kings 5⁷. (3) The power of God is contrasted with that of man in v. 14, who can kill and *cannot* make alive again. The last consideration seems to carry the point.

Reuss, though he does not think the Resurrection referred to, seems to adopt a middle course; the Egyptians were actually killed; the Israelites only taken as far as the gates of death, and then rescued.

14. *ἀναστρέφει* and *ἀναλύει* are both translated intransitively by A.V., *S^P*, Arab., and the first also by *L* 'non revertetur nec revocabit animam quae recepta est.' Both are grammatically possible, but the intended contrast with v. 13 compels us to take the transitive meaning. *ἀναλύειν* is equally ambiguous in 2¹ (where see notes), but for *ἀναστρέφειν* we have a striking parallel in Soph., *Phil.*, 448 (*δάιμονες*) τὰ μὲν πανύργα καὶ παλιντριβῆ χαίρουσ' *ἀναστρέφοντες* ἔξ "Αἰδουν. *S^h* has *ἴωσιν* which should be transitive.

παραληφθεῖσαν is generally translated 'received' by the versions; but a single passage in *Polyb.*, III. xxxix. 2 (whose language 'Wisdom' frequently reflects) gives it what is probably the true meaning, 'taken prisoner by Hades'; with this *ἀναλύει* exactly corresponds.

15. With this verse begins the second contrast between the Egyptian and the Israelite, turning on the way in which fire was employed to punish the one and benefit the other.

An extraordinary resemblance exists between this passage and Tobit 13² (*ὅ θεὸς*) κατάγει *eis* ἄδην καὶ ἀνάγει καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁς ἐκφεύγεται τὴν χείρα αὐτοῦ. If we are right as to the date of 'Wisdom,' Pseudo-Solomon had this passage in his mind; but it is in no sense an interpolation, for it suits his argument admirably.

It is absurd to consider 'thy hand' as an instance of anthropomorphism, as does Bois, p. 288. It is the merest metaphor, continual in the Old Testament, most strikingly used, as regards this passage, in Amos 9², 'Though they dig into hell, thence shall my hand take them; and though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down.' Cf. also for the general idea Ps. 139⁷⁻¹¹.

16. For impious men, denying knowledge of thee,
 Were scourged by the might of thine arm,
 Pursued by unwonted rains and hails and pitiless showers,
 And utterly consumed by fire.

17. For what was most incredible, in water that quencheth all
 the fire had the greater power ;
 For nature fighteth for the righteous.

16. R.V. has 'refusing to know thee'; such a construction with the infinitive does not appear to be classical, but it certainly occurs in 17¹⁰, *ἀέρα προσιδεῖν ἀρνούμενοι* and Heb. 11²⁴, *ἡρνήσατο λέγεσθαι νιὸς θυγατρὸς Φαραὼ*. The word, like the Old English 'deny,' hovers between the two meanings. So Shakespeare has 'to deny to come,' i.e. 'to refuse,' and so A.V. *S^P* has 'who disbelieved in thee,' and so *S^H*.

For line 3 *S^P* has a curious rendering, 'Thou didst change for them rain into hailstones, persecuting them without a deliverer.'

For *ξένοις νέτοις*, cf. Exod. 9²⁴, 'Hail such as there was none like it in all the land of Egypt since it became a nation.' In any case rain is rare in Egypt, cf. Deut. 11¹⁰, 'The land of Egypt, from whence ye came out, where thou sowedst thy seed, and wateredst it with thy foot, as a garden of herbs,' Zech. 14¹⁸. For the utter want of it above Memphis cf. Hdt. ii. 13, 14.

17. There is something like an anacoluthon in line 1, possibly the same as in Rom. 8³, *τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦ νόμου ἐν φῷ ἡσθένει διὰ τῆς σαρκός, ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἑαυτὸν νιὸν πέμψας κτλ.* The difficulty is less felt in English than in Greek.

For *πλείον ἐνήργει* the case of Elijah's sacrifice is quoted (1 Kings 18³⁸) from Calmet by Deane, who adds, 'the notion is that the hail was not melted nor the water quenched by the fires of heaven'; but much more than that is meant: the flame feeds upon the water as it would upon oil. The whole is a wild exaggeration of Exod. 9²⁴ (Ex) *ἡν δὲ ἡ χάλαζα καὶ τὸ πῦρ φλογίζον ἐν τῇ χαλάζῃ*, but Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. 20 is much more reasonable: *θέουτε γὰρ διὰ τῆς χαλάζης (κεραυνοί) μαχομένης οὐσίας* (though their nature was conflicting), *οὕτε ἔτηκον αὐτὴν, οὕτε ἐσβέννυντο*. Whether the fire that 'ran along the ground' (A.V.) 'ran down unto the earth' (R.V.) in Exod. 9²³ was St. Elmo's fire or what, does not greatly matter. Farrar's note, however, is worth consulting. Milton expresses rather the Philonian idea, *Par. Reg.*, iv. 410 :

'Fierce rain with lightning mixed, water with fire
 In ruin reconcil'd.'

κόσμος ('creation') is intended to convey the same idea as *ἡ κτίσις* in v. 17, and may be similarly translated; so also v. 24. For *ὑπέρμαχος* (L 'vindex') see 10²⁰. That St. Paul was thinking of this passage when he wrote Rom. 8²⁸, 'all things work together for good to them that love God,' seems fanciful.

18. For at one time the fire was mitigated,
 Lest it should burn up the beasts that were sent against
 the impious,
 But that they beholding might see that they are pursued
 by God's judgment ;

19. But at another time in the midst of water it flameth above
 the power of fire,
 To destroy the products of an unrighteous land.

18. **L** turns *καταφλέξῃ* into a passive, and **S^P** prefixes (instead of *ποτέ?*) 'as thou willest.' This is the wildest exaggeration of all. The writer implies that the plagues were all going on at the same time, whereas we are expressly told in Exod. 8^{13,31} that the frogs were dead and the flies had disappeared before the succeeding plagues occurred. In 19²¹ we actually have the beasts walking in the flames. Grimm quotes an absurd idea of Gutmann, to the effect that the heat of the ovens (Exod. 7²⁸) is meant, which did not destroy the frogs.

Another explanation (or apology) is that of Calmet ; the fires spoken of were those kindled by the Egyptians to destroy the noxious animals, but without effect. Lastly, it is possible that some tradition is referred to, as in the case of the manna, vv. 20,21.

19. **S^P** again gives for *ποτέ* 'as thou willest.' **L** inserts 'undique' after 'exardescebat,' which is itself the wrong tense, and Arab. has 'the mighty power of fire was kindled,' missing the meaning of *ὑπέρ τὴν πυρὸς δύναμιν*.

γεννήματα **L** 'nationem,' which can hardly be right, though the word is classically used for 'offspring' (Lidd. and Sc. s.v.), but in Biblical Greek cf. Luke 12¹⁸, *συνάξω ἐκεῖ πάντα τὰ γεννήματά μου* (R.V. *πάντα τὸν σῖτον*). In v. 22 the 'fruits' are plainly mentioned, and are enumerated in Ps. 105^{32,33}. (Cf. Eccl. 1¹⁷.) But there, as in Exod. 9³¹, the devastation is ascribed to the hail ; here to the fire. Holkot (*ap. A Lapide*) thought there might be an allusion in 'natio' to the destruction of Sodom, which is most unlikely.

S^H has for *ἴνα καταφθείρῃ*, 'that thou mightest destroy,' which has no MS. authority.

'The difference of tense,' says Cornely, 'in the two sentences (*ἡμεροῦτο*, v. 18, and *φλέγει* here) shows clearly that our author is speaking not of the same but of different plagues, the first of which, as already treated in vv. 5,9 *sqq.*, he treats as past, while he is about to dwell upon the second occurrence.' He thinks, therefore, that there is here no real exaggeration of the seventh plague, that of hail and fire. The first fire he, like Calmet, believes to have been that kindled by the Egyptians to protect themselves against the frogs and flies, which was quite ineffectual (*ἡμεροῦτο*), for the frogs and flies walked about in it, 19²¹. That the Egyptians took such measures is collected

20. Instead whereof thou feddest thy people with angels' food,
 And didst send bread from heaven, ready without their
 labouring for it,
 Sufficient for all pleasure and fitted for every taste.

from the fact that they made trenches (Exod. 7²⁴) to avoid the blood-spoiled river.

20. Margoliouth (*op. cit.*, p. 296)—remarking that the Midrash Rabba (ii. 37a, ed. Warsaw) says that the manna transformed itself to suit every taste, and also that it suited every eye; to the middle-aged, bread; to the old, honey; to the young, oil—suggests ἡλικίαν for ἡδονήν; see below.

'Ανθ' ὁν is, of course, used in a different sense from that in 15¹⁷. 'Instead of the destroyed fruits of Egypt thou feddest (ἐψώμισας in classical Greek means "stuffed"; here and elsewhere in later Greek simply "fed") thy people with angels' food.' This expression comes from Ps. 78²⁵, ἄρτον ἀγγέλων ἐφαγεν ἀνθρώπος (¶ and ¶), so translated by A.V. and Prayer Book. R.V. literally 'bread of the mighty,' but the other rendering may give the real sense, cf. Ps. 103²⁰, οἱ ἀγγελοι αὐτοῦ δυνατοι ἰσχύι.

ἀκοπιάτω for ἀκοπιάστως. Cf. Philo, *Cong. Erud.*, § 30, τὴν ἄπονον καὶ ἀταλαίπωρον τροφὴν δίχα σπουδῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐκ γῆς ὡς ἔθος ἀναδοθεῖσαν, ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ δε.

πρὸς πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἰσχύοντα is the reading here translated in line 3. The πρὸς is given by Fritzsch from the famous Codex 248, and is supported by a quotation in Origen. The other reading πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν ἰσχύοντα (Swete, and the received text) is very difficult. §^P, 'Pleasant more than all sweetness, and tasty beyond all tastiness,' and Arab. seem to have taken the word in the sense of 'exceeding,' 'excelling'; but we note that §^P does not understand ἀρμόνιον at all, while Arab. does. ¶ has 'omne delectamentum in se habentem,' which may denote a reading ἰσχοντα. Cf. the ancient antiphon: *A*, 'He gave them bread from heaven'; *R*, 'containing in itself all sweetness,' which is based on this text. Another rather desperate interpretation is based on the uncertain reading in Eccl. 43¹⁸ (generally omitted), ἰσχυσε νεφέλας, 'he thickened the clouds,' and would make the words mean 'increasing all pleasure.' If πρὸς be omitted, ἡδονὴν can only be taken as an accusative of respect, and the translation must be 'strong in every kind of pleasantness.' §^H, 'possessing the power of all sweetness.'

There seems no doubt as to the Jewish legend, which appears in many forms, but always with the underlying idea that the food was suited to every man's taste. So Philo, *loc. cit.*, calls the σοφία, which he thinks the manna symbolised, παντρόφον γεῦμα σοφίας.

It was very natural that the advocates of the theory of Transubstantiation should adapt this text; but as a rule the homiletic commentators compare the manna to prayer. Cf. À Lapide *ad loc.*

21. For the sustenance derived from thee manifested thy sweet-
ness towards thy children,
And serving the desire of him that took it
Was changed to what a man desired.

21. 'Υπόστασις is most uncertain in meaning. (1) It may be (as A.V.) 'sustenance,' 'support.' Cf. Judg. 6⁴, ὑπόστασις ζωῆς. This is the original physical meaning, and Pseudo-Solomon is quite capable of having adopted it, though no doubt it was not the meaning current in his time. S^P may possibly favour this view. (2) The 'substance' sent by thee, which is merely a variation of the first. (3) Luther and others thought it meant 'confidence in thee,' as in 2 Cor. 9⁴, μὴ . . . καταισχυνθῶμεν ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ ὑποστάσει ταύτη; Heb. 11¹, "Εστι δὲ πίστις ἐλπιζομένων ὑπόστασις. But these would hardly justify ὑπόστασις σου. (4) The ordinary philosophical meaning would be 'substance,' 'essence.' And so Grimm, Siegfried, Bois, and most modern critics take it. So too L, 'substantia,' and Arab., 'figure,' 'personality,' and (as a slight modification) R.V. 'thy nature.' But even then the word is ambiguous. Some MSS. omit σου or read αὐτοῦ, obviously referring the word to the substance of the manna; but it is generally taken as meaning the nature of God; which, if it be meant that God was present in the manna, raises a difficult theological question. The Philonizers take it, of course, to refer to the person of the Logos, citing Heb. 1³, χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως αὐτοῦ. See Drummond, ii. 160, 204. Deane thinks that the next line shows that the substance of the manna is meant, but in his text he reads σου.

S^h has ἴσοιτο, 'substantia,' which gives no help.

Margoliouth (*op. cit.*, p. 272) has a theory that ὑπόστασις, 'sustenance,' represents the Aramaic **אָרָעָם**, 'banquet' or 'food,' or **לְעָם**, which he says means 'column,' 'pedestal,' and also 'bread.' Freudenthal, in answering him, gives a fresh example of γλυκύτης from Plutarch, *Mor.*, 67 B, τῇ γλυκύτητι τοῦ νουθετοῦντος ἐπιτείνων τὸ πικρόν. Otherwise it is usual to explain the metaphor by referring to Ps. 34⁸, 'O taste and see that the Lord is good,' 1 Pet. 2³.

The difficulty of the word is shown by the conjectures that have been hazarded. Nannius, ὑπόσταξις, 'dropping dew'; Grabe, ἀπόσταξις, with the same meaning.

προσφερομένου is omitted by L and S^P and translated only by Arab. 'him to whom it was offered.' But it means more than this: it is a regular classical word (in the middle) for to take meat or drink. Cf. Lidd. and Sc., *s.v.* C, and Judith, 12⁹, μεχρὶ οὗ προσηνέγκατο τὴν τροφὴν αὐτῆς πρὸς ἐσπέραν, 'until she took her food at evening.' ὑπηρετῶν should of course be feminine to agree with ὑπόστασις, but the construction is obviously 'according to sense.' R.V. supplies 'bread.'

For the Jewish legend of the adaptability of the manna, Siegfried

22. But snow and ice endured fire and melted not,
 That they might know that fire was destroying the crops
 of their enemies,
 Flaming amid the hail and flashing in the showers;

(in Kautzsch, i. 502 n.) quotes the Rabbinic authorities, and also Philo, *Quod Det. Pot. Ins.*, § 31, where a confused account is given of manna as a rock out of which two cakes are made, one of honey and one of oil. The whole is, of course, in direct contradiction of Exod. 16³¹, ‘the taste of it was like wafers made with honey.’ But Num. 11⁸ says it tasted like fresh oil. Hence possibly the legend. Jerome, on Ps. 147, goes far: ‘if a man desired apples, pears, grapes, bread, flesh, he had the taste of them in the manna.’

Grimm remarks that it is in order to avoid such contradiction of the Mosaic version that the writer attributes to the manna an individual personality (*ὑπόστασις*) which would enable it to adapt itself.

μετακιρνάω is an unusual word, and means rather to mix than to change. However, an instance with the latter meaning is quoted from Pausanias.

Cornely quoted some exceedingly rationalistic commentators (even Lesêtre), who would make the tempering of the manna to every man’s choice depend on the way in which it was cooked (baked or sodden, Exod. 16²³), or even on the condiments which were added to it. But it is not the cooking but the eating that is implied in *προσφερομένου*, says Cornely, who, however, takes notice of the objection that if it suited every one’s taste it was unreasonable of them to ‘loathe this light meat.’ For the legendary idea Arnald quotes St. Augustine, *Epist. 118*: ‘in primo populo unicuique manna secundum propriam voluntatem in ore sapiebat.’

22. Fritzsche’s punctuation would take *φλεγόμενον πῦρ* together, but it is better to translate, as Exod. 9²⁴, and as L and Arab., ‘flaming in the hail and flashing in the rain.’ S^P leaves out ‘flashing in the rain’ altogether, and also renders line 1, ‘fire stood in the snow and ice, and they were not melted.’ The translator obviously thought that Egypt was still referred to, whereas the miracle we are here called upon to believe is that though the manna was ice it did not melt away when it was cooked.

To arrive at this result it is necessary to assume that the manna was not ‘small as hoar frost,’ Exod. 16¹⁴, and Num. 11⁷, *τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ εἶδος κρυστάλλου* (Heb. ‘bdellium’), but that it actually *was* ice, and yet when it was put into ovens (Num. 11⁸) it did not melt. It is very possible that we have here in *κρυστάλλου* a pre-Massoretic text, and this is borne out by Philo’s description of the manna, no doubt traditional: *ἥν ἀπένιφεν ἡσυχῆ, ἀγθη ὑετὸν καὶ παρηλλαγμένον, οὐχ ὕδωρ, οὐ χαλάζαν, οὐ χιόνα, οὐ κρύσταλλον*, but apparently a mixture of all four. Any truth that there is in the writer’s story is

23. And this again, that righteous men may be nourished,
Hath forgotten even its own power.

24. For creation, serving thee its maker,
Straineth itself against the unrighteous for punishment,
And slackeneth for beneficence on behalf of them that
trust in thee.

found in the statements that manna exposed to the sun did melt, Exod. 16²¹, 'when the sun waxed hot, it melted' (cf. below, v. 27), whereas it could be cooked, Num. 11⁸.

23. R.V. is probably right in translating *τράφωσι* and *ἐπιλελῆσται* strictly. The writer intends to describe the scene as present. In the text, however, R.V. adopts the discarded reading of the received text, *ἐπιλελῆσθαι* (dependent on *γνῶσιν*, v. 22), which depends on a doubtful reading of *Γ*, and is represented only by the Arab. *ل* has 'oblitus est.' There would be no irregularity in the alternation of *στι* with an infinitive clause. Winer (Moulton), § Ixiii. (ii.) 2, p. 725.

س^ر has a rendering apparently without any connection with the text; 'and in hailstones and in rain thou gavest scrolls of writing, that the righteous should be separated and not forget thy power.'

Arab. is nearer to the text: 'and the righteous again nourished by the same (element) should forget their own strength.' *ἐπιλελῆσθαι* was plainly read, but the rest is inexplicable.

24. Arab. translates exactly and literally. *ل* has for *ἐπιτείνεται*, 'exardescit' ('in tormentum'), and for *ἀνίεται*, 'lenior fit.' *س*^ر, 'For all creation is subject to thee, and thou didst decree punishment for the wicked and for them that trust in thee.'

There seems to be a hint here of the famous metaphor of the psaltery in 19¹⁸, for *ἐπιτείνεται* and *ἀνίεται* are musical terms. Cf. Arist., quoted by Lidd. and Sc. s.v., *ἐπιτείνειν τὸν φθογγὸν καὶ δέξιν φθέγγεσθαι*, and for both, Plat., *Rep.*, 442 A, *τὸ μὲν ἐπιτείνοντα καὶ τρέφοντα λόγοις τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθῆμασι, τὸ δὲ ἀνιεῖσα παραμυθομένη, ἡμεροῦσα ἀρμονίᾳ τε καὶ ρυθμῷ*. Cf. also Philo, *De Mut. Nom.*, § 13, *ἀρμονίας τῆς ὡς ἐν ὀργάνῳ μουσικῷ περιεχούσης ἐπιτάσεις καὶ ἀνέσεις φθόγγων πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μέλους ἐντεχνον κράσιν*.

For the general idea cf. Judg. 5²⁰. 'The stars in their courses fought against Sisera,' and the story of the standing still of the sun and moon at Joshua's command, Josh. 10¹². 'For the Jew there was no conception of a physical, non-moral world; the universe was in league with the righteous and the enemy of the wicked' (Gregg). 'Sic mare rubrum salvavit Hebraeos, mersit Aegyptios. Sic diluvium absorpsit impios, servavit Noe. Sic ignis perdens Sodomam, pepercit Lot' (A Lapide).

25. For this reason then also, changing into all forms,
 It served thine all nourishing bounty,
 According to the wish of them that needed.

26. That thy sons whom thou lovedst might learn, O Lord,
 That it is not the growth of the crops that doth nourish
 a man,
 But thy word guardeth them that believe in thee.

27. For that which might not be spoiled by fire,
 Being simply warmed by a brief ray of the sun, melted
 away;

25. *δεομένων* may mean 'who asked for it' (R.V. text, A.V. margin). **L** has the ambiguous word 'qui desiderabant.' **S^P** omits it. Arab. not understanding *παντοτρόφω*, translates 'Thy gift (*δωρεᾶ*) was changed to anything, and in all food served the wishes of them that needed it.'

μεταλλευομένη for *μεταλλουμένη* is the same mistake as in 4¹² (where see notes), and is at least one proof that this chapter was written by the same writer as the former.

ὑπηρέτει is now generally read as above for the received text, *ὑπηρετεῖ*. Previously it was the manna that adapted itself to all needs; now it is the fire.

26. The versions are singularly good. Only **L** renders *γενέσεις κάρπων* by 'nativitatis fructus,' which seems meaningless (see Deane, however), and **S^P** has for *οὐς ἡγάπησας ὁ κύριε*, 'the sons whom the Lord loved.' Before line 3 one would expect *ὅτι* to be repeated, but there seems no trace of it in the MSS. or versions (though Walton's translation of the Arabic implies it), and the verb may be indirect.

For lines 2, 3, cf. Deut. 8³, *ἐψώμισέ σε τὸ μάννα ὃ οὐκ ἔδεισαν οἱ πατέρες σου ἵνα ἀπαγγείλῃ σοι ὅτι οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρτῷ μονῷ ζήσεται ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ παντὶ ῥήματι τῷ ἐκπορευομένῳ διὰ στόματος θεοῦ.* It is quoted in this form in Matt. 4⁴ (cf. John 6³²); but the Hebrew is slightly different, 'by every thing that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.'

We note that *ῥῆμα* (**L** 'sermo') is here used interchangeably with *λόγος* in v. 12, showing that the latter has not the technical philosophic meaning which some would force upon it.

27. *Μή* may possibly, as so often in Biblical Greek, simply represent *οὐ*, cf. Winer (Moulton), p. 610, etc., but the translation given is an attempt to give it full force. R.V. is probably right in translating *φθειρόμενον* merely 'marred,' and not as A.V. 'destroyed.' **L** 'exterminari.' Arab. misses the whole force of the passage, 'what fire did not waste, a small ray of the sun heated,' while **S^P** apparently takes the Israelites for the subject, 'Many times came the fire and they were not harmed; but those who were not melted by the fire,

28. That it might be known that 'tis needful to anticipate the sun for giving thanks to thee,
And supplicate thee at the dawning of light.

when the sun came with his heat, melted away' (أَعْصَى), the last clause seeming to mean the Egyptians. The only other suggestion that the plagues of Egypt are still referred to seems to be in Cantacuzen's *Scholia*, quoted by A Lapide.

The Targum of Jonathan on Exod. 16²¹ has been repeatedly quoted as bearing on this passage. It is given in Walton's Polyglot., vol. iv. (ii.) 133, 'They gathered it from dawn till the fourth hour of the day; but at the fourth hour and afterwards the sun grew hot upon it and it melted and became fountains of waters, which flowed down to the Great Sea, and there came wild beasts clean (for food) and cattle which drank of it, and the Israelites hunted and ate them.'

28. The verse is well known as one depended on by the supporters of the theory that Pseudo-Solomon was an adherent of the Therapeutæ or Egyptian Essenes, supposed to be described in Philo's (?) *De Vita Contempl.* The point has been already discussed in the Introduction, and only a few particulars need be noticed here. Much depends on the interpretation of *πρὸς ἀνατολὴν*. For the Therapeutæ are alleged to have prayed thus: *τὰς ὁψεις καὶ ὀλον τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ἔω στάντες, ἐπάν θεάσωνται τὸν ἥλιον ἀνίσχοντα, τὰς χειρὰς ἀνατείναντες εἰς οἰρανὸν εὐημερίαν καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἐπεύχονται καὶ δέξωπίαν λογισμοῦ.* So Joseph., *B. J.*, II. viii. 5, 'Before sunrising they speak not a word about profane matters, but put up certain prayers which they have received from their forefathers as if they made a supplication for its rising.' This latter passage refers to the real Palestinian Essenes (it is doubtful if the others ever existed). But both may allude to some form of sun-worship, probably derived from Babylonian sources. Of this there is no trace in 'Wisdom.' *πρὸς ἀνατολὴν φωτός* is rendered correctly by L, 'ad ortum lucis,' and so practically in all the versions. A.V. 'at the dayspring,' R.V. 'at the dawning of the light.' It is to be noted that the Jewish daily prayer beginning 'Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord' (Deut. 6⁴) was to be recited, according to the Mishna, 'when the sun's rays lighted up the tops of the mountains,' and this custom is traced by Fairweather in Hastings *D.B.*, v. 274a, to a Persian source. References to early prayer are perpetual. Ps. 5³, 'In the morning will I order my prayer unto thee and will keep watch; 63¹, 'Early will I seek thee,' and v. ⁶, 'In the night watches'; 87¹⁴, *τὸ πρωὶ ἡ προσευχή μου προφθάσει σε.* 57⁸ (margin), 'I will awake the dawn'; *ἔξεγερθσομαι ὅρθρον.* Yet Gfrörer and Zeller adhere to the view that an Essene custom was here indicated.

§^P 'That they might know that the sun also riseth in thankfulness, and at the rising of his light cometh before thee.' Arab. 'That it might be known that it is needful for the sun to reach us, that we

29. For the hope of the unthankful man shall melt away as the
wintry hoar frost,
And run off like useless water.

17. 1. For great are thy judgments and hard to explain ;
Therefore did undisciplined souls go astray.

should thank Thee.' It seems that both translators failed to understand *φθάνειν*. The mistake of Arab. in particular is quite clear. With *πρὸς ἀνατολήν* cf. Luke 24²⁰, *πρὸς ἐσπέραν*, and for *ἐντυχάνειν* meaning 'to approach in prayer' see 8²¹, and note there. §^h translates *φθάνειν* 'follow closely,' and *πρὸς ἀνατολήν* 'at (the) sunrise.'

On the identification of manna with prayer, A. Lapide (*ad v.* ²¹) has a most voluminous note, adducing many instances of such identification from the Fathers. It should be noted that *εὐχαριστίαν* was taken by early commentators (e.g. Bonaventura, Holcot, Dion. Carthusianus, cited by Cornely) as meaning simply the manna, 'the favour of God,' which had to be gathered at daybreak. If this could be accepted it would remove the main difficulty of the passage.

Drummond's remarks on the passage (*Philo*, i. 179) are worth quoting. Gfrörer, ii. 270, would render *πρὸς ἀνατολήν* 'when they see the sun rising.' Drummond points out that (1) it cannot mean that, and that in any case *φθάνειν τὸν ἥλιον* would settle the question. (2) The Therapeutae pray for *εὐημερίαν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ὁξεωπίαν λογισμοῦ*. Of this there is no hint in Wisdom; no word of mental illumination. (3) They prayed 'towards the sun,' *πρὸς τὴν ἔω στάντες*, of which our author says nothing. Drummond adds (p. 181), 'It is not a violent supposition that some of the Jews in Egypt may have adopted so simple and devout a custom as giving thanks before daybreak without submitting themselves to the discipline of a sect.'

29. For 'useless water' (§^P  cf. Ps. 58⁷, 'Let them melt away as water that runneth apace.' Grimm remarks that the resemblance to vv. 14, 16 is 'formal only,' but there seems a closer resemblance than this indicates.

17. 1. *δυσδιήγητοι* (§^P, 'wonderful to tell of,' Arab. 'difficult to tell of') is practically the same as Rom. 11³³, *ἀνεξερεύνητα τὰ κρίματα αὐτοῦ*. L inserts 'O Domine' and refers 'inenarrabilia' to another interpolation 'verba tua.' §^h 'hard to recount.'

ἀπαίδευτοι A.V. 'unnurtured.' §^P 'they that are impudent in their souls,' which is incorrect. L 'indisciplinatae' gives the true force: 'souls untrained to recognise God's judgments.' That this was not their fault in the case of the Egyptians is of no consequence to the author; they had the plague at all events.

From this verse to 18⁴ we have the third contrast between Israel and Egypt: in respect of light and darkness.

2. For lawless men having thought to lord it over a holy race,
 Prisoners of darkness and fettered captives of long night,
 Shut in under their roofs lay exiled from eternal provi-
 dence.

3. For thinking to escape detection in their secret sins
 Under a dark veil of forgetfulness,
 They were scattered asunder, terribly affrighted
 And dismayed by spectres.

2. ὑπειληφότες **Ὡ** 'Dum persuasum habent,' which is good Low Latin for 'having persuaded themselves.' For φυγάδες it has 'fugitivi' (A.V. marg. and Genev. 'to escape the everlasting providence'), which is quite the wrong idea. Cornely adopts it, quoting 10¹⁰, φυγὰς ὄργης τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ; but Zorell, his editor, has a more recondite explanation: as φεύγω means to be defendant in a lawsuit, he would render 'prosecuted by eternal providence.' With **Ὡ** agrees Arab., which mistakes the whole passage, and has 'for the wicked, capturing a holy race (ὑπειληφότες ἔθνος ἀγιον), preferred themselves to it.' **Ὡ** is worse still. It inserts after line 1 'For them locusts and flies did bite,' and they died; 'chains of darkness and levers (**λόδοι**) of night they devised in themselves, and thought to escape from the opinions of the world ($\tau\hat{\eta}\mathfrak{s}$ αἰωνίου προνοίας).'

For 'prisoners of darkness' cf. 2 Pet. 2⁴, 'Cast them down to hell and delivered them into chains of darkness' (R.V. 'pits of darkness'), and for the construction Winer (Moulton), p. 236, who cites δέσμιος χριστοῦ from Eph. 3¹, etc.; but probably δέσμιοι $\tau\hat{\eta}\mathfrak{s}$ συναγωγῆς, Zech. 11¹², is more to the purpose.

ἔκειντο and a great deal of what follows is merely an expansion of Exod. 10²³, οὐκ ἔξανεστη οὐδεὶς ἐκ τῆς κοίτης αὐτοῦ τρεῖς ἡμέρας. Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. 21, τότε δέ φασι τοὺς μὲν ἐρριμμένους ἐν ταῖς εὐναῖς μὴ τολμάν ἔξανιστασθαι, τοὺς δὲ ὅπότε κατεπείγοι τι τῶν τῆς φύσεως ἀναγκαῖων, ἐπαφωμένους τοῖχων ἡ τινος ἐτέρου καθάπτερ τυφλοὺς μόλις προσέρχεσθαι. And Joseph., *Ant.*, II. xiv. 5 exaggerates even more: 'a thick darkness without the least light spread itself over the Egyptians, whereby their sight being obstructed and their breathing hindered by the thickness of the air, *they died miserably*', cf. v. ⁹ 'they perished for very trembling' (R.V.).

For the sense of ᔁκειντο cf. Ps. 48¹⁶, ὡς πρόβατα ἐν ἄδη ἔθεντο. θάνατος ποιμάνει αὐτούς.

3. The common punctuation produces the translation 'they were sundered one from another by (A.V. under) a dark veil of forgetfulness.' This is almost meaningless as following on line 1, and the scribes read ἐσκοτίσθησαν (Ἑ^ΔϹ). As Grimm remarks, 'The reading ἐσκυρπίσθησαν is in flagrant opposition not only to the context (for the Egyptians are described in v. ² as each confined to his own place)

4. For not even the nook that held them kept them without fear,
And echoes dismayed them sounded about them,
And darkling ghosts with gloomy visages appeared.

but to the distinct intention of the writer to enforce the truth of the law of punishment of like by like,' *i.e.* the darkness which covered their misdeeds 14²³, should now be their punishment. Instead of that they are 'scattered,' when they should be 'plunged in darkness.' Nevertheless §^h reads 'were scattered,' using also a word for $\lambda\eta\theta\eta$ which means rather 'ignorance' than 'forgetfulness.'

Very possibly Pseudo-Solomon is again using a word which he does not understand, and connecting it with *σκορπίος* in the sense of torment; but if this be not so, it is possible to get good sense by punctuating as above. **L** may be read 'Dum putant se latere in obscuris peccatis tenebroso oblivionis velamento dispersi sunt, paventes horrende, etc.'; and this is actually the rendering of Arab. Otherwise, in addition to the unfortunate word *ἐσκορπίσθησαν*, we are driven to give to *λήθης παρακάλυμμα* the unnatural meaning of 'God's forgetfulness.'

ἰνδάλμασιν means 'appearances,' or rather 'resemblances,' and is translated by A.V. 'apparitions, R.V. 'spectral forms.' The word was only intelligible to Arab. which has 'phantoms,' otherwise translating correctly. **L** 'cum admiratione nimia perturbati.' **S^P** translates the whole, 'and for the concealment of their sins they thought by what they did they were accused and scattered, and they feared horribly and were confused and cast down.' Deissmann, *Bible Studies* (Eng. trans.), p. 273, quotes an African inscription, 'I adjure thee by the great God (through whom) ἔκαστος ἰδάλλεται ὃν ἔχει φόβος τοῦ κυρίου . . . ἀθανάτου, where *ἰδάλλεται* (*ἰνδάλλεται*) seems to mean 'is made like to God in respect of immortality.' But the verb (Lidd. and Sc. *s.v.*) is as indefinite as the noun. **G^B** has the gloss *φαντάσμασιν*.

4. For *ἐκταράσσοντες*, A.V., R.V. adopt the received text in line 2 *καταράσσοντες*, 'rushing down,' which necessitates the understanding of some words like 'as of waters,' A.V. It is no doubt the difficult reading, and is supported by **L**. The other versions give no help, and are not worth quoting. **S^p** takes *μυχός* to mean 'darkness,' and Arab. 'the wicked one' (? *μοιχός*). **L** has 'spelunca,' which is a possible meaning of the Greek, but inappropriate here, and translates line 3 'personae tristes illis apparentes pavorem illis praestabant' avoiding all difficulties.

The *φίσματα* are variously and fancifully interpreted (cf. Gregg), but Arnald remarks that some explanation may be found in Ps. 78⁵⁰, where the writer, omitting the plague of darkness, substitutes for it the sending of 'angels of evil.'

κατηφῆ may be 'cheerless' (R.V.), but the secondary meaning 'dark' is here more appalling. Of what character the dative *ἀμειδῆτος*

5. And no force of fire was of strength enough to light them,
 Nor the brilliant flames of the stars availed to illuminate
 that hideous night.

6. But there shone upon them only
 A self-kindled flame full of terror,
 And utterly terrified by that sight when they saw it not
 They deemed the things they beheld worse.

προσώποις is of no importance. We note that this is one of the few cases where mention is made in Scripture of ghosts appearing on earth. The most striking is that in Job 4¹³⁻¹⁷. 'When deep sleep falls upon men, a shudder came upon me and a trembling, and made all my bones to shudder, when, see, a wind sweeps before me, the hairs of my body bristle up; it stands, but I cannot discern it; . . . and I hear a murmuring voice,' etc. (Cheyne, *Job and Solomon*, p. 18).

5. *Ἐ ignis nulla vis poterat illis lumen praebere*, which is the sense, and Arab. has much the same, only inserting 'not a single time' before 'was able.' *Σ*^ρ is again so far removed from the text as to afford no help.

For the sense cf. Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. 21, *καὶ τοῦ χρειώδους πυρὸς τὸ φέγγος τὸ μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς κατεχούσσης ζάλης ἐσβέννυτο, τὸ δὲ τῷ βάθει τοῦ σκότους ἀμαυρούμενον ἐνηφανίζετο*. Grimm quotes also Aben Ezra on Exod. 10²¹ ('Darkness that might be felt'); 'they shall grasp the darkness with their hands, for it will be so thick that neither the flame of fire nor a light will burn in it.' So Joseph., *Ant.*, II. xiv. 5, calls the darkness *φέγγος ἀμούρον*. It is suggested that a terrible sandstorm, which might well extinguish all artificial light, was the immediate cause of the darkness.

ὑπέμενον is translated 'ventured' by Deane, but this seems unnecessary. 'Endured' (A.V.) is the classical meaning, and so Arab., but R.V., 'were strong enough,' is not exact.

6. The interpretation is practically that of A Lapide, combined with modern suggestions as to the electric nature of the fire or flashes described. The words of A Lapide are 'significat ignem hunc obiter et in transcurso inter tenebras emicuisse instar coruscationis et fulgoris et mox disparuisse ac post modicum subito et inopinato rursus coruscasse, itaque hac sui ostentatione et disparitione continuum Aegyptiis pavorem incussisse'; and again, 'pyra haec erat fulminea, adeoque non aliud quam conglobata fulmina esse videbatur'; it consisted of electric flashes.

The meaning, then, will be this: every now and then an electric flash lit up the darkness and showed the Egyptians the spectral forms of objects (possibly the ghosts) for a moment; when the flash ceased (*μὴ θεωρουμένης*; the grammar of *μή* is not of much account in

7. But the tricks of magic art lay low,
And the conviction of the vaunting of their wisdom was
ignominious :

Pseudo-Solomon) they exaggerated in the darkness the things they had for an instant beheld. For *αὐτομάτη* *S^h* has the Greek word transliterated.

The ordinary interpretation (A.V., R.V.) takes *ὅψεως* as a genitive of comparison ; R.V. 'In terror they deemed the things which they saw to be worse than that sight on which they could not gaze,' which, as Deane remarks, 'makes the sentence somewhat problematical.' His own rendering seems to approximate to that given, and he translates *μὴ θεωρουμένης* 'if so be it was not beheld,' which is very like the explanation given. Churton's 'in dread of that appearance which they durst not gaze upon' seems impossible, as also Siegfried's 'terrified by a sight they had never seen.' Farrar has 'the sight which they saw not,' like *L*, 'timore perculti illius quae non videbatur faciei,' which is simply a contradiction in terms, strongly emphasised by Genev., 'being afraid of this vision which they could not see.' Arnald indicates something like our interpretation. Reuss translates 'cette vue qu'ils ne s'expliquaient pas,' which is not the Greek. So Cornely renders 'exteriti autem visione illa non clare cognitas (?) aestimabant deteriora esse (quam re erant) quae videbantur (*τὰ βλεπόμενα*).' But the general idea seems to be that of the horror of expectation of evil. Cf. Plin., *Epist.*, viii. 18, 'Parvulum differt patiaris adversa an expectes : nisi quod tamen est dolendi modus, non est timendi.' *S^P* did not understand a word of the passage, and Arab. only the first line.

τῆς ὅψεως is explained by Grimm (who quotes A Lapide without comment) as either a genitive absolute or a causal genitive dependent on *ἐκδειματούμενοι*. Both are possible.

7. R.V. has 'they lay helpless, made the sport of magic art,' contrary to the context in v. ⁸ and to all reasonable sense, for no 'magic art' but the judgment of God it was that afflicted them. This rendering also demands the adoption of the little supported Complutensian reading *κατέκευτο*, whereas *κατέκειτο* is now generally read.

L is difficult to understand : 'magicae artis appositi erant derisus,' where 'appositi' may represent some peculiar African meaning similar to *κατέκειτο*. To adopt the conjectural reading 'arti' would be to suggest a rendering not unlike that of R.V. The translations of *S^P* and Arab. are still of the nature of those quoted above, *i.e.* useless. *S^h* has 'their inclinations to the craft of magic arts were suppressed.'

For the sense cf. Exod. 7^{11.12} as to the temporary success of the magicians, as in 8⁷, followed by their complete discomfiture in 9¹¹, when the boils and blains even attacked them. Cf. 2 Tim. 3⁸ as to 'Jannes and Jambres.'

8. For they that promised to drive away fears and alarms from a sick soul,

These were sick with ridiculous apprehension.

9, 10. For even if nothing to cause dismay affrighted them,

Yet having been once scared by the creepings of vermin and hissings of reptiles,

They perished trembling,

And refusing to look on the air which could on no side be escaped.

ἐμπαίγματα may mean either 'tricks' or 'scoffs.' The first is plainly the meaning here, and **L** by taking the second ['derisus'] produced the difficulty which led to its confused translation.

8. The versions are here more reasonable: **L** has for line 2 'hincum derisu pleni timore languebant,' where it is tempting to read 'derisus pleno.' 'Derisus,' as the next word to 'cum,' might easily be altered to ablative. Arab. fairly represents the text, except that it renders line 2 'these he (God) smote into a disease of ridiculous fear.' **S^P**, 'Their minds were evilly led' (which represents the whole of line 1), 'and they were sick with derision and fear.'

There is no mention in Exodus of any attempt of the magicians to dispel the darkness, 'but,' says Farrar, 'since they failed in the plague of lice the writer assumes that they failed still more hopelessly during the plague of darkness.' With the frogs they succeeded in producing a counter-miracle, but were never able to stop a plague.

9, 10. *μηδὲν ταραχῶδες*, **L** renders 'nihil ex monstris,' possibly a rendering of *τερατῶδες*, found in Ven. and *secunda manu* in **GN**. **S^P** may have read this also: 'all manner of portents terrified them, flies by defilement, and serpents by irritation; and from (? the sight of) birds they fell down and trembled and perished; and from the air which is nothing (*μηδαμόθεν*) the infidels fled that they might not believe.' Arab. is better, but mistakes *μηδαμόθεν φευκτόν* for 'put to flight on every side.' **S^h** 'even the air that from one place or other cannot be escaped to gaze upon'; 'to gaze upon' apparently going with *φευκτόν*; but it is possible to take it with 'refusing' in **S^P**. Margoliouth defends the **S^P** as a translation, however mistaken, of a Hebrew original. 'They fell from birds' he thinks may be from the New Hebrew **מִפְרַחִים**, which, as past participle of the Hophal of **פָרַח**, would mean 'scared,' and also as the present participle of Kal with the preposition **מִן** might signify 'from birds.' It is to be noticed, however, that the meaning of *ἐκσοθεῖν* is 'to scare birds,' and possibly this attracted the attention of the Syriac translator, who, we have good reason to believe, was not well versed in Greek.

Gregg is no doubt right in insisting on the full perfect meaning of

11. For wickedness is a thing innately cowardly, which being convicted beareth witness thereof,
And being hard pressed by conscience hath exaggerated grievous things.

ἐκσεσοβημένοι, 'Having once been scared (not, as Deane, "being scared out of their corners") in the former plagues by flies and reptiles ("hissing serpents" is a new invention), they were now so terrified that they shut their eyes and died of fear.'

διώλλυντο, 'died of fear,' cf. Luke 21²⁶, ἀποψυχόντων ἀνθρώπων ἀπὸ φόβου.

ἀρνούμενοι, 'refusing,' may be paralleled by Virg., *Aen.*, iv. 451 (of the wretched Dido), 'taedet caeli convexa tueri,' and Tennyson's 'She could not look on the sweet heaven either at morn or eventide.' If, however, as A.V., we take it 'denying that they saw the air,' it implies that they were out of their minds from terror. Gregg suggests 'the air that needed no escaping from'; it was innocent of harm and contained no horrors; but their imagination peopled it with such. It is doubtful if the Greek will bear this. φευκτέον instead of φευκτόν might possibly imply it. Lastly, ἀήρ is interpreted as 'the darkness,' and in Homer it does signify 'a cloud,' but Grimm questions if it ever could mean *σκότος*. But with 'Wisdom' all things are possible, and it certainly would give a good meaning.

11. This is a translation of Swete's text, δειλὸν γὰρ ἰδίως πονηρία μαρτυρεῖ καταδικαζομένη ἀεὶ δὲ προσειληφεν τὰ χαλεπὰ συνεχομένη τῇ συνειδήσει.

R.V. (as A.V.) translates the easier reading *ἰδίω μάρτυρι* and *προειληφεν*, but this, though read by the Complutensian and by Fritzsche, rests chiefly on *Ἐκ* (which constantly writes *ι* for *ει*) and *Ἐκ^A* as regards *μάρτυρι*, while *ἰδίω* seems to have no MS. authority whatever except *Ἐκ^N secunda manu*. The rendering is smooth, and for that reason to be suspected: R.V. has 'wickedness, condemned by a witness within (more likely, in accordance with Pseudo-Solomon's usage, is A.V., "by her own witness"), is a coward thing.' Bois suggests *εἰδός* for *ἰδίως*, 'a cowardly spectacle'; but this is mere conjecture. Cornely adopts Swete's text, but would punctuate δειλὸν γὰρ ἰδίως πονηρία μαρτυρεῖ καταδικαζομένη. This he translates 'wickedness is of its own nature a cowardly thing. It shows this when convicted.'

ἰδίως is very rare in the sense of 'peculiar' in Hellenistic Greek, and probably non-existent in 'Wisdom.' On the other hand it took in the *Κοινή* almost the force of a possessive pronoun, *ἐαυτοῦ* or *ἐαυτῶν*. Cf. Milligan, *Selections from the Greek Papyri*, p. 25*n*, who cites Job 7¹⁰, Matt. 22⁵, 1 Cor. 7². See also Moulton, *Prolegg.*, 87*ff*.

What the versions read is difficult to say, but all agree in respect of *μαρτυρεῖ*. *L* omits *ἰδίως* and translates 'cum sit enim timida

12. For fear is nothing but abandonment of the succours that come from reasoning;

nequitia, dat testimonium condemnationis,' making καταδικαζομένη depend on μαρτυρεῖ, 'testifies that it is condemned.' Σ^P may have read ἵδιο, 'Because their wickedness testifies against them and condemns them.' Arab., 'the peculiarity of wickedness is fear by which witness is borne against it (wickedness) and it is condemned.' Σ^h combines both readings: 'Hard peculiarly is wickedness when through (literally "by the hand of") a private witness it is convicted.' In next line the translator undoubtedly read προειληφε.

It is possible to put a stop before μαρτυρεῖ and to translate 'wickedness is naturally a timid thing; it gives evidence thereof when it is convicted.' What Siegfried means by saying that μαρτυρεῖ should be μαρτυρεῖται, and translating accordingly, it is difficult to understand.

προσειληφεν, 'takes in addition,' 'aggravates evils,' which is the received text, gives a better meaning than A.V. and R.V., 'forecasteth,' προειληφεν, which, though supported by Σ , 'praesumit,' and Arab. is only found in Σ^h , *secunda manu*. The supposed use of προσλαμβάνειν for 'anticipate' depends on a false quotation from Josephus given by Grimm, who remarks that other writers had copied it (no unusual thing in commentators on 'Wisdom') but he could not find it.

συνείδησις here occurs for the first time in the sense of 'conscience' in Biblical Greek. It is found in Eccles. 10²⁰, but with the meaning 'secret thoughts.' τὸ συνείδος, however, occurs with this signification in Philo, *Adv. Flacc.*, § 2, ἐν τῷ τοῦ συνειδότος δικαιοστηρίῳ, 'before the tribunal of conscience,' and Grimm claims that is quite common. He cites Jos., *Ant.*, III. xv. 3, etc. The word συνείδησις occurs as early as the traditional sayings of Periander and Bias (cf. Farrar's note). For its combination with συνέχει cf. Test. XII. Patr. Reuben, c. 4. ή συνείδησις μου συνέχει με περὶ τῆς ἀμαρτίας.

For the effect of a 'guilt-sick conscience' cf. Prov. 28¹, 'the wicked fleeth when no man pursueth'; Job. 15²⁰, 'the wicked man travaleth with pain all his days . . . a sound of terrors is in his ears: in prosperity the spoiler shall come upon him,' Jer. 2¹⁹. Instances from modern literature are plentiful; Farrar quotes a beautiful one from Tennyson's 'Sea-Dreams'; but Deane rightly points out that 'Wisdom' is speaking of a special case: 'Evil men under some circumstances may hide their coward nature, but when put to the test (καταδικαζομένη) they exhibit their base fear.' Hooker, *Eccl. Pol.*, v. i. 2, 'Evils great and unexpected (the true touchstone of constant minds) do cause oftentimes even them to think upon divine power with fearfulest suspicions, which have been otherwise the most secure despisers thereof.'

12. This sententious statement is probably direct from the lips of

13. For the all too feeble expectation of help from within
 Counteth this ignorance as worse than the cause of the
 torment.

some Greek teacher in the schools of Alexandria. It was a commonplace of the philosopher that fear was merely 'apprehension' (*προσδοκία* in v. ¹³). Cf. Philo, *De Mut. Nom.*, § 30, ἡ μὲν γὰρ παρουσία τοῦ κακοῦ λύπην, ἡ δὲ προσδοκία φόβον ἐγέννησεν.

The meaning is that terror prevents our examining the sources of our fear. Such an idea was particularly congenial to the popular Stoic school, with its doctrines of 'indifference to pain,' and 'independence of outward circumstances.' ⁴ Macc. is a mere fairy tale invented to illustrate the Stoic doctrine of the superiority of Reason to the Feelings, and classical quotations to this effect are plentiful. Hor. *Od. III. iii.* represents a popular form of the idea, and Farrar cites Virg., *Georg.*, ii. 490, 'Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas Quique metus omnes et inexorabile fatum Subjecit pedibus,' but he assigns it to Lucretius (!). He is more fortunate with a quotation from 'Comus.'

13. This is Freudenthal's translation of the passage, which he gives in arguing against Margoliouth (*op. cit.*, p. 271), who, presupposing a Hebrew original, proposes to restore meaning to the passage by assuming no less than three mistranslations, viz. of ἐνδόθεν, ἀγνοια, and βάσταρος. By this means he arrives at the rendering 'an expectation of evil originally slight grows great from a trifling cause.' This seems unnecessary and not in accordance with the sense of v. ¹². Reason in the face of tormenting conscience has surrendered her powers: the hope from within (which should be founded on reason) is all too feeble. Man has nothing to rely on, and he naturally counts his ignorance of what is causing his terrors as the worst of his misfortunes. The passage, in fact, includes two psychological truths: first, that 'conscience doth make cowards of us all'; and secondly, that 'dangers unknown are more terrible than even worse dangers which are understood and can be fathomed.' The text is plain, and the versions unanimous.

Grimm, quoting Nannius for an excellent rendering of ἡττων, 'nimirum oppressa per desperationem fiducia,' would explain ἀγνοια, 'ignorance of possible succour,' supplying βοηθημάτων with this and with *προσδοκία*. R.V., on the contrary, is alone in taking it 'the ignorance of the cause that bringeth the torment.' Bissell translates 'the expectation of succour overpowered from within,' which is surely impossible. \mathfrak{L} possibly may have the meaning given by R.V., 'majorem computat inscientiam ejus causae, de qua tormentum praestat.' \mathfrak{S}^P is hopelessly astray, and \mathfrak{S}^h slavishly translates the Greek words one by one. Arab. takes ἀγνοια as 'folly,' and λογίζεται as passive, confusing the whole passage.

14. But they throughout a night really powerless,
 And coming upon them from the depths of powerless
 Hades,
 Sleeping the same sleep,

Dr. Margoliouth's explanation (alluded to above) of this difficult passage is all his own. Starting from the idea of mistranslation of a Hebrew original, he argues that (1) מִלְפָנִים can mean from within, but also (with a different pointing), 'originally,' 'from beforehand'; (2) that חַשְׁנָה שְׁנִיאָה can signify 'increases the ignorance,' but also (with different pointing) can be interpreted 'grows great'; (3) finally that in New Hebrew מִצְעָרָה is 'producing the torture,' but may also be 'slight,' 'trivial.' He would then translate the verse thus—'For an expectation of evil originally slight grows great from a trifling cause.' Freudenthal, *J. Q. R.*, 1891, p. 744, pronounces the Hebrew sentence thus reconstructed to be unintelligible, and the thought expressed to be trivial and unsuited to the context.

It seems possible, however, that ἐνδοθεν, which does not occur elsewhere in Wisdom, is used by Pseudo-Solomon with a mistaken idea of its meaning; perhaps he did think it meant 'originally.'

14. This rendering is adopted solely in reference to the context, which seems to require that the unfounded character of the Egyptians' fears should be the main point pressed. So R.V., **L** ('noctem impotentem' avoiding the second ἀδύνάτου altogether, and translating 'ab infimis et ab altissimis inferis supervenientem'), and **S^p** 'night which hath no power, and cannot come from hell by reason of its chain.' Possibly there was an old variant **βαθυτάτου** which **L** translated. As to the powerlessness of Sheol, there are many passages cited from the Old Testament. Cf. Charles, *Eschatology*, pp. 47, 48. There may be a reference to 'Hades who has no dominion on earth.' Deane quotes Gutberlet, who thinks the words ironical: 'that night which the magicians called impotent; that hell which they scoffed at as feeble,' but ὅντως is against this.

But ἀδύνατος may be either active or passive; it may mean 'impossible,' 'insurmountable' (of an obstacle), and so A.V. here translates it, first 'intolerable' then (of Hades) 'inevitable,' with margin in the first case 'in which they could do nothing.' This rendering is supported by **S^h**, which gives 'impassable' in both cases, and Arab. 'intolerable.' Cf. Cic., *Phil.* v., 'principatus impotentissimus.' Grotius suggested *οἱ δὲ τὴν ἀδύτον νύκτα*, 'that impenetrable night.' For the second ἀδύνάτου **S^h** read, with Codex 261, ἀδύνάτων.

ὕπνον is peculiar; for we have been led to think of the Egyptians so far as lying there and quaking; certainly not as sleeping. It is probably mere rhetoric. Gregg's explanation that 'the only way of describing the enforced rest of the Egyptians is to be found in terms of night, *i.e.* sleep,' is a reflection, possibly well deserved, on our

15. On the one hand were persecuted by portents of apparitions,
And on the other were paralysed by their soul's surrender,
For sudden and unexpected fear was poured upon them.
16. Then thus whosoever there fell down
Was kept straitly shut up in a prison not of iron:
17. For whether a man was a husbandman or a shepherd,
Or a doer of labours in a desert place,
Being overtaken he endured the inevitable fate,
For by one chain of darkness all were bound.

author's vocabulary. There are plenty of words to express mere 'quiescence' or 'stupor.' S^P has 'in the sleep of it,' *i.e.* of the darkness.

15. $\tau\alpha\ \mu\acute{e}v\ \dots\ \tau\alpha\ \delta\acute{e}$. **L** 'Aliquando . . . aliquando,' and so R.V. A.V. 'partly . . . partly.' Arab. 'some . . . others,' translating loosely. **S^P** has no connection with the Greek, and Margoliouth, p. 274, thinks its translation of line 2 $\tau\alpha\ \delta\acute{e}\ \tau\eta\acute{s}\ \psi\chi\eta\acute{s}\ \pi\alpha\epsilon\lambda\eta\acute{o}nto\ \pi\ro\delta\sigma\acute{a}$ 'and thou didst seem to be bound when thou wast not in chains,' is proof that it was translated from another (Hebrew) original. Taken in conjunction with so many other passages, it seems rather to prove ignorance of Greek. It seems, moreover, that this is not a translation of the words quoted at all, but of v. ¹⁶, little as it applies there. Dr. Margoliouth's point is that in Syriac **لَوْلَوْلَوْ** means 'treachery,' and might be also New Hebrew, while in Hebrew **מִסְרָוִת** does mean 'chains.'

'Their soul's surrender' is a reference to v. 12. 'L'anima traduzione' is stronger, and implies the 'treachery' of the soul, which is quite a possible rendering.

ἐπεχύθη in line 3 is the reading of **GN** Ven. and **S^h**, but ἐπῆλθεν (Swete) is that of **GB**, **L**, Arab., very possibly an alteration of copyists as easier, cf. 1 Thess. 5³, αἰφνίδιος αὐτοῖς ἐφίσταται δεθρός.

Grimm finds a *παρονομασία* in *πραδοσία* . . . *ἀπρασδόκητος*; not a bad example of the way in which things are read into 'Wisdom.'

16. 'So then' (R.V., A.V.) is not correct. *εἰτα* is temporal (L, 'deinde'), and 'so then' would be *οὕτως οὖν*. There is a slight difference in punctuation, Fritzsche reading *ἐκεῖ* with *ὅς δήποτε οὖν ήν*. So Arab. and apparently S^h, but L is indefinite. A.V., R.V. join *ἐκεῖ* with *καταπίπτων*. Deane remarks that it seems jejune to say 'whoever was there,' when all were in the same plight, and so would join *ἐκεῖ* with *ἔφοιοείτο*.

17. **L** is disfigured by 'eset' after 'praeoccupatus,' the insertion of an ignorant copyist. **S^P** has in Walton, for *προληφθεῖς*, the incomprehensible translation **לְכָאָלָל** 'wouldst be shed abroad,' corrected in Lagarde to **לְכָאָלָל** which expresses the Greek.

18. Whether there were a whistling wind,
 Or a melodious noise of birds around thick branches,
 Or a measured sound of water running violently.

19. Or a sharp crash of rocks cast down,
 Or an unseen running of bounding animals,
 Or a voice of most savage beasts roaring,
 Or an echo resounding from the hollow of the hills,
 It paralysed them, terrifying them.

κατ' ἐρημίαν ἐργάτης μόχθων (L 'agri laborum operarius') is curious. What could a man, not a shepherd, be toiling at in the desert? It is probably another instance of the wrong word. Very likely Pseudo-Solomon meant *κατ' ἡρεμίαν* 'in peace'—a mechanic quietly working in his shop at his trade: we have then a pretty complete enumeration of the working class. Dr. Margoliouth, *op. cit.*, p. 275, points out that in New Hebrew בָּבָר means 'field' as well as 'desert.' Hence possibly S^P 'labouring at the work of the field,' and L as above.

S^P gives a double translation of line 4. (1) 'There is one entrance of darkness, and all pray' (εδέθησαν, but this may not be the meaning of the Syriac); (2) correct as above.

18. The idea is that sounds which before the darkness were even pleasant now became horrible. It is plain here as elsewhere, that the darkness is conceived as only covering the Egyptians, while the birds were singing in the trees around, and all natural noises still going on. It is then a mere exaggeration of Exod. 10²³, 'All the children of Israel had light in their dwellings.' Arab. has a curious rendering 'whether their sufferings were compared to a hissing sound or to this and that . . . such was the terror which assailed them' (end of v. 19). For the terror of the Egyptians cf. Ps. 53⁶, Lev. 26³⁶, 'the sound of a driven leaf shall chase them.' 'Pavet ille fragorem motorum ventis nemorum' is quoted from Lucan.

The πνεῦμα συρίζον would sound to them like the hissing of serpents (v. 9), and the singing of birds became a shriek; the fall of waters (cf. S^h) the roar of a cataract, etc.

19. We have here another class of sounds actually terrible in themselves which seemed worse still to the helpless Egyptians. The variants are unimportant. ἀπηνέστατος θηρίων φωνή (for ἀπηνεστάτων) is read by G^A, L, but 'harshly roaring' (R.V.) seems to represent neither. For the use of adjectives of three terminations as if of two only, cf. Winer (Moulton), § xi. p. 80.

ἐκ κοιλότητος ὄρέων, 'from the ravines of the hills,' S^h, 'from the midst of the hills.' S^P 'de altissimis montibus.' L favours the 'received' reading κοιλοτάτων, which Deane says is not found in G^B as commonly stated. For ἡχώ S^h, S^P have  naturally,

20. For the whole world was illuminated with bright light,
And was engaged in unhindered toils ;

21. But over them alone heavy night was spread,
An image of that darkness which was to receive them ;
But to themselves they were heavier than darkness.

18. 1. But for thy holy ones there was a very great light ;
Whose voice they indeed hearing, but seeing not their
form,
Counted them happy that they had not suffered.

but not very accurately, for the expression in Syriac as in New Hebrew means 'a voice from heaven.' Arab. expands ἀντανακλωμένη into 'of which one sound answers to the sound of another.' For the effect of echo in an enclosed space cf. Judg. 7²⁰ (the noise made by Gideon's men with their trumpets and pitchers).

20. **L** for συνείχετο has 'continebatur,' possibly misunderstanding the word, for which cf. Acts 18⁶, συνείχετο τῷ λόγῳ δὲ Παῦλος (R.V.).

We note the hexametric ending of line 1, λάμπρῳ κατελάμπετο φωτὶ.

21. The sudden introduction of moral darkness in place of physical is striking, and Thackeray in *Journal of Theol. Stud.*, vi. 234, suggests that εἰκὼν σκότους may be a Christian interpolation. This idea is possibly suggested by the fact that nowhere else in Wisdom do we find any allusion to a 'hell' for the ungodly. Cf. *Church Quart. Rev.*, April 1879, p. 95, 'Probably it was urged against the Jews that they had no Tartarus ; no hell for the wicked. This chapter supplies the want of this by the terrors of a guilty conscience. Egyptian darkness was an image of that darkness which should afterwards receive them.'

There is no important variant. **L** translates the δέ in line 3 by 'ergo,' and **S^P** renders the line simply, 'darkness was heavy on them.'

18. 1. R.V. is here surely wrong. It accepts the received text ὅτι μὲν οὖν κἀκεῖνοι ἐπεπόνθεισαν, which is read by **G^{NBC}**, but in that case οὖν must remain simply untranslated. It is far better to read with **G^A** and **L** οὐ for οὖν. The latter version, however, gives a wrong turn to the sentence : 'et quia non et ipsi (i.e. the Israelites) eadem passi erant magnificabant te.' The plain meaning is that the Egyptians thought on the one hand (<μέν>) the Israelites lucky because they had not suffered, and on the other hand (δέ v. ²) blessed their own good fortune that the Israelites did not fall upon them in their darkness and avenge their previous wrongs. A.V. accepts the **L** and **G^A** reading 'because they also had not suffered the same things they counted them happy.' **S^h**, however, read οὖν. Farrar notices the impossible rendering of ἐμακάρισσον, 'they counted it a happy thing.'

The versions in this and the following verse give no help ; lines

2. But for that they do not hurt them having been aforetime wronged, they give thanks ;
 And for the difference that was made, they besought favour for them.

3. In place of which thou didst afford a blazing pillar,
 A guide indeed of their unexplored journey,
 But a harmless sun to light their honourable exile.

1-3 they translate literally, but line 4 they plainly did not understand, and give wild translations.

Another rendering is proposed by Deane on the suggestion of Gutberlet, viz. to take *ὅτι* as the relative *ὅτι* and translate 'whatsoever they also (the Israelites) had suffered by reason of their bondage, they (the Egyptians) thought them happy compared with their own evil case.' But no MS. or version supports this.

2. The notes on v.¹ explain the first line ; the second is much disputed ; the rendering given means that in their gratitude for having been spared the Egyptians begged of Pharaoh that he would favour the Israelites and allow them to depart. There is nothing of course in Scripture which quite justifies this ; but cf. Exod. II⁸, 'All these thy servants shall come down unto me, and bow down themselves unto me, saying, Get thee out,' etc. Cf. 12³³, 10²⁴. R.V., 'because they had been at variance with them' does not represent the Greek. *Ἄλλον* 'for the change (or the difference) they asked a favour.' A.V. 'besought them pardon for that they had been enemies.' So Deane. And this may be right, cf. Grimm.

Ἄλλον 'ut esset differentia donum petebant.' Arab. 'they rejoiced at the favour conferred on them,' which is obviously a mere guess at what the text should have meant.

A strange meaning is noticed by Grimm as that accepted by Luther and others, 'Begged of them the favour of their departure.' Arnald adds : 'There is another interpretation of this passage ; that the Israelites besought God that there might always be such a difference made between his own people and the Egyptians, or between them and their other enemies, as there was in this particular instance of the darkness.' Cf. Exod. II⁷, 'that ye may know how that the Lord doth put a difference between the Egyptians and Israel.' Arnald also suggests the rendering of *χάριν* as an adverbial preposition, quoting Gal. 3¹⁹, *ὅτι νόμος τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν προσετέθη* ; he would translate 'they entreated them, because of their former differences.' But this is hardly the usual force of *χάριν*.

3. 'Ανθ' *ἄντι* is probably literal here. R.V. 'whereas,' which is certainly adversative, but not strong enough. *Ἄλλον*, 'Propter quod,' is a possible meaning in other contexts, but not here. Arab. has an idea of its own ; 'Instead of (ἀνθ' *ἄντι*) a blazing pillar . . . Thou

4. For worthy were they to be deprived of light and to be imprisoned in darkness,
 Who kept thy sons shut up,
 Through whom the indestructible light of the law was to be given to the world.

5. But them who plotted to slay the infants of the holy ones
 (And when a single child had been exposed and saved)
 Thou to convict them didst deprive of the multitude of their children,
 And all together didst destroy them in a mighty flood.

gavest them a sun which harmed not their desired journey'; so also **λ**, 'sine laesura boni hospitii,' A.V., 'a harmless sun to entertain them honourably.' **λ** as usual splits up *φιλοτίμου* into its component parts and renders 'a pilgrimage enamoured of honour.' Occasionally the word means no more than 'honourable,' as in Aesch., *Eum.*, 1032. *μεγάλαι φιλότυμοι Νυκτὸς παῖδες*.

The idea is, no doubt, that instead of the burning sun of the Sinaitic desert the mild rays of the pillar of fire lighted the Israelites. This is the idea expanded in the Targum quoted by Gregg. 'The sons of Israel were protected by seven clouds of glory on their four sides; one above them, that neither hail nor rain might fall upon them, *nor they be burned by the heat of the sun*; one beneath them, that they might not be hurt by thorns, serpents, or scorpions; and one went before them, to make the valleys even and the mountains low, and to prepare them a place of habitation.'

φιλοτίμου ξενιτείας is a difficult genitive to explain. It may, of course, depend on *ἀβλαβῆ*, which is used with the genitive in Plat., *Legg.*, 953 A; but Winer (Moulton), p. 242, suggests that, as the genitive is the 'whence-case,' Heb. 3¹², *καρδία πονηρὰ ἀπιστίας*, and this passage may be explained in the same way, 'a heart evil in respect of unbelief,' and 'a sun harmless in respect of their journey.'

4. **λ** gives the sense, but is too literal in translating *ήμελλε*, 'incipiebat.' Arab. is here better, and in the whole verse represents the Greek well.

The interest of the verse centres in the idea here propounded of the universal application of the 'Law.' Our author would probably understand this of the 'religion' of Israel in general. The idea that the ceremonial law would last for ever is found in Tobit 1⁶, Baruch 4¹, but this is a different idea, viz. that the religion of God was not to be confined to his own people, but to spread over all the earth. Philo's idea (*De Abrab.*, § 19) is a very restricted one. The Jews are to possess *τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀπαντος ἀνθρώπων γένους ἱερωσύνην καὶ προφητείαν*. Wisdom's view is probably a larger one.

τῷ αἰώνι is here used exactly as in 14⁶, where see notes.

5. There is confusion here; line 2 is a mere parenthesis which

6. That night was known beforehand to our fathers,
That knowing surely on what oaths they trusted they might
be cheered.

Arab. works into the text by translating 'through one child that was exposed . . . thou didst destroy,' which is doubtless what Pseudo-Solomon meant to imply. But whereas three contrasts should be indicated—(1) the natural one, the avenging of the Hebrew children by the death of the firstborn; (2) the drowning of the drowners; (3) the survival of the one child effecting the death of thousands of his would-be murderers—(1) is allowed to slip altogether, and undue stress laid on the weaker contrast (2), while (3) is only hinted at, though with reckless disregard of the text \mathfrak{S}^P makes it the main point; cf. Arab. also. The parenthesis is expressed by the ablative absolute in \mathfrak{L} , 'uno exposito filio et liberato'; A.V., R.V., and \mathfrak{S}^h evade the difficulty of construction in a similar way.

'Traductio,' the L rendering of ἔλεγχος, means, as in 2¹⁴, etc., 'rebuke' or 'conviction.' It is a question whether *εἰς* ἔλεγχον should not be connected with the preceding line, but the idea of rebuke is more naturally connected with the destruction of many than the saving of one. The idea that Moses was the only child who escaped Pharaoh's decree (Farrar) is not implied.

ἐκτεθέντος is almost a technical word for the exposure of an infant with a view to its death. Hdt. i. 112, λαβομένη τῶν γουνάτων τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔχρυψε μηδεμίη τέχνη ἐκθεῖναι μν. Cf. Ar., *Nub.*, 530. 'Cast forth' in R.V. and A.V. is therefore insufficient. Siegfried, 'ausgesetzt,' which gives the true meaning. Ομοθυμαδὸν, 'with one accord' (cf. v. 12), is the wrong word. In Job 16¹⁰ it is used in the correct sense. Job 21²⁶, 'they lie down alike in the dust' is more to the purpose, but does not quite justify the use here.

In Jubilees xlviii. 14 we have the statement, 'a thousand strong and brave men perished for one infant whom they had cast into the river,' and on the strength of this Charles would translate 'in retribution (*εἰς ἔλεγχον*) for even a single child that was exposed thou didst take away a multitude': but it is more than doubtful if *ἔλεγχος* would bear this meaning.

6. R.V., 'That having sure knowledge they might be cheered by the oaths wherein they trusted,' which is contrary to all versions. **L**, 'ut vere scientes quibus juramentis crediderunt animaequiores essent.' **S^P**, 'That they might know in truth that by him in whom they trusted they should live.' Arab., 'Knowing by what oaths they were bound, they should in safety remember them' (an unwarrantable expansion). A.V. is correct, and so also **S^h**.

Reuss explains the sense: 'if God kept his promise' (Exod. 11⁴) 'as to the death of the firstborn, they might rely on him to keep His promises for the future.' But the expression is probably general.

7. But by thy people was expected

Preservation of the righteous and destruction of their enemies;

8. For wherein thou didst punish the adversaries,

Therein calling us to thee thou didst glorify us.

They knew they were a covenanted people and God would save them in the long run.

Gregg's remark that 'the writer in a way most unusual for him identifies himself with the Israelites' is hardly correct. *ἐκεῖνοι*, 'the other people,' are the Egyptians (chap. 16⁴, etc.), while *οὗτοι*, the people on this side, are the Israelites: he merely pictures himself as marching with them.

πατράσιν has caused much difficulty, on the ground that Pseudo-Solomon never uses it elsewhere in the New Testament sense of 'our ancestors' (as in Heb. 1¹, 3⁹, and throughout Acts 7). It is also urged that if the Israelites in general are meant, and so *πατέρες* are identical with *λαός*, the adversative force of *δέ* in the next verse is lost. Commentators therefore, as early as A. Lapide, decline to consider Exod. 11⁴ *sqq.* and 12²¹ *sqq.*, which are amply sufficient to justify the statement in the text, and render *πατράσιν* 'the patriarchs,' referring to the promises to Abraham and others, and citing Gen. 15¹³, 22¹⁶, 26³, 28¹³. But (1) it is not certain that the word is not elsewhere used for ancestors. In v. ⁹, as we shall see, 'fathers' may have this or a cognate meaning; and it is quite in Pseudo-Solomon's way to use a word in one sense for a verse or two and never repeat it again; (2) there is absolutely no reference in the passages quoted from Genesis to the last, or indeed any, of the plagues of Egypt.

ἐπευθυνμήσωσι is an extraordinary word, found only in Aristaenetus, *Ep.* ii. 14 (cited by Grimm: date about 450 A.D.). It is matched by *L*, 'animaequiores essent,' a word confined to ecclesiastical Latin.

7. *προσεδέχθη* is rendered by *L* 'suscepta est' ('a populo tuo sanitas justorum'), 'sanitas' being a strangely literal translation of *σωτηρία*, which is elsewhere rendered 'salus,' 16⁶. Cf., however, 6²⁴ (26). *S^P* omits the word altogether, and Arab. translates 'obtained,' taking the word as active. A.V. follows *L*, 'was accepted,' which gives a feeble sense.

δέ is translated by A.V., R.V. 'so,' which is impossible, though the Arabic *ف*, which has very rarely an adversative sense, seems to support it. *G^N* omits the connecting particle altogether, and *G^B* also, but nearly all MSS., with *S^b*, have it. We can only translate the text as it stands, noting Pseudo-Solomon's clumsy use of the connecting particles here as elsewhere.

8. This is a general expression, answering to many that have

9. For in secret did the holy children of good men sacrifice,
 And with one accord arranged the law of divinity,
 That the saints should share alike in the same blessings
 and dangers,
 Already chanting the praises of the fathers.

gone before, but here restricted by the tenth verse to the case of the death of the firstborn. R.V., 'As thou didst take vengeance,' does not represent the Greek. \mathfrak{L} is equally indefinite, 'Sicut laesisti adversarios, sic et nos provocans magnificasti.' Arab. similarly. \mathfrak{S}^h translates the Greek literally, reading φ and not ω s, which is found in $\mathfrak{G}^N A$. \mathfrak{L} may have read $\pi\kappa\alpha\lambda\epsilon\sigma\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu\sigma$, but not necessarily.

$\pi\kappa\alpha\lambda\epsilon\sigma\alpha\mu\epsilon\nu\sigma$ is not very clear. Reuss suggests two interpretations—(1) the last plague, being immediately followed by the escape of the Israelites, was a summons to them, or (2) by the same means by which God punished their enemies (the Red Sea) he collected his people.

9. R.V. has for line 2 'took upon themselves ($\delta i\acute{\epsilon}\theta\epsilon\nu\tau o$) the covenant of the divine law,' which is surely impossible. A.V. 'made a holy law.' \mathfrak{S}^h 'established.' Cf. Cremer, *Lex. s.v.* (quoted by Bissell). \mathfrak{L} 'justitiae ($\delta\sigma\iota\sigma\tau\eta\tau o$, as \mathfrak{G}^N) legem in concordia disposuerunt.' So \mathfrak{S}^p , unfortunately adding by way of translation of line 3, 'for good and evil alike.' Arab. approximates to R.V. $\delta\sigma\iota\sigma\tau\eta\tau o$ seems to be a plain gloss for the more difficult $\theta\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\eta\tau o$, which is, indeed, not easy to translate, though the meaning is plain; 'they agreed to observe the worship of God.'

There are two distinct readings, both well supported, in line 4. (1) As above, $\pi\kappa\alpha\lambda\mu\epsilon\lambda\pi\kappa\mu\nu\tau\epsilon s$, which alone seems to give any sense to $\eta\delta\eta$: the Israelites were already so far a nation that they had their traditional glories of the patriarchs to chant. (2) $\pi\kappa\alpha\lambda\mu\epsilon\lambda\pi\kappa\mu\nu\tau\omega n$ as A.V., R.V., 'the fathers already leading the sacred songs of praise.' But a variant of (1) is found in \mathfrak{S}^h which, reading $\pi\kappa\alpha\lambda\epsilon\pi\kappa\mu\nu\tau\epsilon s$ for $\pi\kappa\alpha\lambda\mu\epsilon\lambda\pi\kappa\mu\nu\tau\epsilon s$, includes it in the previous sentence, and so translates 'they agreed that the holy fathers should take their share of good things and of dangers, and already began to chant their hymns of praise.'

The reading and rendering (2) seems founded on a fantastic contrast between the 'fathers' in Israel and the lamentation of the Egyptians for their 'children.' Otherwise there is no reason why the sons should sacrifice and the fathers lead the singing.

Other explanations suggested for $\eta\delta\eta$ are (Gregg) 'while now the singing was in progress,' there was heard the discordant cry from the Egyptians, and (Grimm) simply 'already,' i.e. even at this time they had already begun to sing something corresponding to the ceremonial Hallel of later days (Ps. 113-118. Cf. Matt. 25³⁰). Of course the actual Psalms could not be sung in Egypt, but there are indications

10. But there sounded back a discordant cry of the enemies,
 And a piteous voice of lamentation for children was borne
 abroad.

11. But slave together with master being punished with like
 penalty,
 And the common man suffering the same as the king;

of singing (of some kind) at the passover in 2 Chron. 30²¹ (Hezekiah's passover), and 35¹⁵ (Josiah's). *Aἴνους* must mean praises of the patriarchs, and not, as Gregg suggests, songs once sung by them.

ἀγαθῶν in line 1 is surely masculine. To argue that Pseudo-Solomon nowhere else calls the Israelites *ἀγαθοί*, but *ὄστιοι*, *δίκαιοι*, etc., is to show ignorance of that writer's ways, while the rendering of the neuter 'children of blessing' is very forced. Deane rightly calls it a 'barbarous idiom' and rejects Grimm's parallel from John 17¹², *νιὸς τῆς ἀπωλείας*, as irrelevant. Isa. 57⁴, *τέκνα ἀπωλείας*, is more to the point, but *τέκνα* is not *παιδες*. Cf. Farrar *ad loc.* *S^h* has the masculine.

κρυφῆ, 'secretly,' is quite justified by Exod. 12⁴⁶, where, for whatever reason, it is plainly intended that the celebration of the Passover shall be strictly private. For the spelling of the word cf. Blass, *Grammar* (Eng. trans.), p. 7.

10. *L* has for *ἀσύμφωνος βοή* 'inconveniens vox,' which, however, probably represents the Greek in the Latin of the time. *θρηνουμένων παιδῶν* is for clearness translated as above, though it does not exactly correspond to the Greek. *L* 'planctus ploratorum infantium' is literal but confusing, as is seen in Arab., 'a voice of children weeping.' *S^h* takes the genitive as absolute 'as the children were lamented,' which may be right, though hardly in Wisdom's style. Swete omits *φωνή* in line 2, but Fritzsche inserts it. So *GENA*, *L*, Arab., and *S^h*. It is obviously needed. To take *οἰκτρά* for *οἴκτος* is impossible, and *οἰκτρά* standing alone must be taken as a second epithet of *βοή*.

Farrar seems right in taking *ἀσύμφωνος* to mean 'clashing with the joyful songs of the Israelites,' and not merely discordant in itself, which gives no antithesis of the kind dear to Pseudo-Solomon. For the cry cf. Exod. 11⁶, 12³⁰.

Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. 24, *ἀπάντων ἀθρόως ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐκβοησάντων, ἐνα θρῆνον ἀπὸ περάτων εἰς πέρατα συνηχῆσαι κατὰ πάσης τῆς χώρας*, and *ΤΙΟΝ*, on Exod. 12³⁰ seem to imply that the cry could be heard four hundred miles away.

As a specimen of *S^P* its translation must here be given: 'But there came on the enemies misery without equal, and they were eaten up in compensation for their children.' It is useless to quote further renderings of this type. The next verse is better.

11. A.V. and all the versions make this an independent verse, a

12. Yet all alike under one form of death

Had corpses innumerable:

For the living were not even sufficient to bury them,

Since at one moment their more precious offspring was destroyed.

13. For disbelieving all by reason of the enchantments,

Upon the destruction of the firstborn they confessed the people to be God's son.

nominative absolute, and if δέ be read in v. ¹² this is correct. R.V. omits the δέ, as does **G**^N, and makes the sentence run on into v. ¹², thus avoiding anything like an anacoluthon. Deane would supply ἦν with the participles, which is violent.

For the sense cf. Exod. 12²⁹, 'from the first-born of Pharaoh that sat on his throne unto the firstborn of the captive that was in the dungeon.' There **G** not unnaturally makes 'the captive' feminine, as in 11⁵, 'even unto the firstborn of the maid-servant that is behind the mill.'

12. ὁμοθυμαδόν is again used in the quite unclassical sense (without any regard to its derivation) of 'all alike,' as in v. ⁵. As usual, Pseudo-Solomon picks up a word which pleases him, uses it once or twice in the course of a few verses, and then forgets it. ὅνομα in the sense of 'form' seems to have no parallel either classical or Biblical.

The δέ at the beginning of the line has very little adversative sense. A.V. 'so,' R.V. 'yea.' **L** 'ergo.' Arab. 'finally,' 'in short.'

The statement that there were not enough living to bury the dead is a mere exaggeration of Num. 33^{3.4}. 'The children of Israel went out with an high hand, in the sight of all the Egyptians, while the Egyptians were burying their firstborn.' To palliate the overstatement by referring to the long and pompous ceremonies required at an Egyptian funeral is unnecessary.

πρὸς μίαν δοπήν, 'moment,' having regard to its derivation, is the best translation. **L** 'uno momento,' and so **S^h**. **S^P** has 'at one wink.'

ἐντιμοτέρα (Reuss 'leur progéniture privilégiée' referring to the eldest son's rights) need not be translated as A.V., 'their noblest offspring.' The comparative is sufficient. **L** 'quae erat praeclarior natio illorum.'

13. **L**, expressing the meaning of line 2 accurately by inserting 'tunc vero primum' at the beginning, yet translates ὡμολόγησαν 'spoponderunt.' **S^P** is for once close to the text; Arab. explains line 1 by inserting 'all the plagues which had befallen them.'

The Greek of line 2 is peculiar, for λαός without the article is rare, but is found in Eccl. 46⁷, Jude ⁵. Winer (Moulton), § xix. 1, gives many examples of words which had become so technical as to lose the

14. For while peaceful silence enveloped all things,
And night in her own swift course was at midway,
15. Thy all-powerful word from heaven, from the royal throne,
A stern warrior leapt into the midst of the doomed land,
article (as in our English expression 'Ministers' for 'the Ministry'),
but does not include λαός.

For the expression 'son of God' for the entire people cf. Exod. 4²², *υἱὸς πρωτότοκός μου Ἰσραὴλ*. Hos. 11¹, *νήπιος Ἰσραὴλ καὶ ἡγάπησα αὐτόν*, neither of which, however, exactly supports this passage; nor does 2^{13.18} above.

The passage is a complete contradiction of 16^{8.9}, where the magicians are described as become objects of contempt. It ignores Exod. 8¹⁹, when they themselves suffer from the boils and blains, and goes back to Exod. 7^{13.22}, where Pharaoh's heart is hardened by the success of the enchanters. Nor is there any hint that the Egyptians acknowledged the people to be 'the child of God' except Exod. 12³¹, 'Go, serve the Lord, as ye have said . . . and bless me also.'

14. The variants are not important. \mathfrak{S}^p has for line 2 'when fear arose at midnight.' \mathfrak{S}^h keeps closely to the text. Arab. has for *τὰ πάντα* 'all creatures'; but none support the curious repetition of *τὰ πάντα* given at the end of line 2 by Swete, apparently from \mathfrak{G}^B *prima manu*. It seems obviously the insertion of a too accurate copyist, who thought that *μεσαζούσης* as a transitive verb ought to have something to govern. This also accounts for the alteration of the word to *μεσούσης* in the good cursive 261.

The passage at once recalls the famous lines of Virg., *Aen.*, iv. 521, 'Nox erat, et placidum carpebant fessa soporem Corpora per terras,' etc.

15. There is no variation in the Greek texts or \mathfrak{S}^h . \mathfrak{S}^p takes *πολεμιστής* for an accusative plural, and translates 'Cast down the warriors on the ground in the midst of destruction.' Arab. is similar and useless.

δλεθρίας γῆς is 'the land of ruin,' like Bunyan's 'City of Destruction.' \mathfrak{L} 'terram exterminii.' Cf. 1 Kings 20⁴², where Benhadad is called ἄνδρα δλέθριον, 'a man appointed to destruction.' Soph., *Trach.*, 878, *τάλαιν' δλεθρία, τίνι τρόπῳ θανεῖν σφε φῆς*.

The meaning of λόγος here has been much discussed, and it is claimed that it represents the Philonian Logos; the half independent Spirit.

(a) It is quite certain that there is here a reminiscence of 1 Chron. 21¹⁶, ἐπῆρεν Δαυεὶδ τοὺς ὁφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰδεν τὸν ἄγγελον κυρίου ἐστῶτα ἀνὰ μέσον τῆς γῆς καὶ τὸν οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἡ ρομφαία αὐτοῦ ἐσπασμένη ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ, from which it would appear that the 'angel of the Lord' is meant, and in Philo (Dähne, i. 259, n. 259, who quotes *De Conf. Ling.*, § 8, κατὰ τῶν θείων ἔργων καὶ λόγων συνομοσά-

μενοι οὐς καλεῖν ἔθος ἀγγέλους, *De Migrat. Abr.*, § 31, etc., same words) the angels are said to be called at times λόγοι. It is objected that Pseudo-Solomon nowhere else speaks of angels—an argument utterly valueless in his case; at all events he knew his Jewish theology, in which angels played an important part. To urge that παντοδύναμος cannot be applied to an angel is again to attribute to 'Wisdom' greater accuracy than he generally shows. Cf. also Reuss's note on v. ²¹ quoted below.

(b) It is also quite certain that the function here attributed to λόγος is elsewhere assigned to ρῆμα. Hos. 6⁵, ἀπέκτεινα αὐτούς (the false prophets), ἐν ρήματι στόματός μου, and it is to be noted that though the ^TON. on Exod. 12²⁹ has 'the word of the Lord slew all the firstborn in the land of Egypt,' the text here and in 11⁴ speaks of God as the agent. 'Hence it is plain that the writer had no intention of hypostatising the Logos, but had in mind only the customary Jewish periphrasis for the Lord, *i.e.* the memra of Jehovah. This expression means the Divine Being in self-manifestation' (Gregg). It is noteworthy that L here uses 'sermo' and not 'verbum' to translate λόγος.

(c) The view that the Logos of Philo is here meant is, however, still maintained, as it was in his *Bampton Lectures* by Burton, whose knowledge of 'Wisdom' seems to have been limited. The most recent presentation of it is by Fairweather in Hastings' *D. B.*, v. 283a. 'The description here given of the Logos inevitably suggests what the writer has already said of Wisdom as sharing God's royal throne (9⁴). And besides, as Langen (*Judenthum*, p. 262) has pointed out, there is merely a transference to the Logos of what is before said of Wisdom; viz., that it pervadeth and penetrateth all things (7²⁴), and reacheth from one end of the world to the other (8¹). In support of the view that God's word is here only another name for His wisdom, we have the general doctrine otherwise already expressed in our book; that God executes His will through His word (16¹²). *It can make no difference* that in this case His will was to punish Egypt and was not associated with any healing or creative purpose.' But it makes all the difference. It is useless to quote, as Langen does (263 n.) the drowning of the Egyptians (10¹⁹) by σοφία. The point is that the Philonian Logos is never represented as the agent of destruction, and this led even Gfrörer (ii. 232) to refuse to identify the Logos here with that of Philo. Wisdom's idea, in short, of the 'Word of God' is that of an emissary of vengeance, as in the New Testament in Heb. 4¹², foreshadowed in Jer. 23²⁹, οὐκ ἰδοὺ οἱ λόγοι μου ὀσπερ πῦρ, καὶ ὡς πέλνξ κόπτων πέτραν, Ps. 148⁸, 147¹⁵, etc. It must always be remembered that Wisdom's purpose is homiletic rather than philosophic. Cf. Drummond, *Philo*, i. 228.

'That the personification of the Logos is here purely poetical,' says Gregg (a point which Langen, 263, n. 21, is quite unable to understand), 'is supported by those Biblical narratives in which the agent is

16. Bearing as a sharp sword thine irrevocable commandment,
And standing filled all things with death ;
And touched the heaven yet trod upon the earth.

now spoken of as God and again as the angel of the Lord.' He cites Gen. 31¹¹ and¹³, 'The angel of God said to me in the dream, Jacob' ; 'I am the God of Bethel.' Gen. 32²⁴ and³⁰ (the wrestling of Jacob with the angel or God) is uncertain. Exod. 14¹⁹ and²¹ are also ambiguous. But Acts 7³⁰ and³² ('the burning bush') is clear ; and cf. Ezekiel the poet in Euseb., *P. E.*, ix. 29, § 8, δ ἐκ βάρου σοι θεῖος ἐκλάμπει λόγος, where God is speaking. So Acts 7³⁸, 'the angel which spake to him in Mount Sinai' ; Gal. 3¹⁹, Heb. 2², where 'angels' are spoken of as declaring the will of God. 'In these passages we see how strongly the Jews felt that what in God is capable of manifestation must be distinguishable from his transcendental existence, and yet that they only ventured to provide themselves with a formula to express God in self-manifestation : they were very far from postulating a "second eternal" which Philo did.'

It remains to notice the suggestion of Bretschneider, who, it will be remembered, assumes a Hebrew original for 'Wisdom.' He thinks there is a mistranslation, or confusion between בָּרֶךְ 'word,' and בָּרֶךְ 'pestilence.' This stands or falls with his theory. Cf. *Dogmatik der Apokr.*, p. 259.

That the old commentators, as Cornely says, interpreted λόγος as 'unigenitum Dei Filium, Verbum Dei' is no doubt true. But it would be difficult to adduce any passage of Scripture where the *destructive* powers either of the son or of the personified Logos are implied, unless indeed we refer to Matt. 10³⁴, οὐκ ἥλθον βαλεῖν εἰρήνην ἀλλὰ μάχαιραν, or to 12⁹ above ('by one stern *word* to make away with them at once') ; but there the λόγος is surely not personified. Bishop Bull's statement, cited by Deane, to the effect that this text assigns to the Logos 'a royal throne in heaven' is totally wrong. The translation of R.V. 'out of the royal throne' is unjustifiable. The preposition is not *ἐκ* but *ἀπό*, 'away from.' The Logos has no more a throne than has Wisdom in 9⁴, 'that sitteth by thy throne' (cf. notes *ad loc.*), or any other of the angels that stand round about the throne and are sent thence to execute justice upon the earth. Cf. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, p. 167.

16. **L** has an extraordinary mistranslation, 'Gladius acutus insimulatum imperium tuum portans' ; **S^p** has 'A sharp sword in thy commandment, which is no accepter of persons, it brought (the translation in Walton seems wrong) and completed all at thy command.' There is obviously a mistake in **لَوَّافَ**, which is repeated from the earlier part of the verse. Arab. is loose, but gives the sense. **S^h** exactly represents the Greek.

17. Then on a sudden visions of dreams terribly dismayed them,
And unexpected fears came upon them:

18. And one here, another there, thrown down half dead,
Made manifest through what cause he was dying:

19. For the dreams that terrified them presaged this,
That they might not perish, not knowing why they suffer.

'Irrevocable' (Siegfried) seems to express the meaning better than 'unfeigned,' Genev., A.V., R.V. Deane 'irreversible,' Gregg 'inflexible.' Cf. Heb. 4¹², Ζῶν γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἐνεργῆς καὶ τομώτερος ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν μάχαιραν δίστομον.

For οὐρανοῦ ἥπτετο cf. Hom., *Il.*, iv. 443 (of Eris) οὐρανῷ ἐστήριξε κάρη καὶ ἐπὶ χθονὶ βαίνει and the imitation in Virg., *Aen.*, iv. 177 (of Rumour), 'Ingrediturque solo et caput inter nubila condit.' Philo, *De Confus. Ling.*, § 23, ἀκρόπολις . . . ἡσ οἱ μὲν πόδες ἐπὶ γῆς βανέτωσαν ἡ δὲ κεφαλὴ πρὸς οὐρανὸν φθανέτω . . . ἐπιβᾶσα (of evil as represented by a tower). Cf. *De Mundi Opif.*, § 51.

17. Fritzsche reads δεινῶν (for δεινῶς) with ὄνειρων, but it is not supported by \mathfrak{S}^h , though backed by $\mathfrak{G}^{\mathfrak{N}^A}$, \mathfrak{L} , \mathfrak{S}^P , Arab. ἐπέστησαν, \mathfrak{L} 'supervenerunt,' \mathfrak{S}^h 'fell upon them.'

There is no authority for this statement. Arnald thinks it may be a fragment of Rabbinic tradition, or a reflection of the well-known superstition according to which great disasters were heralded by apparitions of the dead. He compares the appearance of Hector to Aeneas in Virg., *Aen.*, ii. 270.

18. \mathfrak{L} adds at end of line 2 'mortis,' a mere repetition by a copyist who did not see that 'causam' already had a clause dependent on it. Both Arab. and \mathfrak{S}^P translate 'why *they* were dying,' as $\mathfrak{G}^{\mathfrak{N}^A}$, etc.

It is a question whether the firstborn or those who died in terror of darkness are meant. If the first, then ἐνεφάνιζεν simply means 'their (simultaneous) death showed that it was due to the wrath of God.' If the latter, there may be something in Grimm's idea that the dying actually declared to the survivors that such wrath was slaying them. \mathfrak{S}^P and Arab. evidently both have this idea.

19. κακῶς πάσχουσι may be a historic or graphic present, but all the versions translate as if it were a regular past tense.

Pfeiderer's idea that we have here a trace of Stoicism is exaggerated. The Stoics certainly did pay much attention to dreams, but so did all ancient peoples. Cf. Jevons' article 'Dreams' in Hastings' *D. B.*, i. 622. Pfeiderer especially quotes M. Aurel. ix. 27.

20. But an experience of death touched the righteous also,
And in the desert there was a destruction of the people ;
But not for long the wrath remained.

21. For a blameless man hasted to be their champion,
Bringing the shield of his own ministry,
Prayer and the propitiation of incense :
He opposed the wrath and set a limit to the disaster,
Showing himself thy servant.

20. **L**, 'Tentatio mortis,' a conveniently ambiguous term, represented also by **S^P** and Arab. A.V. 'tasting.' For 'the wrath' (**L**, Arab., **G** of Swete), **S^P**, **S^h**, **G^N*** have 'thy wrath.'

θραύσις is a peculiar word, used in Num. 16⁴⁶⁻⁴⁹ to mean 'plague,' and often elsewhere in the Old Testament with very little regard to its original meaning of 'breaking' or rather 'smashing.' No classical instance of the verb suggests such a meaning. Very probably 'plague' is the correct rendering here. **L** 'commotio.'

Pseudo-Solomon seeks to minimise the effect of the plague ; but 14,700 persons perished therein.

21. **L** is peculiar ; it translates **ἄμεμπτος** as 'sine querela,' which may mean 'of whom no one could complain,' dividing **κομίσας** into two words 'proferens servitutis suae scutum, orationem et per incensum deprecationem allegans,' and rendering **συμφόρα** 'necessitate.' **S^P** is merely a paraphrase, and Arab. expands greatly.

σπεύσας is supported by Num. 16⁴⁷; **ἔδραμεν εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν**, and 4 Macc. 7¹¹, **ὁ πατὴρ Ἀαρὼν τῷ θυμιατηρίῳ καθωπλισμένος διὰ τοῦ ἔθνοπλήκτου πυρὸς ἐπιτρέχων τὸν ἐμπυριστὴν ἐνίκησεν ἄγγελον**. It is useless to discuss the term 'blameless' applied to Aaron, and to refer it to the fact that he had not taken part in the sin of Korah. Pseudo-Solomon is simply exaggerating the character of one of his Jewish heroes in the usual way.

σπλον A.V., **L** 'shield,' and so probably Arab. Wherever the word is used in the singular in Greek it means 'shield' or something like it ; it certainly never means an offensive weapon. 2 Cor. 10⁴ is not to the point : the plural is there used. Again 'weapon' (R.V.), 'an aggressive weapon, a sword' (Gregg, quoting Eph. 6¹⁷, where **μάχαιρα** is the word used), is totally inappropriate here. Aaron did not attack the destroying power ; he kept it off, 'with propitiation of incense.' Reuss's note is acute : 'Of course this cannot mean that Aaron opposed *God*. The real idea is that it was the angel of the Lord who was executing judgment ; *only for some reason the author is unwilling to express it*.' This throws light on v. 15, where, if we suppose that Pseudo-Solomon deliberately avoids mentioning an angel, the Logos theory falls to the ground.

22. But he overcame the wrath, not by strength of body, not by force of arms,
 But by word he subdued the chastiser,
 Appealing to the oaths and covenants of the fathers.

23. For when the dead were now fallen in heaps upon one another,
 Standing between he cut short the wrath,
 And parted the way to the living.

λειτουργία is the technical word for the ministration of the priesthood throughout the Old Testament. That **L** should render it 'servitus' is remarkable. **S^P** has more accurately 'priesthood.'

22. Every version and every MS. except two cursives, which read *δλοθρεύοντα*, has *όχλον*, 'crowd' or 'crowds.' The two cursives, which include 248, are followed by the Complutensian and A.V. Yet *χόλον* (first suggested by Bauermeister) is almost certainly right. The *όχλος* was at an end: Korah's crew were dead; and evasive translations like 'confusion,' 'perturbation,' 'crowd of destroying angels' command no respect. Gregg's suggestion *τὸν όχλοῦντα* from Tobit 6⁸, where it is used of the troublings of an evil spirit, does not seem likely; it would not have been altered; but his second suggestion, that *ἄγγελον* may have been originally read, is better. A copyist finding that the word was elsewhere studiously avoided, may have altered it here. Actual examples of confusion of *χόλος* with *όχλος*, as of *ἐν χολῇ* with *ἐνοχλῇ* (Heb. 12¹⁵), are given by Grimm. Further, *χόλον* is supported by v. 2¹, *ἀντέστη τῷ θυμῷ*, and v. 2³, *ἀνέκοψε τὴν ὄργην*.

τὸν κολάζοντα is as near to a personification of the destroying spirit as we are likely to get in Wisdom. **L** most curiously translates 'qui se vexabat'; but the destroyer was not plaguing Aaron.

διαθήκας (**S^H** transliterates the word) *πατέρων* is, of course, covenants concluded *with* the fathers. Cf. the case of Noah, Gen. 6¹⁸, etc., Abraham 15⁷, Isaac 17¹⁹, Jacob 28¹³, etc.

23. The difficulty is in the last line. **L** 'divisit illam quae ad vivos ducebant viam' gives no good sense; it apparently means 'cut short the path of the destroyer on his way to the living to kill them.' The force of *πρός* seems rather to be 'on the side towards'; he cleft a way among the people, keeping the living all on one side of it. **S^P** and Armenian (Margoliouth, p. 284) have 'cut a path between the living and the dead'; but it is questionable if this is more than an explanation, or rather an imitation, of Num. 16⁴⁸, *ἀνέστη ἀνὰ μέσον τῶν τε θυηκότων καὶ τῶν ζώντων*. R.V. (and probably A.V.) follows **L** and translates 'cut off the way to the living,' but this should be *ἀπέκοψεν* and not *διέσχισε*, which means 'cleft.' Gregg seeks to avoid this difficulty by 'he cut through it as if he were breaking down a bridge.' Siegfried: 'split open a cleft in the road,' which is far-

24. For on the robe that reached to his feet was the whole world,

And the glories of the fathers upon the four-rowed stone of graving,

And thy greatness on the diadem of his head.

fetched. Cornely 'interrupit viam (plagae) ad vivos (progredi contantis)'; which is very questionable. There is no classical instance of *διασχίζω* meaning 'to cut short.'

The most exact parallel is found in *TJER.* on Numb. 16⁴⁸, 'Aaron stood in the midst in prayer and made a division with his censer between the dead and between the living.'

24. The simple explanation of this passage, of which so much has been made as proving the 'allegorising' tendency of 'Wisdom,' is as follows: there had arisen among a people who delighted in symbolism and in symbolic acts a tradition that each part of the high priest's garments had a mystic meaning. This is given most simply by Joseph., *Ant.*, III. vii. 7. The blue vestment denoted the sky, the girdle the ocean, the sardonyx buttons on the priest's shoulders the sun and moon, the mitre or 'diadem' the heaven again. This was expanded by Philo into four full chapters (*Vita Mosis*, III. §§ 11-14 and elsewhere), but 'Wisdom's' account is all typological, after the manner of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and not allegorising in the Philonian sense, which would imply the explaining away of the high priest's dress altogether. If Philo had merely found a description of this in the Scriptures he might very easily have argued that it existed only in an allegorical sense, but with the dress plain for every one to see at Jerusalem he was reduced to extracting mystic meanings from it; which is all that 'Wisdom' does. What mysterious nonsense Philo would write on such a subject may be seen from *De Migr. Abr.*, § 18, where he says of this same high priest's garment that it is *πεποικιλμένη ἐκ τε νοητῶν καὶ αἰσθητῶν δυνάμεων* (? *τοῦ κόσμου*). Cf. too *De Profugis*, § 20, *ἐνδύεται ὁ μὲν πρεσβύτατος τοῦ ὄντος λόγος ὡς ἐσθῆτα τὸν κόσμον*. Coverdale, Genev. Junius, all interpreted *κόσμος* as 'ornament' or 'beauty,' which seems meaningless, but is supported by the Armenian, *Ֆ*, Vatablus, Luther, etc.

ἐπὶ ποδήρους ἐνδύματος. Some confusion is caused in the versions by the taking of *ποδῆρες* as a substantive. Thus *L* 'in veste poderis quam habebat.' *S^P* has *Է* (which is translated 'ephod') 'of his garment.' Arab. 'the cloak of his garment.' *S^b* simply transliterates, but as an adjective, and probably correctly; for this is the classical use. The word is used as a substantive in *G*, e.g. Exod. 28^{4,31}, Zech. 3⁴, Eccl. 45⁸, and once in the New Testament (Rev. 1¹³). A similar transference of usage is found in the Latin 'talaris,' properly an adjective, but similarly used for a garment reaching to the heels. As a matter of fact the blue vestment, the *mē'il*, did not

25. To these the destroyer yielded ; and these he feared ;
For the single experience of the wrath was sufficient.

reach to the feet, but only to the knees. It was the white garment under it which touched the ground or nearly so. This is called the ephod in 1 Sam. 2²⁸, though the ephod proper was more of the nature of a waistcoat, Exod. 28⁶⁻¹².

$\epsilon\pi\iota\tau\tau\rho\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\chi\omega\iota$ λίθον γλυφῆς is a Hebraism for ‘the four-rowed graven stone’ : the four rows of precious stones in the high priest’s breastplate had the names of the twelve patriarchs ($\pi\alpha\tau\epsilon\rho\omega\iota$ δόξαι, \mathbb{L} ‘Parentum magnalia,’ the great deeds of the fathers). A.V., with \mathbb{L} , Arab. (apparently), and \mathbb{S}^p , adopts the reading λίθων, which turns $\tau\tau\rho\alpha\sigma\tau\iota\chi\omega\iota$ into a substantive. R.V. takes $\epsilon\pi\iota$ with γλυφῆς ‘upon the graving of the four rows of precious stones.’ \mathbb{S}^p has something like this. With λίθον, supported by $\mathbb{G}\mathbb{N}_B$ and \mathbb{S}^h , we must suppose that the whole array of jewels is regarded as one stone. Jos., *Ant.*, III. vii. 5 names the whole ornament ‘the oracle’ (as Exod. 28¹⁶ λογεῖον). Philo, of course, explains that it has a mystical meaning representing the heavens, and writes in *Vita Mosis*, iii. § 12, *οἱ κατὰ στέρνα δώδεκα λίθοι ταῖς χρόαις οὐχ ὅμοιοι . . . τίνος ἐπέρου δείγματ’ εἰσιν ἡ τοῦ ζωδιακοῦ κυκλοῦ*; and so forth. Eight or nine of the stones at least (the translation is not always certain) as enumerated in Exod. 28¹⁹, correspond to those of the foundations of the holy city in Rev. 21^{19,20}.

διάδημα is possibly rather ‘fillet’ or ‘band’ than ‘diadem’ in our sense of the word. It refers to the golden πέταλον or plate fastened on the linen mitre on which were the words $לִיהוָה$ קָרְבָּן. ‘It seems to me,’ says Jos., *Ant.*, III. vii. 7, ‘to mean heaven ; for how otherwise could the name of God be inscribed upon it?’

25. Readings and meaning equally support $\epsilon\phi\omega\beta\eta\theta\eta$, ‘he feared,’ and $\epsilon\phi\omega\beta\eta\theta\sigma\alpha\nu$, ‘they (the people) feared.’ The first is read by $\mathbb{G}AV$, \mathbb{L} , \mathbb{S}^h , A.V., and much may be said for it ; for the change of subject is most unnatural. But it is urged that only an evil spirit could have been terrified by the sacred emblems, whereas this is a messenger of God. Accordingly Swete, following $\mathbb{G}\mathbb{N}_B$, \mathbb{S}^p , Arab. gives $\epsilon\phi\omega\beta\eta\theta\sigma\alpha\nu$, as R.V., which certainly agrees better with line 2.

The sense of line 2 (reading $\epsilon\phi\omega\beta\eta\theta\eta$ in line 1) is given by Farrar : ‘had it not been enough that they should merely have trial, as it were, of what the effects of God’s wrath could be, the high priest’s robes could not have been sufficient to terrify the destroyer’ ; which is not very clear. Gregg (reading $\epsilon\phi\omega\beta\eta\theta\sigma\alpha\nu$), ‘The people feared, because no more was needed to awaken them than the mere preliminary taste of death. They were not like the Egyptians, who needed to drain the cup to its dregs.’

19. 1. But on the ungodly until the end there came pitiless anger ;
 For even their future he knew beforehand.

2. How themselves having changed their minds about their
 departure,
 And having sent them away with eagerness,
 They should pursue them, repenting.

3. For while they yet had their mournings still on their hands,
 And were lamenting over the graves of the dead,
 They seized upon another counsel of folly,
 And whom they cast out with supplications, these they pur-
 sued as runaways.

19. 1. *μεχρὶ τέλους*, *¶* 'usque in novissimum,' which does not give much meaning ; 'usque ad extremum' (*§^P* 'to the limit') is better ; cf. 16⁵ and 1 Thess. 2¹⁸, *ἔφθασεν δ' ἐπ' αὐτούς η ὁργὴ εἰς τέλος*, 'to the uttermost.' Grimm 'until the final destruction in the Red Sea.'

This chapter is said to be quoted by no ancient Greek or Latin writer.

προήδει has as its subject 'God,' supplied out of 'indignation' in line 1. At first sight the moral of the passage seems difficult to understand ; cf. Exod. 3¹⁹, 'I know that the king of Egypt will not let you go,' and 7⁴. But Deane probably states the position of Pseudo-Solomon correctly, 'his doctrine would be that men not using grace given, God, foreseeing that they would make no use of further supplies, punishes accordingly.' (Cf. Additional Note A on 'Pre-existence of the Soul.')

2. 'Επιστρέψαντες (Swete from *¶N**, Ven., etc., *§^P*, Arab.) is adopted as the more difficult reading. The genitive *τοῦ ἀπείναι* is undoubtedly hard to construe. *§^P* *καὶ μέσαται*, which is exactly the Greek, but gives no help. Grimm would render 'having thought anxiously over their departure'; he accepts therefore *ἐπιστρέφεσθαι* with the genitive, which *ἐπιτρέψαντες*, the alternative reading, could hardly govern ; the latter 'permitting them to go' is of course far easier except for this point. It is read by *¶A* and the authorised edition of *¶* ; but many MSS. of the latter have 'quoniam ipsi cum reversi essent.' Siegfried translates *ἐπιστρέψαντες*, 'urging them to go away,' quoting Judith 8¹¹, *ἐπιστρέφειν βοήθειαν*, which is not at all to the point.

μετὰ σπουδῆς, cf. Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. 24, *εἰτ' ἀλλος ἀλλον παρεκάλει τὸν λεών μετὰ πάσης σπουδῆς ἐξ ἀπάσης τῆς γῆς ἐξελαύνειν*, and Exod. 12³³, *κατεβιάζοντο οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι τὸν λαὸν σπουδῆ ἐκβαλεῖν αὐτοὺς ἐκ τῆς γῆς*.

ἀπείναι, 'to be absent,' is for *ἀπέίναι* ; with the rendering 'having provided for their absence,' the difference is small ; with any other translation it is very harsh. Grimm calls it an abbreviation for *τοῦ ἀπιέναι καὶ απείναι*.

3. 'Εν χερσὶν ἔχοντες, *¶* 'inter manus habentes.' The expression is

4. For a deserved fate dragged them on to this end,
 And inspired them with forgetfulness of what things had
 happened,
 That they might fill up the measure of punishment lacking to
 their torments,
 5. And that thy people might accomplish a wonderful journey,
 And they might find a strange death.

an ordinary colloquial one, and there is no need to suppose that the actual manual work of embalming is referred to. The versions are exact, only Arab. being somewhat erratic.

ἐπεσπάσαντο, **L** 'sibi assumpserunt.' In 1¹² the verb means 'to draw towards oneself,' and R.V., not very felicitously, translates it so here.

The folly of the Egyptians was, perhaps, not so great after all. The curious *volte-face* of the Israelites from Etham (Exod. 14²) might well make their enemies think that their ignorance of the locality had led them into a trap between a hostile country and the sea, and that they might be easily crushed there. Moreover, according to the **T¹⁰ON** on Exod. 14², Pharaoh believed that they were now in the dominion of the god Zephon, who was hostile to them.

4. **L** is most inaccurate. It translates line 2, 'Horum quae acciderunt commemorationem amittebant,' which admits of a quite different rendering. **S^P**, though it renders line 1 'vengeance became a scourge for them to the end of necessity,' is thereafter accurate, and Arab. fairly so.

Again in line 3 **L** has 'ut quae deerant tormentis repleret punitio.' There are no variants in the MSS. to justify such transpositions of the Greek. The only important one is the old reading (**GB**) προαναπληρώσωσιν, which is now generally rejected. Cf. 2 Macc. 6¹⁴ ἀναμένει μακροθυμῶν ὁ Δεσπότης μέχρι τοῦ καταντήσαντας αὐτοὺς πρὸς ἐκπλήρωσιν ἀμαρτιῶν κολάσαι.

In ἀξία ἀναγκή, says Reuss, we have a flat contradiction in terms. 'Fatality' implies predestination; 'deserving' implies the freewill of man. Cf. Gfrörer, *Philo*, ii. 254-5. But as Toy (*Enc. Bibl.*, 5340) points out, ἀνάγκη is not in Pseudo-Solomon's system the Greek inevitable destiny, superior even to the gods; it is divine predestination according to desert, or rather, perhaps (Gregg), the inevitable sequence of cause and effect.

Remark that in several passages it is said that Pharaoh and his people hardened their own hearts, Exod. 8^{16.32}; 9³⁴, 'he sinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants.' Cf. Ezek. 2⁴, Zech. 7¹¹, 2 Chron. 36¹⁸, Ps. 95⁸.

5. περάση in line 1 is the common reading. Swete from **GB** reads πειράση, and is supported by **S^P** (which, however, takes the word as

6. For the whole creation in its several kinds was fashioned again anew,

Obeying thy several commandments,
That thy servants might be kept without hurt.

passive) and by Arab., and so Siegfried has 'erführe.' 'They' of course means the Egyptians.

6. This is 'Wisdom's' theory of miracles ; a retuning (v. 18) or re-fashioning of nature according to God's special intentions at the moment. 'Nothing new came into being ; there was only a transmutation of elements,' says Gregg, who also quotes Epictetus (iii. 24), 'This cosmos is one city, and its constituent substance is one, and there must needs be a certain periodicity and surrender of one thing to another, some things being dissolved and others combining, some standing still and others moving'; and again, 'This variability is partaken of both by men and animals ; and not only they but the gods and the four elements are turned up and down in their transmutations, so that earth becomes water, and water air, and air turns into aether ; and the same process of transmutation takes place in the reverse way' (*ἄνωθεν κάτω*). The quantity of water is constant ; any partial disturbance is followed by a corresponding reaction throughout the whole mass.

There is something to be said here for Pfleiderer's view, who (p. 325) thinks the whole idea Heraclitic. He favours the translation of *ἄνωθεν* as not 'up and down,' but as Arab., *ش*, and Bois, 'coelitus,' 'from above.' Cf. John 3³¹, where, however, the word is used in a theological sense, as in Jas. 1¹⁷. *L* has 'ab initio,' for which cf. Acts 26⁵, *προγυνώσκοντές με ἄνωθεν*, etc. Cornely interprets *πάλιν* *ἄνωθεν* 'denuo ut antea' or 'denuo a principio' (there is no pleonasm, he says) ; 'Sapiens quippe ad primam creaturarum formationem respiciens eas virium suarum mutatione non tantummodo *iterum* formatas, sed etiam novas factas esse significat.' " *Ἄνωθεν*, in the sense of 'again,' is confined to Hellenistic Greek, and rare even there. Cf. Joseph., *Ant.*, I. xviii. 3 and Gal. 4⁹. John 3³ is doubtful : the word may mean, as elsewhere, 'from above,' but Nicodemus takes it as *δεύτερον*.

ἐν ἰδίῳ γένει is difficult to translate, though the meaning is fairly plain, and is brought out in R.V. as above. Bois, however, will have it that *īdios* in 'Wisdom' can never mean 'peculiar,' but always 'proprius,' in short a strong possessive pronoun. He cites its uses in 19¹³ (but see below) with a pronoun ; in 2²³, 11¹⁴, 16²³, 18²¹, 19¹⁹, with article but no pronoun ; in 10¹, 18¹⁴, with neither. This is partly borne out by *ش*, which everywhere translates by *كـ*, *except in 17¹⁰ and 19¹³*. Further, it is everywhere used of the third person ; Bois wants to take it here of the second, and to 'thy com-

7. The cloud that shadowed the camp,
 And the coming up of dry land out of water which stood
 there before was seen,
 An unhindered way out of the Red Sea,
 And a grass-bearing plain out of the raging wave;

mands,' for *ταῦς ἰδίαις ἐπιταγαῖς* there is no objection, but when he renders *ἐν ἰδίῳ γένει* 'in respect of thine own family,' *i.e.* the Israelites, we hesitate. Yet this view of Bois receives strong support from the usage of the *κοινή* as represented in the Egyptian papyri. Milligan, *Selections from Greek Papyri*, 21, l. 3, gives an example of *ἴδιος* used of the second person, *viz.*, *ἰδίῳ κινδύνῳ*, 'at thine own risk.'

The versions are fairly accurate, except that *S^P* translates line 1, 'all creation in the order of its nature had been created from above,' and Arab. renders the ambiguous *παιδεῖς* in line 3 by 'thy beloved.' *S^h* has remarkable variations: it has 'course' for *γένει*, and for *οἱ σοὶ παιδεῖς* it read *ὅσιοι παιδεῖς*. It also adds *σαῖς* to *ἐπιταγαῖς* with *GNA* 261 and *L, S^P*. (The versions may have simply supplied it.)

A.V. takes *ἰδίαις ἐπιταγαῖς* as 'thy peculiar commandments,' which Farrar explains as meaning that 'in the passage of the Red Sea the elements obeyed the special injunctions laid on them instead of following their normal course.'

7. *νεφέλη* goes with *ἐθεωρήθη*, but the construction is very awkward, and all the versions render *σκιάζουσα* as a verb finite (A.V. has 'namely, a cloud shadowing the camp') except *S^h*, which has 'that cloud which overshadowed the camp, *but* (which is correct) from the waters which stood up before a *revelation* of dry land was seen.' This possibly denotes *ἀνάδοσις*, read by 261, with which this version so often agrees.

L has for *ἐξ ἐρυθρᾶς θαλάσσης* 'in mari rubro,' and for *ἐκ κλύδωνος βιαίου* 'de profundo nimis,' which seems to point to a variant *βαθοῦς* or the like; Arab. has 'out of the circle of the way,' mistaking *κλύδωνος* for *κύκλου*; and only *S^P* 'out of the storm' seems to refer to *βιαίου*.

χλοηφόρου πέδιον is a gross exaggeration, not found in *T^{TON}* or in Philo or Josephus; but Grimm quotes from Gutmann a Hebrew Passover-prayer, 'they walked through abysses as on made roads: on both sides rose trees laden with fruit; he caused sweet springs to gush out for them in the abyss, and perfume of sweet spices to spread its scent before them.' The 'green field' is possibly a fantastic description of the actual bottom of the Red Sea. Some such tradition is reflected by Pliny, *N. H.*, xiii. 25 (quoted by Arnald), who says that that sea was in many places interspersed with trees, some of them bearing fruit, and had the appearance of a floating wood. Thick seaweed is probably meant.

8. Through which a whole nation, they that were protected by thy hand, did pass,
Beholding marvellous wonders.

9. For as horses they pastured,
And as lambs they skipped,
Praising thee, O Lord, that delivered them.

10. For they remembered yet the things that happened in their sojourning,
How instead of production of cattle the earth brought forth lice,
And instead of water-creatures the river vomited forth a swarm of frogs.

8. *πᾶν* *ζέθνος* in line 1 is the more difficult reading, and is read by nearly all MSS. and versions. The old reading *πανεθνί*, or better *πανεθνεῖ*, has little support, and the word seems to occur once only in Greek, in Strabo. For *σκεπαζόμενοι χειρί* cf. Isa. 51¹⁶, *ὑπὸ τὴν σκιὰν τῆς χειρός μου σκεπάσω σε*.

9. *ἐνεμήθησαν*, in accordance with all classical usage, means 'fed' (Lidd. and Sc., s.v.), and so all the versions, e.g. **L** 'depaverunt escam.' A.V. 'went at large,' and R.V. 'roamed at large' are wrong, but cf. Isa. 63¹³, *ῆγαγεν αὐτοὺς δι' ἀβύσσουν ὡς ἵππον δι' ἐρήμου*. A reading mentioned by A. Lapide, *ἐχρεμέτισαν*, 'they neighed,' seems to be found in no existing MS.

διεσκίρησαν is another instance of Pseudo-Solomon's way of using a word twice or thrice in proximity; cf. 17¹⁸, and for the sense Ps. 114⁴, *τὰ ὅρη ἐσκίρησαν ὥστει κριοί, καὶ οἱ βοῦνοι ὡς ἄρνια προβάτων*.

ρύσαμένον, 'that didst deliver,' is supported by **L**, **S^P**, Arab., and by **G^{AC}**, etc. The other reading, *ρύόμενον*, would imply that God was always and is their deliverer, and may be correct.

10. *παροικία* is a perfectly correct word to denote sojourning (**L** 'incolatus') in a city without the rights of citizenship; but it is confined to Biblical and ecclesiastical Greek. Acts 13¹⁷, *ἐν τῇ παροικίᾳ ἐν γῇ Αλγύπτῳ*, and so *πάροικος* in Acts 7^{6,29}, *πάροικος ἐν γῇ Μαδιάν*.

γενέσεως, **L** 'pro natione animalium,' and so **S^P** and Arab. The word is ambiguous, but a reference to 'production' seems required (v. 11). Deane's idea, however, that a supernatural production from the earth instead of the normal process of generation is alluded to seems far-fetched; the earth does not ordinarily generate cattle. A.V. omits the word altogether. 'The ground in reality,' says Arnald, 'does not bring forth flies, much less cattle; the meaning is, and the sense is much more natural and just, that the ground was so disposed by God as to be a proper *nidus* for the generation of flies, but did not afford its usual nourishment for the support and increase of cattle.'

11. But later on they beheld also a new production of fowl,
When led on by appetite they demanded meats of
delicacy;

12. For for their comfort there came up for them the quail from
the sea.

So Ps. 104¹⁴, where, immediately after 'he bringeth forth grass for the cattle,' we are told that God bringeth forth food out of the earth and wine and oil; obviously a hyperbole, as here.

σκνίφα, 'lice,' 'flies,' 'sandflies' (R.V.). The word is properly singular, and is altered in some MSS. into *σκνίφας*; but the declension is uncertain (cf. Lidd. and Sc.), and it is quite possible that Pseudo-Solomon meant it for a plural. That the versions give a plural means nothing; they would naturally translate it so, as we do. But for the singular use in such a case cf. Exod. 10¹², ἄκρις, and Joel 2²⁵, ἀνταποδόσω ὑμῖν ἀντὶ τῶν ἐτῶν ὧν κατέφαγεν ἡ ἄκρις καὶ ὁ βροῦχος καὶ ἡ ἐρυσίβη καὶ ἡ καμπή. Cf. Exod. 8¹⁸, ἐξαγαγεῖν τὸν σκνίφα.

ἀντὶ ἐνύδρων (there is no need to supply *γενέσεως* with Deane), **L** 'pro piscibus.' Frogs are, of course, ἐνύδρα, but there can be no doubt as to the meaning.

ἐξηρεύξατο properly, as **L**, 'eructavit,' 'belched forth,' is from Exod. 8³, ἐξερεύξεται ὁ ποταμὸς βατράχους.

11. 'Εφ' ὑστέρω, **L** 'novissime,' which seems to represent a reading 'εφ' ὑστάτω. **S^P, S^H**, 'afterwards.' Arab. curiously 'add to this, that,' which seems also to indicate a variant.

γένεσιν here is undoubtedly 'production.' 'A new race of birds' (R.V.) is absurd, for quails must have been perfectly familiar to the Hebrews. Cf. for their immense numbers Post in Hastings' *D. B.*, iv. 179.

ἐδέσματα τρυφῆς is a Hebraism for 'delicate meats' as A.V., Arab. 'Escas epulationis,' **L** which means 'meats of revelry' is a possible translation of *τρυφῆς*.

We remark that Pseudo-Solomon, *more suo*, takes a very different view of the story from that given in Exod. 16¹¹, Num. 11⁴⁻³⁵, where it is 'the mixed multitude that was among them' that 'fell a-lusting.' It is most strongly put in Ps. 77³⁰⁻³¹, 'They were not estranged from their lust, their meat was yet in their mouths when the anger of God went up against them,' and most leniently in Ps. 105⁴⁰, 'They asked, and he brought quails, and satisfied them with the bread of heaven.' On this last 'Wisdom' probably relied.

12. **L**, which translates *παραμύθιον* in 3¹⁸ 'allocutio,' in the sense of 'comfort,' here expands by adding 'desiderii,' and may have read *δρέξεως* 'for the assuaging of their desire.'

There is no need to suppose that *ἐκ θαλάσσης* means 'out of the sea.' We are expressly told in Num. 11³¹, 'There went forth a wind from the Lord, and brought quails from the sea.' Cf. Post, *l.c.*

13. And the punishments came upon the sinners,
 Not without signs preceding, in the violence of the
 thunders ;
 For justly did they suffer by their own wickednesses,
 For they practised a yet harsher hatred of strangers.

14. For certain persons did not receive them that knew them
 not when they came,
 But these enslaved guests that did them kindness.

Farrar's remark is acute : 'this reversion to facts of which he has already explained the significance, shows that the writer has exhausted his originality and has nothing left to say which he has not said already.' There is indeed little to take hold of in this last chapter.

Cornely remarks that the Egyptians were warned by a storm which fell upon them after they had entered the passage and before Moses stretched out his hand and brought the waters back. He refers to Exod. 14²⁴, Ps. 77¹⁷⁻¹⁹, and Joseph., *Ant.*, II. xvi. 3. The first reference does not prove much ; the others are stronger. Arnald notices the curious **L** translation of **G** in Ps. 77¹⁸, where **G** has *ἐν τῷ τρόχῳ* (? whirlwind), but **L** has 'rota curruum.'

13. *ai τιμωρίαι* is 'the punishments.' Chary in his use of the article, Pseudo-Solomon employs it here with effect. The comforts are for the Hebrews ; the punishments for their enemies.

The versions here again become erratic. **L** has 'argumentis' for *τεκμηρίων*, which is perhaps unexceptionable ; but **S^P** has for 'violence of thunders,' 'indignation and mishap,' and Arab. is altogether astray. Only **S^H** keeps closely to the Greek, but translates *ἰδίαις πονηρίαις* 'by their peculiar iniquities.' Cf. notes on v. 6. **S^P** translates line 4, 'For they had devised an evil way.'

The 'thunders' can hardly be referred to Exod. 14²⁴, 'The Lord looked forth upon the host of the Egyptians through the pillar of fire and of cloud, and discomfited the host of the Egyptians,' but to the expansion of this in **T^{TON}** and **T^{IER}**. The latter has 'the word of the Lord looked forth upon the host of the Egyptians and cast upon them pitch and fire and hailstones, etc.' So Joseph. *Ant.*, II. xvi. 3, 'Showers of rain also came down from the sky, and dreadful thunders and lightning with flashes of fire. Thunderbolts also were darted upon them.'

14. The mannerism of Pseudo-Solomon, which causes him to avoid all proper names (and as Reuss points out even to shun the naming of the 'angel of the Lord' in 18²⁵), is here pushed to an absurdity. We are simply left to conjecture that it is the Sodomites who are meant, and the comparison of them as superior in virtue to the Egyptians is to the full as perverse and absurd.

ἀγνοοῦντας in line 1 is difficult and therefore probably right. It is

15. And not only so, but whatever allowance there be shall be theirs,

Since they received hatefully those that were aliens ;

so given in \mathfrak{S}^h , and there is no real variant. Grotius suggested $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\nu\dot{\omega}\tau\alpha s$, which would represent the \mathfrak{L} 'ignotis,' but \mathfrak{S}^p , \mathfrak{S}^h represent $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\nu\alpha\dot{\omega}\tau\alpha s$. Arab. probably is like \mathfrak{L} , but is ambiguous. It either means 'not knowing them' as above, or 'not knowing the place,' as \mathfrak{S}^p seems to imply. R.V. 'strangers,' A.V. 'those whom they knew not when they came,' which cannot be right.

$\epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha s$, both through the benefits conferred on the land through Joseph and through their own labours in the land of bondage. And they were certainly invited guests, as we see from Gen. 45^{17.18.} Gregg is probably right in thinking that there is a reference to later ill-treatment of Jews by Egyptians. \mathfrak{S}^p has for $\epsilon\nu\epsilon\rho\gamma\epsilon\tau\alpha s$ 'foreign stewards,' doubtless referring to Joseph.

Churton's explanation of the antithesis between the two verses also explains $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\nu\alpha\dot{\omega}\tau\alpha s$, 'The men of Sodom refused hospitality to those to whom they were unknown and in no way indebted.'

An extraordinary turn to this passage was given by the old commentators, who, apparently swayed by the \mathfrak{L} translation of $o\acute{i}\ \mu\acute{e}r\ .\ .\ .\ o\acute{v}\tau\acute{o}i\ \delta\acute{e}$ as 'alii . . . alii,' made it refer to two different classes of Egyptians, some of whom were less inhospitable than others. The succeeding verses are incompatible with this idea.

15. This is probably the meaning of \mathfrak{L} , 'Et non solum haec, sed et aliis respectus illorum erat' (the last word is unfortunate. It is not $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{a}i$, which \mathfrak{S}^p , \mathfrak{S}^h , and Arab. translate properly). With the rendering given A.V. to a certain extent agrees; 'peradventure some respect shall be had of those.' R.V., 'God shall visit the men of Sodom after another sort' agrees more or less with Arab. and \mathfrak{S}^p .

The difficulty turns on two words, the ever ambiguous $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}\kappa\kappa\acute{\o}t\acute{\iota}$, and $\dot{\eta}\tau\acute{\iota}s$. For the latter many conjectures are hazarded. Swete actually reads $\dot{\eta}\ \tau\acute{\iota}s$ (the confirmatory $\dot{\eta}$), but this seems too classical for Pseudo-Solomon. Other suggestions are: $o\acute{v}\ \mu\acute{o}n\acute{o}\ \acute{a}\acute{\l}\acute{l}\acute{\eta}\ \tau\acute{\iota}s\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}\kappa\kappa\acute{\o}t\acute{\iota}$ or $o\acute{v}\ \mu\acute{o}n\acute{o}\ a\acute{u}\tau\acute{\eta},\ \acute{a}\acute{\l}\acute{\l}\acute{\eta}\ \tau\acute{\iota}s\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{a}i$, or $o\acute{v}\ \mu\acute{o}n\acute{o}\ \acute{a}\acute{\l}\acute{\l}\acute{\eta}\ \acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}\kappa\kappa\acute{\o}t\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\acute{a}i\ a\acute{u}\tau\acute{\eta}\acute{o}i\acute{s}$. Our business is to translate and explain the text as we have it.

The best explanation of line 2 is that the Sodomites were frankly inhospitable; they did not offer an insidious welcome succeeded by maltreatment. The perversion of Scripture and the passing over of the hideous crime of Sodom need no comment. \mathfrak{S}^p renders the line 'because they would not let the strangers go,' mistaking not only the Greek but the force of the passage. Reuss also seems to misunderstand; and he translates 'for which they shall yet have punishment' ($\acute{\epsilon}\pi\acute{\iota}\kappa\kappa\acute{\o}t\acute{\iota}$ in the bad sense), and explains 'the punishment inflicted on the Egyptians will not be the last, another being reserved for them.'

16. But they with feastings

Welcoming them that already shared the same rights,
Vexed them with sore labours.

17. Yea and they were smitten with sightlessness,

As were those at the doors of the righteous man,
When, enveloped in yawning darkness,
Each was seeking for the way through his own doors.

18. For the elements being changed in order among themselves,

As in a psaltery the notes vary the character of the tune,
Yet always adhering to the sound,
Which one may accurately divine from the sight of things
that have happened.

16. For *μετὰ ἑορτασμάτων* *L* (as all the versions except *S^h*) has 'cum laetitia,' doubtless considering that general 'feastings' are nowhere mentioned. But Pseudo-Solomon is thinking of Joseph's banquets for his brethren, Gen. 43³¹⁻³⁴, and of the general hospitality showed to the Israelites, Gen. 47¹⁻¹². Similarly 'the same rights' is an exaggeration, but one that might be justified from Gen. 45¹⁷⁻²⁰ and especially v. ²⁰, 'the good of all the land of Egypt is yours.'

τῶν αὐτῶν μετεσχηκότας δίκαιων does not seem to have been understood. *L* 'qui eisdem usi erant justitiis,' *S^P* 'those on whose account they received punishment.' Arab. is nearly accurate. *S^h* renders the exact words.

17. The writer returns to his favourite plague of darkness, and uses the indefinite word *ἀόρασία*, only found in Biblical Greek, to express the deprivation both of light (Egyptians) and of sight (Sodomites).

ἀχανεῖ σκότει is variously rendered. *L* 'subitaneis tenebris.' Arab. 'very deep darkness.' *S^P* omits the adjective. It is a peculiar word, from *χανεῖν*, 'to yawn,' to 'open the mouth,' and may be either 'mute,' *not* opening the mouth 'in the dumb darkness,' or, with *ἀ* emphatic, 'yawning wide.' It is possible that *L* took the first meaning 'not gaping,' 'not lethargic,' and so 'surprising' (Deane), but this seems forced. It is nowhere said that they groped about to find their *own* doors, but that of Lot. Perhaps, however, as Reuss suggests, there is here a sudden return to the plight of the Egyptians. Nearly every line of this chapter bears marks of carelessness if not weariness.

18. The difficulties of the verse are three: (1) *διαλλάσσονται* is predicated both of *στοιχεῖα* and of *φθόγγοι*, and the two members of the comparison are so mingled together that the terms properly applicable to one only are also assigned to the other. (2) Line 3 is too briefly expressed; the meaning is 'continuing always the same, each in its several sound' (Gregg), but that is not in the Greek. (3) In any case there is an anacolouthon, which R.V. avoids by transposing lines 1-2

19. For land creatures were turned into water creatures,
And swimming things migrated on the earth;

and rendering ‘even so did the elements.’ A.V. simply translates *μεθαρμοζόμενα* ‘were changed . . . and yet are always sounds,’ taking *ηχω* as a plural, which no other translator does, except perhaps Siegfried. Farrar, not without reason, regards the word as an awkward and heedless addition of the writer.

L translates ‘In se enim elementa dum convertuntur, sicut in organo qualitatis sonus immutatur, et omnia suum sonum custodiunt; unde aestimari ex ipso visu certo potest.’ *ὅπερ* seems to have been mistaken for *ὅθεν* in line 4, but otherwise the meaning is fairly given and the anacoluthon preserved. **S^P** is quite wide of the mark, translating line 1, ‘For for their own sake the elements were established,’ etc. Arab. is even worse.

Bois explains: the musician plays a tune by a certain combination of *musical* sounds. He lays down his instrument, resumes it, and plays an entirely different tune; yet the sounds are the same; only their combination differs. So God has before him matter—the *στοιχεῖα*—which he combines in a certain way, and they produce *κτίσις*, an orderly creation—the first melody. But then it becomes a question of blessing or punishing. He combines the elements in a different way; there is a new creation—the second melody; but the *φθόγγοι* are the same. Bois also mentions the possibility of putting a stop after *ρύθμοῦ* and construing it with *φθόγγοι*, but this is contrary to all the versions quoted, and also to **S^H**, which translates *μεθαρμοζόμενα*, ‘changed from their harmony.’

For the comparison to a psaltery (**L** ‘organum,’ meaning any kind of instrument, as explained by A. Lapide), cf. Philo, *De Poster. Caini*, § 32, καὶ μὴν ὅσπερ ὄργανα κατὰ τὰς τοῦ μέλους ἀπέιρους ὅσας κράσεις μεθαρμόττεται οὕτως καὶ ὁ λόγος συνῳδός ἐστιν, ἐρμηνεὺς πραγμάτων γινόμενος, ἀμυθήτους λάμβανει μεταβολάς, and for the change in the elements to punish the Egyptians, cf. *Vita Mosis*, i. § 17. τὰ γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ παντὸς γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἄὴρ καὶ πῦρ ἐπιτίθενται δικαιώσαντος θεοῦ, οἷς ἀπετελέσθη ὁ κόσμος, τὴν ἀσεβῶν χώραν φθαρῆναι, πρὸς ἔνδειξιν κράτους ἀρχῆς ή κέχρηται, τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ σωτηρίας ἐπὶ γενέσει τῶν ὅλων (cf. Bois above), σχηματίζοντος, καὶ τρέποντος ὅποτε βουληθείν πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἀπώλειαν.

A good example of an exact and yet purposeless interpretation is found in Rabanus Maurus, quoted by all the old commentators, who did not perceive that our author is giving a not unscientific explanation of miracles. It runs thus, ‘Sicut in instrumento organi diversi inter se discrepant soni, sed ad concordiam melodiae temperamento consentiunt musici, ita et varia elementa, licet ab invicem discrepant qualitate, ad creatoris sui, servato jure naturae, flectuntur voluntatem.’

19. *μετέβανεν* ἐπὶ γῆς cannot possibly mean as R.V. ‘trod upon the earth’; the Greek no doubt is bad, but there is little authority for the

20. Fire had control of its own power in the water,
And water forgot its power of quenching:

21. Contrariwise, flames wasted not the flesh of animals easily
perished that walked among them,
Nor was melted the easily-melted ice-like kind of heavenly
food.

better readings *εἰς γῆν* and *ἐπὶ γῆν*. **L** has ‘in terram transibunt,’ and so Arab. **S^P** has for line 1 ‘untilled land was turned into lakes’ or ‘marshes.’

The meaning of line 1 (a very far-fetched one) is that the Israelites and their cattle by passing through the Red Sea became water-animals. The swimming creatures which migrated to land are the frogs, which again are, unfortunately for the contrast, amphibious. But Philo takes the same view (*Vita Mosis*, i. § 18), *καθάπερ εἰς ἀποικίαν (μετέβαινεν) ἐν γένος τῶν ἐνύδρων τῆς φύσεως ἐκπέμψαι διανοθείσης πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίαν χώραν· ἐναντία γὰρ χέρσος ὑδατί.*

20. A.V. curiously connects *ἐπελανθάνετο* with *δυνάμεως*, ‘the fire had power in the water, forgetting his own virtue,’ which is contrary to the meaning, the versions, and our Greek, but is supported by some MSS. of repute, which add, after *δυνάμεως*, *ἐπιλελησμένον*. But the point is that the fire (the flashes among the hail, 16^{17.19}) did not forget its powers. **L** has ‘valebat supra suam virtutem,’ which does not necessarily imply a reading *ὑπερίσχυεν*; the verb *ἰσχύειν* with a genitive may mean ‘to exceed.’ So Aristoph., *Vesp.*, 357, has *ἴσχυόν τ’ αὐτὸς ἐμαυτοῦ*, meaning *ἴσχυρότερος ἦν οὐ τὰ νῦν*.

Cf. again Philo, *Vita Mosis*, i. 20, quoted above on 16¹⁷. The whole passage is a wearisome rechauffé of what has been already said.

21. The versions all agree in translating *οὐδὲ τηκτὸν* in line 3 as if *οὐδὲ ἔτηκον* was read, which, conjectured by Nannius, nevertheless appears in no known MS. **L** ‘nec dissolvebant,’ **S^P** (of course wrongly) ‘nor were there melted (*ἔτηκον*) the hailstones which destroyed the fruits.’ Arab. is quite off the point, but certainly read *ἔτηκον* or *ἔτηκεν*.

As before remarked, the writer appears to believe that all the plagues, hail, fire, locusts, and flies, occurred at once. The creatures that walked amid the flames and consorted with them (**L** ‘coambulantum’) are apparently the locusts.

ἀμβροσίας τροφῆς is a ‘purpureus pannus,’ representing the ‘angels’ food’ of 16²⁰. So far the author is true to the derivation of the word, which means not ‘pleasing’ but ‘immortal’ (*ἀμβροτος* for *ἀμορτος*).

In the *Sibylline Oracles*, iii. 84, it is apparently prophesied that manna will be the food of the righteous in heaven.

Οἱ δὲ θεὸν τιμῶντες ἀλήθινον, ἀέναον τε
Ζωὴν κληρονομοῦσι, τὸν αἰῶνος χρόνον, αὐτοὶ¹
Οἰκοῦντες παραδείσου ὅμως ἐριθηλέα κῆπον
Δαινύμενοι γλυκὺν ἄρτον ἀπ’ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος.

22. For in all things, Lord, thou didst magnify and glorify thy people,
And didst not overlook them, standing by them at every time and place.

22. **L** has for *ὑπερεῖδες* 'despexisti,' which is too strong.

Many apologies have been made for the abrupt termination of the book. Some have assumed (as Hasse and Heydenreich, quoted by Grimm) that the book has been mutilated; others, as Zöckler, that the author did not complete his design. Either assumption is unnecessary. 3 Macc. ends in much the same way, *εὐλογητὸς ὁ ἥστης Ἰσραὴλ εἰς τοὺς δὲ τὸν χρόνον*, and we may assign several reasons for the breaking off of the narrative at this point. (1) The subsequent history of Israel furnishes no such opportunities as this for the antitheses in which our author delights; (2) he has now finished with the Egyptians, against whom for some reason (cf. Introduction, § 3), whether on account of ancient oppression or of modern apostasy, his invectives are chiefly directed.

But most of all we may set it down to the absolute weariness of the author with his subject. Any one who reads carefully the last chapter or two, with their tautologies in language and their repetitions of matter, will agree that they are the work of a man whose enthusiastic rhetoric had found its limit. He has no more to say, and it is a pity that he did not recognise this before. His vocabulary and his imagination are alike exhausted.

ADDITIONAL NOTES

A

'ON THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL IN THE BOOK OF WISDOM'

A thorough and convincing exposition of the matter is contained in a paper under this title contributed by Mr. F. C. Porter to a collection of *Old Testament and Semitic Studies in Memory of W. R. Harper* (Chicago, 1908). His object is to prove that such doctrine of pre-existence as is indicated here is founded not on Greek speculations but on ancient Hebrew^a beliefs. He denies that the book contains any real Platonic theory, with its necessary consequence dualism—the antagonism of soul and body—at all. The existence of a Stoic element he concedes, and even here he probably concedes too much. He couples i⁷ ('That which holdeth all things together hath knowledge of every voice') with the Pseudo-Solomonic passage 7²²-8¹. He finds (p. 207) 'a conception of wisdom as no longer only a personification of the creative thought and energy of God as in Proverbs 8, but a substantial entity, a spirit filling the world and holding all things together: uniting in itself physical, rational, and moral qualities, and betraying unmistakably in many of its attributes and functions the influence of the Stoic world-soul.' It may be noted in passing that, as we have seen, i⁷ implies nothing more than that God's wisdom (not an independent wisdom) holds the world together, and that without this verse the Pseudo-

^a For the genuine Hebrew idea of 'pre-existence' cf. Kohler in the *Jewish Encyclopædia*, s.v. Everything that was described as 'from the beginning' was regarded as 'pre-existent.' Thus: (1) the Torah of course; (2) the 'throne of glory' which (Ps. 93²) is 'established of old'; (3) the sanctuary, Jer. 17¹²; 'Set on high from the beginning'; (4) the patriarchs, Hosea 9¹⁰, 'I saw your fathers as the first-ripe in the fig tree at her first season'; (5) Israel, Ps. 74², 'thy congregation, which thou hast created from the beginning' (Heb.); (6) Messiah, Micah 5², 'Whose goings forth are from of old, from everlasting'; (7) repentance, Ps. 90^{2,3}. All these are supposed to have had an existence prior to the creation of the world. The one plain indication of the pre-existence of a man is in the *Assumption of Moses* i. 14, 'Excogitavit et invenit me, qui ab initio orbis terrarum praeparatus sum.' The doctrine of the pre-existence of souls was specifically condemned by the Second Council of Constantinople (Vigouroux, *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, v. col. 1352).

Solomonic passage is mere talk. It should be noted that later on (pp. 231, 232) the writer speaks of wisdom by no means as a separate entity but as an agency of God—very much as we speak of ‘nature.’

With regard to the alleged Platonic element, he deals with the four doctrines usually assumed to be implied in ‘Wisdom’ and supposed to prove the writer’s acquaintance with the Platonic dialogues, viz. (a) that of creation out of ‘formless matter’ (11¹⁷), (b) the pre-existence of souls (8¹⁹⁻²⁰), (c) the body as the source of sin (1⁴, 8²⁰), and (d) the elevation of the wise and pious after death to communion with God. Menzel, the most exact writer on the subject (*Der Griechische Einfluss auf Prediger und Weisheit Salomos*, 1889), enumerates these points, but leaves it (p. 61) an open question whether the author derived them direct from Plato or not, believing, however, that 9¹⁵ (‘a corruptible body weigheth down the soul,’ etc.) shows a verbal knowledge of *Phaedo*, 81c. Other writers, more or less uncritically, accept as proven the statement that the author was well acquainted with both Stoic and Platonic philosophy—a matter already alluded to in the ‘Introduction.’ Among these we may class Zeller, Schürer, Edmund Pfeiderer, Siegfried, Farrar, and Toy (in the *Enc. Bibl.*). Grimm (*Einl.*, p. 22) qualifies his admission as to the Hellenic element in ‘Wisdom’ by the remark that ‘Pseudo-Solomon’s knowledge of Greek philosophic doctrines seems rather to be casually acquired than the result of deeper study.’

It is primarily with the doctrine of pre-existence of souls that Mr. Porter’s treatise is concerned, but all the other three points come under consideration. It is, he says, ‘customary to attribute to the author of Wisdom almost the fully developed doctrine of Philo in regard to the soul and its relation to the body,’ and this doctrine he states very fairly as follows (cf. Gfrörer, *Philo*, i. 374 *sqq.*; Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 252): ‘Souls in Philo’s view ^a pre-exist, the air being full of them. Those that remain true to their nature, incorporeal, are the angels. It is only souls that somehow have lower propensities that sink to earth and enter bodies. Of these some are further degraded by the earthly prison or grave that holds them. The task of the philosopher is to flee from the body and the outer world. By contemplation rising to ecstasy the soul may even now escape sense and attain a vision of truth and of God.’ It is needless to say that in the Book of Wisdom there is no indication of all this; yet it seems to be assumed as the background for the two verses on which the whole of our discussion turns. It is, however, certain that if Josephus (*B. J.*, ii. viii. 11) correctly describes the doctrines of the Essenes, they held a like view, though he does not say that they regarded the body as actually the source of evil. Indeed great care is necessary in discriminating between the belief that the body is a mere prison of the soul and the idea that it is positively the curse of the soul, defiling it by its own evil passions.^b The passages 1⁴ and 8²¹, which are quoted in support of the latter theory,

^a Drummond, *Philo*, ii. 277, points out that however much Philo may have believed in this doctrine theoretically, he proceeds as if every man commenced his mental history with his birth.

^b See the first extract from Kautzsch at the end of this note.

really imply the exact opposite—that the body may be good and not evil.

Apart from Philo's confused guesses at truth, there seems to have existed a genuine Jewish doctrine of pre-existence, and this Mr. Porter expounds (p. 211 *sqq.*). He gives a fair summary of Harnack's distinction between the Hebrew and Hellenic ideas (*Hist. of Dogma*, i. App. I.) as follows: 'To the Greek mind *pre-existence* is connected with the contrast between *spirit* and *matter* (*i.e.* implies the Platonic dualism), and expresses the thought that the idea or form, or energy of all things exists before their physical embodiment, and remains independent of this imperfect material copy. It is only the higher spiritual nature of things that pre-exists. The Jewish conception of pre-existence, on the other hand, rests on the contrast between God and man . . . things pre-exist just as they are afterwards to appear, not in their idea or form but in their proper selves. They are hidden with God, and in the appointed time are manifest on earth.' This last rather vague generalisation Mr. Porter corrects or amplifies as follows: 'To the Greek the soul that pre-exists was or tended to be the personality, the man's real thinking self, while to the Jew it was only a part of the coming man, the divine breath or spirit which was to make him alive, the breath (*neshāmāh*) of life which God breathes into the earthly form, making it a living being (*nephesh*).'

Our author's view of Hebrew psychology differs very widely from that of Dr. Charles, who even discovers (*Eschatology*, pp. 37-42) in Gen. 2⁴, 3 a complete trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit.^a Mr. Porter refuses to recognise even a dichotomy; that is to say, he denies that the ancient Hebrews had any clear conception of the distinction between body and soul. It may be noted that Dr. Charles himself concedes something like this twice over: first, when he points out the early identification of the soul with the material blood; and secondly, when he remarks that purely animal functions are attributed to the 'soul' (*nephesh*). Similarly Philo, as quoted by Gfrörer, i. 376, seems to have shown traces of his old Jewish beliefs in the ascription to the soul of certain bodily qualities. But all this depends upon the identification of '*nephesh*' with the soul, and on this point Mr. Porter remarks: 'There is scarcely a greater cause of confusion and difficulty in the comprehension of Hebrew modes of thought than the tendency—in part, to be sure, the necessity—that impels us to translate "*nephesh*" by the word "soul." The "*nephesh*" is the life or the self of man, the living man himself, just as he is here and now. The older Hebrews had no word for "body" (*σῶμα*), and what we call body was not to them the opposite of "*nephesh*," but was inseparable from it.' When the Jews wished to speak of that which preceded and survived the earthly life of man, the word they naturally used was not '*nephesh*' but '*neshāmāh*' (less often '*rūah*'), not the word that expressed the personal self of man, but the word that suggested the divine in contrast to the earthly element that entered into his making. But the pre-existence of the '*neshāmāh*' is a very different thing from the pre-existence of the *ψυχή*.

Mr. Porter's theory had better be given in his own words (pp. 212,

^a See Kautzsch: second extract.

213). 'There is a sense in which pre-existence entered into the old Hebrew conception of man. It was, however, not the pre-existence of the person himself, the "I," the *nephesh*, that was in mind, but that of the two elements of which the man was made. The fundamental passage for later Jewish ideas on this subject was Gen. 2⁷. Man is on one side dust from the earth and on the other living breath or spirit from God. Man is taken out of the earth and returns to earth again, Gen. 3¹⁹ ("Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return"). God's breath (*neshāmāh* or *rūāh*), which makes him a living "nephesh," is withdrawn at death; and this also goes back to the source from which it came.^a Death, then, is the return of each part of man to its source. It would be possible therefore for the Hebrew, in reflecting on what precedes man's birth, to think either of the body as it is formed in the womb and comes ultimately from the earth, or of the *neshāmāh* (*rūāh*) of Life which God breathes into the earthly form. As a matter of fact, however, this breath or spirit of God seemed to the Hebrews to belong to God to such a degree that for a long time they did not even individualise each man's share in it, still less connect with it the man's personal consciousness. It remained more natural for them to apply the personal pronoun to the pre-existing body than to the pre-existing "*neshāmāh*": man comes from earth and returns to earth again. . . . The nearest approach to actual reflection on the pre-existence of man in the Old Testament is found in Psalm 139; and here it is the pre-existent body with which the poet in some sense identifies himself. It is "I" that am formed in the womb and even wrought in the lowest parts of the earth—these two being curiously blended in thought as they are also in Job 1²¹ ("Naked came I out of my mother's womb, and naked shall I return thither") and in Eccles. 40¹ ("From the day of their coming forth from their mother's womb until the day of their burial in the mother of all things"). But we should expect the idea to arise in course of time that the breath of God also was for each man in some sense a distinct entity. Beginnings in this direction may possibly be found in such passages as Job 32⁸ ("There is a spirit in man, and the breath of the Almighty giveth them understanding"), 33⁴ ("The Spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty giveth me life"). Prov. 20²⁷, and especially the expression "the *neshāmōth* which I have made" in Isaiah 57¹⁶.

Coming to the contrasted Greek doctrine, Mr. Porter has little difficulty in showing that it proceeds, as Harnack had indicated, on entirely different lines, and lines of which there is absolutely no trace in the Book of Wisdom. 'Greek thought,' he says (p. 214), 'issued at its best in a doctrine of the immortality of the soul; Hebrew thought in a doctrine of the Resurrection.' The absolutely sensuous and carnal visions of the Messianic revival (as, for example, the repeated promise of the 'banquet on Leviathan') he is no doubt right in separating from the Resurrection idea. But Resurrection 'was deeply rooted in Jewish ideas of man and God.' The Greeks asked, 'Is the soul immortal?' the Jews, 'If a man die, shall he live again?'

^a Besides the well-known text Eccles. 12⁷, cf. 2 Esdr. 3⁵ coupled with 7⁷⁸.

But the writer makes one acute remark on the development of the very ancient Greek theory of the metempsychosis or transmigration of souls (p. 214). The earlier form of that theory, he says, approached very nearly to the Jewish idea that there can be no true life of a man apart from the body. The dispossessed soul must find another dwelling, or as we might put it, the ' *neshamah*' returned to God must again be bestowed in another earthly receptacle. ' But on the higher level of Greek thought in the Orphic mysteries and in Pythagoras and in Plato, metempsychosis was so transformed that reincarnation was a disciplinary punishment, and the ideal to be striven after was the permanent escape of the soul from the body.' Here, then, we have the real background of the Greek (not the Hebrew) theory of the pre-existence and perpetuity of souls—the antagonism between flesh and spirit, in which the warfare is waged by means of a perpetual asceticism and continual mortification of the vile fleshly envelope. Of this theory there is no trace in the Book of Wisdom. An ascetic writer would hardly have chosen Solomon as his eponymous hero.

A few of the writer's remarks on isolated texts will be found in the notes, but on three crucial passages—(a) 8^{19.20} (pre-existence of souls), (b) 11¹⁷ (the creation from ' formless matter'), and (c) 9¹⁵ (the oppression of the soul by the body)—his commentary is extensive and must be given here.

(a) 8^{19.20}, ' Now I was a child of parts, and a good soul fell to my lot: or rather, being good, I came into a body undefiled.'^a

The two verses, says Mr. Porter, are parenthetical and could be removed without injury to the context. As, however, they really assist his theory of the Jewish origin of Pseudo-Solomon's doctrine of pre-existence, he discusses them as they stand. That doctrine, to put it briefly, would amount to this: that God has the souls (or, more properly, the ' *neshamoth*') in his keeping, and provides one for each body that comes into the world. That this belief or something like it was held by the rabbis, Mr. Porter takes considerable trouble to prove. Admitting, then, that this is the sense of the first member of the text, what are we to do with the second clause? Grimm (who, of course, is closely followed by Farrar) thinks that the first clause represents the traditional opinion, and that the second corrects (*i.e.* contradicts) it. He goes so far as to say that it would have been clearer if the author had said, ' Being a good soul I came into a body undefiled,' which is precisely what no devout Jew would have said: the ' *neshamah*' in itself could, so far as we can perceive, possess no moral qualities, and Grimm himself recognises this when he says, ' it is also to be assumed

^a Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, 225 *sqq.*, gives a very full account of the Rabbinic doctrine of conception and of the entry of the soul into the body. The idea underlying this is Creationist, and the soul, according to it, is only lent to man. This does not, however, imply the *Platonic* doctrine of pre-existence. But the soul itself is pure and clean. The body is so far unclean as it is (1) corruptible, (2) the seat of the 'evil instinct'; which evil instinct hardly appears in 'Wisdom,' but is sufficiently prominent in Ecclesiasticus, cf. Bousset, *Religion des Jud.*, 384, and his quotations from another work of Mr. Porter, 'The Yecer Hara,' which seems to modify Weber's statements.

that the writer did not imagine that souls were created good and bad. They could only become so of their own free choice': which is apparently true as a summary of Pseudo-Solomon's theory of sin.

Mr. Porter's explanation of the alternative clauses is this: the author is a Jew writing Greek (and without, we may add, any extensive linguistic powers: see Introduction). He holds the Jewish view that the souls of men, the '*neshāmōth*', are in the keeping of God, who allots one to each body. Having expressed this, 'it occurs to him that it would be better to connect the personality with the soul, and to say that the body was happily matched to the soul rather than that the soul was happily matched to the body,' and he sets it down so: had he meant to contradict the first clause, why did he not erase it?^a 'The fact that he leaves the first clause as it was, presents, as it seems to me, positive proof that no such doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul as that of Plato or Philo was in his mind. The birth of Solomon was the coming together of a good soul and a pure body.' But at this point we part company with Mr. Porter and hold with Grimm: 'a good soul' in the first half of the verse is surely the '*nephesh*'. The 'personality' (which Pseudo-Solomon must perforce translate 'soul' as we do, because he has no other word), including the body, the '*neshāmāh*', is surely colourless in itself—if not, Mr. Porter's own view of sin as the result of free choice, presently to be spoken of, fails. But adopting the view that *ψυχή* means '*nephesh*', we shall find in the second half of the verse a presentation in a form intelligible to Greeks or Hellenised Jews of the belief expressed in the first part. This may not seem satisfactory, but we must remember that the author is using the clumsy medium of a foreign tongue, and it is at all events better than ascribing to him downright predestinarian views. As to the author's inability to distinguish in language between *ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*—'*nephesh*' and '*neshāmāh*'—we may compare Mr. Porter's own note on 15¹¹ (p. 225).

(b) 11¹⁷. 'Thine all-powerful hand, that created the world out of formless matter.'

(Here again the words are merely parenthetic; they are introduced to support no theory, and can be left out without injuring the sense.) *ἀμορφός ὥλη* is undoubtedly a Platonic term; but it is common to the Stoic schools also, and these latter certainly used it without any idea of that evil nature of matter which seems to have been an element in the Platonic dualism. And certainly the author of Wisdom attributed to matter no such quality, for he says (1¹⁴) that in the world as God made it only healthsome powers are operative. If no idea of evil attaches to the idea of the *ἀμορφός ὥλη*, the mere use of the words will not prove the Platonism of the writer. The verbal question of *ἀμορφός ὥλη* is further treated in the notes on 11¹⁷.

(c) Lastly we have the famous passage in 9¹⁵, 'For a corruptible body weigheth down the soul,' etc., which is supposed to prove the writer's acquaintance with the letter of the *Phaedo* of Plato. The

^a Bois, p. 275, remarks, 'a learned man might say the "sun goes round the earth" and then *correct himself*': he might in conversation perhaps: if he did so in a book he would be regarded as an imbecile.

verbal parallelism is striking and unimpeachable. The passages run thus :—

Wisdom.

Φθαρτὸν γὰρ σῶμα βαρύνει ψυχήν,
καὶ βρίθει τὸ γεῶδες σκῆνος νοῦν
πολυφροντίδα.

Phaedo, 81c.

Ἐμβριθὲς δέ γε τοῦτο [τὸ σωματοειδές]
οἰεσθαι χρὴ εἶναι καὶ βαρὺ καὶ γεῶδες
καὶ ὄρατν. ὁ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη
ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἔλκεται κτλ.

The correspondence is undeniable: that the writer of Wisdom had either read the *Phaedo*, or heard it read and lectured upon, seems equally undeniable; but the exact parallelism, with all that might be deduced from it, fails for one simple reason, the same which renders the comparison of *Wisd.* 5¹⁷⁻²⁰ and *Ephes.* 6¹¹⁻¹⁷, in spite of their verbal identities, useless: the same words are used by the two writers for different purposes. 'Plato,' says Mr. Porter (p. 227), 'is speaking here, not of the hindrance that the body offers to the mind in its search^a for truth, but of the lot after death of souls which have been defiled by the body during the earthly life,' whereas, of course, 'Wisdom' is speaking of what Plato is not thinking of. 'That the writer of Wisdom selected them (the words) from Plato and made the application (expressing a Platonic thought in Platonic language, which Plato used to express an entirely different thought) is improbable. The improbability will not lessen when we find that one so deeply concerned as our author is with the subject of immortality shows in all that he says about it not the slightest trace of the influence of the *Phaedo*, though this was the greatest book on the subject which the world had up to his time produced.' In fact Mr. Porter's conclusion is very much that of the present editor—hinted at by Grimm—that we have to deal merely with 'certain Platonic phrases which the author had caught from the popular philosophical teaching of his day' (p. 229).

Sin, then, is not inherent in the body^b—at least the author of 'Wisdom' does not say so: that it is inherent in matter he emphatically denies (1¹⁴). Whence then does it, in the view of Pseudo-Solomon, arise? Mr. Porter endeavours to answer the question (pp. 233-236). The origin of sin, he says, is simply a man's free choice of evil, by which he renounces his true nature as a son of God and throws away his heritage of rulership and immortality. For this view he certainly can induce strong expressions, e.g. *Wisdom* 1¹², 'Court not death in the error of your life'; 1¹⁶, 'Ungodly men called death unto them'; 2²¹, 'They were led astray, for their wickedness blinded them,' etc. So the nature and growth of sin are described in connection with those

^a It should be added that there is in *Wisdom* no trace of the ascetic doctrines which should accompany the theory of the badness of the body, cf. Bois, p. 278. The attempt to prove the existence of such doctrine in 3^{13,14} is a mistake, cf. notes *ad loc.*

^b In the Sibylline oracles the theory seems to be that not the body but the soul is the source of sin—the perverted soul, 3 *Proem.* i., ii.; cf. Drummond, *Philo*, i. 175.

types of incorrigible sinners, the Egyptians and the Canaanites. God's punishment of them was justified by their hopeless wickedness. But even to the Canaanites he 'gave room for repentance' (12¹⁰).

Similarly the perfectly voluntary choice of idolatry is regarded as the great and original (and unjustifiable, 13¹) sin from which all others, especially immorality,^a spring. Denial of God and of the Unseen is the creed of the ungodly (2^{1-5.22}), and sensuality and cruelty its results (2⁶⁻²⁰).

On the other hand certain influences, often assumed as the causes of sin, cannot be so regarded. The world is not evil in itself; 'the first author of beauty,' 13³, created it. Matter is not evil; the man who believed that $\delta\lambda\eta$ or $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ was the cause of evil could never have written 1¹⁴; while 9²³ and 6³⁴ and ^{20.21} imply God's intention that the conduct of the world's inhabitants should correspond to the order and 'healthsomeness' which he designed for it.

Nor, again, is the devil powerful enough to make men follow him. He has no royal prerogative on earth, whatever may be the meaning of $\beta\alpha\sigma\lambda\epsilon\iota\omega\sigma$ in 1²⁴, and his envy (cf. Bois, *Essai Critique*, 295) is caused by the fact that he has not. Those who choose him choose voluntarily. (Cf. the notes on 1¹⁶.)

With these conclusions Bois's view coincides for the most part. He regards (p. 278) 8^{19.20} as at all events denying the doctrine of original sin, and possibly asserting the original goodness of every man.^b Solomon (7¹) is like all the rest, and he does not say that there are any bad souls.

'My conclusion is,' says Mr. Porter (p. 249), 'that the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul is not to be found in the Book of Wisdom. It is not the natural meaning of the one verse which is thought to assert it (8²⁰); it is not sustained by the two Platonic phrases (9¹⁵, 11¹⁷) which are adduced in its support; it has not its inevitable accompaniments, its roots and its fruit, in the writer's views as to the world in general, which so far as they are not Jewish are Stoic in character, nor in his conception of the origin and nature of sin, nor in his view of death and his doctrine of immortality.' For this latter point see the end of Additional Note B.

In a second section of his essay Mr. Porter gives, as already indicated, a summary of early Rabbinic doctrine on the subject of the origin of the soul, which he acknowledges to be, from an early date, strongly tinged with Hellenic ideas. More important, therefore, are the theories

^a Cf. Wisd. 14¹², 'The devising of idols was the beginning of fornication, and the invention of them the corruption of life.' Rev. 2¹⁴.

^b Cf. Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 252. 'According to the Book of Wisdom, a good soul obtains a good body.' Are we to infer from this that souls were created originally with a specifically ethical character, some good, some bad? This can hardly be so, since God is 'conceived as the perfectly good and as the lover of souls': but he goes on to argue, 'thus the ethical character of the soul on its entrance into the mortal body would appear to be the result of its own action in the past.' Bois's conjecture seems preferable.

indicated in the Apocalypses of Baruch (?60-100 A.D.) and of Ezra (?90 A.D.). It is in these apparently that we first find the idea of chambers or treasuries in which are kept the souls of the righteous dead.^a To found such doctrines on passages like 1 Sam. 25²⁹ ('The soul of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life with the Lord thy God ; and the souls of thine enemies, them shall he sling out, as from the hollow of a sling') is manifestly absurd ; but we have to treat such beliefs not as justified but as existing. From the same two books our author collects the ideas of (1) the resurrection as including that of the body^b from the earth as well as of the soul from the chambers, and (2) of a transfiguration of the earthly^c and corruptible nature into a glorious form, angel-like and star-like, fitting it for the immortal world.

The whole of the quotations from the Rabbinic writings run on the same lines with regard to the pre-existence of souls according to the semi-concrete Jewish idea. The other element appears in the various versions of the parable of the blind and lame men. The blind man carries the lame man to commit a theft ; both are held guilty ; the meaning being that soul and body are equally responsible for sin committed. It is possible that this was the view of Pseudo-Solomon ; at all events he never lays the blame on the body alone. It is man that sins, and man is neither body nor soul, but the union of the two.

The question of *ἄμορφος ψλη*, which is briefly raised in the preceding pages, demands some further discussion, for it is possible to accuse 'Wisdom,' on the score of this phrase, of something very like dualism.

When Drummond (*Philo*, i. 188) states that Wisdom *expressly* says that God created the *κόσμος* out of formless matter, he is misleading. The phrase occurs in no description of cosmogony or the like, but is incidentally used as an illustration of God's power, which would have made it easy for him to create strange wild beasts to plague the Egyptians ; it is not employed to establish any principle. Nevertheless it seems to prove acquaintance with a definite Platonic doctrine : the existence of matter (*στοιχείον*) before the creation of the visible world. We remark in the first place that though Plato himself uses the word *ψλη* he never employs it definitely of this pre-existing matter. For this we have to turn to Aristotle, who does so use it, and in *Phys.* i. vii. 13 couples *ἡ ψλη καὶ τὸ ἀμορφόν*. The idea was no doubt in accordance with the principle *τὸ ἐκ μὴ δυτῶν γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον* (*Phys.* i. iv. 9), but it led plainly to dualism and is baldly so stated by Diog. Laert. iii. 41 referring to Plato. It became, however, a recognised theory of the Platonic schools, cf. Plut. *de Def. Orac.*, 10, εῦ μὲν λέγοντιν οἱ λέγοντες θτὶ Πλάτων τὸ ταῖς γεννωμέναις ποιῶτησιν ὑποκείμενον στοιχεῖον ἔξευρών, δι νῦν ψλην καὶ φύσιν καλούσι πολλῶν ἀπήλλαξε καὶ μεγάλων ἀποριῶν τοὺς φιλοσόφους. The expression 'and nature' is worth noticing in reference to the modern dualism, which practically sets up a second power independent of the Creator in 'Nature.'

^a *Apoc. Baruch*, xxx. 2 ; 2 *Esdras* 4^{35.41}, 7^{32.95*}. The idea that similar chambers contained the souls of those yet to be born is found only in the Rabbinic writings.

^b 2 *Esdras* 7⁸² ; cf. *Daniel* 12².

^c 2 *Esdras* 7^{87*.125}.

The idea of two powers in this universe was, however, abhorrent to philosophic feeling. An attempt was made to evade it by making 'matter' senseless, formless, and even invisible, in order to prevent its limiting or interfering with the one creative and disposing intelligence. Hence we find in Timaeus, 51A, *τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὄρατοῦ καὶ παντὸς αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑπόδοχην . . . λέγωμεν . . . ἀόρατον ἔλός τι καὶ ἀμορφὸν, πανδεχέσ.* Other writers call it 'colourless' and 'without figure.'

But Philo, though he adopted the phrase (*de Vict. Offer.*, § 13) and even improved on it (*de Mundi Opif.*, § 5), where he calls *ὕλη, ἐξ ἐαυτῆς ἀτακτος, ἀποιος, ἀψυχος* *ἐπεροιετητος, ἀναρμοστας, ἀσυμφωνιας μεστή,* yet was not careful to avoid the imputation of dualism. But how uncertain his ideas were may be seen from the quotations in Grimm, p. 212 note. Philo himself, says Drummond, i. 300, 'seems to have been half-conscious of an inconsistency between his dualism and the traditional faith, for he treats this subject with marked reserve, and his language is not altogether free from ambiguity.' His language probably expressed the state of his ideas.

Now this apparent expression on Wisdom's part of belief in the existence of a substance, to say the least, extraneous to God, naturally offended the older commentators as contrary to the orthodox idea of creation out of nothing, and it was by some assumed that the expression was a mere Platonised version of the *תוה ובוה* of Gen. 1². Bois (*Essai*, 260 *sqq.*) would accept the same explanation, he says, if this were a real Hebrew book; but the writer is too much imbued with Greek ideas. However, the idea has found a defender in Professor Margoliouth in *Journ. Roy. As. Soc.*, 1890, 287, who is opposed by Freudenthal, *Jewish Qu. Rev.*, iii. (1891) 728, on the ground that both words are adjectives. Yet it is almost certain that the Septuagint had the Platonic idea in their minds when they translated *ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος*.

Another way out of the difficulty, as stated above in the case of Philo, is to suppose that matter itself was previously created, and that there was in fact a double creation—the first 'out of nothing.' This, says Drummond, i. 188, it is impossible that 'Wisdom' can have believed; this is 'evident from the fact that the formation of the world is adduced as a pledge of the divine omnipotence, and had he supposed that the whole system of things had been called into being out of perfect emptiness, he would surely have availed himself of this more striking mode of conception.' Philo simply contradicts himself in the matter. In the Latin version of *de Providentia*, i. § 55, he seems

* A double creation was, it would appear, accepted by the Rabbinic schools, Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*, 197. The world was created for the Law. If it would not obey the Law it should return to the *Tohu wa bohu*. This is distinct dualism. Matter is a power apart from God, blind and lawless. Two creations are by some Rabbis plainly spoken of: the first did not please God, and he sent it back to chaos (*ibid.*, 201). Yet this is a different idea from that of a first creation of matter, and a second of the world out of matter.

distinctly to affirm that creation out of nothing is impossible, and yet in *de Somn.* i. § 13, he says δέ θεός τὰ πάντα γεννήσας, οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸ ἔμφαντον ἤγαγεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ πρότερον οὐν ἦν, ἐποίησεν, οὐ δημιουργός μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κτιστης αὐτὸς ὅν. (Drummond, i. 294n., also quotes *De Migr. Abrah.*, § 32, and *Vita Mosis*, iii. § 36.) According to Bois (267), attempts have been made to justify Philo by explaining that the doctrine of pre-existent matter is part of his public doctrine; that of creation *ex nihilo* a secret doctrine. But why should not the suppositions be reversed?

Now this word *κτίζειν*, 'to create,' is used by Wisdom besides *κατασκευάζειν* (9², 13⁴), which would denote a simple arrangement of existing matter, from which Bois concludes that our author's own ideas on the conflicting ideas may possibly be indefinite, as indeed they probably are. There is certainly something like a reference to a 'rearrangement of matter' as explaining the miracles wrought for the Israelites at the exodus (*διετυπώντο*, 19⁶); but Drummond is again too positive when he declares that 'the conversion of chaos into cosmos is the author's highest idea of creation.'

As supporting the views of Mr. Porter, we may add the following two passages from the article of Dr. Kautzsch in Hastings' *D. B.*, v. 666⁶:-

(a) 'It might have seemed natural that the material substratum of human personality, the *flesh* or the *body* [the Heb. בָשָׂר may stand for either], should be regarded as the seat of sin, just as the N.T. σάρξ undeniably has this collateral notion attached to it. But in spite of appearances, such as arise from Gen. 6⁸, it is wrong to conclude that such a view was held. It is true that the flesh or the body, in consequence of its origin from the earth, is a type of the decaying and transitory (cf. the characteristic contrast in Isa. 31⁸, "their [the Egyptians'] horses are flesh, and not spirit"), and this thought attaches itself almost always to the very frequent expression "all flesh" (*i.e.* either all men or all earthly living creatures). But the truth that the flesh, although an occasion also of moral weakness, is not thought of as *per se* sinful and therefore unclean, is unmistakably implied in the circumstance that in sacrifice it was used as a gift to God, and such a gift could never have been in itself *unclean*.'

(b) 'The habit of putting upon the Old Testament a trichotomous view of human personality was due almost entirely to a false conception of the *nephesh* and its relation to the *ruah*. This distinction between "soul" and "spirit" naturally caused the actually existing dichotomy of body (or flesh) and spirit of life to be missed. The real state of things is as follows. As long as the divine breath of life is outside man, it can never be called *nephesh* but only *ruah* (more completely *ruah hayyim*, *i.e.* "spirit or breath of life," in which sense we find also *nishmath hayyim* used, *e.g.* Gen. 2⁷). On the other hand, the breath of life which has entered man's body and manifests its presence there may be called either *ruah* or *nephesh*. The two alternate in poetical parallelism in such a way that the same functions are attributed at one time to the *nephesh* and at another to the *ruah*. This indeed has not prevented its coming about that in certain expres-

sions usage has established only one of the terms, or has at least secured a preference for it. Further, it may be noted that both very frequently stand in parallelism with **בַּשָּׁר** ("heart," "disposition," also "understanding or insight," the heart and not the head being with the Hebrews the seat of intellect). But in no case should the use of *nephesh*, whereby it stands for particular functions of the soul or even for a complex of these, be confused with its signification of "person" or "living being" (and even "corpse"). In this latter sense *nephesh* could never have its place taken by *nāh* or *lēbh*.

B

ON THE INTERPRETATION OF WISDOM 3¹⁷.

The work of Dr. Charles on Jewish ' *Eschatology*' (1899) is so thorough, and in most points so convincing, that his view of the real significance of the crucial passage, ' the souls of the righteous,' etc., demands special consideration and investigation. He apparently posits three principles on which he conducts his interpretation of the passage.

- (a) The author does not believe in a resurrection of the body after death.
- (b) He holds that judgment ensues immediately after death.
- (c) The ' righteous ' who are to judge the nations and have dominion are not the faithful departed, but those who live on till the establishment of the kingdom upon earth.

(a) *Eschatology*, p. 252: ' The chief fundamental doctrines of Alexandrian doctrines as distinct from Palestinian are three—(1) the eternity of matter and its essentially evil nature. From this philosophical dogma it follows at once that there can be no resurrection of the flesh.'

Now it is difficult indeed to prove that in ' Wisdom ' at all events the evil nature of matter is anywhere asserted. God creates the world *εξ ἀμόρφου ύλης*, but we are expressly told (2¹³⁻¹⁴) that in the world as He created it ' the generative powers are healthsome, and there is no poison of destruction in them.' Nor is the flesh in itself evil. The use of the word *σκῆπτος* shows that; for the ' tent ' has no harm in it *per se*; it merely imprisons and hampers the soul (Wisd. 9¹⁵, and cf. the notes there). The body is no doubt subject to fleshly lusts while in this world, and that seems to be the ground of the Platonic and Pauline complaints of it; but there is no reason why it should be so subject

in the resurrection.^a It may be noted, by the way, that the word 'carnal' is responsible for much misunderstanding on this point; signifying properly 'connected with the body or flesh' only, it has gradually acquired the worst of meanings.^b

But Dr. Charles interprets Wisd. 1⁴ as meaning that an ineradicably evil nature attaches to the human body. We have already seen (Introd., p. 30) that this passage is primarily a mere refutation of the hedonism of Koheleth. But apart from this, the words are simply οὐδὲ κατοικήσει (σοφία) ἐν σώματι καταχρέω ἀμαρτίας, the preceding line being 'wisdom will not enter into a soul that deviseth evil.' If we take the second sentence to mean that every body is the slave of sin, we must also take the first to mean that every soul devises evil; in which case wisdom can enter into no soul at all, whereas in 7²⁷ ('from generation to generation passing into holy souls') we are expressly told that she does.^c Similarly 8^{20.21}, which is quoted to prove that the body is the seat of sin, really proves that some bodies at least are not the seat of sin but are 'undefiled.'

This *a priori* argument from the badness of the flesh is on a par with the reasoning that any one who held the doctrine of Gen. chaps. 2, 3 as to the spirit of man could not believe in a Sheol where departed spirits were conscious. No doubt logically this is correct: as the belief in the all-pervading power of Yahwe was extended, it seemed unreasonable that there should be any place where existed conscious beings exempt from his authority. But the passages quoted to prove that such a view was ever held in Israel (*Eschat.*, p. 47) are not very convincing. Those from Ecclesiastes may be at once dismissed, as testifying to no orthodox Judaic view.

(b) *Eschatology*, p. 254: 'Souls immediately after death enter on

^a Deane *ad loc.* quotes appositely and conclusively from St. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.* cxli. 19: 'Non corpus aggravat animum (nam et tunc habebimus corpus) sed "corpus quod corrumpetur." Ergo carcerem facit non corpus sed corruptio.' Moreover, the author of Wisdom recognises that there were such things as 'a body undefiled' (8²⁰).

^b Cf. particularly Rom. 8⁸, 'They that are in the flesh cannot please God.' It is difficult to imagine a text which can lend itself so easily to perverse interpretation.

^c No one puts this more strongly than Bousset, *Religion des Judentums*, p. 383, who, it must be noted, declares that (p. 260) in Philo, Wisdom, 4 Macc., the Slavonic Enoch, and the doctrine of the Essenes as stated by Josephus: 'any idea of the Resurrection of the Dead is excluded.' His words are 'Hellenic Judaism . . . shows (if we leave Philo out of account) very few traces of the view that the body, the material earthly existence, is the origin of all unhappiness and the source of sin, a hindrance and check to the original higher life of man.' The reference to the body as weighing down the soul (9¹⁵) he considers a mere *obiter dictum*, and, of course, insists on the passages quoted above. There is, he adds, 'no idea that death is a release from the body' (15⁸, 'the soul which was lent him' is the only passage which could suggest such a view).

On the whole subject of the sinfulness of the body, see Mr. Porter in Additional Note A.

their final award whether of blessedness or torment, and 'this is the teaching . . . most probably of Wisdom.'

The whole of this argument seems to rest on the interpretation of the single expression *ἐν χειρὶ θεοῦ*. This undoubtedly means 'under the protection of God.' The idioms both of the German and English languages suggest the alluring explanation that it means 'close at hand to God,' and Grawe (p. 276) seems to have fallen into this error and to have considered the expression as equivalent to St. Paul's 'depart and be with Christ' (Phil. 1²³); but neither in Greek nor in Latin nor in Hebrew can the words bear that meaning; they signify 'protection' and nothing else. Dr. Charles is too good a scholar to be led astray by such a snare, but he does seem to argue that as the souls of the righteous are under the immediate protection of God their immediate fate is settled—they are judged and approved. But we note at once that it is not said that other souls than those of the righteous are otherwise treated. The whole point of the writer is to prove that the death of the righteous, however untimely, does not mean misery. He is, indeed, mainly concerned to uphold this belief against the doctrine of Koheleth, that 'there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked' (Eccles. 9²); and his contention is simply that the righteous, however much they suffered in this world, do not suffer now. They are under the protection of God. His point of view so far is negative.

But it becomes positive when he refers to the *ἐπισκοπή*, which is to come after. Of what possible use is this *ἐπισκοπή* except to decide between the good and the bad? That the word is in classical and even in Septuagint Greek capable of divers interpretations may be readily granted (cf. notes *ad loc.*); but in this passage of Wisdom its meaning seems certain. It is an 'inspection' of the kind pretty fully set forth in the description of convicting justice (Wisd. 1^{8,9}), and alluded to in Eccl. 18²⁰, *πρὸ κρίσεως ἐξέταξε σεαυτὸν, καὶ ἐν ὥρᾳ ἐπισκοπῆς εὑρήσεις ἔξιλασμόν*. When that decision is made, and not before, the righteous will enter into their privileges. Until then they are simply 'in the hand of God'—under his protection.

Dr. Charles concludes from these premises that (p. 256) 'Accordingly there is only an immortality of the soul. For the soul in such evil straits there is one sovereign remedy, and that is divine wisdom. Wisdom is the redeemer of the soul, its preserver and the only spring of its immortality.' This may be a view expressed by other Alexandrian philosophers, but it is not to be found in Wisdom. The passages 8¹⁷ and 6^{18,19} are quoted. The first runs thus, 'in kinship unto wisdom is immortality,' and it is supplemented by 8¹³, 'because of her I shall have immortality.' The latter says, 'The love of wisdom is observance of her laws, and the giving heed to her laws is an assurance of incorruption.'

Now this is simply to confound the concrete idea of immortality, so to speak, with the abstract.^a The language is loose compared with

^a 'Old age' is similarly spoken of in figurative language in 4⁹: 'Understanding is grey hairs unto men, and an unspotted life is ripe old age.' No! one supposed that 'grey hairs' and 'ripe old age' are anything but figurative here. If we do, the meaning becomes grotesque.

the definite statements of chap. 3¹⁻⁷. So we loosely say that Shakespeare's works have rendered him immortal, but we do not mean that the immortality of his soul depends on the fact that he wrote his plays. This is a fine example of reading into a rhetorical passage an exact philosophical meaning of which probably the author never dreamed. That the stronger quotation comes from one of the three 'Wisdom-chapters' (see Introduction, § 9) is a point, though one which need not be insisted on here; but it should be noted that the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, on which Dr. Charles relies as another proof that those who held it could not have believed in the resurrection of the flesh (*Eschat.*, p. 266, where speaking of the 'Slavonic Enoch' he remarks, 'There is no resurrection of the flesh: this would naturally follow where the soul's pre-existence was accepted'), is only found, if at all, in these same doubtful chapters. But on the whole question here involved see the preceding Note A.

In dealing with the detailed and circumstantial account of God's coming to judgment in *Wisd.* 4¹⁶⁻⁵²³, Dr. Charles surely shows less than his usual candour. He says (p. 258), 'The writer gives a dramatic representation of the final judgment . . . but it can hardly be taken literally.' Why not? The passage should surely run, 'the account of the final judgment in these chapters proves clearly that the individual is not judged immediately after death.' Why does the writer of *Wisdom* waste forty verses in describing a scene in which he does not believe? The explanation of inconvenient passages by the assumption that they are 'not to be taken literally' is obsolete, and certainly not in accordance with Dr. Charles's candid and incisive methods. The whole of the two chapters in question seem to express the writer's views in their most fervid form; and certainly such texts as 4²⁰, 'they shall come, when their sins are reckoned up, with coward fear, and their lawless deeds shall convict them to their face,' are not to be lightly dismissed. But, says Dr. Charles (p. 258 margin), they are 'not to be taken literally, for the individual is judged immediately after death.' Stronger proof of this proposition^a is required. And when again (p. 302) he says, 'The Alexandrian writers, as we might anticipate, taught only a resurrection of the soul or spirit immediately after death as we find in *Wisdom*, *Philo*, and *4 Maccabees*,' he takes too much for granted. An unbiassed reading of *Wisdom* certainly produces the impression that the writer believed that while pending a general resurrection and inquiry (*ἐπισκοπή*) the souls of the righteous are under God's protection, their bodies will then rise and will assume the dominion over the wicked which the wicked exercised over them in their earthly life. The expression (*Wisd.* 3⁷), 'They shall shine

^a Bousset, *op. cit.*, p. 282, adduces only one further argument. He says also that the retribution is to take place immediately after death: *for* the wicked are then to disappear utterly. He thinks this proved by a comparison of 4¹⁸⁻¹⁹, 'They shall become a dishonoured carcase . . . and they shall be utterly waste and be in anguish, and their memory shall perish,' with 3^{10,17} and 5^{9 ff}; but how are they to be in anguish if they are annihilated? Such argument suggests a *parti pris*.

forth and as sparks among stubble they shall run to and fro,' hardly seems to apply to vague and disembodied spirits. Moreover, if, as is generally understood, the 'stubble' indicates the wicked, a resurrection of the wicked is also implied, and indeed the expressions with regard to these latter cited by Dr. Charles himself (p. 258), that 'they will be subject to pain (4¹⁹) and be aware of the blessedness of the righteous (5^{1,2}),' imply bodily rather than spiritual experiences.

(c) Is it possible, then, to find an explanation of these clear allusions to bodily activity of the saints in the theory that vv. 7⁸ of chap. 3 refer to those only who shall be alive at the coming of the Lord, whatever that somewhat indefinite term may imply? Dr. Burney (*Israel's Hope of Immortality*, p. 73) thinks this is Dr. Charles's view. It does not seem to be anywhere plainly expressed by that writer, though his expressions in Hastings' *D. B.*, i. 746b, art. 'Eschatology,' certainly seem to indicate it when he says 'the righteous in Israel are to judge the nations. This seems to be a later development of the judgment by the sword frequently mentioned in previous literature.' Dr. Burney is probably right in holding that there is no distinction between the saints of vv. 7⁸ and those spoken of before. 'The whole passage 3¹⁻⁹ is speaking of the same people. The righteous who "seemed to have died," whose "departure was accounted to be their hurt, and their journeying away from us to be their ruin," are the same who "shall judge nations and have dominion over peoples," this being part of "their hope" which "is full of immortality." And Reuss *ad loc.* takes the same view: 'D'autres cependant voient dans ce passage la prédiction d'une restauration politique et terrestre d'Israël; les étincelles sont alors l'image d'une victoire qui anéantit les adversaires. Il faut convenir que, dans ce cas, la transition est très brusque, et pas du tout indiquée explicitement. Car il est incontestable qu'auparavant il a été question de la félicité d'outre-tombe, et, à vrai dire, ce qui suit en parle aussi.' Nevertheless Bois and most later writers seem to entertain the other somewhat far-fetched hypothesis.

Lastly, as Dr. Charles adopts the hypothesis that Wisdom belongs to the first century A.D., there is no *a priori* argument to be urged against the possibility of Pseudo-Solomon's having held the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The passages in Daniel, in 2 Macc., and possibly that in 2 Esdr. 7³² ('The earth shall restore those that are asleep in her, and so shall the dust those that dwell therein in silence'), are anterior to the reign of Caligula. And nothing can well be stronger than their testimony to the fact that the doctrine was held, and widely held, by devout Jews. It is only if we eliminate not only this belief, but also (as Dr. Charles suggests, p. 254) belief in 'final judgment in the ordinary sense' and indeed in a resurrection of any kind, that we have to fall back upon an account of the purpose of Wisdom as teaching that 'for the soul in such evil straits (*i.e.* oppressed by the body) there is one sovereign remedy, and that is Divine wisdom,' which will help it to one of the spurious or rather figurative forms of immortality indicated in

careless and ill-considered words here and there in the book. Cf. Introduction,^a § 3.

It remains to notice the somewhat peculiar theory of Gfrörer (*Philo*, ii. 256-258), known as that of 'Lichtkörper.' Bretschneider had already adopted the view of Charles and other modern critics that in 3⁷ the author of Wisdom suddenly turns from a description of the glorification of the righteous in the day of judgment to a portrayal of the blessedness of the saints who shall be alive on earth at that day. With this Gfrörer quite properly cannot agree. But he finds an explanation in an admixture of two views. 'Αναλάμψουσιν and ὡς σπινθῆρες ἐν καλάμῃ διαδραμοῦνται must refer, he thinks, to the annihilating fire which, according to the Alexandrian 'Sibyllines,' is to devour the wicked, and at the same time the 'kingdom of grace' is to be regarded as an earthly one. 'But in so far as the heavenly souls share in it, it is to be considered also as heavenly.' For these as well as the saints upon earth are to take part in it, as is proved by Wisd. 5^{15.16}. 'The righteous live for ever, and in the Lord is their reward and the care for them with the most High. Therefore shall they receive the crown of royal dignity and the diadem of beauty from the Lord's hand.' The souls of the righteous are therefore to reappear upon earth as a sort of reinforcement of the living saints; but 'with what body will they come?' Gfrörer's answer is: not, 'as the Pharisees believed,' with their original bodies, but with some kind of etherealised form. For a belief in such purified and yet substantial frames he refers to the passage in Josephus, *B. J.*, ii. viii. 11, in which the Essene belief is stated: that the souls of the righteous shall dwell in a land beyond the ocean, where is neither rain nor frost nor heat—an 'island-valley of Avilion.' But how, he asks, can this freedom from elemental plagues affect souls which have no bodies? He determines, therefore, that the souls of the righteous, after they are delivered from the burden of the flesh, do possess etherealised bodies; but it must be noticed that his argument depends on the fact that he believes the author of Wisdom to represent the views of the Therapeutæ—a supposed Egyptian offshoot of the Essenes. Apart from this, he recognises, as every candid scholar must do, the literal nature of the description of the Judgment Day in ch. 5, and is at pains to prove (*Philo*, ii. pp. 259, 260) that 'we have not the slightest ground for supposing the complete annihilation of the wicked: all points to their eternal punishment.'

That Grimm could ascribe to Gfrörer the belief in 'a return of souls without bodies to the earth at the Day of Judgment,' shows the absolute untrustworthiness not only of such speculations but of the estimates founded upon them.

It may be well to state as an appendix to this note the views as to 'Wisdom's' doctrine of the resurrection held by two of the most recent critics, Bois (1890) and F. C. Porter (1908). Both recognise

^a There is a good deal of assumption about Mr. Fairweather's statement in Hastings' *D. B.*, v. 306a. 'Matter being essentially evil, there can be no resurrection of the body.' It would hardly be guessed by the ordinary reader that here one of the most controverted points in the Book of Wisdom is settled off-hand.

the difficulty of extracting a definite scheme from Pseudo-Solomon's confused ideas, but Mr. Porter does attempt to give something like a connected view.

He accounts (p. 248) for the apparent presentation of conflicting ideas in the same book by an apt quotation from Rohde (*Psyche*, ii. 279): 'in the late period of Greek thought all the stages of development in regard to the continuance of the soul after death which had been reached in the course of time were present and valid at the same time'; but for himself he concludes that Pseudo-Solomon's doctrine is this: the righteous will not truly die; the wicked will die absolutely, will be annihilated. That 'Wisdom' does not attempt to confute the theory of the wicked as set forth in 2²³ is due to the fact that he believes them to be right; to them death will be the end of all things.

The verse 9¹⁵ he thinks to be decisively against any belief in the resurrection of the flesh, and the question whether the soul in distinction from the body can attain immortality is left open. Mr. Porter quotes from Schwally, *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, p. 180, the statement that the book knows no resurrection but only the immortality of the soul. To support this and to prove that the doctrine *ràs ψυχàs áθavátrous élavai* which Josephus ascribes to the Essenes is also that of 'Wisdom,' the well-worn passages 6¹⁹, 1¹⁶, 3⁴, 15³, 8¹³ are quoted, but in none of these is the word *ψυχή* or any equivalent used, and it has already been pointed out in the Introduction that a metaphorical immortality is implied. So Mr. Porter remarks that though the words *áθavácia*, *áθaváros*, *áθavapòia*, are all used in Schwally's passages, they are all indefinite. They are used of the destiny for which God made man (2²²); of the hope of the righteous (3⁴), of that which Wisdom imparts to those who love to follow her (6^{18.19}, 8^{13.17}); of that which belongs together with righteousness to the knowledge of God (15³); of the memory of virtue (4¹, cf. 8¹³). It is scarcely an accident that these words are never used of the soul; and strange, indeed, if the writer's eschatology rested on the contrast between a mortal body and an immortal soul.

Inconclusive as this statement may appear, Bois has little more to offer; indeed, he raises more difficulties. The question of the resurrection he does not fully discuss, but thinks that the wicked may be alluded to in 17⁴ as awaiting the final judgment in some place of darkness and misery typified by the Egyptian horrors. He suggests the somewhat fantastic view that the wicked will destroy the righteous from off the face of the earth, and that their disappearance will be the signal for the coming of God to judge the earth. The wicked will be annihilated and the just live for ever—good rulers in particular will (6²¹) reign for ever. But he puts the pertinent query, What in this judgment is to become of the devil? is he to be annihilated too? It was he who brought death (contrary to God's aim, which was life), *i.e.* annihilation, into the world, and of this the wicked, his subjects and allies, will be the prey. They think that the good, too, will be annihilated; they are mistaken; only the bodies of the just die, their souls are in the hand of God. For the wicked is reserved not eternal punishment, but death of body

and soul alike. He accepts the idea that 3^{7,8} refer to persons different from those mentioned in 3¹⁻⁶ and 3⁹.

Bois,^a however, does a real service by pointing out the incongruities of 'Wisdom's' own statements, and proving the futility of trying to extract formal theories from the book. He refers especially to the end of ch. 4 and parts of ch. 5. Ch. 4¹⁹, he says, describes the last judgment and the final punishment of the wicked, and we think they are done with, condemned and exterminated. But in 5²⁰ they reappear risen and recovered; they come to assist at the examination of their sins. They are so far dead that their very memory is to perish (4¹⁹), and here are they who had been hurled headlong into some abyss quietly standing before the judgment-seat. Those who had been struck dumb in 4¹⁹ begin to talk again in 5³. Again, 5¹⁷ *sqq.* presents fresh difficulties. The recantation of the wicked and their sorrow for their sins (5³⁻¹³) must surely refer to the last judgment; but in 5²⁰⁻²³ we have them back on earth amid thunder and hail, tempest and flood.

Anything like a chronological dissection of this puzzle is impossible, though Bois attempts it; his simpler explanation (p. 301), and that not very satisfactory, is 'the disorder of prophetic inspiration,' including repetition; the writer gives a sketch of the punishment of the wicked in 4¹⁹, and then repeats it with details in 4²⁰ and ch. 5.

Yet one more difficulty arises: the doctrine of punishment of like by like (*καθ' & ἐλογίσαντο ἔξουσιν ἐπιτιμιῶν*) (3¹⁰) is carried out fairly well as regards the wicked who denied immortality. Good: then for them there shall be no immortality but annihilation (cf. *ἀναιρεῖ ψυχὴν* in 1¹¹ and *ἀφανισθήσεται* in 3¹⁶), and even (4¹⁹) their memorial shall perish. But what of the idolaters? They did not deny immortality; they looked forward to an Elysium and a Tartarus. Were these expectations to be realised or not?

In spite, however, of Bois's contemptuous treatment of Wisdom as vague and unsystematic ('il ne faut pas prendre Pseudo-Salomon pour un génie spéculatif transcendant et qui réussisse toujours ou même cherche ordinairement à donner à ses idées une cohérence fortement marquée'), he has succeeded in reading into him the very theory of an intermediate state, during which the wicked are to suffer and after which they are to be finally annihilated, which Grimm declared to be dead and buried. In the *Journal of Theol. Studies*, ii. 215 *sqq.*, Mr. Tennant sufficiently criticises this view of Bois, and in so far as it rests on the theory of the final annihilation of the wicked, it may be said to have already failed.

Modern critics, almost without exception (Schwally, *Das Leben nach dem Tode*, 153; André, *Les Apocryphes de l'Ancien Testament*, 317,

^a He is strongly rebuked by Tennant (*Journ. of Theol. Stud.*, ii. 216) for reviving what Grimm calls the obsolete idea that 'Wisdom' believed in an intermediate state. Tennant's criticism on him is: 'When one finds the last clauses of 4¹⁹ detached entirely from the context in which they occur and regarded as a summary—equally irrelevant to what precedes and what follows—of the characteristics of (1) death, (2) hades-existence, (3) annihilation, *in inverse order*, one can have no further doubt but that the writer's system of interpretation is artificial.'

among others), refuse to recognise in Wisdom any such doctrine. Nothing less than a contortion of passages like 4¹⁹ (cf. Tennant, 216) is required to argue away the plain statement that the wicked are to suffer and behold the happiness of the good—no period being fixed for such experience. The passages on which the advocates of the annihilation-theory rely, 1¹¹, 'the mouth that lieth destroyeth the soul' (R.V., 'a mouth that belieth destroyeth a soul'); 3¹⁶, 'the seed of an unlawful bed shall vanish away'; 4^{19d}, 'their memory shall perish'; 5¹⁴, '(the hope of the ungodly) passeth by as the remembrance of a guest that tarried but a day,' are rightly regarded in the light of 5¹³, 'in our wickedness we were utterly consumed' as entirely figurative and indeed homiletic in character. The *θάνατος* then which is spoken of in 1¹² is not, as the Epicureans seem to have held, the destruction of soul and body alike at the same time, which would be acceptable to men of their opinions, nor is it annihilation preceded by a final judgment. It is the 'second death' of later theology, which is defined in the Revelation. It is not (Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 353) 'annihilation, but the endless torment of the wicked.' Rev. 20¹⁴, 'This is the second death, even the lake of fire,' cf. 21⁸; but over the good, 20⁶, 'the second death hath no power.' 2¹¹, 'He that overcometh shall not be hurt of the second death.'

It would be unfair not to state one of the strongest *a priori* arguments against the possibility that in 3⁷ 'Wisdom' contemplated the resurrection of the bodies of the just. This argument is founded on the probable origin of the belief in the rising again of the saints with their bodies. Such belief seems to be concurrent with the Messianic hope. It took its rise among the Pharisees, who were ardent Messianists, whereas the Sadducees, for political reasons, maintained an attitude of cool neutrality towards all such hopes; and it did undoubtedly reach its highest point among the early Christians who looked for an immediate coming of their Lord. This point, as emphasised by Harnack (*Dogmengeschichte*, i. 140), who quotes Clem. Rom., 1 Cor. 25-26 (comparison of the dying body with the dying Phoenix); Hermas, *Simil.* v. vii. 2, 'Take heed that it be not instilled into thy mind that the body perishes,' etc.; Ep. Barn., v. 6 *sqq.*; Pseudo-Clement, 2 Cor. 9¹. 'As ye were called in the flesh ye shall also come to judgment in the flesh'; and Polycarp vii. 2. He goes on to suggest that as Messianic hope declined, *e.g.* in the case of St. Paul and Ignatius, the belief in the resurrection of the body recedes into the background. Schwally, *op. cit.*^a further illustrates this. The reason for a resurrection of dead bodies, he says, was primarily to provide the Messiah with sufficient men to establish his kingdom (p. 116), for which the living Jews would not be sufficient, cf. Isaiah 26¹⁹,

^a It is noteworthy that Schwally, advanced critic and follower of Kuenen as he is, is one of those who refuse to argue out of Job 19²⁵⁻²⁷ all reference to a resurrection, cf. *op. cit.*, 109-112. He reasons that Job expected some amelioration of his lot hereafter: he certainly did not expect it in Sheol: then he must have referred to a new life after a resurrection. It is possible that after all we may come back to the original interpretation of the words, with certain modifications. For example, the rendering 'Redeemer' can hardly be justified.

where resurrection of the body is distinctly connected with such hopes.

Now this taken by itself would be almost enough to prove that in 3⁷ those who are to 'run to and fro like sparks among the stubble' are not the living Jews—there would not be enough of them—but the vast armies of the dead saints. For in any case it must be conceded that something like a rule of the righteous is here contemplated. Yet because no distinct Messianic hope is expressed, we are told that 'Wisdom' could not have believed in the resurrection of the flesh.

But in the resurrection of the soul he undoubtedly firmly believed, and it is likely that he arrived at his belief not through Greek influence but by a purely Hebrew process, which is described by Schwally, 120 *sqq.* The Israelite, he says, considered longevity the greatest of blessings. The happy condition of the patriarchs is symbolised by their long lives, and, on the other hand, in the Book of Enoch we are assured that one of the chief blessings of the glorified righteous will be that they will live five hundred years and beget one thousand children (10¹⁰ and 10¹⁷). Even in the second Isaiah we have like statements, 65²⁰, 'The child shall die an hundred years old';^{22b} 'As the days of a tree shall be the days of my people,' cf. Zech. 8⁴.

Now the conclusion is reasonable: such long life was no longer attainable on earth; the age of the patriarchs was over, therefore it must come in another life, and hence the belief in immortality. This also will be the meaning of the destruction or conquest of death, as in Hos. 13¹⁴, 'I will ransom them from the power of the grave; I will redeem them from death,' etc.; and of course repeatedly in the New Testament, Rom. 6⁹, 1 Cor. 15²⁶, 2 Tim. 1¹⁰, Heb. 2¹⁵, Rev. 1¹⁸. It is the breaking down of a barrier; the recovery of continuity; the restoration to the Hebrew of that infinitely long life for which he craved.

But from the resurrection to the idea of retribution in that resurrection is a long step. And we find that step first taken in the semi-apocryphic book of Daniel 12²³, which contains striking resemblances to our Book of Wisdom. 'Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever.' Cf. Schwally, 133. It is difficult to restrict this pronouncement, with Charles (*Eschatology*, p. 180), to a few prominent souls on either side: and the little noticed passage of Judith 16¹⁷ is even stronger with regard to the wicked, 'The Lord Almighty will take vengeance of them in the day of judgment, to put fire and worms in their flesh; and they shall weep, and feel their pain for ever.'^a

All this points clearly to a belief in the punishment of the body, *i.e.* to a resurrection of the body which is to be punished; and Schwally, 154,

^a This, according to Josephus, was also the teaching of the Pharisees. In *Ant.*, XVIII. i. 3, he speaks of the punishment of the wicked as taking place *ὑπὸ χθονὸς*. In *B. J.*, II. viii. 14, the phrase is *καθ' ἀδον*, in Hades; that is, in Sheol. The righteous rise again and possess other bodies; but for the wicked there is no resurrection. Here the view of 'Wisdom' differs.

has to acknowledge this in (1) the reward of the eunuch in 3¹⁴, 'There shall be given him for his faithfulness a peculiar favour, and a more delightsome lot in the sanctuary of the Lord'; (2) the case of the children of unlawful marriages; they have no *παραμύθιον*, no consolation, in the day of decision. He explains these away as antiquated forms of expression; but taking all these passages together and, so to speak, collecting their average, it is difficult to maintain that 'Wisdom' did not to some extent believe in the resurrection of the flesh after death.

C

THE CONNECTION OF ST. PAUL'S EPISTLES
WITH THE BOOK OF WISDOM.

This question is one which cannot be lightly dismissed, as e.g. by Farrar, p. 422. The resemblances both in language and matter are occasionally very strong indeed, and for more than a century efforts have been made to explain them. The results both of early and later criticism are well summed up by E. Grafe in *Theologische Abhandlungen C. von Weizsäcker zu seinem 70ten Geburtstag gewidmet*, Freiburg, 1892, pp. 251-286.

The subject may be approached from three points of view—(1) Are the two writers in correspondence? can similarity of doctrine be proved? (2) Was St. Paul actually influenced in his opinions by the writer of Wisdom? and (3) Had St. Paul read 'Wisdom' at all? The order of these questions seems logically faulty; chronologically it is correct.

1. For the earlier investigations were mostly caused by the question of the retention or non-retention of the Apocrypha in the Bible as it was generally used in the Lutheran Church, and to justify its inclusion it was necessary to prove that its doctrines were at least not at variance with those of the canonical Scriptures. It was with this object that Stier in 1828, and again in 1853, published works in which a mass of passages from the Apocrypha were adduced in which resemblances to the Pauline writings could be discovered. He had, however, had predecessors in the field. Origen and Jerome had maintained that the Apocryphal books were used by the writers of the New Testament, and this has always been the belief of the Roman Church. But there had been no systematic collation of passages till the time of Kuinoel (1794), who was presently followed by Nachtigal (1799). The latter collected an imposing series of passages^a (twenty-seven in Wisdom and thirty in St. Paul), in which he detected resemblances, often quite fanciful; but he professed himself unable to decide whether the apostle had studied the Pseudo-Solomon himself or had gathered his ideas from the teaching of Gamaliel. Stier added a good many passages

^a Grafe, p. 263, n. 3.

which he thought showed connection, but Grimm opposed the whole theory, alleging that nothing more could be proved than similarity of thought common to all Jews familiar with their own Scriptures,^a or at most the use by both writers of the same passages of the Old Testament. This last is certainly capable of proof.^b

2. But critics like O. Pfleiderer and his school have approached the question from an entirely different point of view. Their idea is to prove that St. Paul actually derived his doctrines directly from 'Wisdom'—nay, that in one instance he was induced by the study of the book to change his opinions on a vital point. As an instance of the extreme form of such criticism, it may be well to state this case first.^c

It is first assumed that St. Paul, in passages like Phil. 1²³, 'I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ,' and in 2 Cor. 5¹⁴, declares his belief in the continued existence of the soul after death, and prior to any general resurrection, in the presence of Christ. This, then, is contrary to his earlier belief in the resurrection of the body. To this change of opinion he had been led by the study of passages like Wisd. 3¹ *sqq.*, 'The souls of the righteous, etc.'; 9¹⁵, 'For a corruptible body weigheth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle lieth heavy upon a much musing mind'; 8¹³, 'Because of her (Wisdom) I shall have immortality and leave behind an eternal memory'; 8¹⁷, 'Kinship unto wisdom is immortality'; and these views had been expounded to him by Apollos, who converted him from the 'Palestinian Jewish' belief in the resurrection of the body to the 'Alexandrine hope of spiritual immortality.'

Grafe, whose criticism is generally sound enough, supports this theory^d in its essential parts, and adds that the expression to be 'in the hand of God' in Wisd. 3¹ corresponds to that in Phil. 1²³, 'to be with Christ.' More to his purpose is Wisd. 6¹⁰ ἀφθαρστὰ δὲ ἐγγὺς εἶναι ποιεῖ τοῦ θεοῦ. He, however, ascribes St. Paul's change of opinion not entirely to the teachings of Wisdom, but to the fact that when he wrote the later epistles he had been in imminent danger of death, and being thereby convinced that his end might come before the appearance of the Lord upon earth, now welcomed the belief that death was but a bridge which should convey him straight into the presence of his

^a So Westcott in Smith, *D.B.* 'In the case of St. Paul it may be questioned whether his acquaintance with the book may not have been gained orally rather than by direct study.' But was 'Wisdom' known at all to the Palestinian Jews? A Lapide will have it that Christ himself in Matt. 13⁴³, 'Justi fulgebunt,' quotes Wisd. 3⁷.

^b For the exaggerated view taken by the Roman Church, in accordance with her exaltation of the Apocrypha generally, of the influence of 'Wisdom' on New Testament writers, we may quote a miniature edition of our book by Canon M'Intyre, intended for popular use, where (Introd., p. 1) it is stated that 'the Book of Wisdom has entered largely into the New Testament writings. In particular SS. Peter, Paul, and John were simply saturated by its descriptions, its modes of thought and expressions.' The writer goes on to say that it has been called the prologue to St. John (cf. Ewald, *Israel*, v. p. 484, Eng. trans.).

^c O. Pfleiderer, *Urchristentum*, p. 161; *Paulinismus* (2), p. 284.

^d P. 276.

Saviour. 'And thus he borrows from Wisdom a form of expression for a conviction attained in quite another way.' Now, setting aside the question whether St. Paul had really modified his belief, it is perfectly evident that the passages quoted from Wisdom were not sufficient to induce him to do so. The passage with regard to the 'souls of the righteous' is succeeded by others (e.g. v. ⁸, 'They shall judge nations and have dominion over peoples') which, if they mean anything at all, imply bodily existence,^a and the two quoted from ch. 8 either prove too much or too little. If pressed they would seem to reduce the belief of the author to that of Ben Sira, whose idea of 'immortality' is to leave a flourishing family^b and a respectable reputation behind one on earth. But as a matter of fact such expressions are not inconsistent with belief in the resurrection, any more than the statement that Shakespeare is rendered immortal by his works. The reference to Apollos is negligible; and Grafe's identification of 'the hand of God' with the 'presence of Christ' seems faulty. 'The hand' surely means 'protection,' as constantly in the Old Testament (Deut. 33³; Isa. 51⁹).

With regard to a further theory of Pfleiderer's (*Urchristentum*, pp. 161, 257), by which he actually deduced St. Paul's doctrine of the Holy Spirit from Wisd. 7, 8, 9, and especially 7²² and 9^{6.9-17}, it may be well to allow the reader, by comparing the passages alleged to be parallel, to judge for himself. As no verbal correspondence is concerned, it will be sufficient to quote the R.V. in English.

It is fair to say, however, that Pfleiderer modified his original statement that in the central thought of 'Pseudo-Solomon' (namely that divine wisdom or the Holy Ghost 'makes the souls in which it finds its abiding-place friends of God and prophets, furnishes them with all knowledge and makes them even partakers of eternal life'), lies the root of St. Paul's doctrine. He afterwards maintained only that the apostle derived from the apocryphic book the idea of a Holy Ghost producing not merely momentary ecstasies, but a permanent character of godliness and devotion. But the general theory of connection can best be tested by comparing the passages adduced.

1 Cor. 2^{7.16}

7. We speak the wisdom of God in a mystery, even the wisdom that hath been hidden, which God fore-ordained before the worlds unto our glory.

8. Which none of the rulers of this world knoweth: for had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.

Wisdom.

(8) And who ever gained knowledge of thy counsel except thou gavest wisdom and sentest thy Holy Spirit from above, Wisd. 9¹⁷ (supposed to correspond to Cor. vv. 8.10.11 b).

^a Cf. Burney, *Israel's Hope of Immortality*, pp. 73-75.

^b *Ibid.*, pp. 67, 68.

9. But as it is written, Things which eye saw not and ear heard not, and which entered not into the heart of man ; whatsoever things God prepared for them that love him.

10. But unto us God revealed them through the spirit ; for the spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God.

11. For who among men knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of the man which is in him ? even so the things of God none knoweth save the Spirit of God.

12. But we received not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God ; that we might know the things that are freely given to us by God.

13. Which things also we speak, not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Spirit teacheth ; comparing spiritual things with spiritual.

14. But the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are foolishness unto him ; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned.

15. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things, and he himself is judged of no man.

16. For who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he should instruct him ? But we have the mind of Christ.

(9) For nothing doth God love save him that dwelleth with wisdom, Wisd. 7²⁸.

(10) She being one hath power to do all things, and remaining in herself reneweth all things and from generation to generation passing into holy souls she maketh men friends of God and prophets, Wisd. 7²⁷.

(14) For the thoughts of mortals are timorous, and our devices are prone to fail ; for a corruptible body weigheth down the soul, and the earthly frame (tent) lieth heavy upon a mind that is full of cares (musing much), Wisd. 9¹⁴⁻¹⁶.

(15) For she knoweth all things and hath understanding thereof ; and in my doings she shall guide me in ways of soberness, and she shall guard me in her glory, Wisd. 9¹¹.

(16) For what man shall know the counsel of God, or who shall conceive what the Lord willeth ? Wisd. 9¹³.

Of all these the last verse only exhibits anything like affinity of language ; and unfortunately for the argument, that language is almost

a commonplace of the Old Testament. Cf. Isa. 40¹³, Job 21²², 36²³, and cf. Rom. 11²⁴.

Grafe, sane as his judgment generally is, so far yields to the 'derivation' theory that, while emphasising St. Paul's claims to originality of thought (pp. 285-6), he yet argues that he 'derived' from 'Wisdom' (1) his doctrine of predestination, and (2) his view of the position of idolaters: to these he adds, as we have seen, his ideas as to immortality.

With regard to (1), his most cogent argument is certainly that drawn from a comparison of Rom. 9²², 'God, willing to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much longsuffering vessels of wrath fitted unto destruction,' with Wisd. 12⁸, 10, 11^a, 20^a, as proving 'the mildness of God towards his enemies, though he knows that it will profit them nothing.' The expression in Wisd. 12²⁰, *διφειλομένους θανάτῳ* is certainly like the *κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν* of Romans. The author of Wisdom is, it is true, speaking only of the Canaanites.

But such passages in both authors as refer simply to the measureless and uncontradictable prove nothing. All can be referred to Old Testament dicta; and in one text in particular, a 'potter' passage, St. Paul, Rom. 9^{19,20}, is much nearer to the original (Isa. 45^{9,10}) than Wisdom 12¹². The metaphor of the potter is indeed so common in the Old Testament (Isa. 29¹⁶, 64⁸; Jer. 18⁶, 19¹, cf. Ps. 2⁹) that no argument can be based upon it except that both writers knew the Scriptures well, while in the passage, Wisd. 15⁷, compared with Rom. 9²¹, where the strongest verbal likeness appears, Pseudo-Solomon is speaking of the folly of idolaters, whereas St. Paul is simply alluding to the difference between the classes of mankind.

As to (2), the peculiarity common to Wisdom^a and St. Paul is the division of idolaters into two classes, the refined, who worshipped the stars or the elements as deities (Wisd. 13²), and the coarser-minded, who adored idols and even vile beasts (13¹⁰, 12²⁴). To the former of these classes those described in Gal. 4⁸⁻¹⁰ are considered to belong, the word *στοιχεῖα* in v. ⁹ being apparently taken in its late sense of the physical elements—the stars. In Rom. 1¹⁸ and elsewhere the debased worshippers of idols are meant, and these are declared to be *ἀναπολέγητοι*, while the others are simply *οὐκ εἰδότες θεόν*. To this distinction the mild condemnation of star-worshippers in Wisd. 13⁶, *ἐπὶ τούτοις ἔστι μέμψις δλιγή* is supposed to correspond. But it is immediately followed by *πάλιν δὲ οὐδὲ οὐτοὶ συγγνωστοι*, so that it results that while St. Paul condemns only the image-worshippers, Wisdom condemns (expressly) the star-adorers.

The relation of body and soul expressed in both by the metaphor^b of a 'tent,' an oppressive covering (Wisd. 9¹⁵; 2 Cor. 5¹⁻⁴), Grafe rightly refuses to insist on as a proof of connection. The notion is to be found in Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy. There is, however, some resemblance between Pseudo-Solomon's idea (Wisd. 9¹⁶, 16 and 12²⁷) of the correspondence of the punishment to the sin, and the paronomasia of Rom. 1²⁸, *καθὼς οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν τὸν θεόν ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς ὁ θεὸς εἰς αδόκιμον νοῦν*.

^a Grafe, p. 270 sq.

^b P. 274.

3. The third position, which is simply that St. Paul had read the Book of Wisdom and knew it well, will be readily conceded. We may go further and say that he was probably fresh from the reading of it when he wrote the Epistle to the Romans. But here the concession must end. The most famous of all the alleged correspondences, that of the 'panoply' in Ephes., turns out to be no correspondence at all, but the utilisation of the same passage of Isaiah, for totally different purposes, by the two writers. The parallel passages are—

Isa. 59¹⁷, He put on righteousness as a breastplate, and an helmet of salvation upon his head; and he put on garments of vengeance for clothing, and was clad with zeal as a cloke.

Wisd. 5¹⁷⁻²⁰, He shall take his jealousy as complete armour . . . he shall put on righteousness as a breastplate, and shall array himself with judgment unfeigned as with a helmet, he shall take holiness as an invincible shield, and he shall sharpen stern wrath for a sword.

Eph. 6¹¹⁻¹⁷, Put on the complete armour of God . . . having girded your loins with truth, and having put on the breastplate of righteousness; and having shod your feet with the preparation of the gospel of peace; withal, taking up the shield of faith. . . . And take the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God.

That Grafe should remark^a that 'it matters nothing that Wisdom is referring (as does Isaiah) to the armour of an offended God and St. Paul to that of the Christian warrior,' is not in accordance with his usual candour. But more than this, the two later writers take only one feature in common from their original—the breastplate of righteousness: Pseudo-Solomon further turns the 'garments of vengeance' into a 'panoply of jealousy,' St. Paul has the breastplate and also the 'helmet of salvation,' whereas Wisdom makes the helmet 'judgment unfeigned,' and in all the other particulars, spear, shield, etc., the two are hopelessly in disagreement.

We may conclude with Grafe's excellent summing-up^b: 'The dependence is more formal than real. A man of experience with a sharp eye for practical needs, St. Paul took good things where they presented themselves to him. And thus he borrowed from Wisdom a store of words, of ideas, and of metaphors, and applied them to the expression of thoughts and convictions elsewhere acquired.'

^a P. 279.

^b P. 286.

D

ON THE CONNECTION OF 'WISDOM'
WITH GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

It was very late before the Christian commentators on Wisdom recognised that there was any connection between the doctrines of Pseudo-Solomon and those of the heathen philosophers. They were naturally more concerned with the practical and homiletic value of the book than with the origin of the writer's opinions. Rabanus Maurus, whose commentary is the earliest now in existence, nowhere shows any idea that Wisdom represents even the Alexandrian school of thought. Nicolas de Lyra gives the first indication of such a thought when he says (as quoted by Menzel) that the author 'Philonismum redolet,' but the remark is made in passing, and he does not enforce it by remarks on such passages as *e.g.* 7²², which might reasonably give occasion for such a statement. The credit of bringing such connection to light rests with the English Dominican Robert Holcot, who, in his elaborate *Lections* on the book (repeatedly printed before 1500; most accessible in the Basle edition of 1586), illustrates it by a very wide circle of quotations. It is difficult, however, to discover any single passage in which he distinctly affirms Pseudo-Solomon's^a indebtedness to heathen writers. He cites Aristotle for parallels repeatedly, particularly the metaphysics. He thinks there are Platonic and Pythagorean elements in the work, but above all he refers constantly to Seneca.

Now Seneca, as a kind of eclectic Stoic, probably represents most nearly the standpoint of Wisdom, in whom the doctrines of the Stoic seem, when all is considered (compare Menzel's list of passages showing Greek influence in his *De Graecis in libris Koheleth et Sophiae vestigiis*, pp. 41-51), to be most prominent. It is, of course, impossible to suppose that Pseudo-Solomon was acquainted with the Roman philosopher's writings, but the theory of the late origin of Wisdom now generally adopted would make the two nearly contemporary, and would explain a similar development of thought. We need have no hesitation in ascribing to Wisdom an eclectic Stoicism,^b which would account for

^a Menzel's references are often wrong. His citation of Holcot's 'Introduction and first Lection' is surely a mistake. For the first Lection is the Introduction, and it is simply a preliminary sermon. The best passage for our purpose is in *Lectio xcvi.* p. 325, ed. Basil.: 'Ex his patet quod monachis et religiosis licet studere in libris vel literis philosophorum.' He then quotes August., *De doctrina Christiana*, ii. 4: 'Philosophi autem qui vocantur si qua forte vera ac fidei nostrae accommoda dixerunt et maxime Platonici non solum formidanda non sunt sed ab eis tanquam ab injustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda.' He plainly uses this passage to protect himself. He never ventures openly to suggest that 'Wisdom' is founded on heathen ideas.

^b It should, however, be observed that whereas later Stoicism at all events (cf. Strong in *Journal of Theol. Studies*, ii. 234) degenerated into absolute materialism, there is no trace of such influence in Wisdom.

many of his expressions without presupposing any deep knowledge of Greek philosophy. Stoicism, it must be remembered, represents the first attempt to provide a rational theory of morality which the common man could understand—its ideal, *mutatis mutandis*, is not unlike the *σοφία* of the last chapters of Wisdom—and it is very much this popular basis of ethics (with the idea of Providence, *πρόνοια*, strongly in evidence) that our author sets before us.

Avoiding, then, the 'parallelomania' which, according to Menzel, p. 40, has enabled some critics to adduce some one hundred and fifty passages of Greek writers to illustrate a single passage of Wisdom, we may set ourselves to inquire systematically what the traces of heathen philosophy in our author amount to.

It must be premised, and indeed it cannot be too strongly insisted upon, that we are here dealing neither with a very systematic thinker nor with a deeply read man. Whatever Pseudo-Solomon may have known, he shows no signs of acquaintance with more philosophy than he might have gathered from the vagrant Greek teachers of his time; and this view is corroborated by the best modern critics. Grimm, Bois, Pleiderer, all agree that we have here a mere dabbler in philosophy. In this philosophy, however, the Stoic element probably predominated.

Can we find any traces of the Socratic philosophy in Wisdom? Such traces have been found, but there is little difficulty in showing that they are either fortuitous or are the commonplaces of the Socratically-Platonic school. Some of the passages relied on to prove this connection are mere instances of 'parallelomania.' In 7⁸ we have *προκρίνειν τι τυνος*, and so we have in Xen. *Mem.* III. v. 19. In 7²² *σαφής* is used as an epithet of wisdom, and also in *Mem.* II. iv. 1 in the description of a true friend. The citation of *μᾶλλον δέ* from *Mem.* III. xiii. 6 to prove a point in Wisd. 8¹⁹ and of *ἐν θχλοις* (for 'in public,' cf. 1. 1¹⁴) to illustrate 8¹⁰ may likewise be disregarded; but there is a real similarity (it is no more) between the accounts of man's relation to things 'divine and human' in Wisd. 9¹⁶ and in *Mem.* I. i. 15. There is an explanation of the term *εὐφυής* (8¹⁸) in *Mem.* IV. i. 2-4, and the word *ἀνωθεν*, which is not without its difficulties (19⁵), is more or less explained by *Mem.* IV. iii. 14, *κεραυνὸς ἀνωθεν ἀφίεται*. But, on the other hand, the personification of virtue in *Mem.* II. i. 21 *sqq.* can hardly be quoted as illustrating the personification of Wisdom in 8³⁻¹⁶.

We come now to the question of Platonism; and here we have as usual extreme views on both sides. Some hold (as Lincke, *Samaria und seine Propheten*, p. 129) that Pseudo-Solomon was a thorough Platonist,^a

^a A curious light is thrown upon the motives of the early supporters of the ultra-Platonic theory by Bretschneider. It seems that the idea of Brucker and Eichhorn in particular was to prove that our author was an adherent of the Therapeuta. These Therapeuta they held to be Platonic ascetics of an exaggerated type, and to demonstrate the Platonism of 'Wisdom' was to prove his connection with them.

Lincke exaggerates. He finds Plato everywhere, and even brings in the Skeptics through the medium of certain supposed allusions to the tenets of Xenophanes, who, himself an Eleatic, was regarded with respect by the founders of the Skeptic school.

and only selected a few principles from other schools. This view seems to have been sufficiently confuted by Mr. Porter (Additional Note A). On the other hand, many commentators during the last century denied any direct Platonic influence in Wisdom. The truth probably lies between the two. Pseudo-Solomon was acquainted with Platonism as presented by the Stoics. But E. Pfeiderer has reduced the question to four points of agreement or rather contact: (1) the Immortality of the Soul; (2) the Doctrine of Pre-existence; (3) the verbal correspondence of 9¹⁵ and Plato's *Phaedo*, 81 c; (4) certain references to the *Cratylus* of Plato.

To these we should add the apparent reference to the *Timaeus*,^a the doctrines of which, however, were adopted by Stoicism and may have reached 'Wisdom' through its medium. The question of the pre-existence of the soul has been discussed in Additional Note A and there dismissed; belief in its immortality is assuredly no peculiar property of Platonism; we are therefore reduced to the last two points, as to the first of which there can be no doubt (cf. 9¹⁵ and the notes there). Either Pseudo-Solomon had himself read the *Phaedo* or he had heard this text lectured on and insisted on by some Greek teacher of his day. But the precariousness of the theory which would make him a downright Platonist is shown by the eagerness with which this passage is insisted upon by the supporters of that proposition. There is no need to contest it. But the reference to the *Cratylus*^b is less certain. It is only probable if we accept Pfeiderer's general theory of the indebtedness of Pseudo-Solomon to Heraclitus. Granting this, we discover in Wisd. 7²²⁻²³ and *Crat.* p. 413 not merely likeness of language but identity of thought. Socrates is speaking of the Heracliteans, and he says, 'ὅσοι ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνοντι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι οἷον οὐδὲν ἀλλὸ ή χωρεῖν· διὰ δὲ τουτοῦ παντὸς εἶναι τι διεξίον, δι' οὐ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίγνεσθαι. εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον. οὐ γάρ ἀν δύνασθαι ἀλλως διὰ τοῦ λόντος οἶναι παντὸς εἰ μὴ λεπτότατον ἦν κτλ.' With this we compare Wisd. 7²⁴, where immediately after λεπτότατον (v.1.) we have πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως κινητικώτερον σοφίᾳ διήκει δὲ καὶ χωρεῖ διὰ πάντων διὰ τὴν καθαρότητα. Even here it is possible that this Heraclitean language came to our author through the Stoics, who (Zeller, *Stoics*, Eng. trans., p. 369 *sq.*) at least derived their views of natural science, such as they were, from those of the Ephesian philosopher.

Other verbal assonances (for they are little more) are found in 1¹⁴, where φάρμακον is used as in *Phaedrus*, 274 E; 3¹⁸ διάγνωσις as in *Laws*, 865 c; 6²² ἥδεσθαι ἐπὶ τινι as in *Phileb.*, 48 B; 7⁵ γένεσις as in *Phaedrus*, 222 D; 14³ διακυβερνᾶν as in *Laws*, 709 B; 14¹⁶ τελεταῖ for sacrifices as in *Rep.* ii. 365 A. We have also the use of ὄσιότης

^a Grant, *Ethics*, i. 277. 'Posidonius wrote a commentary on the *Timaeus*, apparently to reconcile it with the Stoical physics,' which were not an important part of their system.

^b Pfeiderer's remark (*Heraklit*, p. 300) that Pseudo-Solomon probably was attracted to the *Cratylus* as a great 'Liebhaber der Wortspielen' is acute, but would hardly justify us in assuming his acquaintance with the dialogue.

and δικαιοσύνη in 9³ as in *Gorgias*, 507 B. Menzel insists also (p. 58) on the resemblance between 7¹⁷ σύστασιν κόσμου and *Timaeus*, 32 E. He has collected in all one hundred and thirty-five passages which seem to have reference at least to the language of Greek philosophy, and it is noteworthy that of these ninety-three are taken from chs. 1-9.

The notes of acquaintance with Heraclitus which Pfeiderer thinks he has discovered may be classed under three heads: (1) antithetical or paradoxical statement; (2) allusions to the mysteries and their evils; (3) the forged 'letters,' which, or some of which, he believes that 'Wisdom' actually wrote.

Firstly there seems undoubtedly to be a certain resemblance between the violent contrasts of the last chapters of Wisdom and Heraclitean paradoxes. For example, *Fragm.* 36 of Heraclitus runs thus, ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμῶν θέρος· πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κύρος λιμὸς· ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ ὄκωσπερ ὄκταν συμμίγη θυώσασι· ὄνομάζεται καθ' ἡδονὴν ἔκάστου. With this Pfeiderer compares Wisd. 16²² *sqq.*, 'Snow and ice endured fire and melted not,' and so forth. But his exegesis seems strained. Πόλεμος εἰρήνη he thinks Pseudo-Solomon appropriated as representing God at war with Egypt and at peace with Israel. Χειμῶν θέρος gave him the idea of the hail of Egypt contrasted with the comforting sun (16^{27,28}) and pillar of fire of the Israelites, and in μεταλλευομένη, 16²⁵ he finds an unfortunate reminiscence of ἀλλοιοῦται. Certainly the last words of the fragment do bear a certain resemblance to 16²⁰, where the manna is spoken of as 'agreeing to every taste . . . while that bread, ministering to the desire of the eater, tempered itself according to every man's choice.' Similarly the whole of the tiresome antitheses in chs. 17, 18 of Wisdom may be traced to the influence of such statements as that contained in Heracl., *Frs.* 21, 22, 23, and especially 39 and 40. The last named runs thus, τὰ ψυχρὰ θέρεται, θερμὸν αναίνεται, καρφαλέον νοτίζεται. Some verbal resemblances may be traced, but what Pfeiderer insists upon is the general trend of thought which Heraclitus seems, in his idea, to have inspired in the author of Wisdom.

He thinks, indeed, that the whole of Pseudo-Solomon's theory of retribution was derived from Heraclitus. If he held that all events in this world took place by ordered rule (as it would seem from 11^{20c} that he did), and if he thought that such harmony was maintained in the world by counterbalancing movements up and down (which Pfeiderer collects from πάλιν ἀνωθεν in 19⁶), then it was natural for him to accept the theory of Heraclitus that to every movement in one direction corresponds a movement in the opposite direction, by which equilibrium is maintained. We have then two nations, Israel and Egypt. Israel has been oppressed by Egypt: the balance must be restored. Suppose Israel and Egypt in opposite scales of a balance; if Egypt goes down Israel goes up; the punishment of Egypt entails the happiness of Israel. And far-fetched as this idea seems, the expressions πάντα μέτρῳ καὶ ἀριθμῷ καὶ σταθμῷ διέταξας (11²⁰) and ὡς ροπὴ ἐκ πλαστίγγων ὅλος ὁ κόσμος ἐνάντιον σου (11²²) lend some colour to it. Again the passage in 19⁶, 'As the notes of a psaltery vary the character of the rhythm,' etc., followed by the most exaggerated paradoxes to be found in 'Wisdom,' receives some light from the

fragment of Heraclitus *ταῦτα ἔστι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός . . . πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι παλιντονος ἀμορτα κέσμου, θκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τέξου.* So even sin may be regarded as a movement in a certain direction; it must be compensated or corrected by a movement in the opposite direction, viz. punishment or retribution.

So far, then, we have Pseudo-Solomon as simply influenced by the style and the paradoxical fancies of Heraclitus—an influence produced by his deep study of the author: we have now to consider his antagonism to the author he had studied. This appears in the matter of the mysteries. It is true that the distinct allusions to them are few; but if Pfleiderer (and Bois supports him) is right, there is intermittent reference to them in several passages, beginning with 1¹². In 1¹⁶ it is possible that the 'covenant' refers to the ceremony of initiation. We have in Heraclitus (*Fr. 127*) a passage which might well appear to have excited the antagonism of 'Wisdom.' It runs as follows: *Εἰ μὴ γὰρ Διονύσῳ πομπὴν ἐποιεῦντο καὶ ὕμνεον ἄσμα αἰδοῖοι, ἀναιδέστατα εἰργαστ' ἀν· ὥντὸς δὲ Ἀτόης καὶ Διύνυσος ὁτέφ μαινονται καὶ ληναῖονται.* This is a kind of apology for the mysteries, but it contains an idea which (say Pfleiderer and Bois) is abhorrent to all Pseudo-Solomon's theories. That God should have anything in common with death is a horrible idea; yet the identification of Hades and Dionysus means this, and 'Wisdom' begins at once to combat it in his account of the Epicureans in chs. 1, 2.

In 14²³⁻²⁸ we have undoubtedly a distinct allusion to the mysteries: 'celebrating secret mysteries or holding frantic revels of strange ordinances, etc. . . . the worship of those idols that may not be named is a beginning and cause and end of every evil.' But, strangely enough, the passage which seems to correspond most closely to this denunciation occurs, not in the genuine works of Heraclitus, who, as we have seen, appears rather as an apologist of the mysteries, but in one of the forged epistles. It runs as follows (*Ep. vii. pp. 75-76, ed. Bywater*), *ταύτα γελάσω ὥρων ἀνθώπους ποιοῦντας ή ἐσθήτα καὶ γένεια καὶ κεφαλῆς πόνους ἀτημελήτους ή γυναῖκα φαρμάκεως ἐπειλημμένην τέκνου ή μειράκια τῆς οὐσίας ἐκβεβρωμένα ή πολιτην γαμετῆς ἀφηρημένον ή κόρην βίᾳ διαπαρθενευθεῖσαν ἐν παννυχίσιν ή ἔταιραν οὐπω γυναῖκα καὶ γυναικῶν ἔχουσαν ἥδη πάθη ή διὰ ἀσελγείαν νεανίσκον ἔνα πόλεως ἔραστὴν δλης ή τᾶς τῶν ἔλαιων φθορὰς ἐν μύροις ή τὰς ἐν συνδείπνοις γυνομένοις διὰ δακτυλίων παροινας.* The last few words (for which the ordinary texts contain a widely different reading) are supposed to mean the leaving of rings in pledge for the expenses of an entertainment, cf. note on *ἀγερωχία*, 2⁹. It is to be noted that immediately before the sentence quoted the word *τυμπανίσαντες* is used of those revellers, plainly indicating that the processions of mystae are alluded to. The disgust of Pseudo-Solomon at these orgies would of course be greater if, as Pfleiderer (p. 306, n. 1) maintains, he was an Essene.

It will be noticed that the influence which the theory of the *νοῦς* existing in the universe, attributed to Heraclitus and expounded more fully by Anaxagoras, exercised on the Alexandrian school (cf. Fairweather in Hastings' *D. B.*, v. 282a), is little pressed by Pfleiderer. This is owing to the fact that of the writers of that school he devoted his attention

more particularly to 'Wisdom,' in whom signs of the doctrine of *νόος* are hardly to be found. Langen indeed (*Judenthum*, 259) tried to account for this: 'Men were unwilling to transfer to Wisdom the expressions used of *νόος* by the Greeks, because *σοφία* in the abstract is but a bare idea, and thus they would in every instance of such transfer run the risk of attaching to this mere idea properties belonging to the more substantial thing to which they belonged. On this ground Pseudo-Solomon elevated *σοφία* into a substance, investing her with *πνεῦμα*. This implied a real advance in doctrine, . . . but this advance was merely formal and not material, inasmuch as Solomon had already by his anthropomorphic presentation of Wisdom as "playing before God" elevated her above the position of a mere conception.' All the same, there is no *νόος* in 'Wisdom.'

To say that Pfleiderer proves his theory would be going too far: the acute remark of Bois (*Essai*, p. 216) is only too true: 'The similarities between Pseudo-Solomon and the philosophers who succeeded him are quite as striking as the similarities between him and the philosophers who preceded him.' But in any case Pfleiderer's book, like that of Bois, is full of suggestions for exegesis. It cannot be denied, however, that many of his theories are vague.

On one point he commits himself to a very definite statement, viz. when he claims for Pseudo-Solomon the authorship of some at least of the forged^a Heraclitic epistles, especially the sixth and ninth. One or two specimens of his arguments on this subject must suffice. In *Epistle ix.* the writer argues in favour of the grant of *ἰσοπολιτεία* and *λορυμα* to certain oppressed classes—it matters not greatly who or where, for Pfleiderer seeks to find in this a general apology for the oppressed Jews and a plea for their admission to full rights of citizenship wherever they may be. More distinct is his claim that in *Epistle ix.* there is a regular description of the miracles which fell to the lot of the children of Israel in the wilderness, recounted in order. The passage referred to runs as follows (Bywater's ed., p. 74): 'They know not (i.e. the physicians of the day) that in the world God heals great bodies, adjusts their irregularities, unites what is fractured, secretly compresses what has slipped, collects things that are dispersed, beautifies things ugly, gathers together things left, pursues things escaping, illuminates the dark with light, sets bounds to the boundless, and while he gives form to the formless fills with visibility things invisible. For he permeates all existence, adjusting; forming, dissolving; consolidating, dispersing; the dry he melts into the wet, and brings it to dissolving, and while he evaporates the streams, condenses the dispersed atmosphere, and continually while he drives some bodies upward keeps others down. This is his way of healing when the world goes amiss.'

The reader may judge whether there be any real allusion in this to the miracles wrought for the Israelites in their escape from Egypt. But in any case a theory so recent, and supported by so much learning, deserves attention. If there be any certain allusion at all to the Heraclitean

^a *Jahrbuch für Prot. Theol.*, xv. 2. *Rheinisches Museum*, 1887. 153-163.

philosophy (which, it must be remembered, was not unconnected with Stoicism) in Wisdom, it is that in 2³, 'speech is a spark in the movement of our heart.'

Anaxagoras is invoked as having inspired at least three texts of our author: 7²², where Wisdom is called *λεπτόν*, and possibly in the next verse *λεπτότατον* (v.l.) is compared with a dictum of this philosopher; that the *νοῦς* or principle of the universe is *λεπτότατον πάντων χρημάτων*. But we have already seen that this may be otherwise accounted for 7²⁷ is dealt with in the notes *ad loc.* As Grimm remarks, such an idea as the unchangeableness of God, who can change all things, needs no Greek authority to support it. 8¹, *διοικεῖ (ἡ σοφία) τὰ πάντα χρηστῶς* is as much an idea of the Stoics as of any other school which recognises God's government of the world.

That no passage of 'Wisdom' can be safely paralleled from Aristotle is a striking and instructive fact. It bears out the theory already stated in these pages, that the writer's philosophy is that of the market-place or at least of the lecture-room. It is with the rhetorical philosophers only that he is concerned. Of exact writers like Aristotle he knows nothing. So Menzel rightly condemns the attempt to refer 13⁵ to Aristotelian influence, strong as the resemblance in ideas appears to be (cf. notes *ad loc.*). What Wisdom knew of Aristotle came through Stoic teaching.

And here we arrive at the root of the matter. From what has been already said it will be perceived that not a single doctrine of Greek philosophy is represented by Pseudo-Solomon which could not have been derived by him from the prelections of Stoic teachers. And when we consider that this Stoicism was at once the most popularised form of Greek thought and also the one which dealt most practically with that morality which was the only form of philosophy which a Hebrew could recognise, we shall be prepared to see at every turn the traces of it in the Book of Wisdom. Had it not been for the early period assumed for our book, this would long ago have been recognised. Granted the later date, we have no difficulty in discovering in Pseudo-Solomon a Hebrew Seneca—to a certain extent even a Cicero—with all their hesitations, their picking and choosing of doctrines, but, above all, with their real faith in the government of the world by God's providence, call it *σοφία* or what you will.

E

GOD AND MAN^a IN 'WISDOM'

The subject of Wisdom's theology is one that requires to be approached with great caution and discernment, considering both the recognised uncertainty of his ideas and the fact that they are expressed in what was to all intents a foreign language for him. In seeking to discover from his own words his idea of God, we may bear in mind two points on which to base our investigations. First, how far Pseudo-Solomon had progressed from the old anthropomorphic view of the Deity as contained in the Old Testament Scriptures; secondly, what his position is as regards Philo's doctrine of the transcendent God, acting in the world only through an intermediary agency—that of the Logos.

One is surprised to find in Mr. Gregg a supporter of the theory which would make Wisdom another Philo, advocating all the idiosyncrasies of the latter's system, and apparently ready to accept the inconsistencies to which they lead. As a clear statement of such a theory, his arguments must be quoted. It will be observed that he seems to take for granted as settled in favour of his view almost every single point with regard to which scholars differ as to the interpretation of Wisdom's theology. This is the more remarkable, inasmuch as in § 10 of his *Introduction* he accepts the view that the Philonian Logos is not represented in Wisdom, and decides so in the case of the crucial passage, 18¹⁶. When he declares in the same section that Philo's doctrine of the Wisdom is almost identical with that of Pseudo-Solomon, it is difficult to follow him at all. What is Philo's 'doctrine of the Wisdom'? Drummond (*Philo*, ii. 204-213) has summed up such doctrine. Wisdom is the daughter of God; she is the mother of the Logos; she is the mother of the universe. She is identical with the Logos; she is distinguished from the Logos. Philo is endeavouring to reconcile the traditional theory of God's wisdom as an agent with his own invention of the Logos-theory; and the traditional Wisdom goes to the wall, takes second place in his system, or is left out of account altogether.

In his § 11 Mr. Gregg plainly states his views. 'Wisdom emphasises, as might be expected in an Alexandrian work, the distance of God from this world.' (We may ask, Where does 'Wisdom' say or imply this? and what Alexandrian work do we possess, with the sole excep-

^a The best and clearest expositions of this point are still to be found in books as old as Bruch, *Weisheitslehre der Hebräer*, Strassburg, 1851; and Langen, *Das Judenthum in Palästina zur Zeit Christi*, Freib., 1866. Mr. Fairweather's article 'Development of Doctrine,' in Hastings' *D. B.*, vol. v., is copious and informative, but not very systematic.

tion of Philo's own, which justifies such a generalisation? ^{a)} 'Even omnipresence is only indirectly attributed to God: it is the Spirit of God, or *Wisdom*, that fills the world.' (It is a fairly strong presumption to identify the Holy Spirit with Wisdom in 1⁷, seeing that in 1⁶ this all-powerful spirit is 'put to confusion.') ^{b)} Mr. Gregg goes on, 'If God searches hearts and reins, and hears the secret words of men, it is because his deputy lays them open to his mind (1⁶⁻¹⁰). It is as a transcendent God that the book presents Him. He is indeed Creator, Artificer, Author of the world's beauty (1¹⁴, 9⁹, 13¹³), but not directly; His creative action was mediated through *Wisdom*; and similarly, though He might be said to order the course of the world (12¹⁵), yet *Wisdom* is His appointed agent (8¹). All things were made through *Wisdom*, and without her was not anything made.^c God is more rightly named Organiser than Creator. His hand did not make the world out of nothing, but out of formless matter (11¹⁷).'

On the last point it may be sufficient to refer to the notes *ad loc.*; but the whole of this argument lands us in a system of dualism which would be abhorrent to any orthodox Jew, such as we believe Pseudo-Solomon to have been. Philo, with his absolute incapability for appreciating the logical results of his own vague speculations, no doubt accepts such dualism calmly enough; but when Mr. Gregg attributes to our author not one dualism only, but three—God and *Wisdom*, God and matter, God and evil (1^{13,14,16}, 2²⁴)—he charges him with a confusion of thought which is inconceivable.

Totally inconsistent with this view of *Wisdom* as the indispensable intermediary are Mr. Gregg's own quotations: 'there can be a direct self-manifestation of God and the soul that prepares itself for Him (1^{1,2}; 15¹⁻²); men may be His friends (7²⁷); incorruption brings them near to Him (6¹⁹); He inspires them with right words and thoughts (7^{16,16}).' Where the mediation of *Wisdom* in such cases is asserted, we note that the passages (7²⁸, 9¹⁷) come from the Solomonic chapters, and are therefore not above the suspicion of not forming part of *Wisdom*'s original system.

Finally, Mr. Gregg asserts that 'it is easy and possibly correct to view some of the anthropomorphisms in this book as merely synonyms of *Wisdom* (see 10²⁰, 11^{17,21}, 16¹⁵, 19⁸).' Now it is notorious that *Wisdom* (in any other sense than that of $\phi\beta\sigma\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$) has disappeared altogether from the writer's ideas in the last ten chapters; she is not even mentioned in the form she assumes in the first part of the book;

^{a)} It is more than questionable whether Aristobulus was an Alexandrian writer at all.

^{b)} Bruch, p. 345, cites another passage in which the spirit of God certainly appears as separate. 'To show that God loves (11^{24,26}) all living things, he adduces as a proof (12¹) that the incorruptible spirit of God ($\phi\beta\theta\alpha\rho\tau\sigma\pi\nu\epsilon\mu\alpha$) exists in all. Here the Spirit appears, according to traditional Hebrew ideas, as the general life-principle of nature. Although the writer conceives the *Wisdom* of God as a cosmic principle, there is no passage in his book where he derives physical life from her.'—Contrast Gregg, *Introd.*, p. xl.

^{c)} But God is the $\tau\chi\nu\pi\tau\varsigma$ of the world (13¹) without any interference of *Wisdom*.

and to attempt to reintroduce her thus is not reasonable. Throughout those last chapters the direct fatherhood of God and His direct protection of His children is the governing idea; His only agent is, if Reuss's acute conjecture be right (cf. notes on 18¹⁵), that very 'angel of the Lord' whose appearance in the Old Testament is certainly no proof of a dualistic system.

Against these dogmatic statements we may set the cautious analysis of Bruch, who, recognising the vacillating character of Pseudo-Solomon's ideas, and indeed attributing to him a kind of double consciousness, Hebraic and Hellenic, in which now one and now the other has the upper hand, maintains that he was well on the way to the Philonic idea of God. But that his God is ever transcendent in the sense that Philo's God is, he doubts. Such transcendency implies (1) absence of (moral) qualities, (2) a concealed and impenetrable nature.

Now with regard to the first, the very passages which would appear to be relied upon to prove the transcendency of God (Bruch, p. 351) seem also to imply His moral interference in the affairs of the world. All depends on Him (11²⁶) and not on Wisdom. He is the lord of life and death (16¹⁹), and none can escape His hand (16¹⁶). Before Him the whole world is as a mote in the balance, and a drop of early morning dew (11²²). He is the author of the beauties of that world (13¹⁷). From His immeasurable greatness and strength it follows that none can contend with Him (12¹²). But when we come to the direct attribution of qualities we find no lack of these. The ascription to God of omnipotence, of omniscience, and perfect righteousness we take as natural (Bruch, p. 352). But, moreover, His mercy and long-suffering are strongly insisted upon (11²³, 12¹⁹, 15¹ *sqq.*), and He deliberately compasses the reform of the sinner (11²⁵). His long-suffering and mercy are connected with His omnipotence, inasmuch as He has no one to fear, and can show mercy without danger of misapprehension (11²³, 12^{15,16,18}). He loves all that exists; indeed, love was the principle on which He created (11²⁴). He cannot hate anything that He has made. He is *φιλόψυχος*, on the principle above quoted,^a that His spirit is in all, and He cannot hate that wherein His own spirit dwells.

But further: His moral regulation of the world is quite apart from Wisdom. He cares for all (12¹³). It is He who grants their power to princes (6³), who dare not look Him in the face to defend evil (12¹⁴), but have their sway allowed them in order to fulfil His will (6⁴). The sufferings with which He chastens the righteous, and the judgments which He executes upon the impious, combined with the long-suffering with which He endures their sins—all these measures contemplate the good of man, and form in their entirety one great system of discipline embracing all mankind. After all these instances, it is hardly necessary for Bruch to add that 'in very many passages the action in and control of the world exercised by God is described in a manner

^a We note, however, that Fairweather considers 12¹, 'Thine incorruptible spirit is in all things,' as non-Hebraic, as also 13¹.

which seems to leave no room for any intermediary.' But it will be noticed that whereas he draws his instances almost entirely from the last chapters of 'Wisdom,' those of Mr. Gregg come mainly from the earlier, and especially the 'Solomonic' chapters.

Coming now to the question of the impenetrable and incomprehensible nature of God, which is a necessary part of the Philonian idea, we have abundance of testimony that this was not Pseudo-Solomon's view. Bruch goes further (p. 356), 'It cannot be concluded from his theory of the divine Wisdom that he clearly regarded God as external to the world,' though he was approaching that idea. But what we have to deal with is what he actually says. 'We find in his work no passage in which he expresses himself with any distinctness as to the concealed and incomprehensible nature of God.' It is true that he says (in 9¹⁶—a Solomonic chapter, be it observed), 'Hardly do we divine the things that are on earth, and the things that are close at hand we find with labour; but the things that are in the heavens, who ever yet traced out?' But according to the whole context, the words refer not so much to the nature of God and His properties as to His decrees (vv. 13, 'what man shall know the counsel of God, or who shall conceive what the Lord willeth?' and 17), and that is a commonplace of the prophets of the Old Testament, repeated in the New (Rom. 11¹⁸ *sqq.*). But no one will argue from this that Old or New contains the doctrine of the absolute 'concealment' of God.

On the other hand, passages to the contrary effect are numerous. In chap. 1¹² we have 'in singleness of heart seek ye Him, because He is found of them that tempt Him not.' Contrast with this Philo *De Mon.*, § 5. 'There is nothing better than to seek the true God, *even though it be beyond the power of man to find him.*' So in the famous passage on idolatry in chap. 13, we are plainly told that God can be recognised from nature, and they are worthy of blame who fail so to recognise Him. It is noteworthy that the God whom they ought to recognise is described here and nowhere else as *τὸν ὄντα*—the very phrase which is quoted to prove that Pseudo-Solomon's God is the transcendent and incomprehensible Deity of Philo. Now, Philo himself has several passages (e.g. *De Confus. Ling.*, § 28) in which he speaks of the folly of men in not recognising God from nature; and yet he clings to his theory of the impenetrability and concealment of that God's being and properties.

With regard to the nature of man as conceived by Wisdom, enough has been said in Additional Note A ('On the Pre-existence of the Soul'), but Mr. Gregg is no doubt right when (with Bois) he ascribes the vague language of Pseudo-Solomon to the imperfect notions of personality which existed in his time (*Introd.*, p. xlvi.).

We come now to the question: How far does Wisdom show an improvement on the religious ideas of the Old Testament? And here, as usual, every generalisation is subject to serious qualifications. When, for example, Fairweather, 278a, says, speaking of Pseudo-Solomon's higher conception of God, that 'men please him not by their Judaism but by their purity of life,' he disregards a score of

particularist passages; so thoroughly does virtue seem to depend in many places on the keeping of the ordinances that Bruch (p. 336) even says, 'there arose in him (Pseudo-Solomon) the conviction, which we find also in the Son of Sirach, that the law was a production, a pure reflex, so to speak an embodiment, of the divine Wisdom, and therefore Jewish piety must appear as the true practical Wisdom.' So again, when we are told that God is represented rather as all-wise than all-powerful, we must recognise that this conclusion is founded on the first six chapters; whereas in the last ten the stress is throughout laid on the strong hand of the Almighty. Lastly, Fairweather is assuming a position which is strongly controverted when he declares (283a) that in Wisdom 'the Hebrew *Hokhma* is practically identified not only with the Greek *νοῦς*, but also with the Holy Spirit and with the *Logos*.' This is Bois' opinion, but we have seen that there are some passages which are absolutely incompatible with at least the last identification. Wisdom's development of the doctrine of Sophia is better and more cautiously stated by A. B. Davidson, quoted in the same paragraph (283b). 'If in the Alexandrian Wisdom of Solomon a progress directly in *advance* of what is found in Prov. 8 on the doctrine of Wisdom may be justly contested, there is certainly what may be called a progress *round about*—the ideas about Wisdom are expanded and placed in new lights and made to enter into new relations in such a way that a general approximation to the New Testament doctrine of the *Logos* is the result.'

With regard to anthropomorphic language, we may confidently assert that such as appears in the book is of the merest conventional kind—such as we should use without hesitation, for example, in our hymns, which have far more in common with the lucubrations of Pseudo-Solomon than has any exact theological treatise. The majority of those collected by Bois, p. 228 (10²⁰, 11¹⁸, 16¹⁶, 19⁸), all refer to the 'hand' of God (add 5¹⁶, 7¹⁶). Now it is to be noticed that in Hebrew the expression בַּיִד has already acquired the force of 'by means of,' cf. Lev. 10¹¹; 'The statutes which the Lord hath spoken unto them by the hand of Moses' (*i.e.* through Moses); while in Aramaic it has simply become a periphrasis for the ablative of the instrument. The 'ear' of God is mentioned in 1¹⁰, and in 4¹⁸ we have the conventional expression 'the Lord shall laugh them to scorn.' The description of God's arming for the combat in 5¹⁸ *sqq.*, which is to a great extent an imitation of Isa. 59¹⁷, was accordingly left out in the Targum of Jonathan on the latter passage as too anthropomorphic (Langen, *Judenthum*, p. 205 n. 8). It is well known that the process of omission or smoothing over of such expressions had begun with the Septuagint translations. Not all were removed, however. It was reserved for Philo to complete the revolution. 'He held (Fairweather, 278a) that grief, envy, wrath, revenge, etc., cannot be attributed to God, and that when he is represented as showing such emotions and affections the motives of the divine activity are only being expressed in a way that specially appeals to the human mind.' Unfortunately, with his abandonment of anthropomorphism, Philo practically abandoned every

substantial doctrine of Judaism, and his influence must be counted among the causes which made for apostasy.

Of the disappearance of Messianic hope in Pseudo-Solomon much has been said. While the meaning of 3⁷ remains uncertain, we cannot say that there is no anticipation of an earthly rule of the just hereafter. There is certainly no word of a personal Messiah; but this is compensated for by the unhesitating conviction of the immortality of the soul and its resurrection to eternal life which constitutes 'Wisdom's' claim to everlasting fame. This alone raises him far above all Hebrew thinkers of earlier times.

F

A NEW INTERPRETATION OF PSEUDO-SOLOMON'S IDEA OF WISDOM

In the second section of the Prolegomena to his edition of Wisdom, Cornely has systematised and to a certain extent corroborated the views of those scholars who have doubted whether there was really to be found in 'Wisdom' any advance towards the Philonian doctrine of an intermediary influence between God and man: we may call it either Sophia or Logos.

Heading his section 'Quae Sapientia Commendetur,' the writer endeavours to show that the wisdom of the first nine chapters and of the last ten are identical, and that they really mean no more than obedience to the law of God. This idea had been already adumbrated in chap. 24 of Ecclesiasticus; but there Wisdom is not obedience to the Law but the Law itself personified; and that Law, moreover (24²³), 'the law which Moses commanded us for a heritage unto the assemblies of Jacob.' Pseudo-Solomon, according to Cornely, takes a wider view, and regards the law generally as representing God's good scheme for the right management of the world and the good of mankind. To fall in with and to subserve this scheme is wisdom; to act contrary to it is unwisdom. The souls of the *righteous* are in the hand of God; to them are opposed the *unwise*, in whose sight they seemed to die. The supposed instances of hypostatisation are illegitimate inferences from particular passages, which can as a rule be explained so as to support the general theory just stated.

We must briefly examine the grounds of this theory.

(1) There is no literal identification of wisdom with the law in Pseudo-Solomon's book. Indeed, he never once uses the word *νόμος*^a in the sense of the 'book of the Covenant of the Most High God' as Ben-Sira does. But it is possible for Cornely (p. 18) to argue that the *spirit* of

^a The only instance of the use of the word at all is in 2¹¹, 'let our strength be the law of justice'; whereas in Ecclus. it is used some twenty times in the restricted sense.

the law is inculcated throughout the book. 'Uti libris Moysis, qui corpus Legis quasi constituunt, ipsa praecepta continentur, ita in libris sapientialibus animus et consilium Legis magis exponitur, *i.e.* virtutes commendantur ac vitia vituperantur. Atque eas virtutes sapiens maxime celebrat, quibus homo ad Deum recte disponitur, veluti fidem, spem, caritatem, humilitatem pietatemque in Deum; neque tantum crimina quae societatem impetunt et lege humana puniuntur, sed peccata etiam interna, quae ipsa quoque Deum offendunt et lege divina prohibentur, insectatur. In hac igitur perfecta conformatio ad Legem quae summa perfectio hominis est, sapientia consistit, ita ut cognitione quidem Dei legumque divinarum nitatur, sed operatione, *i.e.* fidei legum observatione, compleatur; id quippe proprium huius sapientiae est; neque enim, qui dumtaxat legem cognoscit, sed qui cognitam exsequitur, perfectus ac sapiens habetur.'^a

Exception may be taken to this statement on the ground that 'faith, hope, and charity' are nowhere very distinctly inculcated by Pseudo-Solomon. It is quite true that he does not lay down any code of ethics as the son of Sirach attempts to do; but much is implied, and that often more negatively than affirmatively; for example, we may take the condemnation of the vices in chap. 2 as implying the commendation of the antithetical virtues. 'Wisdom' is indeed not an ethical book; we may look in vain for a catalogue of moral qualities; yet we do find here and there a distinct statement as to them. Faith is inculcated in 1²; honesty (and probably personal purity) in 1⁴; avoidance of slander in 1¹¹; and *εὐσέβεια*—a very wide term—in 10¹². The rest of the moral qualities appear almost to be forgotten in the great and sweeping denunciations of idolatry in which the book abounds; of duty towards our neighbour we can hardly say that we have any plain declaration.

We are not to forget, however, that our author is not founding a new doctrine of wisdom; he is adapting a traditional view to the circumstances of his own times, and he might very well allege that in the traditional content of Wisdom—traditional and therefore not necessary for him to repeat—were implied, in the canonical scriptures, (a) uprightness, Ps. 37³¹; (b) fear of God, Ps. 111¹⁰, Prov. 9¹⁰, 15³⁰; and (c) avoidance of evil, Job 28²⁸. The general ground—the morality of Wisdom—is, moreover, covered by the single verse 1⁴, on which the apt remark of Estius cited by Cornely is worth quoting: 'Si sapientia non esset aliud quam cognitio nuda rerum divinarum et humanarum, qualis a Platone definita est, posset intrare in malevolam animam: sapientia ergo alia loco intelligenda, scilicet rerum divinarum notitia affectuosa, eamque scriptura sacra tum hic tum alibi commendat.' And St. Augustine sums up this view in four words: 'Hominis sapientia pietas est.'

(2) It will not be exaggerating to say that this explanation of the meaning of Wisdom may be made to cover every allusion to her, direct or indirect, in the first six or ethical chapters of our book; but in the next three or Solomonic chapters we have a different view of wisdom;

^a Cf. also Smend, *Die Weisheit des Jesus Sirach. Prolegg.*, xviii.

the man who possesses her will be skilled in all the knowledge of the time. Here we must fall back upon the larger conception of the law as including all God's provision for the well-being of man; obedience to or concurrence with this law will then include the cultivation of such arts, sciences, and even handicrafts as may contribute to the happiness of mankind. And here again an appeal may be made to the formal attribution of Wisdom (*hokhma*) to the mere artist, as in the canonical scriptures, *e.g.* Ex. 28³, 31⁶, 36¹²; Isa. 3², 40²⁰, Jer. 10¹, 1 Chron. 22¹⁵, 2 Chron. 2^{7,13}, to the interpreter of dreams, Gen. 41⁸, and of hard sayings, Prov. 1⁶. These passages, however, include no reference to the investigator of natural phenomena; but the *hokhma* which in a primitive age (and also, be it remarked, without the slightest indication of personification) is supposed to inspire the mere worker, may, in the natural development of human knowledge, become attributable to the natural philosopher. It must be admitted that the definition of obedience to 'the law' in its wider sense may be made to cover this point also. But this is to attribute to the writer of Wisdom a very deep philosophical conception indeed.^a

(3) With regard to the last ten chapters there can be no difficulty whatever: the Wisdom indicated but never mentioned there can only be obedience to the law; not merely to the general Providence which guides the world by law; not merely even to the Mosaic ordinances, but to one particular and distinctive section of those ordinances—the first two of the Ten Commandments.

Up to this point, therefore, Cornely's theory is perfectly clear, rational, and capable of proof. Pseudo-Solomon's Wisdom is not a person at all but an abstract quality—a few careless and casual expressions notwithstanding. The personification in Prov. 8 stands unsupported, without any appearance of a 'bridge' between it and the arbitrarily-evolved idea of an intermediary influence between God and man as enounced by Philo. The theory has much to be said for it; it is arguable that in Proverbs we have the fresh traces of Persian dualism crudely represented; that this impression died away more and more; that Ecclesiasticus and Wisdom depart further and further from it, and that Philo's idea is merely the revival of a fancy five hundred years old.

Unfortunately, the bent of Roman theology induces Cornely to superimpose upon his clear and well-defined explanation a subsidiary account of that 'divine wisdom' for which his argument has really left no place. He must needs follow St. Thomas Aquinas, who says in the *Summa*, 'Sapientia, qua formaliter sapientes sumus, est participatio quaedam divinae sapientiae, quae est Deus.'

Now this is a distinct thesis and one which can be maintained—wherever 'divina sapientia' is really in question. Bois (*Essai Critique*,

^a Cf. Huxley, quoted by Deane, 'the only medicine for suffering, crime, and all the other woes of mankind, is Wisdom.' If 'Wisdom' be taken to mean obedience to God's direction of the world, we have here the very idea attributed by Cornely to our author.

p. 185 b) had already pointed out that practically every distinctive attribute of God assigned to him in the Sapiential books is also assigned to Wisdom in the same books, and argues therefore that Wisdom (the 'divina sapientia'), as impenetrable and unknowable in reality as God, can be no true or tangible intermediary between God and man. But this is a distinct and irrelevant question. Either the wisdom of the Sapiential books (excluding Proverbs) is a power granted to man by God (and that is Cornely's real theory), or Wisdom is a manifestation of God; God Himself as St. Thomas puts it. Either idea will carry us far in the exegesis of Wisdom and Ecclesiasticus; but the confusion of the two is irrational.

^b Cornely himself has expressed this (pp. 28-29) perhaps more clearly than Bois: 'Si quis hunc Logon philonianum cum divina sapientia nostro. in libro descripta comparare voluerit, sine ullo negotio videbit adversarios nostros a vero longe aberrare. . . . Namque evidens est sapientiam ita describi ut ejusdem numero naturae cum ipso Deo exhibeatur, atque similitudines quoque quibus sapientiae relatio ad Deum illustratur, unitatem naturae perspicue indicent (7.21.25.26, 8.3.4). Profecto creata persona omnium esse artifex, omnia posse, in se permanens omnia innovare, omnes creatos spiritus intime penetrare, omnia a fine usque ad finem fortiter attingere et suaviter disponere nunquam dici potest. Haec et similia soli Deo recte tribuuntur. . . . Porro ea quae legatus jussu regis exsequitur, utrique quidem, nequaquam vero eadem ratione, tribui solent; atqui in libro nostro beneficia populo electo collata eodem prorsus modo nunc sapientiae nunc Deo ita adscribuntur, ut Deus et sapientia eodem in loco et numero ponantur et inter se exaequentur.' . . . He goes on to show that as God governs the world Himself, as He created it (13¹, 11⁴, 14^{3.5}), there is no room for the Philonian Logos and no idea of the Philonian God: 'Qui neque mundum creare neque in eum agere potest, quia timet ne a materia maculetur.'

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

EGYPTIAN DEATH-SONGS

(Quoted by Zenner from Erman, *Aegypten*, ii. 516; cf. also Lenormant, *Hist. Ancienne de l'Orient*, iii. 67.)

The resemblance between the language and sentiments of Wisdom 2¹⁹ and these songs is so striking that they are here quoted in full. The first is 'the Song from the House (Grave) of the late King Entuf (of Thebes),' and runs as follows :—

How well is it with this good king !
(His) good fortune is accomplished.
Bodies go past and others remain behind ;
The gods (*i.e.* kings) which were aforetime
Rest in their pyramids.
They which built houses, whose place is no more,
Thou seest what is become of them.
I heard the words of Genhotep and of Hardadap,
Which both do say in their maxims :
' See those houses, those walls, crumble away ;
Their place is no more,
They are as though they had never been (Wisd. 2^{2b}).
No one comes from thence to tell us what is become of them
(Wisd. 2¹⁴).
To tell us how they fare, to strengthen our heart,
Until ye draw near to the place whither they be gone.
With joyful heart forget not to glorify thyself,
And follow thy heart so long as thou livest (Eccles. xi. 9).
Lay myrrh upon thine head, clothe thyself with fine linen
(Wisd. 2⁷, Eccles. 9⁸).
Anointing thyself with the genuine wonderful things of God.
Deck thyself as fine as thou canst,
And let not thy heart sink.
Follow thine heart and thy joys as long as thou livest on earth
(Eccles. 1¹⁰).
Trouble not thine heart until that day of lamentation come to
thee.
Yet he whose heart standeth still heareth not your complaint,
And whoso lieth in the grave assumeth not your mourning.
With beaming face celebrate a joyful day,
And rest not on it.
For no man taketh his goods with him
Yea, no one returneth again that is gone.'

The second song is a later version ; ' that which the harper sang at the Death-Feast of the Priest Neferhotep.' It runs as follows :—

How quiet is this young prince !
 (His) good fortune is begun.
 Since the time of the Ra bodies pass away
 And younger men come in their places.
 The sun sheweth itself every morning (Eccles. 1⁶),
 And the evening sun sinketh in the west.
 Men beget, women conceive,
 All noses inhale the airs of the morning.
 But they that are born all together
 They go to the place which is determined for them.
 Celebrate a joyful day, O priest,
 Provide ointments and perfumes for thy nose (Wisd. 2^{7a})
 Crowns of flowers for thy limbs (Wisd. 2⁸),
 For the body of thy sister who dwelleth in thy heart
 Who sitteth by thee.
 Let them sing and play before thee
 Cast all care behind thee and think of joy.
 Till that day come on which one goeth to the land which loveth
 silence,
 Celebrate a joyful day, O Neferhotep,
 Wise man, with clean hands.
 I heard all that happened to our forefathers.
 Their walls crumble away
 Their place is no more,
 They are as though they had never been (Wisd. 2^{2b}).

Cheyne, *Job and Solomon*, pp. 269-270, deals with these songs. He thinks the resemblances merely fortuitous, and they possibly are, though they are less likely to be so in the case of Wisdom than in that of Koheleth, of whom he is speaking.

APPENDIX B

PASSAGES OF ENOCH BEARING ON CHAP. 2, ETC., OF WISDOM

Enoch 102^a. ' Fear ye not, ye souls of the righteous, and be ye full of hope that die in righteousness. ⁵. Grieve not if your soul go down to Sheol in great tribulation, in lamentation, sighing and trouble, and your body attained not to your lifetime^a which corresponded to your worth, but now (dies) on a day on which ye became like the sinners and on the day of curse and chastisement. ⁶. If ye die the sinners say over you : as we die so die the righteous.^b What profit have they of their deeds ? ⁷. Behold, as we die, so die they in trouble and darkness. What is their

^a Wisd. 4^{7-9, 16} and especially ¹³ (of Enoch), ' being made perfect in a little while, he fulfilled long years.'

^b Wisd. 2¹ *sqq.*, 3² *sqq.*, 5³ *sqq.*, esp. ⁴, ' We fools accounted his life madness and his end without honour.' Cf. also Eccles. 2¹⁴⁻¹⁶, 3¹⁹⁻²¹, 9³⁻⁶.

advantage over us ? Henceforward we are equal. ⁸ What will they receive and behold in eternity ? For behold they too are dead and from henceforward behold the light no more for ever. ⁹ I tell you, ye sinners, ye be content to eat and to drink, to strip men naked and to plunder them, to sin, to get wealth, and to see luxurious days. ¹⁰ Have ye indeed seen, how the end of the righteous was peace ? ^a For no manner of violence was found in them till the day of their death.'

Then follows apparently another reproach of the wicked.

¹¹ 'They perished and became as though they had never been, and went down to Sheol in tribulation.'

The resemblances to 'Wisdom' are here numerous.

Enoch 103 ⁹⁻¹⁵.

⁹ 'Say not of the righteous and good that have lived : in the days of their life they tormented themselves with their wearisome work and endured all manner of trouble. They were met by many evils and had to suffer from sickness, and they pined away and became weak in spirit. ¹⁰ They were despised, and there was no man that helped them in word or deed. They had no power to attain even the least of things. They were tortured and destroyed, and hoped not to see life from one day to another. ¹¹ They hoped to be the head and became the tail ; they plagued themselves with labours and got no reward for their toils. They became food for sinners, and the unrighteous made their yoke heavy upon them. ¹² They that hated and smote them gained the mastery over them ; to them that hated them they bowed the back and they had no pity on them. ¹³ They sought to escape them, to find safety, and to be at rest, but they found no place to flee unto and save themselves from them. ¹⁴ In their distress they brought complaint of them to the rulers, and cried against them that devoured them ; but they heeded not their outcry and would not listen to their voice. ¹⁵ They helped them that plundered them, and devoured them and punished them ; they concealed their violence and removed not from them their yoke, that devoured and dispersed and slew them. They concealed their murder, and thought not thereon that they had raised their hands against them.'

The resemblance here is more general than particular, the passages illustrated being Wisd. 2 ¹³⁻²⁰, the claims of the righteous man and the manner of his oppression ; and 5 ¹⁻⁶, the recognition by the ungodly of their own false estimate of the righteous and his position.

It is generally understood that the persecutions of the Chasidim are here alluded to (Heb. 11 ³³⁻⁴⁰). It is quite possible that Wisdom also refers to them.

^a Wisd. 3 ³.

APPENDIX C

THE SYRIAC HEXAPLAR

The following are the principal readings favoured, where variants exist, by this version, according to Feldmann, *Texthkritische Materialien zum Buch der Weisheit*, Freiburg, 1902, as given by Cornely:—

I² τοῖς μὴ πιστεύονσιν αὐτῷ *v.l.* τοῖς μὴ ἀπιστοῦσιν αὐτῷ (Swete).
 I⁵ πνεῦμα παιδείας *v.l.* πνεῦμα σοφίας (Γ^A).
 I⁶ πνεῦμα σοφία *v.l.* πνεῦμα σοφίας (Γ^A).
 4¹⁶ δίκαιος καμών *v.l.* δίκαιος θανών (Γ^A, etc.).
 8⁸ τὰ μέλλοντα εἰκάζει *v.l.* τὰ μέλλοντα εἰκάζειν (Swete).
 10⁵ ἔγνω τὸν δίκαιον *v.l.* ἔρεν τὸν δίκαιον (Swete).
 10⁶ ἐξ ἀπολλυμένων ἀσεβῶν *v.l.* ἐξαπολλυμένων ἀσεβῶν (Swete).
 10⁷ ἡς ἔτι μαρτύριον *v.l.* οἵς ἔπι μαρτύριον (Sixtine Edition).
 11⁶ ταραχθέντος *v.l.* ταραχθέντες (Swete).
 11⁹ μετ' ὄργῆς *v.l.* ἐν ὄργῃ (Swete).
 11¹⁶ διὰ τούτων καὶ κολάζεται *v.l.* διὰ τούτων κολάζεται (Swete).
 12²⁰ χρόνους καὶ τόπον *v.l.* χρόνον καὶ τόπον (Γ^A).
 12²³ ἀδίκως *v.l.* ἀδίκους (Swete).
 13³ ταῦτα θεοὺς ὑπελάμβανον *v.l.* θεοὺς ὑπελάμβανον (Swete).
 13⁵ ἐκ γὰρ μεγέθους καὶ καλλονῆς κτισμάτων *v.l.* ἐκ γὰρ μεγέθους καλλονῆς καὶ κτισμάτων (Swete).
 13¹⁰ ἐμμελετήματα *v.l.* ἐμμελέτημα (Swete).
 13¹³ ἐμπειρίᾳ ἀνέστεως *v.l.* ἐμπειρίᾳ συνέστεως (Γ^{B2N2}).
 14¹ τοῦ φέροντος αὐτὸν πλοίου *v.l.* τοῦ φέροντος αὐτὸν ἔύλου (Γ^A).
 14² τεχνίτις σόφια *v.l.* τεχνίτης σόφια (Sixtine Edition).
 14⁴ κἄν *v.l.* ἵνα κἄν (Swete).
 14¹⁴ κενοδοξία *v.l.* κενοδοξίᾳ (Swete).
 15² οὐχ ἀμαρτησόμεθα εἰδότες, ὅτι σοι λελογίσμεθα *v.l.* οὐχ ἀμαρτησόμεθα, εἰδότες ὅτι σοι λελογίσμεθα (Swete).
 15⁵ ἄφρονι *v.l.* ἄφροσι (Swete).
 15⁵ εἰς ὅρεξιν *v.l.* εἰς ὄνειδος (Swete).
 15¹² φησιν *v.l.* φασιν (Γ^{AC}).
 15¹⁴ πάντως δὲ ἀφρονέστατοι *v.l.* πάντες (πάντων, Γ^{AC}) δὲ ἀφρονέστατοι (Swete).
 15¹⁶ ὅτι καὶ πάντα *v.l.* ὅτι πάντα (Γ^{AC}).
 15¹⁸ ἀνοίᾳ γὰρ συγκρινόμενα κτλ. (cf. notes *ad loc.*).

16³ διὰ τὴν εἰδεχθείαν *v.l.* διὰ τὴν δειχθεῖσαν (ὅρεξιν) (Swete).
 16³ αὐτοὶ δέ *v.l.* οὗτοι δέ (Σ^{AC}).
 16²⁰ παρέσχες *v.l.* ἔπειμψας (Swete).
 16²⁰ πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρμονίαν γεῦσιν (sc. ἴσχύοντα) *v.l.* πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρμόνιον γεῦσιν (Swete).
 17⁹ ταραχῶδες *v.l.* τερατῶδες (Σ^N).
 17¹⁵ ἐπεχύθη *v.l.* ἐπῆλθεν (Swete).
 18¹ ὅ τι μὲν οὖν *v.l.* ὅτι μὲν οὐ (Σ^A).
 18⁸ φῶνας γάρ *v.l.* ὡς γάρ (Swete).
 18⁹ τὸν τῆς ὀσιότητος νόμον *v.l.* τὸν τῆς θειότητος νόμον (Swete).
 18⁹ προαναμέλποντες *v.l.* προαναμελπόντων (Swete).
 18²⁰ Insertion of τότε in line 1, with Σ^N.
 18²⁰ ἡ ὀργή σου *v.l.* ἡ ὀργή (Swete).
 18²⁴ κόσμος with the simple meaning of 'ornament,' cf. notes *ad loc.*
 18²⁵ ἐφοβήθη *v.l.* ἐφοβήθησαν (Swete).
 19² ἐπιστρέψαντες *v.l.* ἐπιτρέψαντες (Σ^A, etc.).
 19⁵ πειράσῃ *v.l.* περάσῃ (Σ^A, etc.).
 19⁶ ταῖς σαῖς ἐπιταγαῖς *v.l.* ταῖς ἴδιαις ἐπιταγαῖς (Swete).
 19⁷ καὶ ἐξ ἐρυθρᾶς θαλάσσης *v.l.* omits καὶ (Swete).
 19¹³ προγεγονότων *v.l.* γεγονότων (Swete).
 19²⁰ σβεστικῆς φύσεως *v.l.* σβεστικῆς δυνάμεως (Swete).
 19²¹ οὐδὲ ἔτηκον *v.l.* οὐδὲ τητκόν (Swete).

Some of these readings have already been mentioned in the Notes, and others are necessarily conjectural; for it is difficult in many cases to be sure of what a translator writing in Syriac really found in his Greek original.

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